THE

WORKS

OF

J. J. ROUSSEAU.

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This VOLUME contains,

A Treatiſe on the Social Compact; or the Principles of Politic Law.

A Project for Perpetual Peace.

An Expoſtulatory Letter from J. J. Rouſſeau to Chriſtopher de Beaumont archbiſhop of Paris. To which is prefixed the Mandate of the ſaid prelate, and alſo the proceedings of the parliament of Paris, relative to the new treatiſe on education entitled EMILIUS.

Anecdotes relative to the perſecution of Mr J. J. Rouſſeau; contained in a letter from a gentleman at Neufchatel to his friend.

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A

TREATISE

ON THE

SOCIAL COMPACT;

OR,

The PRINCIPLES of

POLITICAL LAW.

———*Fœder is æquas*
Dicamus leges. Æneid. xi.

BOOK I.

INTRODUCTION.

MY deſign, in the preſent Treatiſe, is to inquire, Whether the nature of ſociety admits of any fixed and equitable rules of government, ſuppoſing mankind to be ſuch as they are, and their laws ſuch as they might be made. In this inveſtigation I ſhall endeavour conſtantly to join the conſiderations of natural right and public intereſt, ſo that juſtice and utility may never be diſunited.

This being premiſed, I ſhall enter on my ſubject, without expatiating on its importance. If it be aſked, Whether I am a prince or legiſlator, that I thus take upon me to write on politics?

litics? I anſwer, I am neither; and that it is for this reaſon I write. Were I a prince or legiſlator, I would not throw away my time in pointing out what ought to be done; I would myſelf put it in practice, or be ſilent.

As the citizen of a free ſtate, and a member of the ſupreme power by birth, however weak may be the influence of my ſingle vote in public affairs, the right of giving that vote is ſufficient to impoſe on me the duty of making thoſe affairs my ſtudy; thinking myſelf happy, in diſcuſſing the various forms of government, to find every day new reaſons for admiring that of my own country *!

CHAP. I. *The ſubject of the firſt Book.*

MAN is born free, and yet is univerſally enſlaved. At the ſame time an individual frequently conceives himſelf to be the lord and maſter over others, though only more eminently deprived of liberty. Whence can this change ariſe? Are there any means by which it may be rendered lawful? The former queſtion I cannot anſwer, tho' I imagine myſelf capable of reſolving the latter.

If I took into conſideration only the exiſtence and effects of power, I ſhould ſay, So long as a people are compelled to obey, they do well to be obedient; but, as ſoon as they are in a capacity to reſiſt, they do better to throw off the yoke of reſtraint: for, in recovering their liberty on the ſame plea by which they loſt it, either they have a juſt right to reaſſume it, or thoſe could have none who deprived them of it. But there

* Geneva.

there is an inviolable right founded on the very nature of ſociety, which ſerves as the baſis of all others. Man doth not derive this right, however, immediately from nature; it is founded on mutual convention. We muſt proceed, then, to inquire, of what kind ſuch convention muſt have been. But, before we come to argue this point, I ſhould eſtabliſh what I have already advanced.

Chap. II. *On the primitive ſtate of ſociety.*

THE moſt ancient of all ſocieties, and the only natural one, is that of a family. And even in this, children are no longer connected with their father than while they ſtand in need of his aſſiſtance. When this becomes needleſs, the natural tie is of courſe diſſolved; the children are exempted from the obedience they owe their father, and the father is equally ſo from the ſolicitude due from him to his children; both aſſume a ſtate of independence reſpecting each other. They may continue, indeed, to live together afterwards; but their connection, in ſuch a caſe, is no longer natural, but voluntary; and even the family union is then maintained by mutual convention.

This liberty, which is common to all mankind, is the neceſſary conſequence of our very nature; whoſe firſt law being that of ſelf-preſervation, our principal concerns are thoſe which relate to ourſelves: no ſooner, therefore, doth man arrive at years of diſcretion, than he becomes the only proper judge of the means of that preſervation, and of courſe his own maſter.

In a family, then, we may ſee the firſt model

of political ſocieties: their chief is repreſented by the father, and the people by his children, while all of them being free, and equal by birth, they cannot alienate their liberty, but for their common intereſt. All the difference between a family and a ſtate lies in this, That, in the former, the love which a father naturally bears to his children is a compenſation for his ſolicitude concerning them; and, in the latter, it is the pleaſure of command that ſupplies the place of this love, which a chief doth not entertain for his people.

Grotius denies that government is inveſted with power ſolely for the benefit of thoſe who are governed, and cites the caſe of ſlaves as an example. It is, indeed, his conſtant practice to eſtabliſh the matter of right on the matter of fact *. He might have employed a more concluſive method, though not a more favourable one for tyrannical governments.

It is then doubtful, according to Grotius, whether the whole race of mankind, except about an hundred individuals, belong to thoſe individuals, or whether the latter belong to the whole race of mankind; and he appears, throughout his whole work, to lean to the former opinion. This is alſo the opinion of Hobbes. Thus they divide the human ſpecies into herds of cattle; each of which hath its keeper, who protects it from others only that he may make a property of it himſelf.

As

* "The learned reſearches into the laws of nature and nations are of nothing more than the hiſtory of ancient abuſes; ſo that it is a ridiculous infatuation to be too fond of ſtudying them." *Manuſcript Treatiſe on the Intereſts of France, by the Marquis d'A.* This was exactly the caſe with Grotius.

As a ſhepherd is of a ſuperior nature to his flock; ſo the herd-keepers of men, or their chiefs, are of a ſuperior nature to the herd over which they preſide. Such was the reaſoning, according to Philo, of the Emperor Caligula; who concluded logically enough from this analogy, that either kings were gods, or their ſubjects no better than brutes.

This argument of Caligula bears much reſemblance to thoſe of Hobbes and Grotius. Ariſtotle had ſaid, indeed, before either of them, that men were not naturally equal; but that ſome of them were born to ſlavery, and others to dominion.

Ariſtotle was right as to the fact, but miſtook the effect for the cauſe. Nothing is more certain, than that every man born in ſlavery is born to be a ſlave. In ſuch a ſtate, men loſe even the deſire of freedom; and prefer ſubjection, as the companions of Ulyſſes did their brutality *. If there are any ſlaves, therefore, by nature, it is becauſe they are ſlaves contrary to nature. Power firſt made ſlaves, and cowardiice hath perpetuated them.

I have ſaid nothing of king Adam, or the emperor Noah, father of three monarchs, who, like the children of Saturn, as ſome have imagined them to be, divided the world among them. I hope my moderation alſo in this reſpect will be eſteemed ſome merit; for, as I am deſcended in a right line from one of theſe princes, and probably from the eldeſt branch of the family, how do I know, that, by a regular deduction of my deſcent, I might not find myſelf the legiti-

* See a little tract written by Plutarch, on the rationality of brutes.

mate heir to univerſal monarchy? Be this, however, as it may, it cannot be denied, that Adam had as good a title to the ſovereignty of the world when he was the only perſon in it, as Robinſon Cruſoe had to that of his iſland under the ſame circumſtances. A very great conveniency alſo attended their government, in that the monarch might reſt ſecurely on his throne, without fear of wars, conſpiracies, or rebellion.

CHAP. III. *On the right of the ſtrongeſt.*

THE ſtrongeſt is not ſtrong enough to continue always maſter, unleſs he transforms his power into a right of command, and obedience into a duty. Hence is deduced the right of the ſtrongeſt; a right taken ironically in appearance, and laid down as an eſtabliſhed principle in reality. But will this term never be rightly explained? Force, in the ſimpleſt ſenſe, is a phyſical power; nor can I ſee what morality can reſult from its effects. To yield to ſuperior force is an act of neceſſity, not of the will; at moſt it is but an act of prudence. And in what ſenſe can this be called a duty?

Let us ſuppoſe, however, for a moment, this pretended right eſtabliſhed, and we ſhall ſee it attended with inexplicable abſurdities: for, if it be admitted that power conſtitutes right, the effect changes with the cauſe, and every ſucceeding power, if greater than the former, ſucceeds alſo to the right; ſo that men may lawfully diſobey, as ſoon as they can do it with impunity; and, as right is always on the ſtrongeſt ſide, they have nothing more to do, than to acquire

ſupe-

ſuperior force. Now what kind of right can that be, which vaniſhes with the power of enforcing it? If obedience be only exacted by compulſion, there is no need to make ſuch obedience a duty; as when we are no longer compelled to obey, we are no longer obliged to it. It appears, therefore, that the word *right* adds nothing in this caſe to that of force, and in fact is a term of no ſignification.

Be obedient to the higher powers. If by this precept is meant, *ſubject to a ſuperior force*, the advice is good, though ſuperfluous; I will anſwer for it, ſuch a rule will never be broken. All power, I own, is derived from God; but every corporeal malady is derived alſo from the ſame ſource. But are we therefore forbid to call in the phyſician? If a robber ſhould ſtop me on the highway, am I not only obliged, on compulſion, to give him my purſe, but am I alſo obliged to it in point of conſcience, tho' I might poſſibly conceal it from him? This will hardly be averred; and yet the piſtol he holds to my breaſt is in effect a ſuperior force.

On the whole, we muſt conclude, then, that mere power doth not conſtitute right, and that men are obliged only to pay obedience to lawful authority. Thus we are conſtantly recurring to my firſt queſtion.

CHAP. IV. *On ſlavery.*

AS no man hath any natural authority over the reſt of his ſpecies, and as power doth not confer right, the baſis of all lawful authority is laid in mutual convention.

If an individual, ſays Grotius, can alienate his

his liberty, and become the ſlave of a maſter, why may not a whole people collectively alienate theirs, and become ſubject to a king? This propoſition, however, contains ſome equivocal terms, which require explanation; but I ſhall confine myſelf to that of *alienate*. Whatever is alienated muſt be diſpoſed of, either by gift or ſale. Now a man who becomes the ſlave of another, doth not give himſelf away; but ſells himſelf, at leaſt for his ſubſiſtence. But why ſhould a whole people ſell themſelves? So far is a king from furniſhing his ſubjects ſubſiſtence, that they maintain him; and, as our friend Rabelais ſays, a king doth not live on a little. Can ſubjects be ſuppoſed to give away their liberty, on condition that the receiver ſhall take their property along with it? After this, I really cannot ſee any thing they have left.

It may be ſaid, a monarch maintains among his ſubjects the public tranquillity. Be it ſo; I would be glad to know of what they are gainers, if the wars in which his ambition engages them, if his inſatiable avarice, or the oppreſſions of his miniſters, are more deſtructive than civil diſſenſions? Of what are they gainers, if even this tranquillity be one cauſe of their miſery? A priſoner may live tranquil enough in his dungeon; but will this be ſufficient to make him contented there? When the Greeks were ſhut up in the cave of the Cyclops, they lived there unmoleſted, in expectation of their turn to be devoured.

To ſay that a man can give himſelf away, is to talk unintelligibly and abſurdly; ſuch an act muſt neceſſarily be illegal and void, were it for no other reaſon than that it argues inſanity

of

of mind in the agent. To ſay the ſame thing of a whole people therefore, is to ſuppoſe a whole nation can be at once out of their ſenſes; but were it ſo, ſuch madneſs could not confer right.

Were it poſſible alſo for a man to alienate himſelf, he could not in the ſame manner diſpoſe of his children, who, as human beings, are born free; their freedom is their own, and nobody hath any right to diſpoſe of it but themſelves. Before they arrive at years of diſcretion, indeed, their father may, for their ſecurity, and in their name, ſtipulate the conditions of their preſervation; but he cannot unconditionally and irrevocably diſpoſe of their perſons; ſuch a gift being contrary to the intention of nature, and exceeding the bounds of paternal authority. It is requiſite, therefore, in order to render an arbitrary government lawful, that every new generation ſhould be at liberty to admit or reject its authority, in which caſe it would be no longer an arbitrary government.

To renounce one's natural liberty, is to renounce one's very being as a man; it is to renounce not only the rights, but even the duties, of humanity. And what poſſible indemnification can be made the man who thus gives up his all? Such a renunciation is incompatible with our very nature; for to deprive us of the liberty of the will, is to take away all morality from our actions. In a word, a convention, which ſtipulates on the one part abſolute authority, and on the other implicit obedience, is in itſelf futile and contradictory. Is it not evident, that we can lie under no reciprocal obligation whatever to a perſon of whom we have a right to demand every thing? and doth not this circumſtance, a-

gainſt

gainſt which he has no equivalent, neceſſarily infer ſuch act of convention to be void? For what claim can my ſlave have upon me, when he himſelf, and all that belongs to him, are mine? His claims are of courſe my own; and to ſay thoſe can be ſet up againſt me, is to talk abſurdly.

Again, Grotius and others have deduced the origin of this pretended right from the ſuperiority obtained in war. The conqueror, ſay they, having a right to put the vanquiſhed to death, the latter may equitably purchaſe his life at the expence of his liberty; ſuch an agreement being the more lawful, as it conduces to the mutual advantage of both parties.

It is clear and certain, however, that this pretended right of the victor over the lives of the vanquiſhed is not, in any ſhape, the natural reſult of a ſtate of war. This is plain, were it for no other reaſon than that the reciprocal relations of mankind, while living together in their primitive independence, were not ſufficiently durable to conſtitute a ſtate either of peace or war; ſo that men cannot be naturally enemies. It is the relation ſubſiſting between things, and not between men, that gives riſe to war; which ariſing thus, not from perſonal, but real, relations, cannot ſubſiſt between man and man, either in a ſtate of nature, in which there is no ſettled property, or in a ſtate of ſociety, in which every thing is ſecured by the laws.

The quarrels, encounters, and duels of individuals, are not ſufficient to conſtitute ſuch a ſtate of war; and, with regard to the particular combats authoriſed by the inſtitutions of Lewis XI. king of France; they were only ſome of the abuſes of the feudal government; a ſyſtem truly

abſurd

abſurd, as contrary to the principles of natural juſtice as of good policy.

War is not, therefore, any relation between man and man, but a relation between ſtate and ſtate; in which individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men, or even as citizens, but as ſoldiers; not as members of their particular community, but as its defenders. In ſhort, a ſtate can have for its enemy nothing but a ſtate, not men; as between things eſſentially different there can be no common relation.

This principle is, indeed, conformable to the eſtabliſhed maxims of all ages, and the conſtant practice of every civilized people. Declarations of war are made leſs to give notice to ſovereigns, than to their ſubjects.

The foreigner, whether a ſovereign, an individual, or a people, who plunders, kills, or takes priſoner a ſubject, without declaring war againſt his prince, is not an enemy, but a robber. Even in a time of war, a juſt prince may make himſelf maſter, in an enemy's country, of whatever belongs to the public; but he will reſpect the perſons and private properties of individuals, he will reſpect thoſe rights on which his own are founded. The deſign of war being the deſtruction of an hoſtile ſtate, we have a right to kill its defenders while they are in arms; but as, in laying down their arms, they ceaſe to be enemies, or inſtruments of hoſtility, they become in that caſe mere men, and we have not the leaſt right to murder them. It is ſometimes poſſible effectually to deſtroy a ſtate, without killing even one of its members; now, war cannot confer any right or privilege, which is not neceſſary to accompliſh its end and deſign. It is true,

true, theſe are not the principles of Grotius, nor are they founded on the authority of the poets; but they are ſuch as are deduced from the nature of things, and are founded on reaſon.

With regard to the right of conqueſt, it has no other foundation than that of force, the law of the ſtrongeſt. But, if war doth not give the victor a right to maſſacre the vanquiſhed, this pretended right, which does not exiſt, cannot be the foundation of a right to enſlave them. If we have no right to kill an enemy unleſs we cannot by force reduce him to ſlavery, our right to make him a ſlave never can be founded on our right to kill him. It is, therefore, an iniquitous bargain, to make him purchaſe, at the expence of liberty, a life, which we have no right to take away. In eſtabliſhing thus a right of life and death over others, on that of enſlaving them; and, on the other hand, a right of enſlaving them on that of life and death; we certainly fall into the abſurdity of reaſoning in a circle.

Let us ſuppoſe, however, that this ſhocking right of general maſſacre exiſted, I ſtill affirm, that a ſlave, made ſo by the fortune of war, or a conquered people, ſo reduced to ſlavery, lie under no other obligations to their maſter, than to obey him ſo long as he hath the power to compel them to it. In accepting of an equivalent for their lives, the victor confers on them no favour; inſtead of killing them uſeleſsly, he hath only varied the mode of their deſtruction to his own advantage. So far, therefore, from his having acquired over them any additional authority, the ſtate of war ſubſiſts between them as before; their relation to each other is the evident effect of it, and his exertion of the rights

as

of war is a proof, that no treaty of peace hath ſucceeded. Will it be ſaid, they have made a convention? Be it ſo: this convention is a mere truce; and is ſo far from putting an end to the ſtate of war, that it neceſſarily implies its continuation.

Thus, in whatever light we conſider this affair, the right of making men ſlaves is null and void, not only becauſe it is unjuſt, but becauſe it is abſurd and inſignificant. The terms *ſlavery* and *juſtice* are contradictory, and reciprocally excluſive of each other. Hence the following propoſal would be equally ridiculous, whether made by one individual to another, or by a private man to a whole people. *I enter into an agreement with you, altogether at your own charge, and ſolely for my profit, which I will obſerve as long as I pleaſe, and which you are to obſerve alſo as long as I think proper.*

CHAP. V. *On the neceſſity of recurring always to the primitive convention.*

ON the ſuppoſition that I ſhould grant to be true what I have hitherto diſproved, the advocate for deſpotiſm would, however, profit but little. There will be always a great difference between ſubjecting a multitude, and governing a ſociety. Let individuals, in any number whatever, become ſeverally and ſucceſſively ſubject to one man, they are all, in that caſe, nothing more than maſter and ſlaves; they are not a people governed by their chiefs; they are an aggregate if you will, but do not form an aſſociation; there ſubſiſts among them neither commonwealth nor body-politic. Such a ſuperior,

though he ſhould become the maſter of half the world, would be ſtill a private perſon, and his intereſt, ſeparate and diſtinct from that of his people, would be ſtill no more than a private intereſt. When ſuch a perſon dies, alſo, the empire over which he preſided is diſſolved, and its component parts remain totally unconnected, juſt as an oak falls into a heap of aſhes when it is conſumed by the fire.

A perſon, ſays Grotius, may voluntarily beſtow themſelves on a king: according to Grotius, therefore, a people are a people before they thus give themſelves up to regal authority. Even this gift, however, is an act of ſociety, and preſuppoſes a public deliberation on the matter. Hence, before we examine into the act by which a people make choice of a king, it is proper to examine into that by which a people became a people; for on this, which is neceſſarily prior to the other, reſts the true foundation of ſociety.

For, if in fact there be no prior convention, whence ariſes (unleſs indeed the election was unanimous) the obligation of the ſmaller number to ſubmit to the choice of the greater? and whence comes it, that an hundred perſons, for inſtance, who might deſire to have a maſter, had a right to vote for ten others who might deſire to have none? The choice by a plurality of votes is itſelf an eſtabliſhment of convention, and ſuppoſes that unanimity muſt at leaſt for once have ſubſiſted among them.

Chap. VI. *On the ſocial pact or covenant.*

I Suppoſe mankind arrived at that term when the obſtacles to their preſervation, in a ſtate of

of nature, prevail over the endeavours of individuals to maintain themſelves in ſuch a ſtate. At ſuch a criſis this primitive ſtate therefore could no longer ſubſiſt, and the human race muſt have periſhed if they had not changed their manner of living.

Now as men cannot create new powers, but only compound and direct thoſe which really exiſt, they have no other means of preſervation, than that of forming, by their union, an accumulation of forces ſufficient to oppoſe the obſtacles to their ſecurity, and of putting theſe in action by a firſt mover capable of making them act in concert with each other.

This general accumulation of power cannot ariſe but from the concurrence of many particular forces; but the force and liberty of each individual being the principal inſtruments of his own preſervation, how is he to engage them in the common intereſt, without hurting his own, and neglecting the obligations he lies under to himſelf? This difficulty, being applied to my preſent ſubject, may be expreſſed in the following terms:

"To find that form of aſſociation which ſhall protect and defend, with the whole force of the community, the perſon and property of each individual; and in which each perſon, by uniting himſelf to the reſt, ſhall nevertheleſs be obedient only to himſelf, and remain as fully at liberty as before." Such is the fundamental problem, of which the Social Compact gives the ſolution.

The clauſes of this compact are ſo preciſely determined by the nature of the act, that the leaſt reſtriction or modification renders them void

and of no effect; in ſo much, that although they may perhaps never have been formally promulgated, they are yet univerſally the ſame, and are every where tacitly acknowledged and received. When the ſocial pact, however, is violated, individuals recover their natural liberty, and are re-inveſted with their original rights, by loſing that conventional liberty for the ſake of which they had renounced them.

Again; theſe clauſes, well underſtood, are all reducible to one, *viz.* the total alienation of every individual, with all his rights and privileges, to the whole community. For, in the firſt place, as every one gives himſelf up entirely and without reſerve, all are in the ſame circumſtances, ſo that no one can be intereſted in making their common connection burdenſome to others.

Beſides, as the alienation is made without reſerve, the union is as perfect as poſſible, nor hath any particular aſſociate any thing to reclaim; whereas, if they ſhould ſeverally retain any peculiar privileges, there being no common umpire to determine between them and the public, each being his own judge in ſome caſes, would in time pretend to be ſo in all, the ſtate of nature would ſtill ſubſiſt, and their aſſociation would neceſſarily become tyrannical or void.

In fine, the individual, by giving himſelf up to all, gives himſelf to none; and, as he acquires the ſame right over every other perſon in the community, as he gives them over himſelf, he gains an equivalent for what he beſtows, and ſtill a greater power to preſerve what he retains.

If therefore we take from the Social Compact every thing that is not eſſential to it, we ſhall find it reduced to the following terms:

"We,

"We, the contracting parties, do jointly and ſeverally ſubmit our perſons and abilities to the ſupreme direction of the general will of all; and in a collective body, receive each member into that body as an indiviſible part of the whole."

This act of aſſociation accordingly converts the ſeveral individual contracting parties into one moral collective body, compoſed of as many members as there are votes in the aſſembly, which receives alſo from the ſame act its unity and exiſtence. This public perſonage, which is thus formed by the union of all its members, uſed formerly to be denominated a CITY *, and at preſent takes the name of a *republic* or *body-politic*. It is alſo called, by its ſeveral members, a *ſtate*, when it is paſſive; the *ſovereign*, when it is active; and ſimply a *power*, when it is com-

* The true ſenſe of this word is almoſt entirely perverted among the moderns; moſt people take a town for a city, and an houſe-keeper for a citizen. Such are ignorant, however, that though houſes may form a town, it is the citizens only that conſtitute a city. This ſame error formerly coſt the Carthaginians very dear. I do not remember, in the courſe of my reading, to have ever found the title of *Cives* given to the ſubjects of a prince, not even formerly to the Macedonians, nor, in our times, to the Engliſh, though more nearly bordering on liberty than any other nation. The French are the only people who familiarly take on themſelves the name of *citizens*, becauſe they have no juſt idea of its meaning, as may be ſeen in their dictionaries; for, were it otherwiſe, indeed, they would be guilty of high treaſon in aſſuming it. This term is with them rather expreſſive of a virtue than a privilege. Hence, when Bodin ſpoke of the citizens and inhabitants of Geneva, he committed a wretched blunder in miſtaking one for the other. Mr d'Alembert indeed has avoided this miſtake in the Encyclopœdia, where he has properly diſtinguiſhed the four orders of people (and even five, reckoning mere ſtrangers) that are found in our city, and of which two only compoſe the republic: No other French author that I know of hath ever comprehended the meaning of the word *citizen*.

compared with other bodies of the ſame nature. With regard to the aſſociates themſelves, they take collectively the name of the *people;* and are ſeparately called *citizens*, as partaking of the ſovereign authority; and *ſubjects*, as ſubjected to the laws of the ſtate. Theſe terms, indeed, are frequently confounded, and miſtaken one for the other; it is ſufficient, however, to be able to diſtinguiſh them when they are to be uſed with preciſion.

Chap. VII. *Of the ſovereign.*

IT is plain from the above formula, that the act of aſſociation includes a reciprocal engagement between particulars and the public; and that each individual, in contracting, if I may ſo ſay, with himſelf, is laid under a twofold engagement, *viz.* as a member of the ſovereignty towards particular perſons, and as a member of the ſtate toward the ſovereign. That maxim of the civil law, however, is inapplicable here, which ſays, that no one is bound by the enagements he enters into with himſelf; for there is a wide difference between entering into a perſonal obligation with one's ſelf, and with a whole, of which one may conſtitute a part.

It is farther to be obſerved, that the public determination, which is obligatory on the ſubject with regard to the ſovereign, on account of the twofold relation by which each ſtands contracted, is not, for the contrary reaſon, obligatory on the ſupreme power towards itſelf; and that it is conſequently inconſiſtent with the nature of the body-politic, that ſuch ſupreme power ſhould impoſe a law, which it cannot break.

For,

For, as the ſovereign ſtands only in a ſingle relation, it is in the ſame caſe as that of an individual contracting with himſelf; whence it is plain, that there neither is, nor can be, any fundamental law obligatory on the whole body of a people, even the Social Compact itſelf not being ſuch. By this, however, it is not meant, that ſuch a body cannot enter into engagements with others, in matters that do not derogate from this contract; for, with reſpect to foreign objects, it is a ſimple and individual perſon.

But as the body-politic, or the ſovereign, derives its very exiſtence from this inviolable contract, it can enter into no lawful engagement, even with any ſimilar body, derogatory from the tenor of this primitive act; ſuch as that of alienating any part of itſelf, or of ſubmitting itſelf entirely to a foreign ſovereign. To violate the act whereby it exiſts, would be to annihilate itſelf; and from nothing can ariſe nothing.

No ſooner are a multitude of individuals thus united in a body, than it becomes impoſſible to act offenſively againſt any of the members without attacking the whole, and ſtill leſs to offend the whole body, without injuring the members. Hence both duty and intereſt equally oblige the two contracting parties to aſſiſt each other; and the ſame perſons ought to endeavour to include, within this twofold relation, all the advantages which depend on it.

Now the ſovereign, being formed only by the ſeveral individuals of which the ſtate is compoſed, can have no intereſt contrary to theirs: of courſe the ſupreme power ſtands in no need of any guarantee toward the ſubjects, becauſe it is impoſſible that the body ſhould be capable of hurt-

hurting all its members; and we ſhall ſee hereafter, that it can as little tend to injure any of them in particular. Hence the ſovereign is neceſſarily, and for the ſame reaſon that it exiſts, always ſuch as it ought to be.

The caſe is different, however, as to the relation in which the ſubjects ſtand to the ſovereign; as, notwithſtanding their common intereſt, the latter can have no ſecurity that the former will diſcharge their engagements, unleſs means be found to engage their fidelity.

In fact, every individual may, as a man, entertain a particular will, either contradictory or diſſimilar to his general will as a citizen. His private intereſt may influence him in a manner diametrically oppoſite to the common intereſt of the ſociety. Reflecting on his own exiſtence as poſitive and naturally independent, he may conceive what he owes to the common cauſe to be a free and gratuitous contribution, the want of which will be leſs hurtful to others than the diſcharge of it will be burdenſome to himſelf; and, regarding the moral perſon of the ſtate as an imaginary being, becauſe it is not a man, he may be deſirous of enjoying all the privileges of a citizen, without fulfilling his engagement as a ſubject; an injuſtice, that, in its progreſs, muſt neceſſarily be the ruin of the body-politic.

To the end, therefore, that the ſocial compact ſhould not prove an empty form, it tacitly includes this engagement, which only can enforce the reſt, *viz.* that whoſoever refuſes to pay obedience to the general will, ſhall be liable to be compelled to it by the force of the whole body. And this is in effect nothing more than that they may be compelled to be free; for ſuch

is

is the condition which, in uniting every citizen to the ſtate, ſecured him from all perſonal dependence; a condition, which forms the whole artifice and play of the political machine: it is this alone that renders all ſocial engagements juſt and equitable, which, without it, would be abſurd, tyrannical, and ſubject to the moſt enormous abuſes.

CHAP. VIII. *Of civil ſociety in general.*

THE tranſition of man from a ſtate of nature to a ſtate of ſociety is productive of a very remarkable change in his being, by ſubſtituting juſtice inſtead of inſtinct as the rule of his conduct, and attaching that morality to his actions of which they were before deſtitute. It is in immediate conſequence of this change, when the voice of duty ſucceeds to phyſical impulſe and the law of appetite, that man, who hitherto regarded only his own gratification, finds himſelf obliged to act on other principles, and to conſult his reaſon before he follows the dictates of his paſſions. Although, by entering into a ſtate of ſociety, he is deprived alſo of many advantages which depend on that of nature, he gains by it others ſo very conſiderable: his faculties exert and expand themſelves; his ideas are enlarged; his ſentiments ennobled; and his whole ſoul is elevated to ſo great a degree, that, if the abuſes of this new ſtate do not degrade him below the former, he ought inceſſantly to bleſs that happy moment in which he was reſcued from it, and converted from a ſtupid and ignorant animal into an intelligent and wiſe being.

To ſtate the balance of what is loſt and gained

ed by this change, we ſhall reduce it to comparative terms. By entering into the ſocial compact, man gives up his natural liberty or unlimited right to every thing which he is deſirous of and can attain. In return for this, he gains ſocial liberty, and an excluſive property in all thoſe things of which he is poſſeſſed. To avoid any miſtake, however, in the nature of theſe compenſations, it is neceſſary to make a juſt diſtinction between natural liberty, which is limited by nothing but the inabilities of the individual, and ſocial liberty, which is limited by the general will of the community; and alſo, between that poſſeſſion which is only effected by force, or follows the right of prior occupancy, and that property which is founded only on a poſitive title.

To the preceding alſo may be added, as the acquiſition of a ſocial ſtate, moral liberty, which only renders a man truly maſter of himſelf: for to be under the direction of appetite alone is to be in a ſtate of ſlavery; while to pay obedience only to thoſe laws which we preſcribe to ourſelves, is liberty. But I have ſaid too much already on this ſubject, the philoſophical meaning of the word Liberty being in this place out of the queſtion.

CHAP. IX. *Of real demeſnes.*

EAch member of the community, in becoming ſuch, devotes himſelf to the public from that moment, in ſuch a ſtate as he then is, with all his power and abilities, of which abilities his poſſeſſions make a part. Not that in conſequence of this act the poſſeſſion changes its nature by changing hands, and becomes actual pro-

property in thoſe of the ſovereignty; but as the power of the community is incomparably greater than that of an individual, the public poſſeſſion is in fact more fixed and irrevocable, without being more lawful, at leaſt with regard to foreigners. For every ſtate is, with reſpect to its members, maſter of all their poſſeſſions, by virtue of the ſocial compact, which, in a ſtate, ſerves as the baſis of all other rights; but, with regard to other powers or ſtates, it is maſter of them only by the right of prior occupancy, which it derives from individuals.

The right of prior occupancy, although more real than that of the ſtrongeſt, becomes not an equitable right, till after the eſtabliſhment of property. Every man hath naturally a right to every thing which is neceſſary for his ſubſiſtence; but the poſitive act by which he is made the proprietor of a certain poſſeſſion excludes him from the property of any other. His portion being aſſigned him, he ought to confine himſelf to that, and hath no longer any right to a community of poſſeſſions. Hence it is that the right of prior occupancy, though but of little force in a ſtate of nature, is ſo reſpectable in that of ſociety. The point to which we are chiefly directed in the conſideration of this right, is rather what belongs to another, than what does not belong to us.

To define the right of prior occupancy in general terms, it is founded on the following conditions. It is requiſite, in the firſt place, that the lands in queſtion ſhould be unoccupied; ſecondly, that no greater quantity of it ſhould be occupied than is neceſſary for the ſubſiſtence of the occupiers; and, in the third place, that poſ-

ſeſſion

ſeſſion ſhould be taken of it, not by a vain ceremony, but by actual cultivation, the only mark of property which, in defect of juridical titles, ſhould be at all reſpected.

To allow the firſt occupier a right to as much territory as he may cultivate and is neceſſary to his ſubſiſtence, is certainly carrying the matter as far as is reaſonable. Otherwiſe we know not how to ſet bounds to this right. Is it ſufficient for a man to ſet foot on an uninhabited territory, to pretend immediately an excluſive right to it? Is it ſufficient for him to have power enough at one time to drive others from the ſpot, to deprive them for ever afterwards of the right of returning to it? How can a man, or even a whole people, poſſeſs themſelves of an immenſe territory, and exclude from it the reſt of mankind, without being guilty of an illegal uſurpation; ſince, by ſo doing, they deprive the reſt of mankind of an habitation, and thoſe means of ſubſiſtence which nature hath given in common to them all? When Nunez Balbao ſtood on the ſea-ſhore, and in the name of the crown of Caſtile took poſſeſſion of the Pacific Ocean and of all South America, was this ſufficient to diſpoſſeſs all the inhabitants of that vaſt country, and exclude all the other ſovereigns in the world? On ſuch a ſuppoſition, the like idle ceremonies might have been ridiculouſly multiplied, and his Catholic Majeſty would have had no more to do than to have taken poſſeſſion in his cloſet of all the countries in the world, and to have afterwards only deducted from his empire ſuch as were before poſſeſſed by other princes.

It is eaſy to conceive, how the united and contiguous eſtates of individuals become the territory

ritory of the public, and in what manner the right of ſovereignty, extending itſelf from the ſubjects to the lands they occupy, becomes at once both real and perſonal; a circumſtance which lays the poſſeſſors under a ſtate of the greateſt dependence, and makes even their own abilities a ſecurity for their fidelity. This is an advantage which does not appear to have been duly attended to by ſovereigns among the ancients, who, by ſtyling themſelves only kings of the Perſians, the Scythians, the Macedonians, ſeemed to look on themſelves only as chiefs of men, rather than as maſters of a country. Modern princes more artfully ſtyle themſelves the kings of England, France, Spain, *&c.* and thus, by claiming the territory itſelf, are ſecure of the inhabitants.

What is very ſingular in this alienation is, that the community, in accepting the poſſeſſions of individuals, ſo far from deſpoiling them thereof, that, on the contrary, it only confirms them in ſuch poſſeſſions, by converting an uſurpation into an actual right, and a bare poſſeſſion into a real property. The poſſeſſors alſo being conſidered as the depoſitaries of the public wealth, while their rights are reſpected by all the members of the ſtate, and maintained by all its force againſt any foreign power, they acquire, if I may ſo ſay, by a ceſſion advantageous to the public, and ſtill more ſo to themſelves, every thing they ceded by it: a paradox which is eaſily explained by the diſtinction to be made between the rights which the ſovereign and the proprietor have in the ſame fund, as will be ſeen hereafter.

It may alſo happen, that men may form themſelves into a ſociety, before they have any poſ-

ſeſſions; and that, acquiring a territory ſufficient for all, they may poſſeſs it in common, or divide it among them, either equally, or in ſuch different proportions as may be determined by the ſovereign. Now, in whatſoever manner ſuch acquiſition may be made, the right which each individual has to his own eſtate, muſt be always ſubordinate to the right which the community hath over the poſſeſſions of all; for, without this, there would be nothing binding in the ſocial tie, nor any real force in the exerciſe of the ſupreme power.

I ſhall end this book with a remark that ought to ſerve as the baſis of the whole ſocial ſyſtem: and this is, that, inſtead of annihilating the natural equality among mankind, the fundamental compact ſubſtitutes, on the contrary, a moral and legal equality, to make up for that natural and phyſical difference which prevails among individuals, who, though unequal in perſonal ſtrength and mental abilities, become thus all equal by convention and right *.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I. *That the ſovereignty is unalienable.*

THE firſt and moſt important conſequence to be

* This equality, indeed, is under ſome governments merely apparent and deluſive, ſerving only to keep the poor ſtill in miſery, and favour the oppreſſion of the rich. And, in fact, the laws are always uſeful to perſons of fortune, and hurtful to thoſe who are deſtitute: whence it follows, that a ſtate of ſociety is advantageous to mankind in general, only when they all poſſeſs ſomething, and none of them have any thing too much.

be drawn from the principles already eſtabliſhed, is, that the general *will* only can direct the forces of the ſtate agreeable to the end of its original inſtitution, which is the common good; for, though the oppoſition of private intereſts might make the eſtabliſhment of ſocieties neceſſary, it muſt have been through the coalition of thoſe intereſts that ſuch eſtabliſhment became poſſible. The bonds of ſociety muſt have been formed out of ſomething common to thoſe ſeveral intereſts; for, if there had been no point to which they could have been reconciled, no ſociety could poſſibly have ſubſiſted. Now it is only on theſe points that the government of ſociety ſhould be founded.

I ſay, therefore, that the ſovereignty, being only the exertion of the general will, cannot be alienated; and that the ſovereign, which is only a collective being, cannot be repreſented but by itſelf: the power of a people may be tranſmitted or delegated, but not their will.

It may not be abſolutely impoſſible, that the will of an individual ſhould agree, in ſome particular point, with the general will of a whole people: it is, however, impoſſible, that ſuch agreement ſhould be conſtant and durable; for the will of particulars always tends to make diſtinctions of preference, and the general will to a perfect equality. It is further ſtill more impoſſible, ſuppoſing ſuch agreement might always ſubſiſt, to have any ſecurity that it would do ſo, as it could never be the effect of art, but of chance. The ſovereign may ſay, My will is now agreeable to the will of ſuch an individual, or at leaſt to what he pretends to be his will: but it cannot pretend to ſay, I agree to whatever may be the will

of ſuch an individual to morrow; as it is abſurd for the will to lay itſelf under any reſtraint regarding the future, and as it is impoſſible for the will to conſent to any thing contrary to the intereſt of the being whoſe will it is. Should a people therefore enter into the engagement of ſimply promiſing obedience, they would loſe their quality as a people, and be virtually diſſolved by that very act. The moment there exiſts a maſter, there can be no longer a ſovereign, the body politic being thereby deſtroyed.

I would not be underſtood to mean, that the orders of a chief may not paſs for the dictates of the general will, when the ſovereign, though at liberty to contradict, does not oppoſe it. In ſuch a caſe, it is to be preſumed, from the univerſal ſilence of the people, that they give their conſent. This will be farther explained in the end.

CHAP. II. *That the ſovereignty is indiviſible.*

FOR the ſame reaſon that the ſovereignty is unalienable, it is alſo indiviſible: for the will is general *, or it is not; it is that of the body of the people, or only that of a part. In the firſt caſe, this will, when declared, is an act of ſovereignty, and becomes a law: in the ſecond, it is only a particular will, or an act of the magiſtracy, and is at moſt a decree.

But our politicians, incapable of dividing the ſovereignty in its firſt principles, divide it in its object: they diſtinguiſh it into power and will; into

* In order that this will ſhould be general, it is not always neceſſary it ſhould be unanimous: it is neceſſary, however, that very individual ſhould be permitted to vote; every formal excluſion infringing the generality.

into a legiſlative and executive power; into the prerogatives of taxation, of executing juſtice, and of making war; into departments of domeſtic and foreign adminiſtration. Sometimes they blend all theſe confuſedly together; and, at others, conſider them as diſtinct and ſeparate, making out the ſovereign to be a fantaſtic compound, juſt as if they ſhould compoſe a man out of ſeveral bodies, of which one ſhould have only eyes, another arms, a third feet, and nothing more. It is ſaid of the jugglers in Japan, that they will take a child, and cut it into pieces in the preſence of the ſpectators; then, throwing up its diſmembered limbs one after another into the air, they are united, and the child deſcends alive and well as before. The legerdemain of our modern politicians greatly reſembles this trick of the Japaneſe; for they, after having diſmembered the body-politic with equal dexterity, bring all its parts together by *hocus pocus* again, and repreſent it the ſame as before.

This error ariſes from their not having formed preciſe ideas of the ſovereign authority, and from their miſtaking the ſimple emanations of this authority for parts of its eſſence. Thus, for inſtance, the acts of declaring war and making peace are uſually regarded as acts of ſovereignty, which they are not; for neither of theſe acts are laws, but conſiſt only of the application of the law. Each is a particular act, determinate only of the meaning of the law in ſuch caſe, as will be ſeen more clearly when the idea attached to the word *law* ſhall be preciſely ſettled.

By tracing, in like manner, their other diviſions, we ſhall find, that we are conſtantly miſ-

taken whenever we think the ſovereignty divided; and that the prerogatives, which are ſuppoſed to be parts of the ſovereignty, are all ſubordinate to it, and always ſuppoſe the predetermination of a ſuperior will, which thoſe prerogatives only ſerve to put in execution.

It is impoſſible to ſay, in how much obſcurity this want of preciſion hath involved the reaſonings of authors on the ſubject of political law, when they came to examine into the reſpective rights of kings and people on the principles they had eſtabliſhed. By turning to the third and fourth chapters of the firſt book of Grotius, the reader may ſee how that learned author, and his tranſlator Barbeyrac, bewildered and entangled themſelves in their own ſophiſms, thro' fear of ſaying too much or too little for their purpoſe, and of making thoſe intereſts claſh, which it was their buſineſs to reconcile. Grotius being diſſatisfied with his own countrymen, a refugee in France, and willing to pay his court to Lewis XIII. to whom his book is dedicated, ſpared no art nor pains to ſtrip the people of their privileges, and to inveſt kings with prerogative. Barbeyrac alſo wrote with a ſimilar view, dedicating his tranſlation to George I. of England. But, unluckily, the expulſion of James II. which he calls an abdication, obliged him to be much on the reſerve, to turn and wind about, as he ſaw occaſion, in order not to make William III. an uſurper. Had theſe two writers adopted true principles, all theſe difficulties would have vaniſhed, and they would have written conſiſtently; in ſuch a caſe, however, they could only, in ſober ſadneſs, have told the truth, and would have paid their court only

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to the people. Now, to tell the truth is not the way to make a fortune; nor are ambaſſadors appointed, or places and penſions given away, by the populace.

CHAP. III. *Whether the general will can be in the wrong.*

IT follows, from what has been ſaid, that the general will is always in the right, and conſtantly tends to the public good. It does not follow, however, that the deliberations of the people will always be attended with the ſame rectitude. We are ever deſirous of our own good, but we do not always diſtinguiſh in what it conſiſts. A whole people never can be corrupted; but they may be often miſtaken, and it is in ſuch a caſe only that they appear to ſeek their own diſadvantage.

There is often a conſiderable difference between the will of all the members and the general will of the whole body: the latter regards only the common intereſt; the other reſpects the private intereſt of individuals, and is the aggregated ſum of their particular wills: but, if we take from this ſum thoſe contradictory wills that mutually deſtroy each other *, the ſum of the remaining difference is the general will.

If a people, ſufficiently informed of the nature

* *Each intereſts*, ſays the Marquis d'A. *has different principles. A coalition between two particular intereſts may be formed, out of oppoſition to that of a third.* He might have added, that a coalition of all is formed out of oppoſition to the intereſt of each. Were there no different and claſhing intereſts, that of the whole would be hardly diſtinguiſhable, as it would meet with no obſtacle. All things would go regularly on of their own accord, and civil policy would ceaſe to be an art.

ture of the ſubject under their conſideration, ſhould deliberate, without having any communication with each other, the general will would always reſult from the greater number of their little differences, and their deliberation would be ſuch as it ought to be. But when they enter into cabals, and form partial aſſociations at the expence of the general one, the will of each of theſe aſſociations becomes general, with regard to the particular members of each; and in itſelf particular, with regard to the ſtate. In ſuch a caſe, therefore, it may be ſaid, there is no longer as many voters as individuals, but only as many voices as there are aſſociations. The differences then become leſs numerous, and give a leſs general reſult. Again, ſhould one of theſe partial aſſociations be ſo great as to influence all the reſt, the reſult would no longer be the ſum of many little differences, but that of one great one; in which caſe, a general will would no longer ſubſiſt.

It is requiſite, therefore, in order that each reſolution may be dictated by the general will, that no ſuch partial ſocieties ſhould be formed in a ſtate, and that each citizen ſhould think for himſelf *. Such was the ſublime inſtitution of the great Lycurgus. But, if ſuch partial ſocieties muſt and will exiſt, it is then expedient to multiply their number, and prevent their inequality, as was done by Solon, Numa, and Ser-

* Vera coſa e, (ſays Machiavel,) che alcuni diviſioni nuocono alle republiche, e alcune giovano: quelle nuocono che ſono dalle ſette e da partigiani accompagnate: quelle giovano che ſenza ſette, ſenza partigiani ſi mantengono. Non potendo adunque provedere un fondatore d'una republica che non ſiano nimicizie in quella, ha da proveder almeno che non viſiano ſette. *Hiſt. Florent.* l. vii.

Servius. Theſe are the only ſalutary precautions that can be taken, in order that the general will may be properly informed, and the people not be miſtaken as to their true intereſt.

CHAP. IV. *Of the limits of the ſovereign power.*

IF the ſtate, or the city, be a mere moral perſon, whoſe life depends on the union of its members, and if the moſt important of its concerns be that of its own preſervation, it ſhould certainly be poſſeſſed of an univerſal compulſive force, to move and diſpoſe each part in ſuch a manner as is moſt conducive to the good of all. As nature hath given every man an abſolute power over his limbs, to move and direct them at pleaſure, ſo the Social Compact gives to the body-politic an abſolute power over all its members; and it is this power which, directed by the general will, bears the name, as I have already obſerved, of the ſovereignty.

But, beſides this public perſon, we are to conſider farther the private perſons of which it is compoſed, and whoſe life and liberty are naturally independent of it. We come now, therefore, to make a proper diſtinction between the reſpective privileges of the citizens and the ſovereign *, as well as between the obligations the former lie under as ſubjects, and the natural rights they claim as men.

It is agreed, that what an individual alienates of his power, his poſſeſſion, or his liberty, by the

* Be not in haſte, attentive reader, to accuſe me here of contradiction. I cannot avoid the ſeeming contradiction in terms, from the native poverty of the language. But have a little patience.

the Social Compact, is only ſuch parts of them whoſe uſe is of importance to the community; but it muſt be confeſſed alſo, that the ſovereign is the only proper judge of this importance.

A citizen is bound to perform all the ſervices he can poſſibly be of to a ſtate, whenever the ſovereign demands them; but the ſovereign, on his part, cannot require any thing of the ſubject that is uſeleſs to the community: he cannot even be deſirous of ſo doing; for, under the law of reaſon, nothing can be produced without a cauſe, any more than under the law of nature.

The engagements in which we are bound to the body of ſociety are obligatory, only becauſe they are mutual; and their nature is ſuch, that we cannot, in diſcharging them, labour for the good of others, without at the ſame time labouring for that of ourſelves. Wherefore, indeed, is it, that the general will is always in the right, and that all conſtantly deſire the good of each, unleſs it be, becauſe there is no one that does not appropriate the term *each* to himſelf, and who does not think of his own intereſt in voting for that of all? This ſerves to prove alſo, that an equality of privilege, and the notion of juſtice it produces, are derived from that preference which each naturally gives himſelf, and of courſe from the very nature of man; that the general will, in order to be truly ſuch, ought to be ſo in its effect as well as in its eſſence; that it ought to flow from all, in order to be applicable to all; and that it muſt loſe its natural rectitude, when it tends to any individual and determinate object; becauſe judging, in ſuch a caſe, of what is foreign to ourſelves, we have no real principle of equity for our guide.

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In fact, no ſooner do we come to treat of a particular fact or privilege, on a point which has not been ſettled by a general and prior convention, than the affair becomes litigious. It is a proceſs, in which the particulars intereſted are one party, and the public the other; but in which I ſee no law to decide, nor judge to determine. It would be abſurd, therefore, in ſuch a caſe, to think of referring it to any expreſs deciſion of the general will, which could be no other than the deciſion of one of the very parties; and therefore muſt be, with regard to the other, foreign and partial, leaning to injuſtice, and ſubject to error. In the ſame manner, alſo, that a partial and particular will cannot repreſent the general will; ſo the latter, in its turn, changes its nature, when employed on a particular object, and cannot, in its general capacity, pronounce concerning any particular man or fact. Thus when the people of Athens, for inſtance, took upon them to appoint or caſhier their chiefs, to decree honours to one, and inflict pains and penalties on another, and thus by numerous decrees exerciſed indiſcriminately all the acts of government, they had then, properly ſpeaking, no general will at all: the Athenian people, in this caſe, did not act in the capacity of ſovereign, but in that of magiſtrate. This may appear contradictory to the common notions of things, but I muſt be allowed time to explain mine.

We may learn hence, that the general will conſiſts leſs in the number of votes, than in the common intereſt that unites them; for, in this inſtitution, every one ſubjects himſelf neceſſarily to thoſe conditions which he impoſes on o-

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thers: hence the admirable conformity between intereſt and juſtice, which ſtamps on public declarations that characteriſtic of equity, which we ſee vaniſh in the diſcuſſion of particular ſubjects, for want of that common intereſt which unites and makes the criterion of the judge the ſame with that of the party.

In what manner ſoever we recur to the firſt principle, we always arrive at the ſame concluſion, *viz.* that the Social Compact eſtabliſhes ſuch an equality among the citizens, that all lay themſelves under the ſame obligatious, and ought all to enjoy the ſame privileges. Thus, from the very nature of this compact, every act of ſovereignty, that is to ſay, every authentic act of the general will, is equally obligatory on, or favourable to, all the citizens, without diſtinction; in ſo much that the ſovereign knows only the whole body of the nation, but diſtinguiſhes none of the individuals who compoſe it. What then is properly an act of ſovereignty? It is not an agreement made between a ſuperior an an inferior, but a convention between a whole body with each of its members: which convention is a lawful one, becauſe founded on the ſocial contract; it is equitable, becauſe it is common to all; it is uſeful, becauſe it can have no other object than the general good; and it is ſolid and durable, becauſe ſecured by the public ſtrength and the ſupreme power.

When the ſubmiſſion of ſubjects is owing only to ſuch conventions, they pay in fact obedidience to none but their own will; and to aſk how far the reſpective privileges of the ſovereign and citizens extend, is to aſk merely how far the latter may enter into engagements with themſelves,

ſelves, *viz.* each individual with all collectively, and all collectively with each individual.

Hence we ſee, that the ſovereign power, abſolute, inviolable, and ſacred as it is, neither does nor can ſurpaſs the bounds of ſuch general conventions; and that every man hath a right to diſpoſe, as he pleaſes, of that liberty and property which the terms of ſuch conventions have left to his own diſpoſal: ſo that the ſovereign hath not any right to lay a greater burden on one ſubject than on another, becauſe, in ſuch a caſe, it becomes a particular affair, in which the ſovereign hath no power to act.

Theſe diſtinctions being once admitted, it is ſo far from being true that there is any real renunciation on the part of individuals when they enter into the Social Compact, that their ſituation becomes, by means of that very compact, much better than before; as, inſtead of making any alienation, they only make an advantageous exchange of an uncertain and precarious mode of ſubſiſtence, for a more ſettled and determinate one: they exchange their natural independence, for ſocial liberty; the power of injuring others, for that of ſecuring themſelves from injury; and their own natural ſtrength, which might be overcome by that of others, for a civil power which the ſocial union renders invincible. Their very lives, which they have by theſe means devoted to the ſtate, are continually protected; and even when they are obliged to expoſe themſelves to death in its defence, what do they more than render back to ſociety what they have before received of it? What do they more, in riſking their lives for their country, than they would have been obliged to do

more frequently, and with much greater danger, in a ſtate of nature; when, ſubject to inevitable outrages, they would have been obliged to defend their means of ſubſiſtence at the hazard of their lives? That every one lies under the obligation of fighting in defence of his country, is true; but then he is relieved by the laws from the neceſſity of fighting to defend himſelf. And are not men gainers, on the whole, by running part of thoſe riſks for their common ſecurity, which they muſt ſeverally run for themſelves were they deprived of that ſecurity?

Chap. V. *On capital puniſhments.*

IT hath been aſked, how individuals, having no right to diſpoſe of their own lives, can tranſmit that right to the ſovereign? The difficulty of reſolving this queſtion, ariſes only from its being badly expreſſed. Every man hath an undobted right to hazard his life for its preſervation. Was a man ever charged with ſuicide, for throwing himſelf from the top of an houſe in flames, in order to avoid being burnt? Was it ever imputed as a crime to a man, who might be caſt away at ſea, that he knew the danger of the voyage when he embarked?

The end of the Social Compact, is the preſervation of the contracting parties. Such, therefore, as would reap the benefit of the end, muſt aſſent to the means, which are inſeparable from ſome dangers and loſſes. He that would preſerve his life at the expence of others, ought to riſk it for their ſafety when it is neceſſary. Now, the citizen is no longer a judge of the danger to which the law requires him to be expoſed:

poſed: but when the prince declares that the good of the ſtate requires his life, he ought to reſign it; ſince it is only on thoſe conditions he hath hitherto lived in ſecurity, and his life is not ſolely the gift of nature, but a conditional gift of the ſtate.

The puniſhment of death inflicted on malefactors may be conſidered alſo in the ſame point of view: it is to prevent our falling by the hands of an aſſaſſin, that we conſent to die on becoming ſuch ourſelves. We are ſo far from giving away our lives by this treaty, that we enter into it only for our preſervation; as it is not to be preſumed that any one of the contracting parties formed therein a premeditated deſign to get himſelf hanged.

Add to this, that every malefactor, by breaking the laws of his country, becomes a rebel and traitor; ceaſing, from that time, to be a member of the community, and even declaring war againſt it. In this caſe, the preſervation of the ſtate is incompatible with his; one of the two muſt periſh: and thus, when a criminal is executed, he doth not ſuffer in the quality of a citizen, but in that of an enemy. His trial and ſentence are the evidence and declaration of his having broken the Social Compact, and that of conſequence he is no longer a member of the ſtate. Now, as he had profeſſed himſelf ſuch, at leaſt by his reſidence, it is right that he ſhould be ſeparated from the ſtate, either by baniſhment as a violator of the Social Compact, or by death as a public enemy: for ſuch an enemy is not a moral perſonage, he is a mere man; and it is in this caſe only that the right of war takes place of killing an enemy.

But, it may be ſaid, the condemnation of a criminal is a particular act. It is ſo; and for that reaſon it does not belong to the ſovereign: it is an act, for doing which the ſupreme power may confer the authority, though it cannot exerciſe ſuch authority itſelf. My ideas on this ſubject are conſiſtent, though I cannot explain them all at once.

It is to be obſerved, however, that the frequency of executions is always a ſign of the weakneſs or indolence of government. There is no malefactor who might not be made good for ſomething; nor ought any perſon to be put to death, even by way of example, unleſs ſuch as could not be preſerved without endangering the community.

With regard to the prerogative of granting pardons to criminals, condemned by the laws of their country, and ſentenced by the judges, it belongs only to that power which is ſuperior both to the judges and the laws, *viz.* the ſovereign authority. Not that it is very clear that even the ſupreme power is veſted with ſuch a right, or that the circumſtances in which it might be exerted are frequent or determinate. In a well-governed State there are but few executions; not becauſe there are many pardoned, but becauſe there are few criminals: Whereas when a ſtate is on the decline, the multiplicity of crimes occaſions their impunity. Under the Roman republic, neither the ſtate nor the Conſuls ever attempted to grant pardons; even the people never did this, although they ſometimes recalled their own ſentence. The frequency of pardons indicates that in a ſhort time crimes will not ſtand in need of them, and every one may

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ſee the conſequence of ſuch conduct. But my reluctant heart reſtrains my pen; let us leave the diſcuſſion of theſe queſtions to the juſt man who hath never been criminal, and who never ſtood in need of pardon.

CHAP. VI. *On the law.*

HAVING given exiſtence and life to the body politic, by a Social Compact, we come now to give it action and will, by a legiſlature. For the primitive act, by which ſuch body is formed, determines nothing as yet with reſpect to the means of its preſervation.

Whatever is right and conformable to order, is ſuch from the nature of things, independent of all human conventions. All juſtice comes from God, who is the fountain of it; but could we receive it immediately from ſo ſublime a ſource, we ſhould ſtand in no need of government or laws. There is indeed an univerſal juſtice ſpringing from reaſon alone; but, in order to admit this to take place among mankind, it ſhould be reciprocal. To conſider things as they appear, we find the maxims of juſtice among mankind to be vain and fruitleſs, for want of a natural ſupport: they tend only to the advantage of the wicked, and the diſadvantage of the juſt; while the latter obſerves them in his behaviour to others, but nobody regards them in their conduct to him. Laws and conventions, therefore, are neceſſary in order to unite duties with privileges, and confine juſtice to its proper objects. In a ſtate of nature, where every thing is common, I owe thoſe nothing to whom I have promiſed nothing: I acknowledge nothing to be the

property of another but what is uſeleſs to myſelf. In a ſtate of ſociety the caſe is different, where the rights of each are fixed by law.

We come at length, therefore, to conſider what is law. So long as we content ourſelves with the metaphyſical idea annexed to this term, we muſt talk unintelligibly; and though we ſhould come to a definition of natural law, we ſhould not know thence any thing more of political law. I have already ſaid there can be no general will relative to a particular object. In fact, every particular object muſt be within or without the ſtate. If without, a will that is foreign, cannot with regard to it be general; and if the object be within the ſtate, it muſt make a part of it: in which caſe there ariſes between the whole and the part, a relation that conſtitutes two ſeparate beings; one of which is the part, but the whole wanting ſuch part is not the whole; and ſo long as that relation ſubſiſts, there is no whole, but only two unequal parts; whence it follows, that the will of the one is no longer general with regard to that of the other.

But when a whole people decree concerning a whole people, they conſider only their whole body; and, if it then forms any relation, it muſt be between the entire object conſidered in one point of view, and the entire object conſidered in another point of view, without any diviſion of the whole. In this caſe, the matter of the decree is general as the will that decrees. Such is the act which I call a law.

When I ſay that the object of the laws is always general, I mean that the laws conſiders the ſubjects in a collective body, and their actions abſtractedly; but never concerns itſelf with in-

individual perſons, nor particular actions. Thus the law may decree certain privileges, but it cannot beſtow them on particular perſons: the law may conſtitute ſeveral claſſes of citizens, and aſſign even the qualities which may entitle them to rank in theſe claſſes; but it cannot nominate ſuch or ſuch perſons to be admitted therein: it may eſtabliſh a legal government, and appoint an hereditary ſucceſſion; but it cannot make choice of a king, nor appoint the royal family; in a word, every function that relates to an individual object, doth not belong to the legiſlative power.

Taking things in this light, it is immediately ſeen how abſurd it is to aſk in whoſe power it is to make laws? as they are acts of the general will; or whether the prince be above the laws? as he is but a member of the ſtate. Hence alſo, it is plain, the law cannot be unjuſt, as nothing can be unjuſt to itſelf; as alſo what it is to be free, and at the ſame time ſubject to the laws, as the laws are only the records of our own will.

It is hence farther evident, the law re-uniting the univerſality of the will to that of its object, that whatever an individual, of what rank ſoever, may decree of his own head, cannot be a law: indeed, whatever the ſupreme power itſelf may ordain concerning a particular object is not a law, but a ſimple decree; it is not an act of the ſovereignty, but of the magiſtracy.

I call every ſtate, therefore, which is governed by laws, a Republic, whatever be the form of its adminiſtration; for in ſuch a caſe only it is the public intereſt that governs, and whatever

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is public is ſomething. Thus every lawful government is republican *. I ſhall explain hereafter what I mean by a government.

The laws are, ſtrictly ſpeaking, only the conditions of civil ſociety. The people who ſubmit to them ſhould therefore be the authors of them; as it certainly belongs to the aſſociating parties to ſettle the conditions on which they agree to form a ſociety. But how are they to be ſettled? is it to be done by common conſent, or by a ſudden inſpiration? hath the body politic an organ by which to make known its will? who ſhall furniſh it with the neceſſary preſcience to form its determinations and to publiſh them before-hand, or how ſhall it divulge them in the time of need? how ſhall an ignorant multitude, who often know not what they chuſe becauſe they ſeldom know what is for their good, execute an enterprize ſo great and ſo difficult as that of a ſyſtem of legiſlature? A people muſt neceſſarily be deſirous of their owd good, but they do not always ſee in what it conſiſts. The general will is always in the right, but the judgment by which it is directed is not always ſufficiently informed. It is neceſſary it ſhould ſee objects ſuch as they are, and ſometimes ſuch as they ought to appear; it ſhould be directed to the ſalutary end it would purſue, ſhould be ſecured from the ſeduction of private intereſts, ſhould have an inſight into the circumſtances of time and

* I do not here mean, by the term *republican*, either an ariſtocracy or democracy; but in general every government influenced by the general will of the people, which is the law. To make a government legal, it is not neceſſary that it ſhould be confounded with the ſovereign, but that it ſhould be the miniſter: ſo that in this ſenſe even a monarchy is a republic. This will be more fully explained in the ſubſequent book.

and place; and ſhould be enabled to ſet the preſent and perceptible advantages of things, againſt the diſtant and concealed evil that may attend them. Individuals often ſee the good which they reject; the public is deſirous of that which it is incapable to ſee. Both ſtand equally in need of a guide: the former ſhould be compelled to conform their deſires to reaſon, and the latter ſhould be inſtructed in the diſcovery of what it deſires. It is thus from the proper information of the public, that there reſults an union of the underſtanding and the will in the body of ſociety; and thence the exact concurrence of its parts, and in the end the greateſt force of the whole. Hence ariſes the neceſſity of a legiſlator.

CHAP. VII. *Of the genius and character of a legiſlator.*

TO inveſtigate thoſe conditions of ſociety which may beſt anſwer the purpoſes of nations, would require the abilities of ſome ſuperior intelligence, who ſhould be witneſs to all the paſſions of men, but be ſubject itſelf to none; who ſhould have no connection with human nature, but ſhould have a perfect knowledge of it; a being, in ſhort, whoſe happineſs ſhould be independent of us, and who would nevertheleſs employ itſelf about ours *. It is the province of gods indeed to make laws for men.

The ſame argument which Caligula made uſe of in point of fact, Plato himſelf employs in point

* Nations become famous only as their legiſlature declines. The inſtitution of Lycurgus made the Spartans happy for ages before they were famous in Greece.

point of right, when he goes about to define the civil or royal perſonage, in treating of a king. But if it be certain that a great prince is a perſonage rarely to be met with, what is that of a great legiſlator? The former hath nothing more to do than to follow the model deſigned by the latter. The one is the mechanical genius who invents the machine, the other only the workman who puts it into execution. In the commencement of ſocieties, ſays Monteſquieu, it is the principal perſons in republics which form their inſtitution; and afterwards it is the inſtitution which forms the chiefs of republics.

He who ſhould undertake to form a body politic, ought to perceive himſelf capable of working a total change in human nature; of tranſforming every individual, of himſelf a ſolitary and independent being, into a part of a greater whole, from which ſuch individual is to receive in one ſenſe his life and exiſtence: he muſt be capable of altering the conſtitution of the man, in order to ſtrengthen it; and to ſubſtitute a partial and moral exiſtence, in the room of that phyſical and independent exiſtence which we receive from the hands of nature. In a word, he muſt be able to deprive man of his natural abilities, in order to inveſt him with foreign powers which he cannot make uſe of without the aſſiſtance of others. The more ſuch natural force is annihilated and extinct, the greater and more durable are thoſe which are acquired, and the more perfect and ſolid is the ſocial inſtitution. So that if each citizen be nothing and can effect nothing but by the exiſtence and aſſiſtance of all the reſt, and the force acquired by the whole body be equal or ſuperior to the ſum of the natural

forces

forces of all its individuals, the legiſlature may be ſaid to have reached the higheſt pitch of perfection it is capable to attain.

The legiſlator is in every reſpect a moſt extraordinary perſon in a ſtate. If he be undoubtedly ſo on account of his genius, he is not leſs ſo from his function. Yet this is not that of the magiſtrate or the ſovereign. That function, which conſtitutes the republic, doth not enter into its conſtitution. It is, on the contrary, a particular and ſuperior employment that hath nothing in common with human government: for if he who hath the command over the citizens ſhould not be entruſted with the command over the laws, he who hath the power over the laws ought as little to have the power over the citizens: for were it otherwiſe, his laws being made inſtrumental to his paſſions, would often ſerve to perpetuate his injuſtice, and he could never prevent particular views from altering his ſyſtem.

When Lycurgus gave laws to his country, he began by abdicating the throne. It was the cuſtom of moſt of the Grecian cities to entruſt their eſtabliſhment with ſtrangers; a cuſtom that hath been often imitated by the modern republics of Italy: that of Geneva did the ſame, and found its account in it †. In the moſt flouriſhing age of Rome, that city ſuffered under flagitious acts of tyranny, and beheld itſelf on the brink

† Thoſe who conſider Calvin only as a theologiſt, know but little of his comprehenſive genius. The digeſt of our laws, in which he had a conſiderable ſhare, do him as much honour as his religious ſyſtem; and what revolution ſoever time may effect in our public worſhip, the memory of this great man will continue to be revered ſo long as patriotiſm and a ſenſe of liberty ſurvive among us.

brink of ruin for having entruſted the ſovereign power and the legiſlative authority in the ſame hands.

Even the Decemviri themſelves, however, never aſſumed the right of paſſing any law merely on their own authority. *Nothing that we propoſe*, ſaid they to the people, *can paſs into a law without your conſent. Be yourſelves, ye Romans, the authors of thoſe laws on which your happineſs depends.*

The legiſlator, therefore, who digeſts the laws, ſhould have no right to make them paſs for ſuch; nor indeed can the people, though inclined to do it, deprive themſelves of that incommunicable right; becauſe, according to the fundamental compact, it is the general will only that is obligatory on individuals; and it is impoſſible to be aſſured that any particular will is conformable to the general, till it be ſubmitted to on the free ſuffrage of the people. I have ſaid this before, but perhaps have not unneceſſarily repeated it.

Thus, in the buſineſs of a legiſlature, we find two things apparently incompatible; a deſign ſuperior to human abilities, carried into execution by an authority which is nothing.

Another difficulty which merits attention is, that wiſe men, in talking their own language to the vulgar, ſpeak unintellibly. And yet there are many kinds of ideas which it is impoſſible to convey in the language of the people. Views too general, and objects too diſtant, are equally beyond their comprehenſion; the individual, reliſhing no other plan of government than that which is conducive to his private intereſt, is with difficulty brought to ſee thoſe advantages which are to be deduced from the continual checks

checks he may receive from ſalutary laws. In order to give a newly-formed people a taſte for the ſound maxims of policy, and induce them to follow the fundamental rules of ſociety, it is neceſſary that the effect ſhould in a manner become the cauſe; that the ſpirit of union which ſhould be the effect of ſocial inſtitutions ſhould preſide to form that inſtitution itſelf, and that men ſhould be ſuch before the laws are made as the laws are deſigned to make them. For this reaſon, therefore, the legiſlator being capable of employing neither force nor argument, he is of neceſſity obliged to recur to an authority of an higher order, which may compel without violence, and perſuade without conviction. Hence it is that the founders of nations have been obliged, in all ages, to recur to the intervention of celeſtial powers; and have honoured their gods with their own wiſdom, in order that the people, by ſubmitting themſelves to the laws of the ſtate in the ſame manner as to thoſe of nature, and acknowledging the ſame power in the formation of the city as in the formation of man, might bend more freely, and bear more tractably the yoke of obedience and public felicity.

Now the determinations of that ſublime reaſon, which ſoars above the comprehenſion of vulgar minds, are thoſe which the legiſlator puts into the mouths of his immortal perſonages, in order to influence thoſe by a divine authority, who could not be led by maxims of human prudence. It does not belong to every man, however, to make the gods his oracles, nor even to be believed when he pretends to be their interpreter. The comprehenſive genius of the legiſlator is the miracle that proves the truth of

his miſſion. Any man may engrave tables of ſtone, hire an oracle, pretend to a ſecret communication with ſome deity, teach a bird to whiſper in his ear, or hit upon other devices to impoſe on a people. But he who knows nothing more, though he may be lucky enough to get together an aſſembly of fools and madmen, will never lay the foundations of an empire; the fabric raiſed by his extravagance preſently falling, and often burying him in its ruins. A tranſitory union may be formed from ſlight and futile connections; nothing but the dictates of wiſdom, however, can render it durable. The Jewiſh law, ſtill ſubſiſting, and that of the ſon of Iſmael, which for ten centuries hath governed half the world, are ſtanding proofs of the ſuperior genius of thoſe great men by whom they were dictated: and though the vanity of philoſophy, and the blind prejudice of party, ſee nothing in their characters but fortunate impoſtors, the true politician admires, in their reſpective inſtitutions, that ſagacious and comprehenſive power of mind which muſt ever lay the laſting foundation of human eſtabliſhments.

It muſt not, from all this, be concluded, however, that religion and government have, in our times, as Warburton alledges, one common object; but only that in the firſt eſtabliſhment of ſocieties, the one was made inſtrumental to the other.

CHAP. VIII. *Of the people.*

AS the architect, before he begins to raiſe an edifice, examines into the ground where he is to lay the foundation, that he may be able to judge

judge whether it will bear the weight of the ſuperſtructure; ſo the prudent legiſlator does not begin by making a digeſt of ſalutary laws, but examines firſt whether the people for whom ſuch laws are deſigned, are capable of ſupporting them. It was for this reaſon Plato refuſed to give laws to the Arcadians and Cyrenians, knowing they were rich and luxurious, and could not admit of the introduction of equality among them. It was for this reaſon that Crete, though it boaſted good laws, was inhabited by ſuch bad men: Minos had only endeavoured to govern a people already depraved by vice. Various have been the nations that have made a diſtiuguiſhed figure in the world, and yet have not been capable of being governed by good laws; and even thoſe who are capable of being ſo governed, continued ſo but a ſhort time. Nations, as well as individnals, are docile only in their infancy: they become incorrigible as they grow old. When cuſtoms are once eſtabliſhed and prejudices have taken root among them, it is a dangeons and fruitleſs enterprize to attempt to reform them. A people cannot even bear to have their wounds probed, though in order to be cured; but reſemble thoſe weak and cowardly patients who ſhudder at the ſight of their phyſician. Not but that ſometimes, as there are diſtempers which affect the brain of individuals and deprive them of the capacity of remembering what is paſt, there happen in ſtates ſuch revolutions as produce the ſame effect on a people, when the horror of the paſt ſupplies the place of oblivion, and the ſtate, inflamed and exhauſted by civil wars, riſes again, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, out of its own aſhes, and reaſſumes the vigour of youth in for-

ſaking the arms of death. This was the caſe with Sparta in the time of Lycurgus, and of Rome after the Tarquins; and ſuch hath been the caſe in modern times with Holland and Switzerland after the expulſion of their tyrants. But theſe events are rare; and are ſuch exceptions as have their cauſe in the particular conſtitution of the ſtate excepted. They cannot even take place twice among the ſame people: for though they may be made free when they are only barbarous and uncivilized; yet, when the reſources of ſociety are exhauſted, they cannot be renewed. In that caſe, faction may deſtroy, but revolutions cannot re-eſtabliſh their freedom; they require for ever after a maſter, and not a deliverer. Every free people, therefore, ſhould remember this maxim, that though nations may acquire liberty, yet if once this ineſtimable acquiſition is loſt, it is abſolutely irrecoverable.

There is in nations, as well as individuals, a term of maturity, at which they ſhould be permitted to arrive before they are ſubjected to laws. This term, however, is not always eaſy to be known; and yet if it be anticipated, it may be of dangerous conſequence. Again, one people may be formed to diſcipline in their infancy; while another may not be ripened for ſubjection till after many centuries. The Ruſſians, for inſtance, will never be truely poliſhed, becauſe they were diſciplined too ſoon. Peter had only an imitative turn: he had nothing of that true genius, whoſe creative power forms things out of nothing. Some of his meaſures, indeed, were proper enough, but moſt of them were ill-timed or ill-placed. He ſaw that his ſubjects were mere barbarians, but he did not ſee that they were not

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ripe for being made polite. He wanted to civilize them, when he ſhould only have checked their brutality. He wanted to make them at once Germans and Engliſhmen; whereas he ought to have begun by making them firſt Ruſſians; and thus he prevented his ſubjects from ever becoming what otherwiſe they might have been, by perſuading them they were ſuch as they were not. It is thus a French tutor forms his pupil to make a figure in his childhood, and to make none for ever afterwards. The empire of Ruſſia, while it is ambitions of reducing all Europe to its ſubjection, will be ſubjected itſelf. Its neighbours, the Tartars, will in time become both its maſters and ours. This event ſeems to me inevitable; all the monarchs in Europe ſeeming to act in concert, to accelerate ſuch a revolution.

CHAP. IX. *The ſubject continued.*

IN the ſame manner as nature hath limited the dimenſions of a well-formed human body, beyond which ſhe produces only giants or dwarfs; ſo in the body-politic there are limits, within or beyond which a ſtate ought not to be confined or extended; to the end that it may not be too big to be well governed, nor too little to maintain its own independency. There is in every body-politic a *maximum* of force which it cannot exceed, and from which it often recedes by extending its dominion. The more the ſocial knot is extended, the more lax it grows; and in general, a little ſtate is always proportionably ſtronger than a great one.

A thouſand reaſons might be given in ſup-

port of this maxim. In the firſt place, the adminiſtration of government becomes always more difficult as the diſtance from the ſeat of it increaſes, even as a body has the greateſt weight at the end of the longeſt lever. It becomes alſo more burdenſome in proportion as it is divided into parts: for every town hath firſt its own particular government to pay; that of each diſtrict again is paid by the ſame people; next that of the province, then that of particular governments with their viceroys, all of whom are to be paid as they riſe in dignity, and always at the expence of the unhappy people; whom, laſt of all, the ſupreme adminiſtration itſelf cruſhes with the whole weight of its oppreſſion. It is impoſſible ſo many needleſs charges ſhould not tend continually to impoveriſh the people; who, ſo far from being better governed by theſe different ranks of ſuperiors, are much worſe ſo than if they had but one order of governors in the ſtate. And yet with this multiplicity of rulers, they are far from being furniſhed with proper reſources for extraordinary occaſions; but on the contrary, when they have occaſion to recur to them, the ſtate is always on the brink of ruin.

Nor is this all; the government not only becomes leſs vigorous and active in putting the laws in execution, removing private oppreſſion, correcting abuſes, or preventing the ſeditious enterpriſes of rebellion in diſtant provinces; but the people have leſs affection for their chiefs, whom they never have an opportunity to ſee; for their country, which to them is like the whole world; and for their fellow-ſubjects, of which the greater part are utter ſtrangers. The ſame laws cannot be convenient for ſo many various

rious people of different manners and climates, and who cannot be ſuppoſed to live equally happy under the ſame form of government. And yet different laws muſt occaſion much trouble and confuſion among people, who, living under the ſame adminiſtration, and carrying on a perpetual intercourſe, frequently change their habitations, intermarry with each other, and, being educated under different cuſtoms, hardly ever know when their property is ſecure. Great talents lie buried, virtue lives obſcured, and vice prevails with impunity, amidſt that multitude of ſtrangers which flock together round the chief ſeat of adminiſtration. The principals, overwhelmed with a multiplicity of buſineſs, can look into nothing themſelves; the government of the ſtate being left to their deputies and clerks. In a word, the meaſures to be taken, in order to maintain the general authority, on which ſo many diſtant officers are ever ready to encroach or impoſe, engroſs the public attention; there is none of it left to be employed about the happineſs of the people, and indeed hardly any for their defence in caſe of need: thus it is that a body too unweildy for its conſtitution grows debilitated, and ſinks under its own weight.

On the other hand, a ſtate ought to be fixed on ſome baſis, to ſecure its ſolidity, to be able to reſiſt thoſe ſhocks which it will not fail to encounter, and to make thoſe efforts which it will find neceſſary to maintain its dependence. Nations have all a kind of centrifugal force by which they act continually againſt each other, and tend, like the vortices of Deſcartes, to aggrandiſe themſelves at the expence of their neighbours. Thus the weak run in danger of being preſently

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ſwallowed up by the ſtrong; nor is there any ſecurity for them, but by keeping themſelves in equilibrio with the reſt, and making the compreſſion on every ſide equal.

Hence we ſee it is prudent in ſome caſes to extend, and in others to reſtrain, the limits of a ſtate; nor is it one of the leaſt arts in civil polity to diſtinguiſh between one and the other, and to fix on that advantageous proportion which tends moſt to the preſervation of the ſtate. It may be obſerved in general, that the reaſons for extending dominion, relating to objects external and relative, ought to be ſubordinate to thoſe for contracting it, whoſe objects are internal and abſolute. A ſound and vigorous conſtitution is the firſt thing to be conſidered; and a much greater reliance is to be made on a good government, than on the reſources which are to be drawn from an extenſive territory.

Not but that there have been inſtances of ſtates ſo conſtituted, that the neceſſity of their making conqueſts hath been eſſential to their very conſtitution. It is poſſible alſo they might felicitate themſelves on that happy neceſſity, which pointed out, nevertheleſs, with the ſummit of their grandeur, the inevitable moment of their fall.

CHAP. X. *The ſubject continued.*

THE magnitude of a body-politic may be taken two ways; viz. by the extent of territory, and the number of the people; a certain proportional relation between them conſtituting the real greatneſs of a ſtate. It is the people which form the ſtate, and the territory which affords ſubſiſtence to the people; this relation, there-

therefore exiſts, when the territory is ſufficient for the ſubſiſtence of the inhabitants, and the inhabitants are as numerous as the territory can maintain. In this proportion conſiſts the *maximum* of the force of any given number of people; for if the territory be too extenſive, the defence of it is burdenſome, the cultivation inſufficient, and the produce ſuperfluous: hence the proximate cauſes of defenſive war. If, on the other hand, the territory be too ſmall, the ſtate is under the neceſſity of being obliged for part of its ſubſiſtence to its neighbours: hence the proximate cauſes of offenſive war. Every people who, by their ſituation, have no other alternative than commerce or war, muſt be neceſſarily feeble: they muſt depend on their neighbours, on adventitious circumſtances, and can only have a ſhort and uncertain exiſtence. They muſt conquer others, and thereby change their ſituation; or be conquered themſelves, and thence be reduced to nothing. It is impoſſible ſuch a ſtate can preſerve its independency but by its inſignificancy or its greatneſs.

It is not eaſy to calculate the determinate relation between the extent of territory and number of inhabitants ſufficient for each other; not only on account of the difference in the qualities of the ſoil, in its degrees of fertility, in the nature of its productions, and in the influence of climate; but alſo on account of the remarkable difference in the temperament and conſtitution of the inhabitants; ſome conſuming but little in a fertile country, and others a great deal on a barren ſoil. Regard muſt alſo be had to the degree of fecundity among the females, to the circumſtances favourable or deſtructive to population,

lation, and to the number of people which the legiſlator may hope to draw from other countries by the advantages attending his ſcheme of government; ſo that he ought not to found his judgment on what actually exiſts, but on what he foreſees may exiſt hereafter; not on the preſent ſtate of population, but on that which will naturally ſucceed. In fine, there are a thouſand occaſions, on which local accidents acquire, or permit a ſtate to poſſeſs, a larger ſhare of territory than may appear actually neceſſary for preſent uſe. Thus a people may ſpread themſelves over a large ſpot in a mountainous country, whoſe natural produce of wood or paſture requires leſs labour of cultivation; where experience teaches us that women are more fruitful than in the flat countries; and in which a large inclined ſuperficies gives but a ſmall horizontal baſe, by which only the land muſt be eſtimated in the affair of vegetation. A people, on the contrary, may inhabit a leſs ſpace on the ſea-ſhore, or even among rocks and almoſt barren ſands; becauſe the fiſhery ſupplies them with ſuſtenance, inſtead of the produce of the earth; they can eaſily diſburden their community by ſending out colonies of its ſupernumerary inhabitants; and laſtly, becauſe it is neceſſary for them in ſuch a caſe to live near to each other, in order to repel the invaſions of pirates.

We may add to theſe conditional precautions, reſpecting the formation of a people, one that can be ſupplied by no other, but without which all the reſt are uſeleſs: this is, that they ſhould enjoy peace and plenty. For the time in which a ſtate is forming, reſembles that in which ſoldiers are forming a battalion; it is the moment

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in which they are leaſt capable of reſiſtance, and the moſt eaſily defeated. They would even make a greater reſiſtance when put into abſolute diſorder afterwards, than during the interval of their firſt fermentation, when each is taken up more about his own particular rank than the common danger. Should a war, a famine, or a rebellion, break out at ſuch a criſis, the ſtate would infallibly be ſubverted.

Not but there have been many governments eſtabliſhed in times of diſorder and confuſion: in ſuch caſes, however, thoſe very governments ſubverted the ſtate. Uſurpers have always given riſe to, or took the advantage of, thoſe times of general confuſion, in order to procure ſuch deſtructive laws, which the people never could have been prevailed on to paſs at a more diſpaſſionate ſeaſon. The choice of the proper time for the inſtitution of laws, is one of the moſt certain tokens by which we may diſtinguiſh the deſign of a legiſlator from that of a tyrant.

If it be aſked then, what people are in a ſituation to receive a ſyſtem of laws? I anſwer, thoſe who, though connected by ſome primitive union either of intereſt or compact, are not yet truly ſubjected to regular laws; thoſe whoſe cuſtoms and prejudices are not deeply rooted; thoſe who are under no fear of being ſwallowed up by a ſudden invaſion, and who, without entering into the quarrels of their neighbours, are able to encounter ſeparately with each, or to engage the aſſiſtance of one to repel the other; a people whoſe individuals may be known to each other, and among whom it is not neceſſary to charge a man with a greater burden than it is poſſible for him to bear; a people who can

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ſubſiſt without others, and without whom all others might ſubſiſt *; a people neither rich nor poor, but poſſeſſed of a competence within themſelves; a people, in ſhort, who poſſeſs at once the conſiſtency of an ancient nation, and the docility of a newly-created one. The great difficulty in legiſlation, conſiſts leſs in knowing what ought to be eſtabliſhed than what ought to be eradicated; and what renders it ſo ſeldom ſucceſsful, is the impoſſibility of finding the ſimplicity of nature in the wants of ſociety. It is true that all theſe circumſtances are very rarely united; and it is for this reaſon that ſo few ſtates have much to boaſt of in their conſtitution. There is ſtill one country in Europe capable of receiving laws: this is the iſland of Corſica. The valour and conſtancy, with which thoſe brave people recovered, and have defended their liberty, might deſervedly excite ſome wiſe man to teach them how to preſerve it. I cannot help ſurmiſing, that this little iſland will, one day or other, be the aſtoniſhment of Europe.

Chap. XI. *Of the various ſyſtems of legiſlature.*

IF we were to inquire, in what conſiſts preciſely the greateſt good, or what ought to be the end

* If two neighbouring people were ſo ſituated that one could not ſubſiſt without the other, the circumſtances of the firſt would be very hard, and of the latter very dangerous. Every wiſe nation, in ſuch a caſe, would extricate itſelf as ſoon as poſſible from ſuch a ſtate of dependence. The republic of Thlaſcala, ſituated in the heart of the Mexican empire, choſe rather to be without ſalt, than purchaſe it, or even receive it gratis, of the Mexicans. The prudent Thlaſcalans ſaw through the ſnare of ſuch liberality. Thus they preſerved their liberty; this petty ſtate, included within that great empire, being, in the end, the cauſe of its ruin.

end of every ſyſtem of legiſlatute, we ſhould find it reducible to two principal objects, *liberty* and *equality;* liberty, becauſe all partial dependence deprives the whole body of the ſtate of ſo much ſtrength; equality, becauſe liberty cannot ſubſiſt without it.

I have already explained the nature of ſocial liberty; and with regard to equality, we are not to underſtand by that term, that individuals ſhould all abſolutely poſſeſs the ſame degree of wealth and power; but only that, with reſpect to the latter, it ſhould never be exerciſed contrary to good order and the laws; and with reſpect to the former, that no one citizen ſhould be rich enough to buy another, and that none ſhould be ſo poor as to be obliged to ſell himſelf †. This ſuppoſes a moderation of poſſeſſions and credit on the ſide of the great, and a moderation of deſires and covetouſneſs on the part of the little.

This equality, they tell us, is a mere ſpeculative chimera, which cannot exiſt in practice. But though abuſes are inevitable, does it thence follow they are not to be corrected? It is for the very reaſon that things always tend to deſtroy this equality, that the laws ſhould be calculated to preſerve it.

Theſe general objects of legiſlature, however, ſhould be variouſly modified in different

† Would you give a ſtate conſiſtency and ſtrength? prevent the two extremes as much as poſſible; let there be no rich perſons nor beggars. Theſe two conditions, naturally inſeparable, are equally deſtructive to the commonwealth: the one furniſhes tyrants, and the other the ſupporters of tyranny. It is by theſe the traffic of public liberty is carried on; the one buying, the other ſelling it.

countries, agreeable to local ſituation, the character of the inhabitants, and thoſe other circumſtances which require that every people ſhould have a particular ſyſtem of laws, not always the beſt in itſelf, but the beſt adapted to that ſtate for which it is calculated. If, for example, the ſoil be ungrateful and barren, or the country too ſmall for its inhabitants, cheriſh induſtry and the arts, the productions of which may be exchanged for the commodities required. On the other hand, if your country abounds in fertile hills and plenteous vales; if you live on a rich ſoil in want of inhabitants; apply yourſelves to agriculture, which affords the means of population; and baniſh the deſtructive arts, which ſerve only to ruin a country, by gathering the few inhabitants of it together in one particular ſpot or two, to the depopulation of all the reſt†. Do you occupy an extenſive and commodious ſituation by the ſea-ſide? Cover the ocean with your ſhips, cultivate the arts of navigation and commerce: you will by theſe means enjoy a brilliant but ſhort exiſtence. On the contrary, do the waves only waſte their ſtrength againſt your innacceſſible rocks? Remain barbarous and illiterate; you will live but the more at eaſe, perhaps more virtuous, aſſuredly more happy. In a word, beſides the maxims common to all nations, every people are poſſeſſed in themſelves of ſome cauſe which influences them in a particular manner, and ren-

† The advantage of foreign commerce, ſays the Marquis d'A. is productive only of a deluſive utility to the kingdom in general. It may enrich a few individuals, and perhaps ſome cities; but the whole nation gains nothing by it, nor are the people the better for it.

renders their own ſyſtem of laws proper only for themſelves. It is thus that in ancient times among the Hebrews, and in modern times among the Arabians, religion was made the principal object of national concern; among the Athenians, this object was literature; at Carthage and Tyre, it was commerce; at Rhodes, it was navigation; at Sparta war, and at Rome public virtue. The author of the *Spirit of laws* hath ſhewn, by a number of examples, in what manner the legiſlator ſhould model his ſyſtem agreeable to each of theſe objects.

What renders the conſtitution of a ſtate truly ſolid and durable, is that agreement maintained therein between natural and ſocial relations, which occaſions the legiſlature always ro act in concert with nature, while the laws ſerve only to confirm and rectify, as it were, the dictates of the former. But if the legiſlator, deceived in his object, ſhould aſſume a principle different from that which ariſes from the nature of things; ſhould the one tend to ſlavery and the other to liberty, one to riches, the other to population, one to peace, the other to war and conqueſts; the laws would inſenſibly loſe their force, the conſtitution would alter, and the ſtate continue to be agitated till it ſhould be totally changed or deſtroyed, and nature have reſumed its empire.

CHAP. XII. *On the diviſion of the laws.*

IN order to provide for the government of the whole, or give the beſt poſſible form to the conſtitution, various circumſtances are to be taken into conſideration. Of theſe the firſt is the

action of the whole body operating on itſelf; that is, the relation of the whole to the whole, or of the ſovereign to the ſtate, which relation is compoſed of thoſe between the intermediate terms, as will be ſeen hereafter.

The laws which govern this relation bear the name of politic laws; and are alſo called fundamental laws, not without ſome reaſon when they are wiſely ordained. For if there be only one good method of government in a ſtate, the people who have been ſo happy as to hit on that method ought to abide by it: but, wherefore ſhould a people, whoſe laws are bad or defective, eſteem ſuch laws to be fundamental? Beſides, a nation is in any caſe at liberty to change even the beſt laws, when it pleaſes: for if a people have a mind even to do themſelves an injury, who hath any right to prevent them?

The ſecond circumſtance is the relations which the members of the community bear to each other and to the whole body; the firſt of which ſhould be as little, and the laſt as great, as poſſible; ſo that every citizen ſhould live in a ſtate of perfect independence on all the reſt, and in a ſtate of the greateſt dependence on the city. Both theſe are ever effected by the ſame means: for it is the power of the ſtate only that conſtitutes the liberty of its members. On this ſecond kind of relation is laid the immediate foundation of the civil laws.

It may be proper to conſider alſo a third ſpecies of relation between the individual and the law; which gives immediate riſe to penal ſtatutes: theſe, however, are in fact leſs a diſtinct ſpecies of laws than the ſanction of all the others.

To theſe three kind of laws, may be added a fourth,

fourth, more important than all the reſt; and which are neither engraven on braſs or marble, but in the hearts of the citizens, forming the real conſtitution of the ſtate. Theſe are the laws which acquire daily freſh influence, and, when others grow old and obſolete, invigorate and revive them: theſe are the laws which keep alive in the hearts of the people the original ſpirit of their inſtitution, and ſubſtitute inſenſibly the force of habit to that of authority. The laws I here ſpeak of are, manners, cuſtoms, and, above all, public opinion; all unknown or diſregarded by our modern politicians, but on which depends the ſucceſs of all the reſt. Theſe are the objects on which the real legiſlator is employed in ſecret, while he appears ſolely to confine himſelf to thoſe particular regulations which compoſe only the preparatory centre of the vault, of which manners, more ſlow in their progreſs, form in the end the immoveable arch.

Of theſe claſſes, politic laws, or thoſe which conſtitute the form of government, are relative only to my preſent ſubject.

BOOK III.

BEFORE we enter on a diſcuſſion of the ſeveral forms of government, it will not be improper to aſcertain the preciſe meaning of that term; which as yet hath not been well explained.

CHAP. I. *On government in general.*

I MUST previouſly caution the reader to per-

ruſe this chapter very deliberately, as it is impoſſible to render myſelf clearly intelligible to ſuch as are not attentive.

Every free action hath two cauſes, which concur to effect its production; the one moral, *viz.* the will which determines the act; the other phyſical, *viz.* the power which puts it in execution. When I walk, for inſtance, toward any particular object, it is firſt neceſſary that I ſhould will to go, and ſecondly that my feet ſhould bear me forward. A paralytic may will to run, and an active racer be unwilling: the want of power in the one hath the ſame effect as the want of will in the other; both remain in their place. The body-politic hath the ſame principles of motion; which are dinguiſhed alſo in the ſame manner by power and will; the latter under the name of the *legiſlative* power, and the former under that of the *executive* power. Nothing is or ought to be done without the concurrence of both.

We have already ſeen that the legiſlative power belongs to the people in general, and can belong to none elſe. On the other hand, it is eaſy to conclude, from the principles already eſtabliſhed, that the executive power cannot appertain to the generality, as legiſlator or ſovereign; becauſe this power is exerted only in particular acts, which are not the province of the law, nor of courſe that of the ſovereign, whoſe acts can be no other than laws.

To the public force, therefore, ſhould be annexed a proper agent, which may re-unite and put it in action, agreeable to the directions of the general will; ſerving as a communication between the ſtate and the ſovereign, and effecting

ing the ſame purpoſe in the body-politic, as the union of the ſoul and body in man. Such is the rationale of government, ſo generally confounded with the ſovereign, of which it is only the miniſtry.

What then is government? It is an intermediate body eſtabliſhed between the ſubject and the ſovereign, for their mutual correſpondence; charged with the execution of the laws, and with the maintenance of civil and political liberty.

The members of which this body is compoſed, are called magiſtrates or *kings*, that is to ſay, *governors*, and the whole body bears the name of the *prince* *. Thoſe, therefore, who affirm that the act, by which a people profeſs ſubmiſſion to their chiefs or governors, is not a contract, are certainly right; it being in fact nothing more than the conferring a ſimple commiſſion on the ſaid chiefs; an employ, in the diſcharge of which they act as mere officers of the ſovereign, exerciſing in his name the power which it hath placed in their hands, and which it may limit, modify, or reſume, whenever it pleaſes, the alienation of its right ſo to do being incompatible with the very nature and being of ſociety.

I call therefore, the legal exerciſe of the executive power, the *Government* or ſupreme adminiſtration; and the individual or body charged with that adminiſtration, the *Prince* or the *Magiſtrate*.

In the government are to be found thoſe intermediate forces, whoſe relations compoſe that of

† Thus, at Venice, the college of ſenators is called the moſt ſerene *prince*, even when the doge is not preſent.

of the whole to the whole, or of the ſovereign to the ſtate. This laſt relation may be repreſented by that of the extremes of a conſtant proportion, the mean proportional of which is the government. The government receives from the ſovereign thoſe orders which it gives to the people; ſo that, in order to keep the ſtate in due equilibrio, there ſhould, every thing conſidered, be the ſame equality between the momentum or force of the government taken in itſelf, and the momentum or force of the citizens, who are the ſovereign conſidered collectively on one ſide, and ſubjects conſidered ſeverally on the other.

It is, beſides, impoſſible to vary any of theſe three terms, without inſtantly deſtroying the proportions. If the ſovereign ſhould be deſirous to govern, or the magiſtrate to give laws, or the ſubjects refuſe to obey, diſorder muſt immediately take place; the will and the power thus no longer acting in concert, the ſtate would be diſſolved, and fall into deſpotiſm or anarchy. Add to this, that as there can be but one mean proportional between each relation, there can be but one good government for a ſtate. But as a thouſand events may change the relation ſubſiſting among a people; different governments may not only be good for different people, but even for the ſame people at different periods of time.

In order to give the reader an idea of the various relations that may exiſt between theſe two extremes, I ſhall, by way of example, make uſe of the number of people, as a relation the moſt eaſily expreſſed.

We will ſuppoſe, for inſtance, that a ſtate is compoſed of ten thouſand citizens. The ſovereign muſt be conſidered as collectively only

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and in a body; but every particular in quality of ſubject is conſidered as an individual: thus the ſovereign is in this caſe to the ſubject as ten thouſand to one; that is to ſay, every member of the ſtate ſhares only the ten thouſandth part of the ſovereign authority, while at the ſame time he is ſubjected to it in his whole perſon. Again, ſhould the number of people be increaſed to an hundred thouſand, the ſubmiſſion of the ſubjects would receive no alteration, each of them being totally ſubjected to the authority of the laws; while his ſhare in the ſovereignty, and vote in the enaction of theſe laws, would be reduced to the hundred-thouſandth part; a tenth leſs than before. Thus the ſubject, remaining always a ſingle integer, the proportion between him and the ſovereign increaſes as the number of citizens is augmented: whence it follows, that as a ſtate increaſes, the liberty of the ſubject diminiſhes.

When I ſay the proportion increaſes, I mean that it recedes farther from the point of equality. Thus the greater the proportion, in the language of the geometricians, it is reckoned the leſs according to common acceptation: agreeable to the former, the relation, conſidered in point of quantity, is eſtimated by its extent; according to the latter, conſidered in point of identity, it is eſtimated by its proximation.

Now, the leſs proportion which particular voices bear to the general, that is to ſay, the manners to the laws, the more ought the general reſtrictive force to be augmented. Thus the government ſhould be relatively more powerful as the people are more numerous.

On the other hand, the increaſing greatneſs of

of a ſtate affording the guardians of the public authority greater temptations and means to abuſe their power, the more force a government is poſſeſſed of to reſtrain the people, the more ought the ſovereign to be poſſeſſed of in its turn to reſtrain the government. I am not ſpeaking here of abſolute power, but of the relative forces of the component parts of the ſtate.

It follows, from this two-fold relation, that the conſtant proportion between the ſovereign, the prince, and the people, is not a mere arbitrary idea, but a neceſſary conſequence of the very exiſtence of the body-politic. It follows alſo, that one of the extremes, *viz.* the people as ſubjects, being a fixed term repreſented by unity wherever the two-fold ratio is increaſed or diminiſhed, that the ſimple ratio muſt increaſe or diminiſh in like manner, and of courſe the mean term will be changed. Hence it appears there is no one ſettled conſtitution of government, but that there may be as many governments different in their nature as there are ſtates differing in magnitude.

If any one ſhould affect to turn my ſyſtem into ridicule, and ſay, that, in order to find this mean proportional, and form the government as it ought to be, we have no more to do than to find the ſquare root of the number of the people; I anſwer, that I here make uſe of the number of the people only by way of example; that the relations of which I have been ſpeaking, are not only eſtimated by the number of individuals, but in general by the momentum or quantity of action, which ariſes from a combination of various cauſes; and though, in order to expreſs myſelf conciſely, I borrow the terms of geometry,

try, I am not ignorant that geometrical preciſion is not to be expected in treating of moral quantities.

The government is in miniature what the body politic containing it is at large. It is a moral perſon endowed with certain faculties, active as the ſovereign, paſſive as the ſtate, and capable of being reſolved into other ſenſible relations, from which of courſe ariſes a new ſcale of proportion, and ſtill another within this, according to the order of the courts of juſtice, till we arrive at the laſt indiviſible term, that is to ſay, the ſole chief or ſupreme magiſtrate, which may be repreſented in the centre of this progreſſion, as an unity between the ſeries of fractions, and that of whole numbers.

But, without embarraſſing the reader with a multiplicity of terms, we ſhall content ourſelves with conſidering the government as a new body in the ſtate, diſtinct from the ſubjects and the ſovereign, and exiſting between both.

There is this eſſential difference, however, between the government and the ſtate, that the latter exiſts of itſelf, and the former only by means of the ſovereign. Thus as the ruling will of the prince is, or ought to be, only the general will, or the law, the power of the prince is only that of the public centered in him; ſo that whenever he would derive from himſelf any abſolute and independent act, the combination of the whole is effected. And if, at length, the prince ſhould have a particular will of his own, more active than that of the ſovereign, and ſhould make uſe of the public power in his hands to enforce obedience to ſuch particular will, forming, as it were, two ſovereigns, the

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one of right and the other of fact, the ſocial union immediately vaniſhes, and the body politic is diſſolved.

In order that the body of government, nevertheleſs, may have an exiſtence, a real life to diſtinguiſh it from that of the ſtate; and that its members may act in concert, to anſwer the end for which it is inſtituted; it is neceſſary that it ſhould be poſſeſſed of a particular identity, a ſenſibility common to all its members, a power and will of its own, for the ſake of its preſervation. Such a particular exiſtence neceſſarily ſuppoſes that of aſſemblies and councils; of a power to deliberate and reſolve; of the rights, titles, and privileges which belong excluſively to the prince, and render the ſituation of a magiſtrate the more honourable in proportion as it is more laborious. The difficulty lies in the method of diſpoſing all the inferior parts of the whole body; ſo that, while it is ſtrengthening its own conſtitution, it may not injure that of the ſtate. At the ſame time, alſo, it ſhould always diſtinguiſh between the peculiar force deſtined to its own preſervation, and the public force deſtined to the preſervation of the ſtate; in a word, it ſhould be always ready to ſacrifice the government to the people, and not the people to the government.

To this we may add, that, although the artificial body of government be the work of another artificial body, and is poſſeſſed only of a borrowed and ſubordinate exiſtence; this doth not prevent it from acting with different degrees of vigour and celerity, or from enjoying, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, a greater or leſs ſhare of health and ſtrength. In ſhort, it may, without running diametrically oppoſite to the pur-

purpoſes of its inſtitution, deviate from them more or leſs, according to the mode in which it is conſtituted.

It is from all theſe differences that ariſe thoſe various relations and proportions, which the government ought to bear toward the ſtate, according to thoſe accidental and particular relations in which the ſtate is modified. For the beſt government in itſelf may often become the worſt, if the relation of its component parts are not altered according to the defects of the body-politic to which it belongs.

Chap. II. *On the principle which conſtitutes the different forms of government.*

TO explain the general cauſe of theſe differences, it is neceſſary to diſtinguiſh here between the prince and the government, in the ſame manner as I have already done between the ſovereign and the ſtate. The body of the magiſtracy may be compoſed of a greater or a leſs number of members. It hath been obſerved alſo, that the relation the ſovereign bears to the ſubject increaſes in proportion to the number of people; thus, by an evident analogy, we may ſay the ſame of the relation between the government and the magiſtrates.

Now the total force of the government, being always equal to that of the ſtate, ſuffers no alteration; whence it follows, that the more ſuch force is ſpent by the diſtribution of it among the members of the government, the leſs remains to be exerted on the whole body of people.

That government, therefore, which is in the hands of the greateſt number of magiſtrates,

muſt be the moſt feeble. As this is a fundamental maxim, we ſhall take ſome pains to illuſtrate it.

In the perſon of the magiſtrate may be diſtinguiſhed three wills eſſentially different. In the firſt place, the particular will of the individual, which tends only to his private advantage: ſecondly, that will which is common to him as a magiſtrate, tending ſolely to the advantage of the prince; being general with reſpect to the government, and particular with regard to the ſtate, of which the government is only a part: and in the third place, the will of the people, or the ſovereign will, which is general as well with regard to the ſtate conſidered as a whole, as with regard to the government conſidered as a part of that whole.

In a complete ſyſtem of legiſlature, the particular will, or that of the individual, ſhould amount to nothing; the will of the body of government ſhould be very limited, and of courſe the general or ſovereign will the ruling and ſole director of all the others.

According to the order of nature, however, theſe different wills are ranged in a contrary manner; being always more active as they are concentrated in themſelves. Thus the general will is always the moſt feeble, that of the government next, and the will of the individual the ſtrongeſt of all; ſo that each member of the adminiſtration is to be conſidered, firſt of all as an individual, ſecondly as a magiſtrate, and laſtly as a citizen; a gradation directly oppoſite to that which the order of ſociety requires.

The point being ſettled, let us ſuppoſe the adminiſtration of government committed to the hands

hands of one man. In this caſe the will of the individual, and that of the body of the magiſtracy, are perfectly united, and of conſequence the latter poſſeſſes the greateſt degree of intenſity. Now, as it is on the degree of the will that the exertion of force depends, and as the abſolute force of the government never varies, it follows that the moſt active of all adminiſtrations muſt be that of a ſingle perſon.

On the contrary, if we unite the adminiſtration and the legiſlature; if we make the prince the ſovereign, and the citizens all ſo many magiſtrates; in this caſe, the will of the government, confounded with the general will, would poſſeſs no greater ſhare of activity, but would leave the particular will of individuals to exert its whole force. Thus the government, having always the ſame degree of abſolute force, would be at its *minimum* of relative force or activity.

Theſe relations are inconteſtable, and may be farther confirmed by other conſiderations. It is evident, for example, that the magiſtrate is more active in that capacity than the citizen in his; and that of courſe the will of the individual muſt have a more conſiderable ſhare of influence in the adminiſtration of government, than in the actions of the ſovereign; every magiſtrate being almoſt always charged with ſome function of government, whereas no citizen, conſidered as an individual, diſcharges any function of the ſovereignty. Beſide this, the real force of a ſtate increaſes, as the ſtate increaſes in magnitude, tho' not always in the ratio of that magnitude; but while the ſtate remains the ſame, it is in vain to increaſe the number of magiſtrates, as the government will not thereby acquire any

additional ſtrength, becauſe its force, being always that of the ſtate, is conſtantly equal. And thus the relative force or activity of government is diminiſhed, without its real and abſolute force being augmented.

It is further certain, that public affairs muſt be tranſacted more or leſs expeditiouſly according to the number of people charged with their diſpatch; that by laying too great a ſtreſs on prudence, too little is truſted to fortune; that the opportunity of ſucceſs is thus frequently loſt, and that by the mere force of deliberation the end of it is defeated.

This may ſerve to prove, that the reins of government are relaxed in proportion as the magiſtrates are multiplied; and I have before demonſtrated, that the more numerous the people are, the more ſhould the reſtraining power of government be increaſed: Hence it follows, that the proportion which the number of magiſtrates ſhould hold to the government ſhould be in the inverſe ratio of the ſubjects to the ſovereign; that is to ſay, the more extenſive the ſtate, the more contracted ſhould be the government, the number of chiefs diminiſhing as that of the people increaſes.

I ſpeak here only of the relative force of the government, and not of the rectitude or propriety of it. For, otherwiſe, it is certain, that the more numerous the magiſtracy is, the nearer doth the will of that body approach to the general will of the whole people; whereas, under a ſole chief, the will of the magiſtracy is, as I have before obſerved, only that of an individual. Thus what is gained in one reſpect, is loſt on the other; and the art of the legiſlator conſiſts

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in tracing the fixed point, at which the force and the will of the government, always in a reciprocal proportion to each other, unite in that proportion which is moſt advantageous to the ſtate.

CHAP. III. *Of the actual diſtinctions of governments.*

WE have treated, in the preceding chapter, of the reaſons for diſtinguiſhing the ſeveral ſpecies and forms of government, by the number of the members compoſing them; it remains therefore to ſhew, in the preſent, how theſe diſtinctions are actually made.

The ſovereign authority may, in the firſt place, commit the charge of the government to the whole people, or to the greater part of them; the number of magiſtrates in ſuch caſe exceeding that of private citizens. This form of government is diſtinguiſhed by the name of a democracy.

Or, otherwiſe, the ſupreme power may commit the office of government into the hands of a few, ſo that the number of private citizens may exceed that of magiſtrates; and this form bears the name of an ariſtocracy.

Or laſtly, the government may be entruſted to one magiſtrate only, who delegates his power to all the reſt. This third form is the moſt common, and is called a monarchy or a regal government.

It is to be obſerved that all theſe forms, and particularly the two former, are ſuſceptible of different degrees of perfection, and admit indeed of conſiderable latitude in their modification: for a democracy may comprehend the

whole people, or be limited to the half. An ariſtocracy alſo may comprehend any quantity from the half of the people to the ſmalleſt number indefinitely. Nay a monarchy itſelf is ſuſceptible of ſome diſtribution. Sparta, for inſtance, had conſtitutionally two kings at a time; and the Romans had even eight emperors at once, without the empire having been actually divided. Thus, we ſee, there is a certain point, at which each form of government is confounded with that to which it is neareſt related; and thus, under three diſtinguiſhing denominations only, government is really ſuſceptible of as many different forms as there are citizens in the ſtate.

To go ſtill farther; as even one and the ſame government is capable, in many reſpects, of being ſubdivided into parts, of which the adminiſtration may reſpectively differ, there may reſult from the varied combinations of theſe forms a multitude of others, every one of which may be again multiplied by all the ſimple forms.

Politicians have in all ages diſputed much about the beſt form of government, without conſidering that each different form may poſſibly be the beſt in ſome caſes, and the worſt in others.

If in different ſtates the number of ſupreme magiſtrates ſhould be in the inverſe ratio to that of the citizens, it follows that the democratical government is generally ſpeaking better ſuited to ſmall ſtates, the ariſtocratical to middling ſtates, and the monarchical to great ſtates. This rule is deduced immediately from our principles; but it is impoſſible to particulariſe the multiplicity of circumſtances which may furniſh exceptions againſt it.

CHAP. IV. *Of a democracy.*

THE inſtitutor of a law ſhould certainly know better than any other perſon, how it ought to be underſtood and executed. It ſhould ſeem therefore, that the beſt conſtitution muſt be that in which the legiſlative and executive powers are lodged in the ſame hands. It is this very circumſtance, however, that renders ſuch a government imperfect; becauſe there doth not exiſt the neceſſary diſtinction, which ought to be made in its parts; while the prince and the ſovereign, being one and the ſame perſon, only form, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, a government without a government.

It is not proper that the power which makes the laws ſhould execute them, or that the attention of the whole body of the people ſhould be diverted from general views to particular objects. Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private intereſt in public affairs; the abuſe of the laws by the government, being a leſs evil than the corruption of the legiſlature; which is infallibly the conſequence of its being governed by particular views. For in that caſe, the ſtate being eſſentially altered, all reformation becomes impoſſible. A people who would not abuſe the power of government, would be no more propenſe to abuſe their independence; and a people who ſhould always govern well, would have no occaſion to be governed at all.

To take the term in its ſtricteſt ſenſe, there never exiſted, and never will exiſt, a real democracy in the world. It is contrary to the natural order of things, that the majority of a peo-

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ple ſhould be the governors, and the minority the governed. It is not to be conceived that a whole people ſhould remain perſonally aſſembled to manage the affairs of the public; and it is evident, that no ſooner are deputies or repreſentatives appointed, than the form of the adminiſtration is changed.

It may be laid down indeed as a maxim, that when the functions of government are divided among ſeveral courts, that which is compoſed of the feweſt perſons will, ſooner or later, acquire the greateſt authority: though it were for no other reaſon than the facility with which it is calculated to expedite affairs.

Such a form of government ſuppoſes, alſo, the concurrence of a number of circumſtances rarely united. In the firſt place, it is requiſite that the ſtate itſelf ſhould be of ſmall extent, ſo that the peple might be eaſily aſſembled and all perſonally known to each other. Secondly, the ſimplicity of their manners ſhould be ſuch, as to prevent a multiplicity of affairs, and perplexity in diſcuſſing them: And thirdly, there ſhould ſubſiſt a great degree of equality between the rank and fortunes of individuals; without which there cannot exiſt long any equality between them in point of right and authority. Laſtly, there ſhould be little or no luxury; for luxury muſt either be the effect of wealth, or it muſt make it neceſſary: it corrupts at once both rich and poor; the one by means of the poſſeſſion of wealth, and the other by means of the want of it. Luxury makes a ſacrifice of patriotiſm to indolence and vanity; it robes a ſtate of its citizens, by ſubjecting them to each other, and by ſubjecting all to the influence of public prejudice.

It

It is for this reaſon that a certain celebrated author hath laid down virtue as the firſt principle of a republican government: for all theſe circumſtances cannot concur without the exiſtence of public virtue. For want, however, of making proper diſtinctions, this great genius hath been led into frequent miſtakes, as well as want of preciſion; not having obſerved, that, the ſovereign authority being every where the ſame, the ſame principle muſt take place in every well conſtituted ſtate; though, it is true, in a greater or leſs degree, according to the form of government.

To this it may be added, that no government is ſo ſubject to civil wars and inteſtine commotions as that of the democratical or popular form; becauſe no other tends ſo ſtrongly and ſo conſtantly to alter, nor requires ſo much vigilance and fortitude to preſerve it from alteration. It is, indeed, in ſuch a conſtitution particularly that the citizen ſhould always be armed with force and conſtancy, and ſhould repeat every day, in the ſincerity of his heart, the ſaying of the virtuous Palatine *, *Malo periculoſam libertatem quam quietum ſervitium.*

Did there exiſt a nation of gods, their government would doubtleſs be democratical; it is too perfect a form, however, for mankind.

CHAP. V. *Of an ariſtocracy.*

IN this form of government exiſt two moral perſons, very palpably diſtinct, viz. the adminiſtration and the ſovereign; which of courſe poſſeſs

* The Palatine of Poſnania, father of the King of Poland, Duke of Lorrain.

poſſeſs two general wills, the one regarding the citizens univerſally, the other only the members of the adminiſtration. Thus, although the government may regulate the interior police of the ſtate as it pleaſes, it cannot addreſs the people but in the name of the ſovereign, that is to ſay, the people themſelves; which is a circumſtance never to be omitted. The primitive ſocieties of mankind were governed ariſtocratically. The heads of families deliberated among themſelves concerning public affairs; the young people readily ſubmitting to the authority of experience. Hence the names of *Prieſts*, the *Fathers*, the *Senate*, &c. The ſavages of North America are governed in the ſame manner to this day, and are extremely well governed.

But, in proportion as the inequality ariſing from ſocial inſtitutions prevailed over natural inequality, riches and power were preferred to age *, and the ariſtocracy became elective. At length power, tranſmitted with property from father to ſon, making whole families patrician, rendered the government hereditary, and boys of twenty became ſenators.

Ariſtocracy therefore is of three kinds; natural, elective, and hereditary. The firſt is applicable only to the moſt ſimple ſtate of ſociety, while the laſt is the worſt of all kinds of government. The ſecond is the beſt; and is what is moſt properly denominated an ariſtocracy.

Beſide the advantage of the above-mentioned diſtinction, this form hath alſo that of the choice of its members. In a popular government, all the

* It is evident that the term *Optimates*, among the ancients, did not mean the beſt, but moſt powerful.

the citizens are born magiſtrates: but in this the number of the latter are very limited, and they become ſuch only by election *; a method by which their probity, their talents, their experience, and all thoſe other reaſons for preference in the public eſteem, are an additional ſecurity that the people ſhall be wiſely governed.

Again, their public aſſemblies are attended with more decorum; affairs of ſtate are more regularly diſcuſſed, and buſineſs executed with greater order and expedition; while the credit of the ſtate is better ſupported, in the eyes of foreigners, by a ſelect number of venerable ſenators, than by a promiſcuous or contemptible mob.

In a word, that order would be undoubtedly the beſt and moſt natural, according to which the wiſe and experienced few direct the multitude, were it certain that the few would in their government conſult the intereſt of the majority governed, and not their own. It is abſurd to multiply the ſprings of action to no purpoſe, or to employ twenty thouſand men in doing that which an hundred properly ſelected would effect much better.

With regard to the particular circumſtances requiſite to this form of government; the ſtate ſhould not be ſo ſmall, nor the manners of the people ſo ſimple or ſo virtuous, as that the execution of the laws ſhould coincide with the public will, as in a well-founded democracy. On the

* It is of great importance to regulate by law the method of chuſing magiſtrates; for, in leaving this to the prince, it is impoſſible to avoid falling into an hereditary ariſtocracy, as happened to the republics of Venice and Berne. Hence the firſt has been long ſince diſſolved, but the ſecond hath been ſupported by the great prudence of the Senate. This is an exception, however, as dangerous as honourable.

the other hand alſo, the ſtate ſhould not be ſo extenſive that the governors, diſtributed up and down its provinces, might be able to render themſelves, each in his ſeparate department, independent of the ſovereign.

But if an ariſtocracy requires fewer virtues than a popular government; there are yet ſome which are peculiar to it; ſuch as moderation in the rich, and content in the poor: an exact equality of condition would in ſuch a government be quite improper; nor was it obſerved even at Sparta.

If a certain degree, however, of inequality in the fortunes of the people be proper in ſuch a government, the reaſon of it is, that in geneneral the adminiſtration of public affairs ought to be put into the hands of thoſe perſons who can beſt devote their time to ſuch ſervice. Not, as Ariſtotle pretends, that the rich ought always to be preferred merely on account of their wealth. On the contrary, it is very neceſſary that an oppoſite choice ſhould ſometimes teach the people, that there exiſt other motives of preference much more important than riches.

Chap. VI. *On monarchy.*

Hitherto we have conſidered the prince as a moral and collective perſonage, formed by the force of the laws, and as the depoſitory of the executive power of the ſtate. At preſent, it is our buſineſs to conſider this power as lodged in the hands of a phyſical perſonage or real man, poſſeſſed of the right of exerting it agreeable to the laws. Such a perſon is denominated a monarch or king.

In

In other adminiſtrations it is common for a collective body to repreſent an individual being; whereas in this an individual is, on the contrary, the repreſentative of a collective body; ſo that the moral unity which conſtitutes the prince, is at the ſame time a phyſical unity, in which all the faculties which the law combines in the former are combined naturally in the latter.

Thus the will of the people and that of the prince, together with the public force of the ſtate, and the particular force of the government, all depend on the ſame principle of action: all the ſprings of the machine are in the ſame hand, are exerted to the ſame end; there are no oppoſite motions counteracting and deſtroying each other; nor is it poſſible to conceive any ſpecies of government in which the leaſt effort is productive of ſo great a quantity of action. Archimedes, ſitting at his eaſe on the ſhore, and moving about a large veſſel on the ocean at pleaſure, repreſents to my imagination an able monarch ſitting in his cabinet, and governing his diſtant provinces, by keeping every thing in motion, while he himſelf ſeems immoveable. But, if no other kind of government hath ſo much activity, there is none in which the particular will of the individual is ſo predominant. Every thing, it is true, proceeds toward the ſame end; but this end is not that of public happineſs; and hence the force of the adminiſtration operates inceſſantly to the prejudice of the ſtate.

Kings would be abſolute; and they are ſometimes told, that their beſt way to become ſo, is to make themſelves beloved by the people. This maxim is doubtleſs a very fine one, and even

in ſome reſpects true. But unhappily it is laughed at in courts. That power which ariſes from the love of the people is without doubt the greateſt: but it is ſo precarious and conditional, that princes have never been ſatisfied with it. Even the beſt kings are deſirous of having it in their power to do ill when they pleaſe, without loſing their prerogatives. It is to no purpoſe that a declaiming politician tells them, that the ſtrength of the people being theirs, it is their greateſt intereſt to have the people flouriſhing, numerous, and reſpectable: they know that this is not true. Their perſonal and private intereſt is, in the firſt place, that the people ſhould be ſo weak and miſerable as to be incapable of making any reſiſtance to government. I confeſs indeed, that, ſuppoſing the people to be held in perfect ſubjection, it would be to the intereſt of the prince that they ſhould be rich and powerful, becauſe their ſtrength, being alſo his, ſerves to make him reſpectable to his neighbours; but as this intereſt is only ſecondary and ſubordinate, and that theſe ſuppoſitions are incompatible, it is natural for princes to give the preference always to that maxim which is the moſt immediately uſeful. This is what Samuel hath repreſented very forcibly to the Hebrews; and Machiavel hath made evident to a demonſtration. In affecting to give inſtructions to kings, he hath given the moſt ſtriking leſſons to the people: His book entitled The Prince, is particularly adapted to the ſervice of republics.

We have already ſhewn, from the general relations of things, that a monarchy is ſuitable only to great ſtates; and we ſhall be more particularly convinced of it, on a further examination.

The

The more numerous the members of the public adminiſtration, the more is the relation between the prince and the ſubjects diminiſhed, and the nearer it approaches to nothing, or that point of equality which ſubſiſts in a democracy. This relation increaſes in proportion as the government is contracted; and arrives at its *maximum* when the adminiſtration is in the hands of a ſingle perſon. In this caſe, then, there is too great a diſtance between the prince and people, and the ſtate is void of connection. To ſupply its place, therefore, recourſe is had to the intermediate ranks of people. Hence the ſeveral orders of nobility. But nothing of this kind is ſuitable to a ſmall ſtate, to which theſe different ranks are very deſtructive.

If the good government of a ſtate be a matter of difficulty under any mode of adminiſtration, it is more particularly ſo in the hands of a ſingle perſon; and every body knows the conſequences when a king reigns by ſubſtitutes.

Again, there is one eſſential and unavoidable defect, which will ever render a monarchical government inferior to a republic; and this is, that in the latter, the public voice hardly ever raiſes unworthy perſons to high poſts in the adminiſtration; making choice only of men of knowledge and abilities, who diſcharge their reſpective functions with honour: whereas thoſe who generally make their way to ſuch poſts under a monarchical government, are men of little minds and mean talents, who owe their preferment to the meretricious arts of flattery and intrigue. The public are leſs apt to be deceived in their choice than the prince; and a man of real merit is as rarely to be found in the mini-

ſtry of a king, as a blockhead at the head of a republic. Thus, when by any fortunate accident a genius born for government takes the lead in a monarchy brought to the verge of ruin by ſuch petty rulers, the world is amazed at the reſources he diſcovers, and his adminiſtration ſtands as a ſingular epoch in the hiſtory of his country.

To have a monarchical ſtate well governed, it is requiſite that its magnitude or extent ſhould be proportioned to the abilities of the regent. It is more eaſy to conquer than to govern. By means of a lever ſufficiently long, it were poſſible with a ſingle finger to move the globe; but to ſupport it, requires the ſhoulders of an Hercules. When a ſtate may with any propriety be denominated great, the prince is almoſt always too little. And when, on the contrary, it happens, which however is very ſeldom, that the ſtate is too little for its regent, it muſt be ever ill-governed; becauſe the chief, actuated by the greatneſs of his own ideas, is apt to forget the intereſt of his people, and makes them no leſs unhappy from the abuſe of his ſuperfluous talents, than would another of a more limited capacity for want of thoſe talents which ſhould be neceſſary. It is thence requiſite, that a kingdom ſhould, if I may ſo ſay, contract and dilate itſelf, on every ſucceſſion, according to the capacity of the reigning prince: whereas the abilities of a ſenate being more fixed, the ſtate, under a republican government, may be confined or extended to any determinate limits, and the adminiſtration be equally good. The moſt palpable inconvenience in the government of a ſole magiſtrate, is the default of that continued ſucceſſion, which, in the two other kinds,

forms

forms an uninterrupted connection in the ſtate. When one king dies, it is neceſſary to have another; but when kings are elective, ſuch elections form very turbulent and dangerous intervals; and unleſs the citizens are poſſeſſed of a diſintereſtedneſs and integrity, incompatible with this mode of government, venality and corruption will neceſſarily have an influence over them. It is very rare that he, to whom the ſtate is ſold, does not ſell it again in his turn, and make the weak repay him the money extorted from him by the ſtrong. Every one becomes, ſooner or later, venal and corrupt, under ſuch an adminiſtration; while even the tranquillity, which is enjoyed under the kings, is worſe than the diſorder attending their *interregnum*.

To remedy theſe evils, crowns have been made hereditary, and an order of ſucceſſion hath been eſtabliſhed, which prevents any diſputes on the death of kings: that is to ſay, by ſubſtituting the inconvenience of regencies to that of elections, an apparent tranquillity is preferred to a wiſe adminiſtration; and it is thought better to run the riſk of having the throne ſupplied by children, monſters, and idiots, than to have any diſpute about the choice of good kings. It is not conſidered, that, in expoſing a ſtate to the riſk of ſuch an alternative, almoſt every chance is againſt it.

Almoſt every thing conſpires to deprive a youth, educated to the command over others, of the principles of reaſon and juſtice. Great pains, it is ſaid, are taken to teach young princes the art of reigning; it does not appear, however, that they profit much by their education. It would be better to begin by teaching them

ſubjection. The greateſt monarchs that have been celebrated in hiſtory, are thoſe who were not educated to govern. This is a ſcience of which thoſe know the leaſt who have been taught the moſt, and is better acquired by ſtudying obedience than command. *Nam utiliſſimus idem ac breviſſimus bonarum malarumque rerum delectus, cogitare quid aut nolueris ſub alio principe aut volueris.*

A conſequence of this want of coherence, is the inconſtancy of regal government, which is ſometimes purſued on one plan, and ſometimes on another, according to the character of the prince who governs, or of thoſe who hold the reins of adminiſtration for him; ſo that its conduct is as inconſiſtent as the object of its purſuit is wavering. It is this inconſtancy which keeps the ſtate ever fluctuating from maxim to maxim, and from project to project; an uncertainty which does not take place in other kinds of government, where the prince is always the ſame. Thus we ſee, in general, that if there be more cunning in a court, there is more true wiſdom in a ſenate; and that republics accompliſh their ends, by means more conſtant and better purſued: while on the contrary, every revolution in the miniſtry of a court produces one in the ſtate; it being the conſtant maxim with all miniſters, and almoſt with all kings, to engage in meaſures directly oppoſite to thoſe of their immediate predeceſſors. Again, it is from this very incoherence that we may deduce the ſolution of a ſophiſm very common with regal politicians; and this is not only the practice of comparing the civil government of ſociety to the domeſtic government of a family, and the prince

prince to the father of it, (an error already expoſed,) but alſo that of liberally beſtowing on the reigning magiſtrate all the virtues he ſtands in need of, and of ſuppoſing the prince always ſuch as he ought to be. With the help of this ſuppoſition, indeed, the regal government is evidently preferable to all others, becauſe it is inconteſtably the ſtrongeſt; and nothing more is required to make it alſo the beſt, than that the will of the prince ſhould be conformable to the general will of the people.

But if, according to Plato, the king by nature is ſo very rare a perſonage, how ſeldom may we ſuppoſe nature and fortune hath concurred to crown him? If a regal education alſo neceſſarily corrupts thoſe who receive it, what hopes can we have from a race of men thus educated? It is a wilful error, therefore, to confound a regal government in general with the government of a good king. But, to ſee what this ſpecies of government is in itſelf, it muſt be conſidered under the direction of weak and wicked princes; for ſuch they generally are when they come to the throne, or ſuch the throne will make them. Theſe difficulties have not eſcaped the notice of ſome writers, but they do not ſeem to have been much embarraſſed by them. The remedy, ſay they, is to obey without murmuring. God ſends us bad things in his wrath, and we ought to bear with them as chaſtiſements from on high. This way of talking is certainly very edifying; but I conceive it would come with greater propriety from the pulpit, than from the pen of a politician. What ſhould we ſay of a phyſician who might promiſe miracles, and whoſe whole art ſhould conſiſt in preach-

preaching up patience and reſignation? It is obvious enough that we muſt bear with a bad government, when we live under it; the queſtion is to find a good one.

CHAP. VII. *Of mixed governments.*

THERE is no ſuch thing, properly ſpeaking, as a ſimple government Even a ſole chief muſt have inferior magiſtrates, and a popular government a chief. Thus, in the diſtribution of the executive power, there is always a gradation from the greater number to the leſs; with this difference, that ſometimes the greater number depends on the leſs, and at others the leſs on the greater.

Sometimes indeed the diſtribution is equal, either when the conſtituent parts depend mutually on each other, as in the Engliſh government; or when the authority of each part is independent, though imperfect, as in Poland. This laſt form is a bad one, becauſe there is no union in ſuch a government, and the ſeveral parts of the ſtate want a due connection.

It is a queſtion much agitated by politicians; Which is beſt, a ſimple or mixed government? The ſame anſwer, however, might be given to it, as I have before made to the like queſtion concerning the forms of government in general.

A ſimple government is the beſt in itſelf, though for no other reaſon than that it is ſimple. But when the executive power is not ſufficiently dependent on the legiſlative, that is to ſay, when there is a greater diſproportion between the prince and the ſovereign, than between the people and the prince, this defect muſt be re-

remedied by dividing the government; in which caſe all its parts would have no leſs authority over the ſubject, and yet their diviſion would render them collectively leſs powerful to oppoſe their ſovereign.

The ſame inconvenience is prevented alſo by eſtabliſhing a number of inferior magiſtrates, which tend to preſerve a balance between the two powers, and to maintain their reſpective prerogatives. In this caſe, however, the government is not properly of a mixed kind; it is only moderated.

The like means may alſo be employed to remedy an oppoſite inconvenience, as when a government is too feeble, by erecting of proper tribunals to concentrate its force. This method is practiſed in all democracies. In the firſt caſe, the adminiſtration is divided in order to weaken it, and in the ſecond to enforce it: for a *maximum* both of ſtrength and weakneſs is equally common to ſimple governments, while thoſe of mixed forms always give a mean proportional to both.

Chap. VIII. *That every form of government is not equally proper for every country.*

As liberty is not the produce of all climates, ſo it is not alike attainable by all people. The more one reflects on this principle, eſtabliſhed by Monteſquieu, the more ſenſible we become of its truth. The more it is conteſted, the more we find it confirmed by new proofs.

Under every kind of government, the political perſonage, the Public, conſumes much, but produces nothing. Whence then doth it derive

rive the ſubſtance conſumed? Evidently from the labour of its members. It is from the ſuperfluity of individuals that the neceſſities of the public are provided. Hence it follows, that a ſocial ſtate cannot ſubſiſt longer than the induſtry of its members continues to produce ſuch ſuperfluity.

The quantity of this ſuperfluity, however, is not the ſame in all countries. It is in many very conſiderable, in ſome but moderate, in others null, and again in others negative. The proportion depends on the fertility of the climate, the ſpecies of labour required in the cultivation of the ſoil, the nature of its produce, the ſtrength of its inhabitants, the conſumption neceſſary to their ſubſiſtence, with many other ſimilar circumſtances.

On the other hand, all governments are not of the ſame nature; ſome devour much more than others; and their difference is founded on this principle, *viz.* that the farther public contributions are removed from their ſource, the more burdenſome they grow. It is not by the quantity of the impoſition that we are to eſtimate the burden of it, but by the time or ſpace taken up in its returning back to the hands from which it is exacted. When this return is quick and eaſy, it matters little whether ſuch impoſition be ſmall or great; the people are always rich, and the finances in good condition. On the contrary, however low a people be taxed, if the money never returns, they are ſure by conſtantly paying to be ſoon exhauſted; ſuch a ſtate can never be rich, and the individuals of it muſt be always beggars.

It follows hence, that the farther the people

are

are removed from the ſeat of government, the more burdenſome are their taxes: thus in a democracy their weight is leaſt felt; in an ariſtocracy they fall more heavy; and in a monarchical ſtate they have the greateſt weight of all. Monarchy, therefore, is proper only for opulent nations; ariſtocracy for middling ſtates; and a democracy for thoſe which are mean and poor.

In fact, the more we reflect on this circumſtance, the more plainly we perceive the difference in this reſpect between a monarchical and a free ſtate. In the latter, all its force is exerted for the public utility; in the former, the public intereſt of the ſtate and the private intereſt of the prince are reciprocally oppoſed, the one increaſing by the decreaſe of the other. In a word, inſtead of governing ſubjects in ſuch a manner as to make them happy, deſpotiſm makes them miſerable, in order to be able to govern them at all.

Thus may we trace in every climate thoſe natural cauſes, which point out that particular form of government which is beſt adapted to it, as well as even the peculiar kind of people that ſhould inhabit it. Barren and ungrateful ſoils, whoſe produce will not pay for the labour of cultivation, would remain uncultivated and uninhabited; or, at beſt, would be peopled only with ſavages. Thoſe countries from which the inhabitants might draw the neceſſaries of life, and no more, would be peopled by barbarians, among whom the eſtabliſhment of civil polity would be impoſſible. Such places as might yield to their inhabitants a moderate ſuperfluity, would be beſt adapted to a free people: while the country where fertile plains and plenteous

vales

vales more bounteouſly reward the labours of the cultivator, would beſt ſuit with a monarchical form of government, in order that the luxury of the prince might conſume the ſuperfluity of the ſubjects; for it is much better that this ſuperfluity ſhould be expended by government than diſſipated by individuals. I am not inſenſible that ſome exceptions might be made to what is here advanced; theſe very exceptions, however, ſerve to confirm the general rule, in that they are ſooner or later conſtantly productive of revolutions, which reduce things to their natural order.

We ſhould always make a diſtinction between general laws, and thoſe particular cauſes which may diverſify their effects. For, though the ſouthern climates ſhould be actually filled with republics, and the northern with deſpotic monarchies, it would be nevertheleſs true in theory, that, ſo far as climate is concerned, deſpotiſm agrees beſt with an hot, barbariſm with a cold, and good polity with a temperate region. I am aware farther, that, even granting the principle, the application of it may be diſputed. It may be ſaid, that ſome cold countries are very fertile, while others more warm and ſouthern are very barren. This objection, however, hath weight only with ſuch as do not examine the matter in every point of view. It is requiſite to take into conſideration, as I before obſerved, the labour of the people, their ſtrength, their conſumption, with every other circumſtance that affects the point in queſtion.

Let us ſuppoſe two countries of equal extent, the proportion of whoſe product ſhould be as five to ten. It is plain that, if the inhabitants of the firſt conſume four, and of the latter nine,

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the ſuperfluity of the one would be $\frac{1}{4}$, and that of the other $\frac{1}{5}$. Their different ſuperfluities being alſo in an inverſe ratio to that of their produce, the territory whoſe produce ſhould amount only to five, would have near double the ſuperfluity of that which ſhould amount to ten.

But the argument does not reſt upon a double produce; nay, I doubt whether any perſon will place the actual fertility of cold countries in general, in a bare equality with that of warmer climates. We will ſuppoſe them, however, to be in this reſpect ſimply equal; ſetting England, for inſtance, on a balance with Sicily, and Poland with Egypt. Still farther to the South we have Africa and the Indies, and to the North hardly any thing. But to effect this equality in the produce, what a difference in the labour of cultivation! In Sicily they have nothing more to do than barely turn up the earth: in England agriculture is extremely toilſome and laborious. Now, where a greater number of hands is required to raiſe the ſame produce, the ſuperfluity muſt neceſſarily be leſs.

Add to this, that the ſame number of people conſume much leſs in a warm country than in a cold one. An hot climate requires men to be temperate, if they would preſerve their health. Of this the Europeans are made ſenſible, by ſeeing thoſe who do not alter their manner of living in hot countries, daily carried of by dyſenteries and indigeſtion. Chardin repreſents us as beaſts of prey, as mere wolves, in compariſon of the Aſiatics; and thinks thoſe writers miſtaken, who have attributed the temperance of the Perſians to the uncultivated ſtate of their country. His opinion is, that their country was ſo little culti-

vated, becauſe the inhabitants required ſo little for their ſubſiſtence. If their frugality were merely the effect of the barrenneſs of their country, he obſerves, it would be only the poorer ſort of them that ſhould eat little; whereas their abſtinence is general. Again, they would in ſuch caſe be more or leſs abſtemious in different provinces, as thoſe provinces differed in degrees of ſterility; whereas their ſobriety is general, and prevails equally throughout the kingdom. He tells us, alſo, that the Perſians boaſt much of their manner of living; pretending their complections only to be a ſufficient indication of its being preferable to that of the Chriſtians. At the ſame time he admits, that their complections are very fine and ſmooth; that their ſkin is of a ſoft texture, and poliſhed appearance; while, on the other hand, the complection of the Armenians their ſubjects, who live after the European manner, is rough and pimply, and their bodies groſs and unwieldy.

The nearer we approach to the line, it is certain, the more abſtemious we find the people. They hardly ever eat meat; rice and maize are their ordinary food. There are millions of people in the Indies, whoſe ſubſiſtence does not amount to the value of a penny a-day. We ſee even in Europe, a very ſenſible difference, in this reſpect, between the inhabitants of the North and South. A Spaniard will ſubſiſt a whole week on what a German would eat up at a ſingle meal. In countries where the people are voracious, even luxury hath a tendency to conſumption. Thus in England it diſplays itſelf in the number of diſhes and quantity of ſolid meat on the table; while in Italy, a re-

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paſt is furniſhed out with ſweetmeats and flowers.

The luxury of dreſs preſents us alſo with ſimilar differences. In climates, where the change of the weather is ſudden and violent, the people wear better and plainer clothes; while in thoſe where the inhabitants dreſs only for ornament, brilliancy is more conſulted than uſe. Even clothes themſelves are an article of luxury. Thus at Naples, you will daily ſee gentlemen walking about in laced clothes, without ſtockings. It is the ſame with regard to buildings: magnificence only is conſulted, where nothing is to be feared from the inclemencies of the weather. At Paris and London, people are deſirous of warm and commodious appartments. At Madrid, they have ſuperb ſaloons, but no ſaſhes nor caſements; and their beds lie open to the rats that harbour in the roof.

The aliment is alſo more ſubſtantial and nouriſhing in hot countries than in cold; this is a third difference that cannot fail to have an influence over the ſecond. Wherefore is it that the Italians eat ſuch a quantity of vegetables? Becauſe they are good, and of an excellent ſavour. In France, where they are themſelves nouriſhed chiefly by water, they are leſs nutritive, and are held of little conſequence. They occupy nevertheleſs as much ground, and coſt as much pains to cultivate them. It hath been experimentally proved, that the corn of Barbary, in other reſpects inferior to that of France, gives a greater quantity of meal, and that the French corn yields ſtill more than that of the North. Hence it may be inferred, that a ſimilar gradation is carried on in the ſame direction from the line to the pole. Now, is it not an evident diſadvan-

tage to have, in an equal produce, a leſs quantity of aliment?

To all theſe different conſiderations I may add another, which ariſes from, and ſerves to confirm them: this is, that hot countries require fewer inhabitants than the cold, and yet afford ſubſiſtence for more; a circumſtance that cauſes a two-fold ſuperfluity, always to the advantage of deſpotiſm. The more the ſame number of people are diſtributed over the face of a large territory, the more difficult becomes a revolt; as they cannot meet together ſo readily or ſecretly, and it is always eaſy for the government to cut off their aſſociations, and ruin their projects. On the other hand, the more a numerous people are collected together, the leſs can the government aſſume over the ſovereign; the chiefs of a faction may deliberate as ſecurely at their meetings, as the prince in his council; and the mob are as readily aſſembled in the public ſquares, as the troops in their quarters. It is the advantage of a tyrannical government, therefore, to act at great diſtances; its force increaſing with the diſtance, like that of a lever*, by the aſſiſtance of a proper center. That of the people, on the contrary, acts only by being concentrated; it evaporates and loſes itſelf when dilated, even as gunpowder ſcattered on the ground,

* This doth not contradict what is advanced in Chap. ix. Book II. concerning the inconvenience of great ſtates; the matter in queſtion there being the authority of the government over its members, and here of its influence over the ſubjects. Its members, ſcattered about in different places, ſerve as points of ſupport to enable it to act at a diſtance on the people; but it hath no ſuch props to aſſiſt its action on its members themſelves. Thus in one caſe the length of the lever is the cauſe of its ſtrength, and in the other of its weakneſs.

ground, takes fire, particle by particle, and is productive of no effect. Countries thinly inhabited are the moſt proper places for tyrants; wild beaſts reign only in deſarts.

CHAP. IX. *Of the marks of a good government.*

WHEN it is aſked, therefore, in general terms, What is the beſt form of government? the queſtion is as indeterminate as unanſwerable; or rather it may be reaſonably anſwered as many different ways as there are poſſible combinations of the abſolute and relative circumſtances of a people.

But if it be aſked, By what ſigns may it be known whether any given people are well or ill governed? this is quite another thing; and the queſtion, as to the fact, is to be reſolved.

This queſtion, however, is never actually reſolved, becauſe every one is for doing it after his own manner. The ſubject cries up the public tranquillity, the citizen the liberty of individuals; the one prefers the ſecurity of property, the other that of his perſon; the one maintains the beſt government to be the moſt ſevere, the other affirms that to be beſt which is moſt agreeable; the latter is for puniſhing crimes, the former for preventing them; the one thinks it a fine thing to be dreaded by his neighbours, the other thinks it better to be unknown to them; the one is ſatisfied if money does but circulate, the other requires the people ſhould have bread. Were they even agreed alſo on theſe and other ſimilar points, they would not be much nearer the end of the diſpute. Moral quantities are deficient in point of preciſion; ſo

that, were men agreed on the ſign, they would ſtill differ about its eſtimation.

For my part, I am aſtoniſhed that a ſign ſo very ſimple ſhould be miſtaken, or that any ſhould be ſo diſingenuous as not to acknowlege it. What is the end of political ſociety? doubtleſs the preſervation and proſperity of its members. And what is the moſt certain ſign or proof of theſe? certainly it is their number and population. Let us not look elſewhere, then, for this diſputed proof; ſince it is plain, that government muſt be the beſt, under which the citizens increaſe and multiply moſt, ſuppoſing all other circumſtances equal, and no foreigners naturalized or colonies introduced to cauſe ſuch increaſe; and that, on the contrary, that government muſt be the worſt, under which, *cæteris paribus*, the number of people ſhould diminiſh. This being admitted, the deciſion of the queſtion becomes an affair of calculation *, and as ſuch I give it up to the arithmeticians.

CHAP.

* It is on the ſame principle that we ought to judge of the ſeveral periods of time that deſerve the preference, in being diſtinguiſhed for the proſperity of mankind. We have in general too much admired thoſe in which literature and the fine arts have flouriſhed, without penetrating into the ſecret cauſe of their cultivation, or duly conſidering their fatal effects; *idque apud imperitos humanitas vocabatur, cum pars ſervitutis eſſet.* Shall we never be able to ſee, through the maxims laid down in books, the intereſted motives of their authors?---No; let writers ſay what they will, whenever the inhabitants of a country decreaſe, it is not true that all things go well, whatever be its external proſperity and ſplendour: A poet poſſeſſed of an hundred thouſand livres a-year, does not neceſſarily make the age he lives in the beſt of all others. We ſhould not ſo much regard the apparent repoſe of the world, and the tranquillity of its chiefs, as the well-being of whole nations, and particularly of the moſt populous ſtates. A ſtorm of hail may lay waſte ſome few provinces, but it ſeldom cauſes a famine.

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CHAP. X. *Of the abuſe of government, and its tendency to degenerate.*

AS the particular will of the prince acts conſtantly againſt the general will of the people, the government neceſſarily makes a continual effort againſt the ſovereignty. The greater this effort is, the more is the conſtitution altered; and as in this caſe there is no other diſtinct will to keep that of the prince in equilibrio, it muſt ſooner or later infallibly happen, that the prince will oppreſs the ſovereign, and break the ſocial compact. This is an inherent and unavoidable defect, which, from the very birth of the political body, inceſſantly tends to its diſſolution, even as old age and death tend to the diſſolution of the natural body.

There are two general methods according to which

Temporary tumults and civil wars may give much diſturbance to rulers; but they do not conſtitute the real misfortunes of a people, who may even enjoy ſome reſpite, while they are diſputing who ſhall play the tyrant over them. It is from their permanent ſituation that their real proſperity or calamity muſt ariſe: when all ſubmit tamely to the yoke, then it is that all are periſhing; then it is that their chiefs, deſtroying them at their eaſe, *ubi ſolitudinem faciunt pacem appellant.* When the intrigues of the nobility agitated the kingdom of France, and the coadjutor of Paris carried a poignard in his pocket to parliament, all this did not hinder the bulk of the French nation from growing numerous and enjoying themſelves in happineſs and eaſe. Ancient Greece flouriſhed in the midſt of the moſt cruel wars; human blood was ſpilt in torents, and yet the country ſwarmed with inhabitants. It appears, ſays Machivel, that, in the midſt of murders, proſcriptions, and civil wars, our republic became only the more powerful; the virtue of the citizens, their manners, their independence, had a greater effect to ſtrengthen it, than all its diſſentions had to weaken it. A little agitation gives vigour to the mind; and liberty, not peace, is the real ſource of the proſperity of our ſpecies.

which a government degenerates; viz. when it contracts itſelf, or when the ſtate is diſſolved. The government contracts itſelf, when its members are reduced from a great number to a few; that is to ſay, from a democracy to an ariſtocracy, and from an ariſtocracy to a royalty. This is its natural tendency *. Should it make a retro-

* The ſlow formation and progreſs of the republic of Venice, preſent a notable example of this ſucceſſion; and it is very ſurpriſing, that in the ſpace of 1200 years the Venetians ſhould be got no farther than to the ſecond term, which began in the year 1198. With regard to the ancient dukes, with which their conſtitution is reproached, it is certain, whatever ſome writers may ſay, that they were not ſovereigns.

The Roman republic will, doubtleſs, be made an objection, as having taken a contrary route, in its progreſs from monarchy to ariſtocracy, and from ariſtocracy to democracy. I am, however, far from thinking this was the real caſe.

The firſt eſtabliſhment of Romulus was a mixed government, which degenerated preſently into deſpotiſm. From very particular cauſes the ſtate periſhed before its time, as a new-born infant before it attained the age of manhood. The expulſion of the Tarquins, was the true æra of the riſe of that republic; although it did not aſſume at firſt a determinate form, becauſe the work was but half done in not having aboliſhed the order of patricians. For hence, an hereditary ariſtocracy, the worſt of all adminiſtrations, acting in oppoſition to the democracy, the form of government remained indeterminate; not being fixed, as Machiavel obſerves, till the eſtabliſhment of tribunes; when, and not before, it was a real government under the form of a true democracy. In fact, the people were then not only ſovereign, but alſo magiſtrate and judge; the ſenate being a tribunal of an inferior order, formed to temper and correct the government; while even the conſuls themſelves, although patricians, firſt magiſtrates, and, as generals, abſolute in the field, yet at Rome they were only preſidents of the aſſemblies of the people.

From this time it is evident the government followed its natural bias, and tended ſtrongly toward ariſtocracy. The patrician order dying away of itſelf, the ariſtocracy ſubſiſted no longer in the members of that body, as at Venice and Genoa, but in the body of the ſenate compoſed of Patricians and Plebeians, and even in the body of tribunes when they began to

trogreſſive change, by having the number of its members increaſed, it might be ſaid to relax or dilate itſelf; but this inverſe progreſs is impoſſible.

In fact, a government never changes its form, except its ſpring of action be too much worn to ſupport its own. Now, if it relaxes ſtill more by being extended, its force becomes abſolutely nothing, and is ſtill leſs capable of ſupporting itſelf. It is neceſſary therefore to wind up and renew ſuch ſpring in proportion as it gives way; otherwiſe the ſtate it is intended to ſupport, muſt neceſſarily fall.

The diſſolution of the ſtate indeed may happen two ways. Firſt, when the prince does not govern according to law, but arrogates the ſovereign power to himſelf: in which caſe he effects a remarkable change, whereby not the government, but the ſtate itſelf is contracted. What I mean to ſay is, that the great ſtate is thence diſſolved, and that he forms another within it, compoſed only of the members of the government, who are only the maſters and tyrants over the reſt of the people. So that when the government uſurps the ſovereignty, at that inſtant the Social Compact is broken, and the individuals, who were citizens before, are reſtored to the rights of natural liberty, and are compelled, not legally obliged, to obedience.

It

to uſurp an active power. For words make no alteration in things. When the people have chiefs who govern in their ſtead, whatever denomination be given to thoſe chiefs, the government is always an ariſtocracy. From the abuſe of the ariſtocratical form, aroſe the civil wars and the triumvirate. Sylla, Julius Cæſar, and Auguſtus, indeed became real monarchs, and at length under the deſpotiſm of Tiberius the ſtate was finally diſſolved. The Roman hiſtory, therefore, doth not tend to diſprove my principle, but to confirm it.

It is the ſame thing when the members of government aſſume ſeparately the power they are entitled to exerciſe only collectively; which is no leſs an infringement of the laws, and is productive of ſtill worſe conſequences. For, in this caſe, there may be ſaid to be as many princes as magiſtrates; while the ſtate, no leſs divided than the government, is totally diſſolved, or changes its form.

When the ſtate is diſſolved, the abuſe of government, of whatever nature it be, takes the common name of anarchy. To diſtinguiſh more nicely, *democracy* is ſaid to degenerate into *ochlocracy; ariſtocracy* into *oligarchy;* and I may add, *monarchy* into *tyranny:* but this laſt term is equivocal, and requires ſome explanation. In the vulgar ſenſe of the word, a tyrant is a king who governs by force and without regard to juſtice or the laws. In the more preciſe and determinate ſenſe, it means any individual who aſſumes the royal authority, without having a right to it. In this latter ſenſe the Greeks underſtood the word tyrant; and give it indiſcriminately both to good and bad princes whoſe authority was not legal *. Thus, *tyrant* and *uſurper* are two words perfectly ſynonimous.

To give different names, however, to different things, I call the uſurpation of regal authority

* *Omnes enim et habentur et dicuntur tyranni, qui poteſtate utuntur perpetua, in ea civitate quæ libertate uſa eſt.* CORN. NEPOS. IN MILTIADE. It is true that Ariſtotle makes a diſtinction between the tyrant and king, in that the one governs for his own good, and the other for the good of his ſubjects: but beſides that all the Greek writers uſe the word tyrant in a different ſenſe, as appears particularly by the Hieron of Xenophon, it would follow from Ariſtotle's diſtinction that no king ever exiſted on the face of the earth.

rity *tyranny*, and that of ſovereign power *deſpotiſm*. The tyrant is he who takes upon himſelf, contrary to law, to govern according to law; and the deſpotic chief, one who places himſelf above the laws themſelves. Thus a tyrant cannot be deſpotic, though a deſpotic prince muſt always be a tyrant.

CHAP. IX. *Of the diſſolution of the body-politic.*

SUCH is the natural and unavoidable tendency of even the beſt conſtituted governments. If Rome and Sparta periſhed, what ſtate can hope to laſt for ever? In our endeavouts to form a durable eſtabliſhment, we muſt not think therefore to make it eternal. If we would hope to ſucceed, we muſt not attempt impoſſibilities, nor flatter ourſelves to give that permanency to human inſtitutions, which is incompatible with their nature.

The politic body, as well as the phyſical, begins to die at its birth, and bears in itſelf the cauſes of its deſtruction. Both, however, may poſſeſs a conſtitution more or leſs robuſt, and adapted to different periods of duration. The conſtitution of man is the work of nature; that of the ſtate, is the work of art. It doth not depend on men to prolong their lives; but it depends on them to prolong that of the ſtate as much as poſſible, by giving it a conſtitution the beſt adapted to longevity. The moſt perfect conſtitution, it is true, will have an end; but ſtill ſo much later than others, if no unforeſeen accident bring it to an untimely diſſolution.

The principle of political life lies in the ſovereign authority. The legiſlative power is the heart

heart of the ſtate; the executive is the brain, which puts every part in motion. The brain may be rendered uſeleſs by the palſy, and yet the individual ſurvive. A man may become an inſenſible driveller, and yet live: but as ſoon as the heart ceaſes to beat, the animal is dead.

The ſtate doth not ſubſiſt by virtue of the laws, but by the giſlative power. The ſtatutes of yeſterday are not in themſelves neceſſarily binding to-day, but the tacit confirmation of them is preſumed from the ſilence of the legiſlature, the ſovereign being ſuppoſed inceſſantly to confirm the laws not actually repealed. Whatever is once declared to be the will of the ſovereign, continues always ſo, unleſs it be abrogated.

Wherefore, then, is there ſo much reſpect paid to ancient laws? Even for this reaſon. It is rational to ſuppoſe, that nothing but the excellence of the ancient laws could preſerve them ſo long in being; for that, if the ſovereign had not found them always ſalutary and uſeful, they would have been repealed.

Hence we ſee, that the laws, inſtead of loſing their force, acquire additional authority by time in every well formed ſtate; the prepoſſeſſion of their antiquity renders them every day more venerable; whereas, in every country where the laws grow obſolete, and loſe their force as they grow old, this alone is a proof that the legiſlative power itſelf is decayed, and the ſtate extinct.

CHAP. XII. *By what means the ſovereign authority is maintained.*

THE ſovereign, having no other force than the legiſlative power, acts only by the laws; while

while the laws being only the authentic acts of the general will, the ſovereign cannot act unleſs the people are aſſembled. The people aſſemble! you will ſay. What a chimera!—It is indeed chimerical at preſent; though it was not reckoned ſo two thouſand years ago. Are mankind changed in their nature ſince that time?

The bounds of poſſibility in moral affairs are leſs confined than we are apt to imagine: It is our foibles, our vices, our prejudices, that contract them. Mean ſouls give no credit to the ſentiments of heroic minds; while ſlaves affect to turn the notion of liberty into ridicule.

By what hath been done, however, we may judge of what may be done again. I ſhall not ſpeak of the petty republics of ancient Greece; but the Roman republic was undoubtedly a great ſtate, and the city of Rome a great city. By the laſt regiſter of the citizens of Rome, their number amounted to four hundred thouſand perſons capable of bearing arms; and the laſt regiſter of the empire amounted to more than four millions of citizens, without reckoning ſubjects, women, children, or ſlaves.

How very difficult, you will ſay, muſt it have been, to aſſemble frequently the people of that capital and its environs? And yet hardly a week paſſed in which the Roman people were not aſſembled, and on ſome occaſions ſeveral times a-week. This numerous body indeed not only exerciſed the functions of ſovereignty, but alſo in ſome caſes thoſe of government. They ſometimes deliberated on ſtate-affairs, and at others decided in judicial cauſes; the whole people being publicly aſſembled almoſt as frequently in the capacity of magiſtrates as citizens.

By recurring to the primitive ſtate of nations, we ſhall find that moſt of the ancient governments, even the monarchical, as that of Macedon and others, had the like popular aſſemblies. Be this, however, as it may, the fact being once inconteſtibly proved, obviates all difficulties; for, to deduce the poſſibility of a thing from its having actually happened, will admit of no objection.

CHAP. XIII. *The ſubject continued.*

IT is not enough, however, that the people once aſſembled ſhould fix the conſtitution of the ſtate, by giving their ſanction to a certain code or ſyſtem of laws: it is not enough that they ſhould eſtabliſh a perpetual government, or provide once for all by the election of magiſtrates. Beſides the extraordinary aſſemblies, which unforeſeen accidents may require, it is neceſſary they ſhould have certain fixed and periodical meetings, which nothing might aboliſh or prorogue: ſo that the people ſhould on a certain day be legally ſummoned by law, without any expreſs ſtatute being required for their formal convocation.

But, excepting theſe regular aſſemblies, rendered legal by the date, all others, unleſs convoked by the proper magiſtrate previouſly appointed to that end, agreeable to preſcribed forms, ſhould be held illegal, and all their determinations declared null and void, becauſe the very manner of the people's aſſembling ſhould be determined by law.

As to the frequency of legal aſſemblies, it depends on ſo many different conſiderations, that

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it is impoſſible to lay down any preciſe rules on this head. It can only be ſaid in general, that the more powerful the government, the more often ought the ſovereignty to diſplay itſelf.

All this, it may be ſaid, is very well for a ſingle town or city; but what muſt be done in a ſtate comprehending ſeveral cities? Muſt the ſovereign authority be diſtributed, or ought it to centre in one to the total ſubjection of the reſt?

I anſwer, Neither one nor the other. In the firſt place, the ſovereign authority is ſimple and uniform, ſo that it cannot be divided without deſtroying it. In the next place, one city cannot be legally ſubject to another, any more than one nation to another; becauſe the eſſence of the body-politic conſiſts in the union of obedience and liberty, and in the terms *ſubject* and *ſovereign* being thoſe identical correlatives, the ideas of which are united in the ſingle term *citizen*.

I anſwer farther, that it is fundamentally wrong, to unite ſeveral towns to form one city; and that ſuch union being made, the natural inconveniences of it muſt enſue. The abuſes peculiar to great ſtates muſt not be made objections to the ſyſtem of one, who maintains the excluſive propriety of little ones. But how, it will be ſaid, can little ſtates be made powerful enough to reſiſt the great?—Even as the cities of ancient Greece were able to reſiſt the arms of a powerful monarch; and as, in more modern times, Switzerland and Holland have reſiſted the power of the houſe of Auſtria.

In caſes, alſo, where the ſtate cannot be reduced within proper bounds, there remains one reſource; and this is by not permitting the exiſtence of a capital, but removing the ſeat of go-

vernment from one town to another, and aſſembling the ſtates of the country in each alternately.

People a country equally in every part; diffuſe the ſame privileges and advantages throughout; and the ſtate will become at once the ſtrongeſt and the beſt governed. Remember that the walls of cities are founded on the ruins of the villages, and that the ſplendid palaces in town are raiſed at the expence of miſerable cottages in the country.

CHAP. XIV. *Subject continued.*

NO ſooner are the people legally aſſembled, in a ſovereign body, than the juriſdiction of government ceaſes, the executive power of the ſtate is ſuſpended, and the perſon of the meaneſt citizen becomes as ſacred and inviolable as the greateſt magiſtrate; becauſe when the body repreſented appears, it is not requiſite that the repreſentatives of it ſhould exiſt. Moſt of the tumults which happened in the *Comitia* at Rome, were owing to the general ignorance or neglect of this rule. On thoſe occaſions, the conſuls were only preſidents of the aſſembly of the people, the tribunes merely orators *, and the ſenate abſolutely nothing.

Theſe intervals of ſuſpenſion, when the prince acknowledges, or at leaſt ought to acknowledge, an actual ſuperior, have been always formidable; and ſuch aſſemblies which are the ſafeguards of the body-politic, and ſerve as ſo many checks to ad-

* Nearly in the ſenſe given to thoſe who ſpeak on any queſtion in the parliament of England. The reſemblance of their emploments ſet the conſuls and tribunes together by the ears, even when their juriſdiction was ſuſpended.

adminiſtration, have always been a terror to the rulers; ſo that they have ſpared no pains in raiſing objections and difficulties, nor ſcrupled making any fair promiſes to render the people averſe to ſuch meetings. When the latter, therefore, have been avaritious, mean, or cowardly, preferring their eaſe to liberty, they have not been able to withſtand long the repeated efforts of government: and thus it is that, this encroaching power inceſſantly augmenting, the ſovereignty becomes totally extinct, and thus moſt cities come to an untimely end.

Sometimes, however, there is introduced between ſovereign authority and arbitrary government, a mean term of power, of which it is neceſſary to treat.

CHAP. XV. *Of deputies or repreſentatives.*

WHEN the ſervice of the public ceaſes to be the principal concern of the citizens, and they had rather diſcharge it by their purſes than their perſons, the ſtate is already far advanced toward ruin. When they ſhould march out to fight, they pay troops to fight for them, and ſtay at home. When they ſhould go to council, they ſend deputies, and ſtay at home. Thus, in conſequence of their indolence and wealth, they in the end employ ſoldiers to enſlave their country, and repreſentatives to betray it.

It is the buſtle of commerce and the arts; it is the ſordid love of gain, of luxury and eaſe, that thus convert perſonal into pecuniary ſervices. Men readily give up one part of their profit, to increaſe the reſt unmoleſted. But ſupply an adminiſtration with money, and they will

preſently ſupply you with chains. The very term of *taxes* is ſlaviſh, and unknown in a free city. In a ſtate truly free, the citizens diſcharge their duty to the public with their own hands, and not by money. So far from paying for being exempted from ſuch duty, they would pay to be permitted to diſcharge it themſelves. I am very far from adopting received opinions, and think the ſervices exacted by force a leſs infringement of liberty than taxes.

The better the conſtitution of a ſtate, the greater influencee have public affairs over private, in the minds of the citizens: they will have, alſo, much fewer private affairs to concern them; becauſe the ſum total of their common happineſs, furniſhing a more conſiderable portion to each individual, there remains the leſs for each to ſeek from his own private concerns. In a city well governed, every one is ready to fly to its public aſſemblies; under a bad government, they are careleſs about going thither at all, becauſe no one intereſts himſelf in what is doing there: it is known that the general will does not influence them, and hence at length domeſtic concerns engage all their attention. Good laws tend to the making better, while bad ones are introductory of worſe. No ſooner doth a citizen ſay, What are ſtate-affairs to me? than the ſtate may be given up for loſt.

It is this want of public ſpirit, the influence of private intereſt, the extent of ſtates, conqueſts and abuſes in government, that have given riſe to the method of aſſembling the people by deputies and repreſentatives. The aſſembly of theſe repreſentatives is called, in ſome countries, the third eſtate of the nation; ſo that the par-

particular intereſts of the two orders are placed in the firſt and ſecond rank, and the public intereſt only in the third.

The ſovereignty, however, cannot be repreſented, and that for the ſame reaſon that it cannot be alienated. It conſiſts eſſentially of the the general will, and the will cannot be repreſented: it is either identically the ſame, or ſome other; there can be no mean term in the caſe. The deputies of the people, therefore, neither are nor can be their repreſentatives; they are only mere commiſſioners, and can conclude on nothing. Every law that is not confirmed by the people in perſon is null and void; it is not in fact law. The Engliſh imagine they are a free people; they are however miſtaken: they are ſuch only during the election of members of parliament. When theſe are choſen, they become ſlaves again; and indeed they make ſo bad a uſe of the few tranſitory moments of liberty, that they richly deſerve to loſe it.

The notion of repreſentatives is modern; deſcending to us from the feudal ſyſtem, that moſt inquitous and abſurd form of government, by which human nature was ſo ſhamefully degraded. In the ancient republics, and even monarchies, the people had no repreſentatives; they were ſtrangers to the term. It is even very ſingular, that at Rome, where the Tribunes were ſo much revered, it was never imagined they could uſurp the functions of the people; and as ſtrange that they never once attempted it. One may judge, however, of the embarraſſment ſometimes cauſed by the multitude, by what happened in the time of the Gracchi, when

part

part of the citizens gave their votes from their houſe-tops.

Where men value their liberty and privileges above every thing, inconveniences and difficulties are nothing. Among this wiſe people things were held in a proper eſtimation? they permitted the Lictors to do what they would not ſuffer the Tribunes to attempt; they were not afraid the Lictors would ever think of repreſenting them.

To explain, nevertheleſs, in what manner theſe Tribunes did ſometimes repreſent them, it will be ſufficient to conceive how government repreſents the ſovereign. The law being only a declaration of the general will, it is clear that the people cannot be repreſented in the legiſlative power; but they may, and ought to be, in the executive, which is only the application of power to law. And this makes it evident, that, if we examine things to the bottom, we ſhall find very few nations that have any laws. But, be this as it may, it is certain that the Tribunes, having no part of the executive power, could not repreſent the Roman people by virtue of their office, but only in uſurping thoſe of the ſenate.

Among the Greeks, whatever the people had to do, they did it in perſon; they were perpetually aſſembled in public. They inhabited a mild climate, were free from avarice, their ſlaves managed their domeſtic buſineſs, and their great concern was liberty. As you do not poſſeſs the ſame advantages, how can you expect to preſerve the ſame privileges? Your climate being more ſevere, creates more wants *; for ſix months

* To adopt in cold countries the luxury and effeminacy of the

months in the year your public ſquares are too wet or cold to be frequented; your hoarſe voices cannot make themſelves heard in the open air; you apply yourſelves more to gain than to liberty, and are leſs afraid of ſlavery than poverty.

On this occaſion, it will probably be aſked me, if liberty cannot ſupport itſelf without the aſſiſtance of ſlavery? Perhaps not. At leaſt the two extremes approach very near. Whatever does not exiſt in nature, muſt have its inconveniences, and civil ſociety ſtill more than any thing elſe. There are ſome circumſtances ſo critically unhappy, that men cannot preſerve their own liberty but at the expence of the liberty of others; and in which a citizen cannot be free without aggravating the ſubjection of his ſlaves. Such was the ſituation of Sparta. As for you, ye moderns, you have no ſlaves; but are ſlaves yourſelves, and purchaſe their liberty by your own. You may, if you pleaſe, boaſt of this preference; for my part, I find more meanneſs in it than humanity.

I do not intend, however, by this to inculcate that we ſhould have ſlaves, or that it is equitable to reduce men to a ſtate of ſlavery; having already proved the contrary. I am here only giving the reaſons why certain modern nations who imagine themſelves free, employ repreſentatives, and why the ancients did not. But let this be as it will, I affirm, that when once a people make choice of repreſentatives, they are no longer free.

Every thing duly conſidered, I do not ſee a poſ-

the Eaſt, is to appear deſirous of ſlavery, without having the ſame excuſe for ſubmitting to it.

poſſibility of the ſovereign maintaining its rights, and the exerciſe of its prerogatives, for the future among us, unleſs the ſtate be indeed very ſmall. But if it be ſo very ſmoll, will it not be liable to loſe its independency? No. I will make it hereafter appear in what manner the exterior power of a great people may be united with the policy and good order of a little one.

CHAP. XVI. *That the inſtitution of government is not a compact.*

THE legiſlative power being once well eſtabliſhed, we proceed to ſettle the executive power in the ſame manner: for the latter, which operates only by particular acts, being eſſentially different from the other, is naturally divided from it. If it were poſſible for the ſovereign, conſidered as ſuch, to poſſeſs the executive power, the matter of right and fact would be ſo confounded, that we ſhould be no longer able to diſtinguiſh what is law and what is not; the body-politic alſo being thus unnaturally ſituated, would ſoon become a prey to that violence, which it was originally inſtituted to correct.

The citizens being, by virtue of the Social Compact, all equal, that which all may perform, all may preſcribe, whereas none can have a right to require another to do what he does not himſelf. Now it is properly this right, indiſpenſibly neceſſary to animate and put the body-politic in motion, with which the ſovereign inveſts the prince in the inſtitution of government.

It has been pretended by ſome, that the act forming this inſtitution was a contract between the

the people and the chiefs of which they made choice; a contract in which the two parties ſtipulated the conditions on which the one obliged themſelves to command, and the other to obey. I am perſuaded every one will agree with me, that this was a very ſtrange mode of contract. But let us ſee whether this opinion is in itſelf well founded.

In the firſt place, the ſupreme authority can no more modify or alter its form, than it can alienate itſelf; to limit or reſtrain, would be to deſtroy it. It is abſurd and contradictory to ſay the ſovereign made choice of a ſuperior: to oblige itſelf to obey a maſter, is to diſſolve its own conſtitution, and reſtore its members to their natural liberty.

Again, it is plain that ſuch a ſuppoſed contract between the people in general and certain particular perſons would be a particular act; whence it follows, that it would not be a law nor an act of ſovereignty, and of conſequence would be illegal.

It is farther evident, that the contracting parties would remain, reſpecting each other, ſimply under the laws of nature, without any ſecurity for the performance of their reciprocal engagements, a circumſtance totally repugnant to a ſtate of civil ſociety. The party only who might have the power, could enforce the execution of the terms; ſo that we might as well give the name of a contract, to the act of a man who ſhould ſay to another, "I give you my whole property, on condition that you will reſtore me juſt as much of it as you pleaſe."

There is but one compact in a ſtate; and that is the act of aſſociation, which alone is excluſive

of

of every other, as it is impoſſible to imagine any ſubſequent public contract which would not be a violation of the original.

CHAP. XVII. *Of the inſtitution of government.*

WHAT notion, then, are we to form of the act by which government is inſtituted? In anſwer to this queſtion, I ſhall firſt remark, that this act is complicated, or compoſed of two others, *viz.* the eſtabliſhment of the law and execution of it.

By the firſt, the ſovereign enacts that a government ſhould be eſtabliſhed in ſuch or ſuch a form; and it is clear, this being a general act, that it is a law.

By the ſecond, the people name the chiefs who are to be charged with the adminiſtration of the government ſo eſtabliſhed. Now this nomination, being a particular act, is not a ſecond law, but only a conſequence of the firſt, and in reality an act of governmnnt.

The difficulty lies in being able to comprehend how an act of government can take place before the government exiſted; and how the people, who muſt be always either ſovereign or ſubjects, become prince or magiſtrate in certain circumſtances.

We have here made a diſcovery of one of theſe aſtoniſhing properties of the body-politic, by which it reconciles operations apparently contradictory to each other; this act being effected by a ſudden converſion of the ſovereignty into a democracy: ſo that, without any ſenſible change, and only by means of a new relation of all to all, the citizens, becoming magiſtrates, paſs from

from general acts to particular ones, and from enacting laws to the execution of them.

This change of relation is not a matter of mere ſpeculation, unexemplified in practice: it takes place very frequently in the parliament of England, where, among the commons, the whole houſe is formed, on certain occaſions, into a committee, for the better inquiry into and diſcuſſion of the matter in hand; the members become mere commiſſioners of the ſovereign court they conſtituted but a moment before. Agreeable to which, the inquiry being ended, they make a report to themſelves, as the Houſe of Commons, of their proceedings as a grand committee, and deliberate anew under the former title on what they had already determined under the latter.

Such, indeed, is the peculiar advantage of a democratical government, that it is eſtabliſhed in fact by the ſimple act of the general will. After which, this proviſional government continues, if ſuch be the intended form; or eſtabliſhes, in the name of the ſovereign, the form of government adopted by law; and thus every thing proceeds according to order. It is impoſſible to inſtitute a government in any other legal manner, without renouncing the principles before eſtabliſhed.

Chap. XVIII. *Of the means of preventing the uſurpations of government.*

From the foregoing illuſtrations reſults the confirmation of what is aſſerted in the XVIth chapter, *viz.* that the act which inſtitutes government is not a contract, but a law; that the

depoſitories of the executive power are not the maſters, but the ſervants of the people; that the people may appoint or remove them at pleaſure; that they have no pretence to a contract with the people, but are bound to obey them; and that in accepting the offices the ſtate impoſes upon them, they only diſcharge their duty as citizens, without having any ſort of right to diſpute the conditions.

When it ſo happens, therefore, that the people eſtabliſh an hereditary government, whether monarchical, and confined to one particular family, or ariſtocratical, and divided among a certain order of citizens, they do not enter thereby into any formal engagement; they only give the adminiſtration a proviſional form, which remains legal till they think proper to change it.

It is certain that ſuch changes are always dangerous; and that a government once eſtabliſhed ſhould not be meddled with, unleſs it be found incompatible with the public good; but this circumſpection is a maxim of policy, and not a matter of right. The ſtate, however, is no more bound to reſign the civil authority into the hands of its magiſtrates or chiefs, than the military authority into thoſe of its generals.

It is certain, alſo, that great care ſhould be taken to obſerve all thoſe formalities, which, in ſuch a caſe, are requiſite to diſtinguiſh a regular and legal act from a ſeditious commotion; to diſtinguiſh between the general will of a whole people, and the clamours of a faction. In which latter caſe, a people are particularly obliged to give the beſt founded remonſtrances no farther countenance, than in the utmoſt ſtrictneſs of juſtice they may deſerve. Of this obligation, how-

however, the prince may take great advantages, in order to preſerve his power in ſpite of the people, without rnnning the riſk of being charged with uſurping it. For in appearing only to make uſe of his prerogatives, he may extend them, and, under the pretence of maintaining the public peace, may prevent thoſe aſſemblies which might otherwiſe be calculated to re-eſtabliſh the good order of government: ſo that he might profit by that ſilence which he keeps from being broken, and by thoſe irregularities which he himſelf might cauſe to be committed; pleading in his favour the tacit approbation of thoſe whoſe fears keep them ſilent, and puniſhing thoſe who are bold enough to ſpeak. It was thus the *Decemviri*, at firſt elected for one year only, and afterwards continued for another, attempted to perpetuate the duration of their power, by preventing the *Comitia* from aſſembling as uſual; and it is by ſuch eaſy means that all the governments in the world, when once inveſted with power, uſurp ſooner or later the ſovereign authority.

Theſe periodical aſſemblies, of which I have ſpoken above, are very proper to prevent or protract this misfortune, particularly when they require no formal convocation; for then the prince cannot prevent them without declaring himſelf openly a violator of the laws and an enemy to the ſtate.

The opening of theſe aſſemblies, which have no other object than the preſervation of the ſocial contract, ought always to be made by two propoſitions, which can never be ſuppreſſed, and ſhould paſs ſeparately by vote.

Firſt, Whether it be the determination of the

ſovereign to preſerve the preſent form of government.

Second, Whether it be the determination of the people to continue the adminiſtration in the hands of thoſe who are at preſent charged with it.

It is to be obſerved, that I here take for granted, what I conceive has already been demonſtrated, *viz.* that there is no fundamental law in any ſtate, which ſuch ſtate cannot repeal, not excepting even the ſocial compact: for, ſhould all the citizens aſſemble with one accord to break this compact, it would undoubtedly be very legally diſſolved. Grotius even thinks that an individual may renounce the ſtate of which he is a member, and reſume his natural independence and property by leaving the country *. Now it would be very abſurd to ſuppoſe that the whole body of citizens united, could not do that in concert, which any one of them might do ſeparately.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I. *That the general will cannot be annihilated.*

SO long as a number of individuals remain perfectly united and conſider themſelves as one body, they can have but one will; which re-

* With this exception, however, that he does not fly, to elude his duty, and avoid ſerving his country on any emergency, when his ſervice is required. In this caſe, his flight would be criminal, and highly deſerving of puniſhment. It would not be a retreat, but deſertion.

relates to their common preſervation and welfare. All the reſources of the ſtate are then ſimple and vigorous, its political maxims clear and obvious; it comprehends no intricate and oppoſite intereſts; but that of the public is demonſtrably evident to all, and requires only the gift of common-ſenſe to underſtand it. Peace, concord, and equality, are enemies to political refinements. When men are honeſt and ſimple, their very ſimplicity prevents their deception; they are not to be impoſed on by ſophiſtry, but are too artleſs even to be duped. When it is known, that, among the happieſt people in the world, a number of peaſants meet together under the ſhade of an oak, and regulate the affairs of ſtate with the moſt prudential œconomy, is it poſſible to forbear deſpiſing the refinements of other nations, who employ ſo much artifice and myſtery to render themſelves ſplendidly miſerable?

A ſtate thus ſimply governed hath need of but few laws; while in proportion as it becomes neceſſary to promulgate new ones, that neceſſity is univerſally apparent. The firſt perſon who propoſes them, takes on himſelf to ſpeak only what every one hath already thought; and neither eloquence nor intrigue is requiſite to make that paſs into a law, which every one had already reſolved to do as ſoon as he ſhould be aſſured others would do the ſame.

That which deceives our reaſoners on this ſubject, is, that, ſeeing none but ſuch ſtates as were badly conſtituted at their beginning, they are ſtruck with the impoſſibility of maintaining ſuch a police in them. They ſmile to think of the abſurdities into which a deſigning knave or

inſinuating orator might lead the people of Paris and London. They are not appriſed that a Cromwell and a Beaufort would have been treated as incendiaries at Berne and Geneva, and have underwent the diſcipline due to their demerit.

But when the bonds of ſociety begin to relax, and the ſtate to grow weak; when the private intereſts of individuals begin to appear, and that of parties to influence the ſtate; the objects of public good meet with oppoſition: unanimity no longer preſides in the aſſemblies of the people; the general will is no longer the will of all; contradictions and debates ariſe, and the moſt ſalutary counſel is not adopted without diſpute.

Again, when the ſtate is bordering on ruin, and exiſts only in empty form; when the ſocial tie no longer connects the hearts of the people; when the baſeſt motives of intereſt impudently aſſume the ſacred name of the public good; then is the general will altogether ſilent: individuals, actuated by private motives, cheriſh no more the ſentiments of citizens, than if the ſtate had never exiſted; while the mock legiſlature paſs, under the name of laws, thoſe iniquitous decrees which have no other end than private intereſt.

Doth it follow from hence, however, that the general will is annihilated or corrupted? No. This remains ever conſtant, invariable, and pure; though it is ſubjected to that of party. There is not an individual who doth not ſee, while he detaches his own intereſt from that of the public, that he cannot ſeparate himſelf from it entirely: but his ſhare in the common evil ſeems nothing in compariſon to the good which he propoſes to ſecure excluſively to himſelf.

ſelf. Setting this motive aſide, he is as ready to concur in meaſures for the good of the public, and that even for his own ſake, as any one. Nay, even in ſelling his vote, he doth not loſe all ſenſe of the general will; he only eludes it. The fault he is guilty of, lies in changing the ſtate of the queſtion, and making an anſwer to what is not aſked him; ſo that, inſtead of admitting by his vote, *that it is to the intereſt of the ſtate*, he ſays, *it is to the intereſt of ſuch an individual or ſuch a party, that this or that law ſhould paſs*. Thus the order which ſhould prevail in the public aſſemblies of the ſtate, ſhould not be calculated ſo much to preſerve the general will inviolate, as to cauſe it to be always interrogated, and to make it anſwer.

I might here make a variety of reflections on the ſimple right of voting in every act of the ſovereignty; a right which the citizens cannot be deprived of: as alſo on the rights of thinking, propoſing, and debating, on public matters; privileges which government is ever ſolicitous enough to confine to its own members. This ſubject, however, is of importance enough to deſerve a whole treatiſe of itſelf; and it is impoſſible for me to ſay every thing in the preſent.

CHAP. II. *On votes.*

IT is evident, from what has been ſaid in the preceding chapter, that the manner in which public affairs are carried on, may afford a ſure indication of the actual ſtate of manners, and the health of the body-politic. The more concord there is in public aſſemblies, that is to ſay, the nearer the members approach to unanimity in

in giving their votes, the more prevalent is the general will among them: but long debates, diſſentions, and commotions, evince the aſcendancy of particular intereſts and the decline of the ſtate.

This appears leſs evident, indeed, when two or more orders of men enter into the conſtitution; as at Rome, where the quarrels of the Patricians and Plebeians occaſioned frequent diſturbances in the *Comitia*, even in the moſt flouriſhing times of the republic. This exception, however, is more apparent than real: as in that caſe there exiſts, by a defect inherent in the body-politic, two ſtates in one; and that which is not true of both together, may nevertheleſs be true of each apart. It is alſo true in fact, that, even during the moſt turbulent times of the republic, the decrees of the Plebeians, when the Senate did not intermeddle, were paſſed with great tranquillity agreeable to the plurality of voices. The citizens having but one common intereſt, the people could have but one will.

Unanimity returns again at the oppoſite extremity of the circle; and this is where the citizens, reduced to ſlavery, have neither liberty nor will. In ſuch a ſituation, fear and flattery pervert their votes into acclamations; they no longer deliberate among themſelves, but either adore or curſe their tyrants. Such were the debaſed principles of the Senate under the Roman emperors. Under theſe circumſtances alſo the ſentiments of the public were frequently expreſſed with the moſt ridiculous precaution; Tacitus obſerving, that, under Otho, the Senators, while they loaded Vitellius with execrations, affected at the ſame time to make a confuſed

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and clamorous noiſe, in order to prevent his knowing, ſhould he become their maſter, what any individual had ſaid.

From theſe conſiderations may be deduced the maxims on which the manner of counting votes and comparing different ſuffrages ſhould be regulated, according as the general will is more or leſs eaſy to be diſcovered, and the ſtate more or leſs advanced towards its decline. There is but one law, which in its own nature requires unanimous conſent: and this is the Social Compact. For civil aſſociation is the moſt voluntary act in the world: every man being born free, and maſter of himſelf, no one can lay him under reſtraint, on any pretence whatever, without his own conſent. To affirm that the ſon of a ſlave is born a ſlave, is to affirm he is not born a man.

If there be any perſons, however, who oppoſe this contract itſelf, their oppoſition does not invalidate that contract; it only hinders their being comprehended therein; and they remain aliens in the midſt of citizens. When a ſtate is formed, a conſent to its inſtitution is inferred by the reſidence of the party: to ſubmit to reſidence in any country, is to ſubmit to its ſovereignty *.

If we except this primitive contract, the determination of the majority is always obligatory on the reſt: this is a neceſſary conſequence of the contract itſelf. But it may be aſked, How can

* This muſt always be underſtood, however, of a free ſtate, from which people have the liberty to depart with their effects at pleaſure. For in others, the conſideration of their family, their property, the want of an aſylum, neceſſity or violence, may detain an inhabitant in a country contrary to his will; in which caſe, his ſimple reſidence neither implies his conſent to the contract, nor his violation of it.

can a man be free, and yet be obliged to conform to the will of others? How can the members of an oppoſition be called free-men, who are compelled to ſubmit to laws which they have not conſented to? I anſwer, that this queſtion is not properly ſtated. The citizen conſents to all laws paſſed by a majority, though ſome of them in particular may have paſſed contrary to his inclination; nay, he conſents to thoſe by which he is puniſhable for the breach of any one. The conſtant will of all the members of a ſtate, is the the general will; and it is this alone that makes them either citizens or freemen *. When a law is propoſed in the aſſembly of the people, they are not preciſely demanded, Whether they ſeverally approve or reject the propoſition; but, Whether it be conformable or not to the general will, which is theirs as a collective body. Each perſon, therefore, in giving his vote declares his opinion on this head; and on counting the votes, the declaration of the general will is inferred from the majority. When a law thus paſſes contrary to my opinion, it proves nothing more than that I was miſtaken, and that I concluded the general will to be what it really was not. So that, if my particular advice had been followed, it would have been contrary to my will, which as a citizen is the ſame as the general, and in that caſe I ſhould not have been free.

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* At Genoa we ſee the word *Libertas* inſcribed on the chain of the galley-ſlaves, and on the doors of the priſoners: the application of which device is beautiful and juſt; as it is in fact only the criminals of all ſtates that infringe the liberty of the citizen. A country, whoſe malefactors ſhould be all actually chained to the oar, would be a country of the moſt perfect liberty.

This argument ſuppoſes, indeed, that all the characteriſtics of the general will are contained in the plurality of votes: and when this ceaſes to be the caſe, take what courſe you will, there is an end of liberty.

In having ſhewn how the will of particulars and parties is ſubſtituted for the general in public deliberations, I have already ſufficiently pointed out the practicable means of preventing ſuch abuſes; of this, however, I ſhall ſpeak further hereafter. With regard to the proportional number of votes that indicate this general will, I have alſo laid down the principles on which it may be determined. The difference of a ſingle voice is enough to break the unanimity; but between unanimity and an equality there is a variety of proportions; to each of which the number in queſtion may be applied, according to the circumſtances of the body-politic.

There are two general maxims, which may ſerve to regulate theſe proportions: the one is, that the more grave and important the deliberations, the nearer ought the determination to approach to unanimity: the other is, that the more expedition the affair requires, the leſs ſhould unanimity be inſiſted on. In deliberations where the matter ſhould be immediately determined, the majority of a ſingle vote ſhould be ſufficient. The firſt of theſe maxims ſeems moſt applicable to permanent laws, and the ſecond to matters of buſineſs. But be this as it may, it is from their judicious combination that the beſt proportions muſt be deduced concerning that plurality in whoſe votes ſhould be ſuppoſed to conſiſt the general will.

CHAP.

Chap. III. *Of election.*

With regard to the election of a prince or of magiſtrates, which, as I before obſerved, is a complicated act, there are two methods of proceeding; viz. by choice, and by lot. They have each been made uſe of in different republics; and we ſee in our own times, a very intricate mixture of both in the election of the doge of Venice.

The preference by lot, ſays Monteſquieu, *is of the nature of a democracy.* This I admit, but not for the reaſons given. *The choice by lot*, ſays he, *is a method which offends nobody, by permitting each citizen to entertain the reaſonable hope of being preferred to the ſervice of his country.*

This, however, is not the true reaſon. If we reflect that the election of chiefs is a function of government and not of the ſovereignty, we ſhall ſee the reaſon why this method is of the nature of a democracy, in which the adminiſtration is ſo much the better as its acts are fewer.

In every real democracy, the office of magiſtrate is not advantageous, but expenſive and burdenſome, ſo that it were unjuſt to impoſe it on one perſon rather than another. The law, therefore, impoſes that charge on him to whoſe lot it falls: for in this caſe, all ſtanding an equal chance, the choice doth not depend on human will, nor can any particular application change the univerſality of the law.

In an ariſtocracy, the prince makes choice of the prince; and, the government providing for itſelf, here it is that votes are properly applicable. The apparent exception, in the election

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of the doge of Venice, confirms this diſtinction, inſtead of deſtroying it. Such a mixed form as is uſed by the Venetians is adapted to a mixed government: for it is a miſtake to ſuppoſe the government of Venice a true ariſtocracy. If the lower order of people, indeed, have no ſhare in the government, the nobility ſtand in their place, and become the people in reſpect to the adminiſtration. What a number is there of the inferior order of nobles, who ſtand no chance of ever getting into the magiſtracy, and reap no other advantage from their rank than the empty title of Excellency, and the privilege of ſitting in the great Council! This great Council being as numerous as our general Council at Geneva, its illuſtrious members have no greater privileges therefore than our ordinary citizens. It is certain, that, ſetting aſide the extreme diſparity of the two republics, the burghers of Geneva repreſent exactly the Patricians of Venice, our natives and ſojourners repreſent the citizens and people, and our peaſants the inhabitants of the *terra firma* belonging to that ſtate. In a word, conſider their Venetian republic in what light you will, abſtracted from its grandeur, its government is no more ariſtocratical than that of Geneva. All the difference is, that we have no occaſion for this kind of election.

The choice by lot is attended with very little inconvenience in a real democracy, when all men being nearly on an equality, as well with regard to manners and abilities as to ſentiments and fortune, the matter of choice is indifferent. But I have already obſerved, a true democracy is only imaginary.

When the election is of a mixed form, viz.

by vote and by lot, the firſt ought to provide for thoſe officers which require proper talents, as in military affairs; the other being beſt adapted to thoſe which require only common ſenſe, honeſty, and integrity; ſuch as the offices of judicature; becauſe, in a well-formed ſtate, thoſe qualities are poſſeſſed by all the citizens in common.

No election, either by vote or lot, hath place under a monarchical government; the monarch himſelf being the only rightful prince and legal magiſtrate, the choice of his ſubſtitutes is veſted in him alone. When the Abbe de St Pierre, therefore, propoſed to increaſe the number of the king's councils in France, and to elect their members by ballot, he was not aware that he propoſed to change the form of the French government.

It remains to ſpeak of the manner of giving and collecting votes in popular aſſemblies; but perhaps an hiſtorical ſketch of the Roman police relating to this point, will explain it better than all the maxims I ſhould endeavour to eſtabliſh. It is worth the pains of a judicious reader to attend a little particularly to the manner in which they treated affairs, both general and particular, in a council of two hundred thouſand perſons.

CHAP. IV. *Of the Roman Comitia.*

WE have no authentic monuments of the earlieſt ages of Rome; there is even great reaſon to believe that moſt of the ſtories told us of them are fabulous †; and indeed, the moſt in-

† The name of *Rome*, which it is pretended was taken from *Romulus*, is Greek, and ſignifies *force*; the name of *Numa* is Greek,

intereſting and inſtructive part of the annals of nations in general, which is that of their eſtabliſhment, is the moſt imperfect. Experience daily teaches us to what cauſes are owing the revolutions of kingdoms and empires; but as we ſee no inſtances of the original formation of ſtates, we can only proceed on conjectures in treating this ſubject.

The cuſtoms we find actually eſtabliſhed, however, ſufficiently atteſt, there muſt have been an origin of thoſe cuſtoms. Thoſe traditions, alſo, relating to ſuch origin, which appear the moſt rational, and of the beſt authority, ought to paſs for the moſt certain. Theſe are the maxims I have adopted in tracing the manner in which the moſt powerful and free people in the univerſe exerciſed the ſovereign authority.

After the foundation of Rome, the riſing republic, that is to ſay, the army of the founder, compoſed of Albans, Sabines, and foreigners, was divided into three claſſes; which, from that diviſion, took the name of tribes. Each of theſe tribes was ſubdivided into ten *Curiæ*, and each *Curia* into *Decuriæ*, at the head of which were placed Chiefs reſpectively denominated *Curiones* and *Decuriones*.

Beſide this, there were ſelected from each tribe a body of an hundred cavaliers or knights, called *Centurions*; by which it is evident, that theſe diviſions, not being eſſential to the good order of a city, were at firſt only military. But it ſeems as if the preſaging inſtinct of future greatneſs induced the little town of Rome to

Greek alſo, and ſignifies *law*. What probability is there that the two firſt kings of this city ſhould have been called by names ſo expreſſive of their future actions?

adopt at firſt a ſyſtem of police proper for the metropolis of the world.

From this primitive diviſion, however, there ſpeedily reſulted an inconvenience. This was, that the tribe of Albans, and that of the Sabines, always remaining the ſame, while that of the ſtrangers was perpetually encreaſing by the concourſe of foreigners, the latter ſoon ſurpaſſed the number of the two former. The remedy which Servius applied to correct this dangerous abuſe was to change the diviſion; and to ſubſtitute, in the room of diſtinction of race, which he aboliſhed, another taken from the parts of the town occupied by each tribe. Inſtead of three tribes, he conſtituted four; each of which occupied one of the hills of Rome, and bore its name. Thus by removing this inequality for the preſent, he prevented it alſo for the future; and in order that ſuch diviſion ſhould not only be local but perſonal, he prohibited the inhabitants of one quarter of the city from removing to the other, and thereby prevented the mixture of families.

He doubled alſo the three ancient centuries of cavalry, and made an addition of twelve others, but always under their old denomination; a ſimple and judicious method, by which he completely diſtinguiſhed the body of knights from that of the people, without exciting the murmurs of the latter.

Again, to theſe four city tribes, Servius added fifteen others, called ruſtic tribes, becauſe they were formed of the inhabitants of the country, divided into as many cantons. In the ſequel were made an equal number of new diviſions, and the Roman people found themſelves

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divided into thirty-five tribes; the number at which their diviſions remained fixed till the final diſſolution of the republic.

From the diſtinction between the tribes of city and country, reſulted an effect worthy of obſervation; becauſe we have no other example of it, and becauſe Rome was at once indebted to it for the preſervation of its manners and the increaſe of its empire. It might be conceived the city tribes would ſoon arrogate to themſelves the power and honours of the ſtate, and treat the ruſtics with contempt. The effect, nevertheleſs, was directly contrary. The taſte of the ancient Romans for a country life is well known. They derived this taſte from the wiſe inſtitutor, who joined to liberty the labours of the peaſant and the ſoldier, and conſigned, as it were, to the city, the cultivation of the arts, trade, intrigue, fortune, and ſlavery.

Thus the moſt illuſtrious perſonages of Rome, living in the country, and employing themſelves in the buſineſs of agriculture, it was among theſe only the Romans looked for the defenders of their republic. This ſtation, being that of the moſt worthy patricians, was held in univerſal eſteem: the ſimple and laborious life of the villager was preferred to the mean and lazy life of the citizen; and a perſon who, having been a labourer in the country, became a reſpectable houſekeeper in town, was yet held in contempt. It is with reaſon, ſays Varro, that our magnanimous anceſtors eſtabliſhed in the country the nurſery for thoſe robuſt and brave men, who defended them in time of war and cheriſhed them in peace. Again, Pliny ſays in expreſs terms, the country tribes were honoured becauſe

of the perſons of which they were compoſed; whereas ſuch of their individuals as were to be treated with ignominy were removed into the tribes of the city. When the Sabine, Appius Claudius, came to ſettle in Rome, he was loaded with honours, and regiſtered in one of the ruſtic tribes, which afterwards took the name of his family. Laſtly, the freed-men were all entered in the city tribes, never in the rural; nor is there one ſingle inſtance, during the exiſtence of the republic, of any one of theſe freedmen being preferred to the magiſtracy, altho' become a citizen.

This was an excellent maxim; but was carried ſo far, that it effected an alteration, and undoubtedly an abuſe in the police of the ſtate.

In the firſt place, the Cenſors, after having long arrogated the right of arbitrarily removing the citizens from one tribe to another, permitted the greater part to regiſter themſelves in whatever tribe they pleaſed; a permiſſion that could ſurely anſwer no good end, and yet it deprived theſe officers of one of their ſevereſt methods of cenſure. Beſides, as the great and powerful thus got themſelves regiſtered in the rural tribes, and the freedmen, with the populace, only filled up thoſe of the city, the tribes in general had no longer a local diſtinction; but were ſo ſtrangely mixed and jumbled together, that their reſpective members could be known only by appealing to the regiſters; ſo that the idea attached to the word tribe, was changed from real to perſonal, or rather became altogether chimerical.

It happened alſo, that the tribes of the city, being nearer at hand, had generally the greateſt influence in the *Comitia*, and made a property of the

the ſtate, by ſelling their votes to thoſe who were baſe enough to purchaſe them.

With regard to the *Curiæ*, ten having been inſtituted in each tribe, the whole Roman people, included within the walls, made up thirty *Curiæ*, each of which had their peculiar temples, their gods, officers, and feaſts called *Compitalia*, reſembling the *Paganalia* afterwards inſtituted among the ruſtic tribes.

At the new diviſion made by Servius, the number thirty not being equally diviſible among the four tribes, he forbore to meddle with this mode of diſtribution; and the *Curiæ*, thus independent of the tribes, formed another diviſion of the inhabitants. No notice, however, was taken of the *Curiæ*, either among the ruſtic tribes, or the people compoſing them; becauſe the tribes becoming a mere civil eſtabliſhment, and another method having been introduced for raiſing the troops, the military diſtinctions of Romulus were dropt as ſuperfluous. Thus, though every citizen was regiſtered in ſome tribe, yet many of them were not included in any *Curia*. Servius made ſtill a third diviſion, which had no relation to the two former, and became in its conſequences the moſt important of all. He divided the whole Roman people into ſix claſſes, which he diſtinguiſhed neither by perſons nor place, but by property. Of theſe the higher claſſes were filled by the rich, the lower by the poor, and the middle claſſes by thoſe of middling fortunes. Theſe ſix claſſes were ſubdivided into one hundred ninety-three other bodies called centuries; and theſe were again ſo diſtributed, that the firſt claſs alone comprehended more than half the number of cen-

centuries, and the laſt claſs only one ſingle century. In this method the claſs that contained the feweſt perſons had the greater number of centuries; and the laſt claſs was eſteemed only a ſubdiviſion, although it contained more than half the inhabitants of Rome.

In order that the people ſhould penetrate leſs into the deſign of this latter form of diſtribution, Servius affected to give it the air of a military one. In the ſecond claſs he incorporated two centuries of armourers, and annexed two inſtruments of war to the fourth. In each claſs, except the laſt, he diſtinguiſhed alſo between the young and the old, that is to ſay, thoſe who were obliged to bear arms, from thoſe who were exempted from it on account of their age; a diſtinction which gave more frequent riſe to the repetition of the *cenſus* or enumeration of them, than even the ſhifting of property: laſtly, he required their aſſembly to be made on the *Campus Martius*, where all thoſe who were of age for the ſervice were to appear under arms.

The reaſon why he did not purſue the ſame diſtinction of age in the laſt claſs, was, that the populace, of which it was compoſed, were not permitted to have the honour of bearing arms in the ſervice of their country. It was neceſſary to be houſekeepers, in order to attain the privilege of defending themſelves. There is not one private centinel perhaps, of all thoſe innumerable troops that make ſo brilliant a figure in the armies of modern princes, who would not, for want of property, have been driven out with diſdain from a Roman cohort, when ſoldiers were the defenders of liberty.

In the laſt claſs, however, there was a diſtinc-

ſtinction made between what they called *Proletarii* and thoſe denominated *Capite Cenſi*. The former, not quite reduced to nothing, ſupplied the ſtate at leaſt with citizens, and ſometimes on preſſing occaſions with ſoldiers. As to thoſe who were totally deſtitute of ſubſtance, and could be numbered only by capitation, they were diſregarded as nothing; Marius being the firſt who deigned to enroll them.

Without taking upon me here to decide, whether this third ſpecies of diviſion be in itſelf good or ill; I may venture ſafely to affirm, that nothing leſs than that ſimplicity of manners which prevailed among the ancient Romans, the diſintereſtehneſs, their taſte for agriculture, their contempt for trade and the thirſt of gain, could have rendered it practicable. Where is the nation among the moderns, in which voracious avarice, a turbulence of diſpoſition, a ſpirit of artifice, and the continual fluctuation of property, would permit ſuch an eſtabliſhment to continue for twenty years, without overturning the ſtate? Nay, it muſt be well obſerved, that the purity of the Roman manners, and the force of a cenſure more efficacious than the inſtitution itſelf, ſerved to correct the defects of it at Rome, where a rich man was often removed from his own claſs, and ranked among the poor, for making an improper parade of his wealth.

It is eaſy to comprehend from this, why mention is hardly ever made of more than five claſſes, though there were in reality ſix. The ſixth, furniſhing neither the army with ſoldiers, nor the *Campus Martius* * with voters, and being of

* I ſay the *Campus Martius*, becauſe it was there the *Comi-*

it

of hardly any uſe in the republic, was hardly ever accounted any thing.

Such were the different diviſions of the Roman people. We will now examine into the defects of which they were productive in their aſſemblies. Theſe aſſemblies, when legally convoked, were denominated *Comitia*, and were held in the *Campus Martius* and other parts of Rome: being diſtinguiſhed into *Curiata*, *Centuriata*, and *Tributa*, according to the three grand diviſions of the people into *Curiæ*, *Centuries*, and *Tribes*. The *Comitia Curiata* were inſtituted by Romulus, the *Centuriata* by Servius, and the *Tributa* by the Tribunes of the people. Nothing could paſs into a law, nor could any magiſtrates be choſen but in the *Comitia*; and as there was no citizen who was not enrolled in a *Curia*, *Century*, or *Tribe*, it follows that no citizen was excluded from giving his vote; ſo that the Roman people were truly ſovereign both in right and fact.

To make the aſſembly of the *Comitia* legal, and give their determinations the force of laws, three conditions were requiſite. In the firſt place, it was neceſſary that the magiſtrate or body convoking them ſhould be inveſted with proper authority for ſo doing; ſecondly, that the aſſembly ſhould occur on the days permitted by law; and thirdly, that the augurs ſhould be favourable to their meeting.

The reaſon of the firſt condition needs no explanation. The ſecond is an affair of police; thus it was not permitted the *Comitia* to aſſemble on market-

tia aſſembled by centuries; in the two other forms, they aſſembled in the *Forum* and other places, where the *Capite Cenſi* had as much influence and importance as the principal citizens.

market-days, when the country people, coming to Rome on buſineſs, would be prevented from tranſacting it. By the third, the Senate kept a fierce and turbulent multitude under ſome reſtraint, and opportunely checked the ardour of the ſeditious Tribunes; the latter, however, found more ways than one to elude the force of this expedient.

But the laws and the election of the chiefs were not the only matters ſubmitted to the determination of the *Comitia;* the Roman people having uſurped the moſt important functions of government, the fate of Europe might be ſaid to depend on their aſſemblies. Hence the variety of objects that came before them gave occaſion for divers alterations in the form of theſe aſſemblies, according to the nature of thoſe objects.

To judge of theſe diverſities, it is ſufficient to compare them together. The deſign of Romulus in inſtituting the *Curiæ*, was to reſtrain the Senate by means of the people, and the people by the Senate, while he himſelf maintained his influence equally over both. By this form, therefore, he gave to the people all the authority of number to counterbalance that of power and riches, which he left in the hands of the Patricians. But, agreeable to the ſpirit of monarchy, he gave more advantage to the Patricians, by the influence of their clients to obtain the majority of votes. This admirable inſtitution of patrons and clients was a maſterpiece of politics and humanity, without which the order of Patricians, ſo contrary to the ſpirit of the republic, could not have ſubſiſted. Rome alone hath the honour of giving to the world this

this fine example, of which no abuſe is known to have been made, and which nevertheleſs hath never been adopted by other nations.

This diviſion by *Curiæ* having ſubſiſted under the kings till the time of Servius, and the reign of the laſt *Tarquin* being accounted illegal, the regal laws came hence to be generally diſtinguiſhed by the name of *leges curiatæ*.

Under the republic, the *Curiæ*, always confined to the four city tribes, and comprehending only the populace of Rome, could not arrive either at the honour of ſitting in the Senate, which was at the head of the Patricians, or at that of being Tribunes, which, notwithſtanding they were Plebeians, were yet at the head of the citizens in eaſy circumſtances. They fell, therefore, into diſcredit, and were reduced to ſo contemptible a ſtate, that their thirty Lictors aſſembled to do the whole buſineſs of the *Comitia Curiata*.

The diviſion by *Centuries* was ſo favourable to ariſtocracy, that it is not at firſt eaſy to comprehend why the Senate did not always carry their point in the *Comitia Centuriata*, by which the Conſuls, Cenſors, and Prætors, were choſen. It is in fact certain, that out of the hundred and ninety-three centuries, forming the ſix claſſes of the whole Roman people, the firſt claſs containing ninety-eight of them, and the votes being reckoned only by centuries, this firſt claſs alone had more votes than all the others. When the centuries of this claſs, therefore, were found to be unanimous, they proceeded no farther in counting votes; whatever might be determined by the minority being conſidered as the opinion of the mob. So that it might be juſtly ſaid,

that

that in the *Comitia Centuriata* matters were carried rather by the greater quantity of money than the majority of votes.

But this extreme authority was moderated by two cauſes. In the firſt place, the Tribunes, generally ſpeaking, and always a conſiderable number of wealthy citizens, being in this claſs of the rich, they counterpoiſed the credit of the Patricians in the ſame claſs. The ſecond cauſe lay in the manner of voting, which was this; the centuries, inſtead of voting according to order, beginning with the firſt in rank, caſt lots which ſhould proceed firſt to the election. And to this the century whoſe lot it was, proceeded * alone; the other centuries being called upon another day to give their votes according to their rank, when they repeated the ſame election, and uſually confirmed the choice of the former. By this method the preference of rank was ſet aſide, in order to give it according to lot, agreeable to the principles of democracy.

There is another advantage reſulting from this cuſtom; which is, that the citizens reſiding in the country had time between the two elections to inform themſelves of the merit of the candidates thus proviſionally nominated; by which means they might be better enabled to give their vote. But under the pretence of expediting affairs, this cuſtom was in time aboliſhed, and the two elections were made the ſame day.

The *Comitia by Tribes*, were, properly ſpeaking, the great Council of the Roman people.

* The century thus preferred by lot was called *Præ-rogativa*, becauſe it was the firſt whoſe ſuffrage was demanded; and hence is derived the word *prerogative*.

Theſe were convoked only by the Tribunes; by theſe alſo the Tribunes were choſen, and by theſe the *plebiſcita* or laws of the people were paſſed. The Senators were not only deſtitute of rank in theſe aſſemblies; they had not even the right to be preſent at them; but, obliged to pay obedience to laws in the enacting of which they had no vote, they were in that reſpect leſs free than the loweſt citizens. This injuſtice, however, was very ill underſtood, and was in itſelf alone ſufficient to invalidate the decrees of a body, whoſe members were not all admitted to vote. Had all the Patricians aſſiſted at theſe *Comitia*, as they had a right, in quality of citizens, they could have had no undue influence where every man's vote was equal, even from the loweſt of the people to the higheſt perſonage of the ſtate.

It is evident, therefore, that, excluſive of the good order that reſulted from theſe ſeveral diviſions, in collecting the votes of ſo numerous a people, the form and method of theſe diviſions were not indifferent in themſelves; each being productive of effects, adapted to certain views in regard to which it was preferable to any other.

But without entering into a more circumſtantial account of theſe matters, it is plain from what hath been advanced, that the *Comitia Tribunata* were the moſt favourable to a popular government, and the *Comitia Centuriata* to an ariſtocracy. With reſpect to the *Comitia Curiata*, of which the populace formed the majority, as they were good for nothing but to favour tyrannical deſigns, they remained in this contemptible ſtate into which they were fallen;

even

even the contrivers of ſedition themſelves not chuſing to employ means which muſt have expoſed too openly their deſigns. It is very certain that all the majeſty of the Roman people was diſplayed only in the *Comitia Centuriata*, which only were complete; the *Curiata* wanting the ruſtic Tribes, and the *Tribunata* the Senate and Patricians.

With regard to the method of collecting the votes, it was, among the primitive Romans, ſimple as their manners, though ſtill leſs ſimple than that of Sparta. Every one gave his vote aloud, which the regiſter took down in writing; the plurality of votes in each tribe determined the vote of that tribe, and the plurality of votes in the tribes determined the ſuffrage of the people. In the ſame manner alſo they proceeded with regard to the *Curiæ* and the Centuries. This cuſtom was a very good one, ſo long as integrity prevailed among the citizens, and every one was aſhamed to give his public ſanction to an unworthy perſon or cauſe. But when the people grew corrupt and ſold their votes, it became neceſſary to make them give their votes more privately, in order to reſtrain the purchaſers by diſtruſt, and afford knaves an expedient to avoid being traitors.

I know that Cicero cenſures this alteration, and attributes to it in a great degree the ruin of the republic. But, though I am ſenſible of all the weight of Cicero's authority in this caſe, I cannot be of his opinion. I conceive, on the contrary, that the ruin of the ſtate would have been accelerated had the Romans neglected making this alteration. As the regimen of people in health is not proper for the ſick, ſo it is

abſurd to think of governing a corrupt people by the ſame laws as were expedient for them before they were corrupted. There cannot be a ſtronger proof of this maxim, than the duration of the republic of Venice; the ſhadow of which ſtill exiſts, ſolely becauſe its laws are adapted only to bad men.

On this change in the manner of voting, tablets were diſtributed among the citizens, by means of which they could give their ſuffrage without its being known. On this occaſion other methods were of courſe made uſe of in collecting votes, ſuch as counting the number of voices, comparing it with that of the tablets, *&c.* Not that theſe methods were ſo effectual as to prevent the returning officers † from being often ſuſpected of partiality: and it is plain in the ſequel, by the multiplicity of laws made to prevent bribery and corruption in elections, that they could not effect this point.

Toward the decline of the republic, recourſe was had to very extraordinary expedients to make up for the inſufficiency of the laws. Prodigies were ſometimes played off with ſucceſs; but this ſcheme, though it impoſed on the multitude, did not impoſe on thoſe who influenced them. Sometimes aſſemblies were called ſuddenly, and in great haſte, that the candidates might not have time to create an undue intereſt: at others, again, the whole ſeſſion was ſpent in declamation, when it was ſeen that the people were biaſſed to take a wrong ſide. At length, however, ambition eluded all theſe precautions; and it is almoſt incredible that, in the midſt of ſo

† Cuſtodes, Diribitores, Rogatores ſuffragiorum.

ſo many abuſes, this immenſe people ſtill continued, by virtue of their ancient laws, to elect their magiſtrates, to paſs laws, to judge cauſes, and to expedite both public and private affairs, with as much facility as could have been done in the Senate itſelf.

Chap. V. *On a tribunate.*

When it is impracticable to eſtabliſh an exact proportion between the component parts of a ſtate, or that inevitable cauſes perpetually operate to change their relations, a particular magiſtracy is inſtituted, which, not incorporating with the reſt, replaces every term in its true relation, and conſtitutes in itſelf a due medium either between the prince and the people, between the prince and the ſovereign, or, in caſes of neceſſity, at once between both.

This body, which I ſhall call a *Tribunate*, is the preſerver of the laws and of the legiſlative power. It ſerves ſometimes to protect the ſovereign againſt the government, as the tribunes of the people did at Rome; ſometimes to protect the government againſt the people, as at preſent the council of the *ten* do at Venice; and again, at others, to maintain an equilibrium both on the one part and the other, as did the Ephori at Sparta.

The Tribunate is not a conſtitutional part of the city, and ought not, therefore, to have any ſhare in the legiſlative or executive power. Even in this, however, its own is much greater: for being able to do nothing itſelf, it may prevent any thing from being done by others. It is more ſacred and revered, as defender of the

laws, than the prince who executes them, or the ſovereign who enacts them. This was very evident at Rome, when the haughty patricians, who always deſpiſed the people collectively, were nevertheleſs obliged to give place to their common officers, without command or juriſdiction.

The Tribunate, when judiciouſly moderated, is the firmeſt ſupport of a good conſtitution; but if it have ever ſo little aſcendency of power, it ſubverts every thing. With regard to its weakneſs, it is not natural to it; for, provided it have any exiſtence at all, it can never have too little power.

It degenerates into tyranny when it uſurps the executive power, of which it is only the moderator, and when it would interpret the laws which it ſhould only protect. The enormous power of the Ephori, which was exerciſed without danger while Sparta retained its purity of manners, ſerved only to increaſe the corruption of them when once begun. The blood of Agis ſpilt by thoſe tyrants was revenged by his ſucceſſor: the crime and the puniſhment of the Ephori accelerated equally the ruin of that republic; for after the time of Cleomenes, Sparta was nothing. The deſtruction of the Roman republic was effected in the ſame manner: the exceſſive power which the Tribunes by degrees uſurped, ſerved at length, with the help of the laws made in defence of liberty, as a ſecurity to the Emperors who deſtroyed it. As for the council of *ten* at Venice, it is a moſt ſanguinary tribunal, equally horrible to the patricians and the people; and which is ſo far from openly protecting the laws, that it now ſerves but ſecretly to effect the breach of them.

The

The Tribunate is enfeebled, as well as the government, by increaſing the number of its members. When the Roman Tribunes, at firſt two, and afterwards five, had a mind to double their number, the Senate did not oppoſe it; being well aſſured they ſhould be able to make one a curb to another; which was actually the caſe.

The beſt way to prevent the uſurpations of ſo formidable a body, a way that no government hath hitherto adopted, would be to render ſuch a body not permanent, but to regulate the intervals during which it ſhould remain diſſolved. Theſe intervals, which ſhould not be ſo great as to give abuſes time to ſtrengthen into cuſtoms, might be fixed by law, in ſuch a manner that it would be eaſy to abridge them, in caſe of neceſſity, by extraordinary commiſſions.

This method appears to me to be attended with no inconvenience; becauſe, as I have already obſerved, the Tribunate making no eſſential part of the conſtitution, may be ſuppreſſed without injury: and it appears to me effectual, becauſe a magiſtrate newly re-eſtabliſhed doth not ſucceed to the power of his predeceſſor, but to that which the law confers on him.

CHAP. VI. *Of the dictature.*

THAT inflexibility of the laws, which prevents their yielding to circumſtances, may in ſome caſes render them hurtful, and in ſome critical juncture bring on the ruin of the ſtate. The order and prolixity of forms, take up a length of time, of which the occaſion will not always admit. A thouſand accidents may happen for which the legiſlature hath not provided; and

and it is a very neceſſary foreſight to ſee that it is impoſſible to provide for every thing.

We ſhould not be deſirous, therefore, of eſtabliſhing the laws ſo firmly as to ſuſpend their effects. Even Sparta itſelf ſometimes permitted the laws to lie dormant.

Nothing, however, but the certainty of greater danger ſhould induce a people to make any alteration in government; nor ſhould the ſacred power of the laws be ever reſtrained unleſs the public ſafety is concerned. In ſuch uncommon caſes, when the danger is manifeſt, the public ſafety may be provided for by a particular act, which commits the charge of it to thoſe who are moſt worthy. Such a commiſſion may paſs, in two different ways, according to the nature of the danger.

If the caſe require only a greater activity in the government, it ſhould be confined to one or two members; in which caſe, it would not be the authority of the laws, but the form of the adminiſtration only, that would be changed. But if the danger be of ſuch a nature, that the formality of the laws would prevent a remedy, then a ſupreme chief might be nominated who ſhould ſilence the laws, and ſuſpend for a moment the ſovereign authority. In ſuch a caſe, the general will cannot be doubted; it being evident, that the principal intention of the people muſt be to ſave the ſtate from perdition. By this mode of temporary ſuſpenſion the legiſlative authority is not aboliſhed; the magiſtrate who ſilences it, cannot make it ſpeak, and though he over-rules cannot repreſent it; he may do every thing indeed but make laws.

The firſt method was taken by the Roman Senate,

Senate, when it charged the conſuls, in a ſacred manner, to provide for the ſafety of the commonwealth. The ſecond took place when one of the conſuls nominated a dictator*; cuſtom which Rome adopted from the example of Alba.

In the early times of the republic, the Romans had frequent recourſe to the dictatorſhip, becauſe the ſtate had not then ſufficient ſtability to ſupport itſelf by the force of its conſtitution. The manners of the people, alſo, rendering thoſe precautions unneceſſary which were taken in after-times, there was no fear that a dictator would abuſe his authority, or that he would be tempted to keep it in his hands beyond the term. On the contrary, it appeared, that ſo great a power was burdenſome to the perſon inveſted with it, ſo eager were they to reſign it; as if it were a difficult and dangerous poſt to be ſuperior to the laws.

Thus it was not the danger of the abuſe, but of the debaſement of this ſupreme magiſtracy, that gave occaſion to cenſure the indiſcreet uſe of it in ancient times. For when they came to proſtitute it in the affair of elections and other matters of mere formality, it was very juſtly to be apprehended that it would become leſs reſpectable on preſſing occaſions; and that the people would be apt to look upon an office as merely titular, which was inſtituted to aſſiſt at empty ceremonies.

Toward the end of the republic, the Romans, becoming more circumſpect, were as ſparing of the dictature, as they had before been prodigal of

* This nomination was ſecretly made in the night, as if they were aſhamed of the action of placing any man ſo much above the law.

of it. It was eaſy to ſee, however, that their fears were groundleſs, that the weakneſs of the capital was their ſecurity againſt the internal magiſtrate; that a dictator might in ſome caſes have acted in defence of public liberty, without ever making encroachments on it; and that the Roman chains were not forged in Rome itſelf, but in its armies abroad. The weak reſiſtance which Marius made to Sylla, and Pompey to Cæſar, ſhewed plainly how little the authority from within the city could do againſt the power from without.

This error led them to commit great blunders. Such, for inſtance, was their neglecting to appoint a dictator in the affair of Catiline. For, as it engaged only the city, or at moſt a province in Italy, a dictator inveſted with that unlimited authority which the laws conferred on him might eaſily have diſſipated that conſpiracy, which was with difficulty ſuppreſſed by a numerous concurrence of fortunate circumſtances, which human prudence had no reaſon to expect. Inſtead of that, the Senate contented itſelf with committing all its power into the hands of Conſuls; whence it happened that Cicero, in order to act effectually, was obliged to exceed that power in a capital circumſtance; and though the public, in their firſt tranſports, approved of his conduct, he was very juſtly called to an account afterwards for the blood he had ſpilt contrary to the laws; a reproach they could not have made to a dictator. But the eloquence of the Conſul carried all before it; and preferring, though a Roman, his own glory to his country, he thought leſs of the moſt legal and certain method of ſaving the ſtate, than the means of ſecuring all the honour

of

of ſuch a tranſaction to himſelf *. Thus was he very juſtly honoured as the deliverer of Rome, and as juſtly puniſhed as the violator of its laws. For, however honourable was his repeal, it was certainly a matter of favour.

After all, in whatever manner this important commiſſion may be conferred, it is of conſequence to limit its duration to a ſhort term; which ſhould on no occaſion be prolonged. In thoſe conjunctures, when it is neceſſary to appoint a Dictator, the ſtate is preſently ſaved or deſtroyed; which cauſes being over, the dictature becomes uſeleſs and tyrannical. At Rome, the Dictators held their office only for ſix months; and the greater part reſigned before that term expired. Had the time appointed been longer, it is to be apprehended they would have been tempted to make it longer ſtill; as did the *Decemvir*, whoſe office laſted a whole year. The Dictator had no more time allowed him than was neceſſary to diſpatch the buſineſs for which he was appointed; ſo that he had not leiſure to think of other projects.

CHAP. VII. *Of the cenſorſhip.*

AS the declaration of the general will is made by the laws, ſo the declaration of the public judgment is made by their cenſure. The public opinion is a kind of law, which the Cenſor puts in execution, in particular caſes, after the example of the prince.

So far, therefore, is the cenſorial tribunal from being

* This is what he could not be certain of, in propoſing a Dictator; not daring to nominate himſelf, and not being aſſured his colleague would do it.

being the arbiter of popular opinions, it only declares them; and, whenever it departs from them, its deciſions are vain and ineffectual.

It is uſeleſs to diſtinguiſh the manners of a nation by the objects of its eſteem; for theſe depend on the ſame principle, and are neceſſarily confounded together. Among all people in the world, it is not nature, but opinion, which determines the choice of their pleaſures. Correct the prejudices and opinions of men, and their manners will correct themſelves. We always admire what is beautiful, or what appears ſo; but it is in our judgment we are miſtaken; it is this judgment then we are to regulate. Whoever judges of manners, takes upon him to judge of honour; and whoever judges of honour, decides from opinion.

The opinions of a people depend on the conſtitution; though the laws do not govern manners, it is the legiſlature that gives riſe to them. As the legiſlature grows feeble, manners degenerate, but the judgment of the cenſors will not then effect what the power of the laws have not before effected.

It follows hence, that the office of a Cenſor may be uſeful to the preſervation of manners, but never to their re-eſtabliſhment. Eſtabliſh Cenſors during the vigour of the laws; when this is paſt, all is over; no legal means can be effectual when the laws have loſt their force.

The Cenſor is preſervative of manners, by preventing the corruption of opinions, by maintaining their morality and propriety, by judicious applications, and even ſometimes by ſettling them when in a fluctuating ſituation. The uſe of ſeconds in duels, though carried to the greateſt

exceſs

exceſs in France, was aboliſhed by the following words inſerted in one of the king's edicts; *As to thoſe who have the cowardice to call themſelves ſeconds.* This judgment anticipating that of the public, was effectual, and put an end to that cuſtom at once. But when the ſame edicts pronounced it cowardice to fight a duel; though it is certainly true, yet as it was contrary to the popular opinion, the public laughed at a determination ſo contrary to their own,

I have obſerved elſewhere *, that the public opinion being ſubjected to no conſtraint, there ſhould be no appearance of it in the tribunal eſtabliſhed to repreſent it. One cannot too much admire with what art this ſpring of action, entirely neglected among the moderns, was employed by the Romans, and ſtill more effectually by the Lacedemonians.

A man of bad morals, having made an excellent propoſal in the council at Sparta, the Ephori, without taking any notice of it, cauſed the ſame propoſal to be made by a citizen of character and virtue. How honourable was this proceeding to the one, and how diſgraceful to the other; and that without directly praiſing or blaming either! Some drunkards of Samos having behaved indecently in the tribunal of the Ephori, it was the next day permitted, by a public edict, that the Samians might become ſlaves. Would an actual puniſhment have been ſo ſevere as ſuch impunity? When the Spartans had once paſſed their judgment on the decency or propriety of any behaviour, all Greece ſubmitted to their opinion.

* I do but ſlightly mention here, what I have treated more at large in my Letter to M. d'Alembert.

Chap. VIII. *Of political religion.*

In the firſt ages of the world, men had no other kings than gods, nor any other government than what was purely theocratical. It required a great alteration in their ſentiments and ideas, before they could prevail on themſelves to look upon a fellow-creature as a maſter, and think it went well with them.

Hence, a deity being conſtantly placed at the head of every political ſociety, it followed that there were as many different gods as people. Two communities, perſonally ſtrangers to each other, and almoſt always at variance, could not long acknowledge the ſame maſter; nor could two armies, drawn up againſt each other in battle, obey the ſame chief. Thus Polytheiſm became a natural conſequence of the diviſion of nations, and thence the want of civil and theological toleration, which are perfectly the ſame, as will be ſhewn hereafter.

The notion of the Greeks, in pretending to trace their own gods among thoſe of the Barbarian nations, took its riſe evidently from the ambition of being thought the natural ſovereigns of thoſe people. In this age, however, we think that a moſt abſurd part of erudition which relates to the identity of the deities of different nations, and according to which it is ſuppoſed that Moloch, Saturn, and Chronos, were one and the ſame god; and that the Baal of the Phenicians, the Zeus of the Greeks, and the Jupiter of the Latins, were the ſame deity; as if any thing could be found in common between chimerical beings bearing different names!

If

If it be aſked why there were no religious wars among the Pagans, when every ſtate had thus its peculiar deity and worſhip; I anſwer, it was plainly for this very reaſon, that each ſtate having its own peculiar religion as well as government, no diſtinction was made between the obedience paid to their gods and that due to their laws. Thus their political were at the ſame time theological wars; and the departments of their deities were preſcribed by the limits of their reſpective nations. The god of one people had no authority over another people; nor were theſe Pagan deities jealous of their prerogatives, but divided the adoration of mankind amicably between them. Even Moſes himſelf ſometimes ſpeaks in the ſame manner of the God of Iſrael. It is true the Hebrews deſpiſed the gods of the Canaanites, a people proſcribed and devoted to deſtruction, whoſe poſſeſſions were given them for an inheritance: but they ſpeak with more reverence of the deities of the neighbouring nations whom they were forbidden to attack. *Wilt thou not poſſeſs that*, ſays Jephtha to Sihon king of the Ammonites, *which Chemoſh thy god giveth thee to poſſeſs? So whomſoever the Lord our God ſhall drive out from before us, them will we poſſeſs.* There is in this paſſage, I think, an acknowledged ſimilitude between the rights Chemoſh, and thoſe of the God of Iſrael.

But when the Jews, being ſubjected to the kings of Babylon, and afterwards to thoſe of Syria, perſiſted in refuſing to acknowledge any god but their own, this refuſal was eſteemed an act of rebellion againſt their conqueror, and drew upon them thoſe perſecutions we read of in their hiſtory, and of which no other example is extant

previous to the eſtabliſhment of Chriſtianity *.

The religion of every people being thus excluſively annexed to the laws of the ſtate, the only method of converting nations was to ſubdue them: warriors were the only miſſionaries; and the obligation of changing their religion being a law to the vanquiſhed, they were firſt to be conquered before they were ſolicited on this head. So far were men from fighting for the gods, that their gods, like thoſe of Homer, fought in behalf of mankind. Each people demanded the victory from its reſpective deity, and expreſſed their gratitude for it by the erection of new altars. The Romans, before they beſieged any fortreſs, ſummoned its gods to abandon it; and though it be true they left the people of Tarentum in poſſeſſion of their angry deities, it is plain they looked upon thoſe gods as ſubjected and obliged to do homage to their own: They left the vanquiſhed in poſſeſſion of their religion, as they ſometimes did in that of their laws; a wreathe for Jupiter of the Capitol being often the only tribute they exacted.

At length, the Romans having extended their religion with their empire, and ſometimes even adopted the deities of the vanquiſhed, the people of this vaſt empire found themſelves in poſſeſſion of a multiplicity of gods and religions; which not differing eſſentially from each other, Paganiſm became inſenſibly one and the ſame religion throughout the world.

Things were in this ſtate when Jeſus came to eſtabliſh his ſpiritual kingdom on earth; a deſign

* It is evident that the war of the Phocians, called an holy war, was not a religious war. Its object was to puniſh ſacrilege, and not to ſubdue infidels.

ſign which, neceſſarily dividing the theological from the political ſyſtem, gave riſe to thoſe inteſtine diviſions which have ever ſince continued to embroil the profeſſion of Chriſtianity. Now this new idea of a kingdom in the other world having never entered into the head of the Pagans, they regarded the Chriſtians as actual rebels, who, under an hypocritical ſhew of humility, waited only a proper opportunity to render themſelves independent, and artfully to uſurp that authority, which in their weak and infant ſtate they pretended to reſpect: and this was undoubtedly the cauſe of their being perſecuted.

What the Pagans were apprehenſive of, alſo did, in proceſs of time, actually come to paſs. Things put on a new face; and the meek Chriſtians, as their number increaſed, changed their tone, while their inviſible kingdom of the other world became, under a viſible head, the moſt deſpotic and tyrannical in this.

As in all countries, however, there were civil governors and laws, there reſulted from this twofold power a perpetual ſtruggle for juriſdiction, which renders a perfect ſyſtem of domeſtic policy almoſt impoſſible in Chriſtian ſtates; and prevents us from ever coming to a determination, whether it be the prince or the prieſt we are bound to obey.

Some nations indeed, even in Europe or its neighbourhood, have endeavoured to preſerve or re-eſtabliſh the ancient ſyſtem, but without ſucceſs; the ſpirit of Chriſtianity hath univerſally prevailed. Religious worſhip hath always remained, or again become independent of the ſovereign, and without any neceſſary connection with the body of the ſtate. Mahomet had very

ſalutary and well-connected views in his political ſyſtem; and ſo long as his modes of government ſubſiſted under the caliphs and their ſucceſſors, that government remained perfectly uniform, and ſo far good. But the Arabians becoming wealthy, learned, polite, indolent, and cowardly, were ſubdued by the Barbarians: then the diviſion between the two powers recommenced; and though it be leſs apparent among the Mahometans than among Chriſtians, it is nevertheleſs to be diſtinguiſhed, particularly in the ſect of Ali: there are ſome ſtates alſo, as in Perſia, where this diviſion is conſtantly perceptible.

Among us, the kings of England are placed at the head of the church, as are alſo the Czars in Ruſſia: but by this title they are not ſo properly maſters as miniſters of the religion of thoſe countries: they are not poſſeſſed of the power to change it, but only to maintain its preſent form. Whenever the Clergy conſtitute a collective body *, they will be both maſters and legiſlators in their own cauſe. There are therefore two ſovereigns in England and Ruſſia, as well as elſewhere.

Of all Chriſtian authors, Mr. Hobbes was the only one who ſaw the evil and the remedy, and who

* It muſt be obſerved, that it is not ſo much the formal aſſemblies of the clergy, ſuch as are held in France, which unite them together in a body, as the communion of their churches. Communion and excommunication form the ſocial compact of the clergy; a compact by means of which they will always maintain their aſcendancy over both kings and people. All the prieſts that communicate together are fellow-citizens, tho' they ſhould be perſonally as diſtant as the extremities of the world. This invention is a maſter-piece in policy. The Pagan prieſts had nothing like it; and therefore never had any clerical body.

who hath ventured to propoſe the re-union of the two heads of this eagle, and to reſtore that political union, without which no ſtate or government can be well conſtituted. But he ought to have ſeen, that the prevailing ſpirit of Chriſtianity was incompatible with his ſyſtem, and that the intereſt of the church would be always too powerful for the ſtate. It was not ſo much that which was really falſe and ſhocking in the writings of this philoſopher, as what was really juſt and true, that rendered him odious †.

I conceive that, by a proper diſplay of hiſtorical facts, in this point of view, it would be eaſy to refute the oppoſite ſentiments both of Bayle and Warburton; the former of which pretends that no religion whatever can be of ſervice to the body-politic, and the latter that Chriſtianity is its beſt and firmeſt ſupport. It might be proved againſt the firſt, that every ſtate in the world hath been founded on the baſis of religion; and againſt the ſecond, that the precepts of Chriſtianity are at the bottom more prejudicial than conducive to the ſtrength of the ſtate.

In order to make myſelf fully underſtood, I need only give a little more preciſion to the vague ideas generally entertained of political religion.

Religion, conſidered as it relates to ſociety, which is either general or particular, may be diſtinguiſhed into two kinds, *viz.* the religion of the man, and that of the citizen. The firſt, deſti-

† In a letter of Grotius to his brother, dated the 11th of April 1643, may be ſeen what that great Civilian approved and blamed in his book *De cive*. It is true, that Grotius, being indulgent, ſeems inclined to forgive the author the faults of his book, for the ſake of its merits; the reſt of the world, however, were not ſo candid.

deſtitute of temples, altars, or rites, confined purely to the internal worſhip of the Supreme Being, and to the performance of the eternal duties of morality, is the pure and ſimple religion of the goſpel; this is genuine theiſm, and may be called the law of natural divinity. The other, adopted only in one country, whoſe gods and tutelary ſaints are hence peculiar to itſelf, is compoſed of certain dogmas, rites, and external modes of worſhip preſcribed by the laws of ſuch country; all foreigners being accounted infidels, aliens, and barbarians; this kind of religion extends the duties and privileges of men no farther than to its own altars. Such were all the religions of primitive ages, to which may be given the name of the law of civil or poſitive divinity.

There is a third kind of religion ſtill more extraordinary, which dividing ſociety into two legiſlatures, two chiefs, and two parties, ſubjects mankind to contradictory obligations, and prevents them from being at once devotees and citizens. Such is the religion of the Lamas, of the Japaneſe, and of the Roman Catholics; which may be denominated the religion of the prieſts, and is productive of a ſort of mixed and unſociable obligation, for which we have no name.

If we examine theſe three kinds of religion in a political light, they have all their faults. The third is ſo palpably defective, that it would be mere loſs of time to point them out. Whatever contributes to diſſolve the ſocial union is good for nothing: all inſtitutions which ſet man in contradiction with himſelf are of no uſe.

The ſecond is ſo far commendable as it unites divine

divine worſhip with a reſpect for the laws, and that, making the country the object of the people's adoration, the citizen is taught that to ſerve the ſtate is to ſerve its tutelary divinity. This is a ſpecies of theocracy, in which there ſhould be no other pontiff than the prince, no other prieſts than the magiſtrates. To die, in ſuch a ſtate, for their country, is to ſuffer martyrdom; to violate the laws is impiety; and to doom a criminal to public execration, is to devote him to the anger of the gods.

It is blameable, however, in that, being founded on falſehood and deceit, it leads mankind into error; rendering them credulous and ſuperſtitious, it ſubſtitutes vain ceremonies inſtead of the true worſhip of the Deity. It is further blameable, in that, becoming excluſive and tyrannical, it makes people ſanguinary and perſecuting; ſo that a nation ſhall ſometimes breathe nothing but murder and maſſacre, and think at the ſame time they are doing an holy action in cutting the throats of thoſe who worſhip the gods in a different manner from themſelves. This circumſtance places ſuch a people in a natural ſtate of war with all others, which is very unfavourable to their own ſafety.

There remains then only the rational and manly religion of Chriſtianity; not, however, as it is profeſſed in modern times, but as it is diſplayed in the goſpel, which is quite another thing. According to this holy, ſublime, and true religion, mankind, being all the children of the ſame God, acknowledge themſelves to be brothers, and the ſociety which unites them diſſolves only in death.

But this religon, having no particular relation

to

to the body-politic, leaves the laws in poſſeſſion only of their own force, without adding any thing to it; by which means the firmeſt bonds of ſuch particular ſociety are of no effect. Add to this, that Chriſtianity is ſo far from attaching the hearts of the citizens to the ſtate, that it detaches them from it, as well as from all worldly objects in general: than which nothing can be more contrary to the ſpirit of ſociety.

It is ſaid, that a nation of true Chriſtians would form the moſt perfect ſociety imaginable. To this aſſertion, however, there is one great objection; and this is, that a ſociety of true Chriſtians would not be a ſociety of men. Nay, I will go ſo far as to affirm, that this ſuppoſed ſociety, with all its perfection, would neither be of the greateſt ſtrength nor duration. In conſequence of its being perfect, it would want the ſtrongeſt ties of connection; and thus this very circumſtance would deſtroy it.

Individuals might do their duty, the people might be obedient to the laws, the chiefs might be juſt, the magiſtrate incorrupt, the ſoldiery might look upon death with contempt, and there might prevail neither vanity nor luxury, in ſuch a ſtate. So far all would go well; but let us look further.

Chriſtianity is a ſpiritual religion, relative only to celeſtial objects: the Chriſtian's inheritance is not of this world. He performs his duty, it is true; but this he does with a profound indifference for the good or ill ſucceſs of his endeavours. Provided he hath nothing to reproach himſelf with, it is of little importance to him whether matters go well or ill here below. If the ſtate be in a flouriſhing ſituation, he can hardly

hardly venture to rejoice in the public felicity, leſt he ſhould be puffed up with the inordinate pride of his country's glory; if the ſtate decline, he bleſſes the hand of God that humbles his people to the duſt.

It is farther neceſſary to the peace and harmony of ſociety, that all the citizens ſhould be without exception equally good Chriſtians; for if unhappily there ſhould be one of them ambitious or hypocritical, if there ſhould be found among them a Catiline or a Cromwell, it is certain he would make an eaſy prey of his pious countrymen. Chriſtian charity doth not eaſily permit the thinking evil of one's neighbour. No ſooner ſhould an individual diſcover the art of impoſing on the majority, and be inveſted with ſome portion of public authority, than he would become a dignitary; Chriſtians muſt not ſpeak evil of dignities: thus reſpected, he would thence aſſume power; Chriſtians muſt obey the ſuperior powers. Does the depoſitary of power abuſe it? he becomes the rod by which it pleaſes God to chaſtiſe his children.

And, would their conſciences permit them to drive out the uſurper, the public tranquillity muſt be broken, and violence and bloodſhed ſucceed: all this agrees but ill with the meekneſs of true Chriſtians; and, after all, what is it to them, whether they are freemen or ſlaves in this vale of miſery? Their eſſential concern is to work out their ſalvation, and obtain happineſs in another world; to effect which, their reſignation in this is held to be their duty.

Should ſuch a ſtate be forced into a war with any neighbouring power, the citizens might march readily to the combat without thinking

of

of flight; they might do their duty in the field, but they would have no ardour for victory, being better inſtructed to die than to conquer. Of what conſequence is it to them, whether they are victors or vanquiſhed? Think what advantages an impetuous and ſanguine enemy might take of their ſtoicifm! Draw them out againſt a brave and generous people, ardently inſpired with the love of glory and their country; ſuppoſe, for inſtance, your truly Chriſtian republic againſt that of Sparta or of Rome; what would be the conſequence? Your devout Chriſtians would be beaten, diſcomfited, and knocked on the head, before they had time to look about them; their only ſecurity depending on the contempt which their enemy might entertain for them. It was, in my opinion, a fine oath that was taken by the ſoldiers of Fabius. They did not make a vow either to die or conquer; they ſwore they would return conquerors, and punctually performed their oath. Chriſtian troops could not have made ſuch a vow, they would have been afraid of tempting the Lord their God.

But I am all this while committing a blunder, in ſpeaking of a Chriſtian republic; one of theſe terms neceſſarily excluding the other. Chriſtianity inculcates ſervitude and dependence; the ſpirit of it is too favourable to tyrants, for them not ſometimes to profit by it. True Chriſtians are formed for ſlaves; they know it, and never trouble themſelves about conſpiracies and inſurrections; this tranſitory life is of too little value in their eſteem.

Will it be ſaid, The Chriſtians are excellent ſoldiers? I deny it. Produce me your Chriſtian troops. For my part, I know of no true Chriſtian

ſtian ſoldiers. Do you name thoſe of the Cruſades? I anſwer, That, not to call in queſtion the valour of the Cruſaders, they were very far from being Chriſtian citizens: they were the ſoldiers of the prieſt, the citizens of the church; they fought for its ſpiritual country, which, ſome how or other, it had converted into a temporal one. To ſet this matter in the beſt light, it was a kind of return to Paganiſm; for as the goſpel did not eſtabliſh any national religion, an holy war could not poſſibly be carried on by true Chriſtians.

Under the Pagan emperors, the Chriſtian ſoldiers were brave; of this all the Chriſtian writers aſſure us, and I believe them; the motive of their bravery was a ſpirit of honour or emulation, excited by the Pagan troops. But when the emperors became Chriſtians, this motive of emulation no longer ſubſiſted; and when the Croſs had put the Eagle to flight, the Roman valour diſappeared.

But, laying aſide political conſiderations, let us return to the matter of right, and aſcertain its true principles with regard to this important point. The right which the ſocial compact confers on the ſovereign, extending no farther than to public utility *, the ſubject is not accountable to that ſovereign on account of any opi-

* *In a republic*, ſays the Marquis d'A. *every one is perfectly at liberty, becauſe no one may injure another.* This is the invariable limit of republican liberty, nor is it poſſible to ſtate the caſe more preciſely. I cannot deny myſelf the pleaſure of ſometimes quoting this manuſcript, though unknown to the public, in order to do honour to the memory of an illuſtrious and reſpectable perſonage, who preſerved the integrity of the citizen even in the miniſtry, and adopted the moſt upright and ſalutary views in the government of his country.

nions he may entertain that have nothing to do with the community. Now it is of great importance to a ſtate, that every citizen ſhould be of a religion that may inſpire him with a regard for his duty: but the tenets of that religion are no farther intereſting to the community than as they relate to morals, and to the diſcharge of thoſe obligations which the profeſſor lies under to his fellow-citizens. If we except theſe, the individual may profeſs what others he pleaſes, without the ſovereign's having any right to interfere; for, having no juriſdiction in the other world, it is nothing to the ſovereign what becomes of the citizens in a future life, provided they diſcharge the duties incumbent on them in the preſent.

There is a profeſſion of faith, therefore, purely political; the articles of which it is in the province of the ſovereign to aſcertain, not preciſely as articles of religion, but as the ſentiments due to ſociety, without which it is impoſſible to be a good citizen or faithful ſubject †. Without compelling any one to adopt theſe ſentiments, the ſovereign may alſo equitably baniſh him the ſociety; not indeed as impious, but as unſociable, as incapable of having a ſincere regard to juſtice, and of ſacrificing his life, if required, to his duty. Again, ſhould any one, after having made a public profeſſion of ſuch ſentiments,

† Cæſar, in pleading for Catiline, endeavoured to eſtabliſh the doctrine of the mortality of the Soul: Cato and Cicero, in anſwer to him, did not enter into a philoſophical diſcuſſion of the argument; but contented themſelves with ſhewing that Cæſar had ſpoken like a bad citizen, and advanced a dogma pernicious to the ſtate. And this was in fact in the only point that came before the Senate of Rome, and not a queſtion in theology.

timents, betray his diſbelief of them by his miſconduct, he may equitably be puniſhed with death; having committed the greateſt of all crimes, that of belying his heart in the face of the laws.

The tenets of political religion ſhould be few and ſimple; they ſhould be laid down alſo with preciſion, and without explication or comment. The exiſtence of a powerful, intelligent, beneficent, preſcient, and provident Deity; a future ſtate; the reward of the virtuous, and the puniſhment of the wicked; the ſacred nature of the ſocial contract, and of the laws; theſe ſhould be its poſitive tenets. As to thoſe of a negative kind, I would confine myſelf ſolely to one, by forbidding perſecution.

Thoſe who affect to make a diſtinction between civil and religious toleration, are, in my opinion, miſtaken. It is impoſſible to live cordially in peace with thoſe whom we firmly believe devoted to damnation: to love them would be to hate the Deity for puniſhing them; it is therefore abſolutely neceſſary for us either to perſecute or to convert them. Wherever the ſpirit of religious perſecution ſubſiſts, it is impoſſible it ſhould not have ſome effect on the civil-police; in which caſe, the ſovereign is no longer ſovereign even in a ſecular view; the prieſts become the real maſters, and kings only their officers.

In modern governments, where it is impoſſible to ſupport an excluſive national religion, it is requiſite to tolerate all ſuch as breathe the ſpirit of toleration toward others, provided their tenets are not contradictory to the duty of a good citizen. But whoſoever ſhould preſume to ſay,

There is no ſalvation out of the pale of our church, ought to be baniſhed the ſtate, unleſs indeed the ſtate be an eccleſiaſtical one, and the prince a pontiff. Such a dogma is of uſe only in a theocratical government; in every other it is deſtructive. The reaſon which it is ſaid Henry IV. gave for embracing the Roman Catholic religion, ought to have made an honeſt man reject it, and more particularly a prince capable of reaſoning on the ſubject.

CHAP. IX. *The concluſion.*

HAVING thus ſtated the true principles of politic law, and endeavoured to fix the ſtate on its proper baſis, it remains to ſhew in what manner it is ſupported by external relations.

Under this head would be comprehended, the laws of nations and commerce, the laws of war and conqueſt, leagues, negotiations, treaties, *&c.* But theſe preſent a new proſpect, too vaſt and extenſive for ſo ſhort a ſight as mine; which ſhould be confined to objects leſs diſtant, and more adapted to my limited capacity.

A PROJECT FOR A PERPETUAL PEACE.

AS a more noble, uſeful, and delightful Project never engaged the human mind, than that of eſtabliſhing a perpetual peace among the contending nations of Europe, never did a writer lay a better claim to the attention of the public than he who points out the means to carry ſuch a deſign into execution. It is, indeed, very difficult for a man of probity and ſenſibility, not to be fired with a kind of enthuſiaſm on ſuch a ſubject: nay, I am not clear that the very illuſions of an heart truly humane, whoſe warmth makes every thing eaſily ſurmountable, are not in this caſe more eligible than that rigid and forbidding prudence, which finds, in its own indifference and want of public ſpirit, the chief obſtacle to every thing that tends to promote the public good.

I doubt not that many of my readers will be fore-armed with incredulity, to withſtand the pleaſing temptation of being perſuaded; and indeed I ſincerely lament their dulneſs in miſtaking obſtinacy for wiſdom. But I flatter myſelf, that many an honeſt mind will ſympathiſe with me in that delightful emotion, with which

I take up the pen to treat of a ſubject ſo greatly intereſting to the world. I am going to take a view, at leaſt in imagination, of mankind united by love and friendſhip: I am going to take a contemplative proſpect of an agreeable and peaceful ſociety of brethren, living in conſtant harmony, directed by the ſame maxims, and joint ſharers of one common felicity; while, realizing to myſelf ſo affecting a picture, the repreſentation of ſuch imaginary happineſs will give me the momentary enjoyment of a pleaſure actually preſent.

I could not reſiſt the impulſe of devoting a few lines, at the beginning of my performance, to a ſentiment with which my heart is replete. Let us now endeavour to reaſon coolly on the ſubject. Being reſolved to advance nothing which I cannot prove, I think myſelf authoriſed to deſire the reader to deny nothing which he cannot confute: for I am not ſo much afraid of thoſe who may argue, as of ſuch as with-hold their aſſent to arguments to which they will nevertheleſs make no objection.

It requires no very long or cloſe attention to the means of bringing any kind of government to perfection, to perceive many obſtacles and embarraſſments, which ariſe leſs from the nature of the conſtution than from its external relations: ſo that the care, which ought to be devoted to the domeſtic policy of a ſtate, is neceſſarily beſtowed on ſecuring its dependency; more pains been taken to enable it to reſiſt other ſtates, than to improve its own government. If the ſocial union were, as pretended, rather the effect of reaſon than the paſſions, how could men have been ſo long in finding out that they have

have always done either too much or too little for their own happineſs; that individuals, being in a ſocial ſtate with regard to their fellow countrymen, and in a ſtate of nature with reſpect to the reſt of the world, they have only prevented civil bloodſhed among particulars, to excite national wars, a thouſand times more general and deſtructive; and that by attaching ourſelves to the intereſt of particular perſons, we become enemies to our whole ſpecies.

If there be any way to remove theſe fatal contradictions, it is perhaps by a confederative form of government only; which, connecting whole nations by the ſame ties that unite individuals, may equally ſubject both the one and the other to the authority of the laws. This mode of government appears, beſides, preferable to every other, as it comprehends at once the advantages both of great ſtates and ſmall ones: it is reſpectable abroad from its power; its laws are vigorouſly executed; and it is the only form which is adapted equally to reſtrain the ſubject, the magiſtrate, and foreign ſtates.

This form of government, indeed, although it ſeem novel in ſome reſpects, and has been well underſtood only by the moderns, was not unknown to the ancients. The Greeks had their Amphictiones, the Tuſcans their Leucumoni, the Latins their Feriæ, the Gauls their cities, and the expiring ſtate of Greece became famous for the Achean League. None of thoſe ancient confederacies, however, diſplayed ſo much wiſdom as the modern ones of the German Empire, the Helvetic League, or the union of the States-General. If theſe bodies-politic alſo are ſtill but few, and far from being arrived at that perfection

tion they are capable of, it is because the beſt of them is not ſo eaſily put in execution as may be imagined; and that in politics as well as in morals, the extent of our knowledge proves hardly any thing any more than that of our misfortunes.

To theſe public confederacies may be added others not leſs real, though leſs apparent, which are tacitly formed by the union of intereſts, a conformity of maxims, a ſimilarity of cuſtoms, and various other circumſtances which admit certain common relations to ſubſiſt even between divided nations. Thus it is that all the powers of Europe form a kind of ſyſtem among themſelves, which unites them by the ſame religion, by the ſame law of nations, by morals, literature, commerce, and by a ſort of equilibrium which is the neceſſary reſult of them all; and which, though nobody ſtudies to preſerve, is not ſo eaſily deſtroyed as many people imagine.

The national ſociety has not always ſubſiſted in Europe; the particular cauſes, which firſt gave riſe to it, ſtill ſerving to preſerve and maintain it. In fact, before the Roman conqueſts, the people of this part of the world were all barbarians, unknown to each other: they had nothing in common but the moſt ſimple faculties of human beings; faculties that, debaſed by ſlavery, hardly raiſed them a degree above the brutes. Hence the Greeks took upon them, out of their philoſophical vanity, to diſtinguiſh mankind, as it were, into two ſpecies; one of which, viz. their own, was formed to command; and the other, comprehending the reſt of the world, to obey. It followed from this principle, that a Gaul or an Iberian was looked upon by a Greek, as we look upon a Hottentot

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or a North-American Indian: while the barbarian nations themſelves bore as little affinity to each other, as the Greeks bore to any of them.

But when this people, naturally pre-eminent, had been ſubdued by the Romans their ſlaves, and great part of the known world had ſubmitted to the ſame yoke, a civil and political union of courſe formed itſelf between the ſeveral members of the ſame empire; an union that was rendered much cloſer by that very wiſe or very fooliſh maxim, of conferring on the vanquiſhed the rights and privileges of the victors; and more particularly by the famous decree of Claudius, which admitted all the ſubjects of Rome into the number of Roman citizens.

To the political chain, which thus united all the members in one body, were now added civil inſtitutions and laws, which gave new force to ſuch connections, by determining, in a clear, preciſe, and equitable manner (at leaſt as far as the extent of ſo vaſt an Empire would admit of) the reciprocal rights and duties of the ſovereign and ſubjects, as well as thoſe of the latter among themſelves. The Theodoſian code, and after that the books of JUSTINIAN, formed new links in the chain of reaſon and juſtice, aptly ſubſtituted for thoſe of the ſovereign power, which were in a very palpable ſtate of relaxation. This ſubſtitute greatly delayed the diſſolution of the Empire, and long maintained its drooping juriſdiction over thoſe very barbarians who were working its deſolation.

A third tie, ſtill ſtronger than the preceding, was that of religion: nor can it be denied that Europe is particularly indebted to Chriſtianity for that kind of ſocial union which is conſtantly kept

kept up between its members: ſo that the people which have not adopted the ſentiments of the reſt, in this particular, have always remained aliens among them. Chriſtianity, the ſubject of contempt, at its riſe, ſerved at length as an aſylum to its detractors: nay, the Roman empire itſelf, after having ſo cruelly and vainly perſecuted it, found in it thoſe reſources which it could not draw from its military power. Its miſſions were of more ſervice than its conqueſts. It ſent Biſhops to repair the blunders of its Generals, and triumphed by its Prieſts when its Soldiers were defeated. It was thus the Franks, the Goths, the Lombards, and a thouſand others, ſubmitted to the authority of Rome, after they themſelves had reduced her impire; and received with the law of the Goſpel, that of the Prince who firſt cauſed it to be promulgated among them.

Such was the reſpect ſtill paid to that imperial body, that its deſtroyers prided themſelves in its titles, even in its expiring moments; while thoſe very conquerors, who had debaſed the Empire, became officers of it; and the greateſt Kings contended for Patrician honours, governments, and conſulſhips: even as a lion cringing to the man he might devour, thoſe tremendous victors paid homage to that throne which they had the power to ſubvert when they pleaſed.

It was thus the Prieſthood and the Empire formed a ſocial chain between various people; who, without having any real connection of intereſts, privileges, or dependence, enjoyed a community of maxims and opinions; the influence of which has remained after the principle has been deſtroyed. The ancient ſtate of the

the Roman Empire hath continued to form a kind of union between the members of which it was compoſed: while Rome poſſeſſing another ſort of dominion after the diſſolution of the Empire, there reſulted from this twofold connection a cloſer ſociety among the nations of Europe, where the centre of the two powers had exiſted, than in other parts of the world, where the inhabitants are too much diſperſed to hold correſpondence with each other, and have beſides no particular point of union.

Add to this, the peculiar ſituation of Europe, more equally populous and fertile, better connected in its ſeveral parts; the continual admixture of intereſts, which conſanguinity, commerce, arts, and navigation, continually effect between ſovereigns; the multitude of rivers, and diverſity of their courſe, which facilitate the communication of different parts; the inconſtancy of the inhabitants, which induces them to travel and paſs frequently from one country to another; the invention of printing, and prevailing taſte for letters, which hath formed a community of knowledge and ſtudies; and laſtly, that multiplicity and ſmall extent of many ſtates, which, added to the calls of luxury, and to the diverſity of climates, render the one always neceſſary to the other: all theſe things united form in Europe, not merely, as in Aſia or Africa, an ideal collection of people, who have nothing but a nominal community between them; but an actual ſociety, which has its religion, morals, cuſtoms, and even its laws, from which none of the people compoſing it can ſeparate without cauſing an immediate diſturbance.

To behold, on the other hand, the perpetual diſ-

diſſenſions, depredations, uſurpations, rebellions, wars, and murders, which are conſtantly ravaging this reſpectable abode of philoſophers, this brilliant aſylum of the arts and ſciences; to reflect on the ſublimity of our converſation and the meanneſs of our proceedings, on the humanity of our maxims and the cruelty of our actions, on the meekneſs of our religion and the horror of our perſecutions, on a policy ſo wiſe in theory and ſo abſurd in practice, on the beneficence of ſovereigns and the miſery of their people, on governments ſo mild and wars ſo deſtructive; we are at a loſs to reconcile theſe ſtrange contrarieties, while this pretended fraternity of European nations appears to be only a term of ridicule, ſerving ironically to expreſs their reciprocal animoſity.

And yet, in all this, things only take their natural courſe; every ſociety deſtitute of laws or magiſtrates, every union formed or ſupported by chance, muſt neceſſarily degenerate into quarrels and diſſenſions upon the firſt change of circumſtances. The ancient union of the European nations hath rendered their intereſts and privileges extremely complicated: they bear againſt each other in ſo many points, that the leaſt agitation of any one puts the whole in motion. Their diſſenſions are alſo by ſo much the more fatal as their connections are intimate; while their frequent quarrels are almoſt as unnatural and cruel as civil wars.

It muſt be admitted, therefore, that the preſent relative ſtate of the European powers is a ſtate of war; and that the partial treaties ſubſiſting between ſome of them, are rather temporary truces, than a ſtate of actual peace; whether

ther it be owing to thoſe treaties having no other guarantees than the contracting parties, or that their reſpective rights are never duly aſcertained, and the pretenſions thence ſubſiſting among powers who acknowledge no ſuperior infallibly prove the ſource of new wars, as ſoon as different circumſtances empower the pretenders to aſſert their claims.

To this it may be added, that the law of nations not being univerſally concerted and eſtabliſhed, but having no general principles, and inceſſantly varying according to time and place, it is full of contradictory maxims, which can never be reconciled but by the right of the ſtrongeſt: ſo that the judgment being without a ſure guide, and always biaſſed in doubtful caſes by ſelf-intereſt, war becomes ſometimes inevitable, even when both parties may be deſirous of acting juſtly. All that can be done, with the beſt intentions, therefore, is to decide this kind of diſputes by force of arms, or to palliate them by temporary treaties. But no ſooner is occaſion taken to revive the cauſe of quarrel, than it takes a new form, and all is complication and confuſion: the real grounds of the affair are not to be ſeen; uſurpation paſſes for right, and weakneſs for injuſtice; while, amidſt the general diſorder, every one finds himſelf inſenſibly ſo far diſplaced, that, if it were poſſible to recur to the real and primitive right, there would be few ſovereigns in Europe who ought not to refund every thing they poſſeſs.

Another ſource of war, leſs obvious though not leſs real, is, that things do not change their from in changing their nature; that ſtates which are hereditary in fact, remain elective in ap-

pearance; that there are parliaments or national ſtates in monarchies, and hereditary chiefs in republics; that one power really dependent on another, ſtill preſerves the appearance of liberty; that all the ſubjects of the ſame ſovereign are not governed by the ſame laws; that the order of ſucceſſion is different in different provinces of the ſame ſtate; in fine, that all governments naturally tend to a change, without there being a poſſibility of preventing it. Such are the general and particular cauſes which connect us for our ruin, and lead us to deſcribe the charms of ſocial virtue with our hands conſtantly ſtained with human gore.

The cauſes of an evil being once known, the remedy, if any ſuch there be, is ſufficiently indicated by the ſame means. It is plain to every one, that ſociety is formed by a coalition of intereſts; that every diſſenſion ariſes from an oppoſition of intereſts; that, as a thouſand fortuitous events may change and modify both the one and the other, it is neceſſary that every ſociety ſhould poſſeſs a coercive force, to direct and concert the movements of its ſeveral members, in order to give their common intereſts and reciprocal engagements that ſolidity which they could not ſeparately acquire.

It would otherwiſe be a great miſtake to ſuppoſe, that ſuch a ſtate of conſtraint could ever change, merely from the nature of things, and without the aſſiſtance of art. The preſent ſyſtem of Europe hath attained preciſely that degree of ſolidity, which may keep it in a perpetual agitation, without ever effectually ſubverting it: thus, if our misfortunes cannot be increaſed, they are ſtill leſs capable of being put

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an end to; becauſe no great revolution can now ever happen.

To prove this, as far as it is neceſſary, we ſhall begin with taking a general view of the preſent ſtate of Europe. The ſituation of the mountains, ſeas, and rivers, which ſerve as boundaries to the ſeveral nations inhabiting it, ſeem alſo to have determined the number and extent of thoſe nations; ſo that the political order of this part of the world may be ſaid to be, in ſome reſpects, the work of nature.

In fact, we are not to ſuppoſe that the boaſted balance of power in Europe hath been actually eſtabliſhed; or that any body has done any thing really with a view to ſupport it. It is found, indeed, to exiſt; and thoſe who find they have not weight enough to deſtroy it, cover their own particular deſigns with the pretence of maintaining it. But whether attended to or not, this balance certainly ſubſiſts, and needs no other ſupport than itſelf, if it were to remain uninterrupted: nay, though it ſhould occaſionally be diſturbed on one ſide, it preſently recovers itſelf on the other: ſo that if the princes, who are accuſed of aſpiring to univerſal monarchy, were really ſo aſpiring, they diſplayed in this particular much more ambition than judgment; for how could they reflect a moment on ſuch a project, without diſcovering it to be ridiculous? How could they be inſenſible, that there is no power in Europe ſo much ſuperior to the reſt, as to be able ever to become their maſter? Thoſe conquerors, who have brought about great revolutions, have always effected it by the ſudden march of unexpected armies; by bringing foreign troops, differently trained to

war, againſt people diſarmed, divided, or undiſciplined: But where ſhall we find an European prince whoſe forces the others are not acquainted with? where find one to ſubdue the reſt, when the greateſt of them all forms ſo ſmall a part of the whole, and they are all ſo vigilant againſt each other's encroachments? Can any one maintain more troops than all the reſt? He could not; or, if he could, he would only be the ſooner ruined, or his troops would be ſo much the worſe as they were more numerous. Could he have them better diſciplined? They would be leſs in proportion. Beſides, military diſcipline is nearly the ſame, or ſhortly will be ſo, all over Europe. Can he have more money? Pecuniary reſources are common, and money never was known to make any great conqueſts. Could he make a ſudden invaſion? Want of ſubſiſtence, or fortified towns, would every moment oppoſe his progreſs. Would he inſenſibly augment his power and dominion? He will then afford his enemies the means of uniting to reſiſt him: time, money, and men, will ſoon fail him. Will he create diſſenſions among other powers, in order to conquer them one after another? The maxims of European policy will render that ſcheme ineffectual; nor could the weakeſt of princes be taken in ſuch a ſnare. In ſhort, not one of them having excluſive reſources, the reſiſtance he will meet with muſt at length equal his efforts; and time will ſoon repair the caſualties of fortune, if not with regard to each particular prince, at leaſt with regard to the general ſyſtem.

Will it be ſuppoſed, that two or three potentates might enter into an agreement to ſubdue

the reſt? Be it ſo. Theſe three potentates, be who they may, will not poſſeſs half the power of all Europe. The other parts will, therefore, certainly unite againſt them; and to ſucceed, they muſt be able to ſubdue a power greater than themſelves. Add to this, that the views of any three ſuch powers are too oppoſite, and their jealouſy of each other too great, ever to permit the forming of ſuch a project; and alſo, that if they had formed it, and actually begun to put it into execution with ſucceſs, that very ſucceſs would ſow the ſeeds of diſſenſion among the allied conquerors, as it would be morally impoſſible that their conqueſts ſhould be ſo equally divided that each ſhould be ſatisfied with his acquiſition: in which caſe the diſſatisfied party would of courſe oppoſe the progreſs of the others; who, for the like reaſons alſo, would ſoon diſagree between themſelves.

I much doubt if, ſince the world exiſted, there ever were ſeen three, or even two, great potentates, that cordially united to ſubdue the reſt, without quarrelling about the contingencies of the war, or their ſhare of the conqueſt; and affording, by their miſunderſtanding, new reſources to the weaker party. Thus, ſuppoſe what we will, it is highly improbable that any prince, or league of princes, will hereafter be able to effect any conſiderable and permanent change in the political ſtate of Europe.

Not that I pretend to ſay that the Alps and Pyreneans, the Rhine or the Sea, are inſurmountable obſtacles to ambition: but theſe obſtacles are ſupported by others, which ſtrengthen them, or ſerve to make ſtates recur to their former limits, whenever they have been occaſion-

ally removed. The preſent ſyſtem of Europe has its ſupport, in a great meaſure, in the arts of political negotiations, which almoſt always balance each other. But it hath a ſtill more ſolid ſupport in the Germanic body; ſituated almoſt in the centre of Europe, keeping the other parts in awe, and ſerving more effectually perhaps to the ſupport of its neighbours than to that of its own members; a body that is formidable to other ſtates on account of its extent and the number and wealth of its inhabitants, at the ſame time that it is uſeful to all by its conſtitution; which, depriving it of the means and inclination of making conqueſts, is the rock on which conquerors generally ſplit. It is certain, that, notwithſtanding the defects in the conſtitution of the Empire, the balance of power in Europe will never be deſtroyed ſo long as that conſtitution ſubſiſts; that no potentate need be apprehenſive of being dethroned by another; but that the treaty of Weſtphalia will be always the baſis of our political ſyſtem. Thus the law of nations, the ſtudy of which is ſo much cultivated in Germany, appears to be of much greater importance than is generally imagined; being not only the law of Germany, but, in ſome reſpects, that of all Europe.

But though the preſent ſyſtem is not to be removed, it is for that very reaſon the more tempeſtuous; as there ſubſiſts between the European powers a kind of continual action and re-action, which, without entirely diſplacing them, keeps them in conſtant agitation; their efforts being always ineffectual and always regenerating, like the waves of the ocean, which inceſſantly agitate its ſurface without raiſing it above the ſhore:

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ſo that the people are perpetually harraſſed, without any ſenſible advantage being derived from it to their ſovereign.

It would be eaſy for me to deduce the ſame truth from the particular intereſts of all the courts in Europe: for I could readily ſhew, that theſe intereſts are ſo connected as to reſtrain their forces within reciprocal reſpect. But the notions of wealth and commerce having given riſe to a ſpecies of political fanaticiſm, they occaſion ſuch ſudden changes in the apparent intereſts of princes, that no ſtable maxim can be eſtabliſhed upon thoſe which are the true: becauſe at preſent every thing depends on œconomical, and moſt of them whimſical principles, which are taken into the heads of miniſters. Be this, however, as it may, commerce, which tends daily to an equilibrium, will, by depriving ſome potentates of their excluſive advantages, deprive them, at the ſame time, of one of the greateſt means they poſſeſſed of giving laws to others *.

If I have inſiſted on that equal diſtribution of power which reſults from the preſent conſtitution of Europe, it has been in order to deduce from it an important inference regarding the eſtabliſhment of a general aſſociation: for to form a ſolid

* There has been a change of circumſtances ſince I wrote the above; my principle, nevertheleſs, will always remain true, Thus for example, it is eaſy to foreſee, that, before twenty years are at an end, England, glorious as it now is, will be undone, and will beſides have loſt the remainder of its liberty. It is generally affirmed, that agriculture flouriſhes in that iſland: but for my part, I would venture to lay a wager it is upon its decline. London is daily increaſing, the country therefore muſt be depopulating. The Engliſh are proud of being conquerors, it will not therefore be long before they are ſlaves.

a ſolid and durable confederacy, it is requiſite that all the members of it ſhould be under ſuch reciprocal dependence, that no one of them ſhould be in a capacity to withſtand all the reſt; and that ſuch particular aſſociations as might injure the general one, ſhould meet with obſtacles ſufficient to prevent their execution: for, without this, the confederacy would be fruitleſs, and each member, though under an apparent ſubjection, would be really independent. Now, if theſe obſtacles are ſuch as I have before deſcribed, even at preſent, when all the powers of Europe are at liberty to make with each other what treaties offenſive or defenſive they pleaſe; let the reader judge what would be the caſe if one grand confederacy were entered into, armed with power, and always ready to oppoſe ſuch as would attempt to diſturb or deſtroy it. This ſuffices to ſhew, that ſuch an aſſociation would not conſiſt of futile deliberations, which each party might diſregard with impunity; but that there would ariſe from it an efficient power, capable of reſtraining the ambitious within the limits of the General Treaty.

From this ſtate of the caſe may be deduced three inconteſtable truths. One is, that, if we except the Turk, there ſubſiſts between all the nations of Europe a ſocial connection; which, tho' but imperfect, is ſtill cloſer than the looſer ties of humanity in general. The ſecond is, that the imperfect ſtate of this ſociety makes the condition of thoſe who compoſe it worſe than it would be if they had no ſociety at all among them. The third is, that the primitive ties, which makes this ſociety hurtful, render it, at the ſame time, improveable, and more eaſy to be

be brought to perfection: ſo that all its conſtituents might derive their happineſs from that which is at preſent the cauſe of their miſery; and convert that ſtate of war, which now ſubſiſts among them, into a perpetual peace.

Let us inquire now in what manner this great work, commenced by fortune, may be compleated by reaſon; and how that free and voluntary ſociety, which unites all the European ſtates, aſſuming the force and ſolidity of a body truly political, may be converted into a real confederacy. It is indubitable that ſuch an eſtabliſhment, giving to this aſſociation its neceſſary perfection, would remove its abuſes, extend its advantages, and compel all parties to concur to the common good. But to this end it is neceſſary that no conſiderable power ſhould refuſe to enter into the aſſociation; that a judiciary tribunal ſhould be eſtabliſhed, inveſted with authority to inſtitute ſuch laws and regulations as all the members are to obey; that this tribunal be inveſted with a coercive and coactive force to compel each particular ſtate to ſubmit to the reſult, whether active or reſtrictive, of the general deliberations; in ſhort, that it be fixed and durable, to prevent the ſeveral members from withdrawing themſelves from it at pleaſure, whenever they conceive their own particular intereſts incompatible with the general. Theſe are the tokens by which it might be certainly known if the inſtitution were prudent, uſeful, and impregnable. We come now to extend this ſuppoſition, in order to find out by analyſis what effects ought to reſult from ſuch a confederacy; what means are proper to eſtabliſh

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it, and what reaſonable hope may be formed of its being carried into execution.

It is a cuſtom among us, for a kind of general diets to aſſemble, from time to time, under the appellation of a Congreſs; to which envoys are ſolemnly deputed from all the ſtates of Europe, to return back juſt as they went: for they either meet to ſay nothing, or to treat of public affairs as if they were private, to deliberate gravely whether the table ſhould be round or ſquare, whether there ſhall be more or fewer doors to their aſſembly-room, whether a certain plenipotentiary ſhould ſit with his face or his back toward the window, whether another ſhould advance a foot more or leſs on a viſit of ceremony, or on a thouſand other points of the like importance, ineffectually debated for theſe three centuries paſt, and undoubtedly well worthy to employ the politicians of the preſent.

It is poſſible that the members of ſome one of theſe aſſemblies may be endowed with common ſenſe; it is not even impoſſible that they may be ſincerely diſpoſed to the public good; and by the reaſons hereafter to be deduced, it may be conceived, that, after having obviated many difficulties, they may have orders from their reſpective ſovereigns to ſign the general confederacy; a ſummary of which I ſuppoſe to be contained in the five following articles.

By the firſt, the contracting ſovereigns ſhould eſtabliſh between themſelves a perpetual and irrevocable alliance; appointing plenipotentiaries to hold a fixed and permanent diet, or congreſs, at a certain place; in which diet all the differences ariſing between the contracting parties ſhall

ſhall be regulated and decided by way of arbitration.

By the ſecond, the number of ſovereigns ſhould be ſpecified whoſe plenipotentiaries are to have votes in the Congreſs, with thoſe who ſhould be invited to accede to the treaty; alſo the order, time, and manner, in which the office of Preſident is to paſs from one to another at equal intervals; and, laſtly, the reſpective quota of contributions, and the manner of raiſing them, to ſupply the general expences.

By the third, the confederacy ſhould guarantee to each of its members the poſſeſſion and government of all the ſtates it at preſent poſſeſſes, as well as the elective or hereditary ſucceſſion, as it may be eſtabliſhed by the fundamental laws of each country. In order alſo to cut off at once the ſource of diſputes inceſſantly recurring among them, it ſhould be agreed to make the actual poſſeſſion and the treaties laſt concluded, the baſis of the mutual rights of the contracting powers; who are to renounce for ever and reciprocally all their prior pretenſions, except future ſucceſſions liable to be conteſted, and other rights in reverſion, which are to be determined by arbitration at the diet, without the parties being ever permitted to do themſelves juſtice by force, or to take up arms againſt each other, under any pretence whatever.

By the fourth, it ſhould be ſpecified that every ally, who ſhall break the treaty, ſhall be put under the ban of the empire, and proſcribed as a common enemy; that is, if he refuſes to comply with the deciſions of the diet, makes preparations for war, negotiates treaties repugnant to the confederacy, or takes up arms to reſiſt or attack

attack any of the allies. It ſhould be farther agreed alſo, by the ſame article, that all the contracting parties ſhall arm themſelves to act offenſively, jointly, and at the common expence, againſt every ſtate put under the ban of the empire, until ſuch ſtate ſhall lay down its arms, and ſubmit to execute the determinations of the congreſs, repair the wrongs, reimburſe the expence, and even compenſate for making preparations for war contrary to treaty.

And, laſtly, by the fifth article, the plenipotentiaries of the European confederacy ſhould always be empowered to form, in the diet, ſuch regulations as ſhall be judged expedient to procure all poſſible advantage to the whole of the European Republic, and its ſeveral members, in conſequence of inſtructions from their reſpective courts, and having a majority of votes for the propoſition of ſuch regulations, and three-fourths five years after for their final determination. But that no alteration ſhall ever be made in theſe five fundamental articles, without the unanimous conſent of the whole confederacy.

I know not but theſe articles, thus conciſely expreſſed and couched in general terms, may be liable to a thouſand little objections, many of which may require explanations more at large; but little difficulties eaſily yield to neceſſity, and are of no conſequence in a project of ſuch importance as the preſent. When the regulation of the Congreſs itſelf ſhould come to be minutely conſidered, no doubt a thouſand obſtacles will preſent themſelves; but there will be found ten thouſand ways of removing them. The point in queſtion now is, Whether, from the nature of things, the project be or be not

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poſſible. A man might write volumes to no purpoſe, if every exigence were to be foreſeen, and its expedient provided. So long as one adheres to inconteſtable principles, it is not requiſite to convince every one's underſtanding, to obviate all objections, or to point out particularly how things are to be brought about. It is ſufficient to ſhew, that what is propoſed is not impracticable.

What remains, therefore, to be examined, in order to form a judgment of our ſyſtem? Only two queſtions; for I would not affront the reader's underſtanding ſo much as to offer to prove that peace is, in general, preferable to war.

The firſt of theſe queſtions is, Whether the confederacy propoſed will certainly attain the propoſed end, and prove ſufficient to ſecure a ſolid and laſting peace to Europe?

The ſecond is, Whether it be the intereſt of ſovereigns to eſtabliſh ſuch a confederacy, and buy a conſtant peace at ſuch a rate?

If the general and particular utility of our project may be thus demonſtrated, there will appear no longer any cauſe, in the reaſon of things, that can prevent the effects of an eſtabliſhment that depends altogether on the will of thoſe who are intereſted in it.

To begin with the diſcuſſion of the firſt article, let us apply what has been already advanced on the general ſyſtem of Europe, and the common effort which confines each potentate in a certain degree within his own limits, and prevents his encroaching ſo far as to prove the entire deſtruction of others. To make my arguments alſo on this head more clear, I ſhall here ſubjoin a liſt of the nineteen potentates which

may be conceived to conſtitute our European Republic; each of which having an equal vote, there will of courſe be nineteen votes in the Congreſs.

The Emperor of the Romans.
The Emperor of Ruſſia.
The King of France.
The King of Spain.
The King of England.
The States-General.
The King of Denmark.
Sweden.
Poland.
The King of Portugal.
The Sovereign of Rome.
The King Pruſſia.
The Elector of Bavaria and his aſſociates.
The Elector Palatine and his aſſociates.
The Swiſs and their allies.
The Eccleſiaſtical Electors and their aſſociates.
The Republic of Venice and her aſſociates.
The King of Naples.
The King of Sardinia.

The many leſs conſiderable ſovereigns, ſuch as the Republic of Genoa, the Dukes of Modena and Parma, with ſeveral others omitted in this liſt, are to be joined to the leaſt powerful of thoſe mentioned, in form of aſſociation, enjoying a a right to vote with them, after the manner of the *votum curiatum* of the Counts of the Empire. It were uſeleſs to give here a more particular enumeration, becauſe accidents may daily ariſe to give occaſion for reforming our project, even to the very moment of putting it in execution. Such accidents, however, make no alteration in the baſis of our ſyſtem.

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One need only caſt an eye on the above liſt, to perceive very evidently, that it is impoſſible for either of the powers compoſing it, to be in a ſituation capable of oppoſing all the others united; or that any partial league can be formed among them, able to make head againſt the grand confederacy.

For how would ſuch league be formed? Would it be concerted by ſome of the moſt powerful princes? We have already ſhewn, that even in ſuch a caſe it could not be durable; and it is now eaſy to ſee farther, that it is inconſiſtent with the general ſyſtem of every great potentate, and with the intereſts inſeparable from their conſtitution. Would ſuch a league be concerted between one great ſtate and ſeveral ſmall ones? The other great powers, united in one confederacy, would preſently cruſh it: it is indeed natural to ſuppoſe, that the grand alliance being always united and armed, it would be eaſy for it, by virtue of the fourth article, to prevent, or inſtantly to ſuppreſs, every partial and ſeditious alliance that ſhould tend to diſturb the public tranquillity.

Obſerve what happens in the Germanic body, notwithſtanding the abuſe of its police, and the great inequality of its members; is there yet one, even of the moſt powerful, amongſt them, that will venture to expoſe himſelf to the ban of the Empire, by directly infringing the laws of its conſtitution? unleſs he has reaſon, indeed, to think that the Empire will not act in earneſt againſt him.

I look upon it, therefore, as demonſtrated, that, if the European congreſs were once eſtabliſhed, there would be no danger of future re-

bellions; and that though ſome abuſes would probably be introduced, they never could proceed ſo far as to elude the deſign of the inſtitution. It remains now to inquire, Whether that deſign will be properly effected by the inſtitution itſelf.

To this end, we ſhall conſider the motives which induce princes to take up arms. Theſe are either to make conqueſts, to defend themſelves againſt invaders, to reduce a too powerful neighbour, to protect the injured, to decide diſputes that cannot be amicably adjuſted, or, laſtly, to enforce obedience to treaties. There can be no cauſe or pretext for war that may not be ranged under one of theſe ſix heads: now it is evident, that not one of all the ſix can ſubſiſt in the new ſtate of things under a confederacy.

In the firſt place, all hopes of conqueſt muſt be given up, from the impoſſibility of making any; it being certain, that whoever attempts it muſt be preſently ſtopped in his career by a ſuperior force; ſo that he will riſk the loſing his all, while he is ſure he cannot gain any thing. Every ambitious prince, deſirous to aggrandize himſelf in Europe, does two things: he begins by ſtrengthening himſelf with good alliances; after this, he endeavours to ſurpriſe his enemy unprovided. But particular alliances will avail nothing againſt a general and ſtronger one always ſubſiſting; while princes, having no longer any pretext to take up arms, they cannot take ſuch a ſtep without being perceived, prevented, and puniſhed by the confederacy, which is conſtantly in arms.

The ſame reaſon which takes from each prince the hope of conqueſt, takes from him alſo the

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fear of being conquered; his dominions, guaranteed by all Europe, being as well ſecured to him as the eſtates of private ſubjects in a well-governed kingdom; nay more ſo, even in the ſame proportion as their ſovereign, their ſole protector, is leſs powerful than the potentates of all Europe united.

There would no longer be excited a deſire to reduce a neighbouring power, from whom there would be no longer any thing to fear; nor would there even be any temptation to it when there would exiſt no hopes of ſucceſs. With regard to the maintenance of the rights of each party, it may be remarked, at firſt view, that a deal of chicanery, with many obſcure and confuſed pretenſions, will be annihilated by the third article of the confederacy; which definitively regulates all the reciprocal rights of the allied ſovereigns, on the footing of their actual poſſeſſions. Hence all poſſible pretenſions and demands will become clear for the future, and be determined by the congreſs, as they occaſionally ariſe. Add to this, that if my rights are infringed, I ought to defend them by the ſame means. Now as no one can encroach upon them by force of arms, without incurring the ban of the congreſs; ſo it is no longer neceſſary that I ſhould by force of arms defend them. The ſame may be ſaid of ſlighter injuries, wrongs, and reparations, and of all the unforeſeen differences that may ariſe between ſovereigns. The ſame power which protects their rights, ought alſo to redreſs their grievances.

As to the laſt article, its ſolution is evident. It is plain, at firſt ſight, that, as there is no aggreſſor to be feared, there is no need of any de-

fenſive treaty; and that, as none could be form-more ſolid and effectual than that of the grand confederacy, every other would be uſeleſs, unlawful, and of courſe null and void.

It is impoſſible, therefore, that the confederacy being once eſtabliſhed, ſhould there remain any ſeeds of hoſtility among the confederates, or that the deſign of a perpetual peace ſhould not be fully accompliſhed by the execution of the ſyſtem projected.

It remains now for us to examine the other queſtion, reſpecting the intereſts of the ſeveral contracting parties: for it is eaſily diſcernible, that the public intereſt may plead in vain againſt that of individuals. To prove that peace is, in general, preferable to war, would be ſaying nothing to one who ſhould think he had reaſons to prefer war to peace; while to point out the means of eſtabliſhing a laſting peace, would be only to excite him to oppoſe it.

It may indeed be ſaid, that ſovereigns will, by this project, be deprived of the right of doing themſelves juſtice, or of doing injuſtice to others, when they pleaſe; they will be deprived of the power of aggrandizing themſelves; they muſt renounce that formidable pomp of power with which they delight to terrify the world, and that glory of conqueſt from which they now derive honour. In fine, they will be reduced to the neceſſity of being juſt and peaceable. What will be their indemnification for the loſs of all theſe?

I will not venture to reply, with the Abbe de St Pierre, that the real glory of princes conſiſts in their promoting the public good and the happineſs of their ſubjects; that their true intereſt

reſt depends on their glory, and that the glory they acquire in the opinion of the wiſe is proportioned to the ſervice they are of to mankind; that the project of a perpetual peace, being the greateſt that ever was formed, ought to confer immortal glory on its author; that the putting it into execution, being, in like manner, the moſt uſeful to ſubjects, would be ſtill more glorious to ſovereigns; that this enterprize would be particularly the only one unſullied with blood and rapine, with ſorrow and execration; and in fine, that the moſt certain way for a prince to diſtinguiſh himſelf among the herd of kings, is to labour for the public good. Such are the ſentiments which, broached in the cabinet of princes, have brought ridicule on the author and his projects. But let us not, like them, deſpiſe his reaſons: we have nothing to do with the virtues of princes; let us ſpeak of their intereſts.

All the powers of Europe have real or groundleſs demands on one another, which are incapable of being clearly aſcertained, becauſe there is no conſtant and common rule by which to determine them, and alſo becauſe they are often founded on equivocal and uncertain facts. The differences hence ariſing alſo are equally indeterminable, as well from want of competent arbitrators, as becauſe each power reclaims, without ſcruple, thoſe ceſſions, which have been exacted of him by the more powerful, in the way of treaty, or after unſucceſsful wars. It is an error, therefore, to inſiſt only on our claims on others, without reflecting on their claims on us, when there is on neither ſide either more juſtice or advantage in the means of enforcing our reciprocal pretenſions. No ſooner doth any thing de-

depend on accident, than the actual poſſeſſion is of ſuch value, that no wiſe man will riſk it for future profit, even upon an equal chance; whilſt all the world muſt blame a man, who, in eaſy circumſtances, ſhould, in hopes to double his fortune, venture the whole on one caſt of the dice.

But it has been made clear, that, even as things now ſtand, every power ambitious of aggrandizing itſelf, muſt meet with a reſiſtance ſuperior to its utmoſt efforts: whence it follows, that the ſtrongeſt having no motive for playing, nor the weakeſt any proſpect of winning, it becomes the intereſt of both, to give up what they covet, in order to ſecure what they poſſeſs.

Let us conſider the waſte of men, of money, of powers of every kind, and in what manner every ſtate is exhauſted even by the moſt ſucceſsful war; and compare the injuries it has received with the advantages it has derived from it; we ſhall find the imaginary winner is ſtill a loſer; and that the conqueror, always weaker than before the war commenced, has no other conſolation than to ſee the vanquiſhed more exhauſted than himſelf: while even this advantage is leſs real than apparent; becauſe the ſuperiority, which may be acquired over an adverſary, hath, in the mean time, been loſt with regard to neutral powers; which, without varying their ſituation, grow ſo much the ſtronger, with regard to us, as we grow weak.

If all Kings are not yet convinced of the folly of making conqueſts, it appears, at leaſt, that the wiſeſt of them begin to ſee that they coſt more than they are worth. Without entering into a thouſand diſtinctions on this head, which

which might lead us too far out of the way, it may be ſaid, in general, that a Prince, who, by enlarging his territories, loſes as many old ſubjects as he acquires new, becomes weaker by his acquiſition; becauſe, with more territories to defend, he hath no more ſubjects to defend it.

Now, it is well known, that, as wars are carried on at preſent, the deſtruction cauſed among the ſoldiery is one of the leaſt cauſes of the depopulation they occaſion. It is there, indeed, that the loſs is more immediately felt; but there is occaſioned, at the ſame time, a more important and irreparable loſs than that of thoſe who periſh, by the want of ſuch as might otherwiſe be born; by the increaſe of taxes, by the interruption of commerce, by the deſertion of the country and the decreaſe of agriculture: thus the evil, which is at firſt hardly perceptible, is cruelly felt in the end; when we are aſtoniſhed at our having been ſo weak as to endeavour to become powerful.

But what renders conqueſts ſtill leſs intereſting, is, that means are known at preſent, by which princes may increaſe their power two or three fold, not only without extending their territories, but ſometimes by contracting them, as was very wiſely done by the Emperor Adrian. It is now obvious, that the power of princes depends on the number of their ſubjects; and it is a truth naturally ariſing from what has been advanced, that of two ſtates, containing the ſame number of inhabitants, that which occupies the ſmalleſt territory is actually the moſt powerful. It is then by means of good laws, by a prudent police, by enlarged views of œconomy, that a wiſe ſovereign is certain of augmenting his

his forces, without putting any thing to the hazard: the real conqueſts he makes over his neighbours are the uſeful eſtabliſhments he forms within his own kingdoms; while every additional new-born ſubject increaſes his power as much as if he had deſtroyed an enemy.

It muſt not be here objected, that I prove too much, in that, if things were as I repreſent them, each prince having an intereſt in abſtaining from war, and his particular intereſts uniting with the general to the preſervation of peace, ſuch peace ought naturally to eſtabliſh and ſupport itſelf without a confederacy. This would be to reaſon very badly on the preſent ſtate of things: for, though it would certainly prove more advantageous to all parties to be conſtantly at peace, the general want of ſecurity in this caſe has this effect, that each party, being uncertain of keeping out of wars, ſtrives to commence hoſtilities at leaſt with advantage, on every favourable occaſion; whence it happens, that many, and theſe even offenſive, wars, proceeds from the unjuſt precaution of ſecuring one's own poſſeſſions, rather than from the deſign of uſurping thoſe of others. However ſalutary, indeed, all public-ſpirited maxims may be in general, it is certain, that, if we conſider them only in a political, nay, even ſometimes in a moral view, they become hurtful to the party who perſeveres in the practices of them towards the reſt of the world, when nobody will practiſe them towards him.

I have nothing to ſay on the parade of arms; becauſe, being deſtitute of all ſolid foundation, whether of hope or fear, ſuch parade is mere childrens play, and monarchs ought not to dandle

dandle puppets. I ſhall be as ſilent alſo on the glory of conquerors; becauſe if there be ſome monſters who regret the want of objects to maſſacre, they ought not to be reaſoned with, but deprived of the means of gratifying their ſanguinary fury.

The guaranty of the third article ſuperſeding all motives for making war, there can be no better reaſon for any potentate's declaring it againſt others, than they will have for commencing hoſtilities againſt him: at the ſame time, it is certainly a great advantage to be ſecured from the riſk of being in the ſituation wherein one is ſingly oppoſed to all.

With regard to the dependence of each party on the common tribunal, it is very clear, that it will not diminiſh their ſeparate claims to ſovereignty; but will, on the contrary, rather confirm ſuch claims; which are rendered more certain by the third article; according to which, each power guarantees not only its own ſtates againſt all foreign invaſion, but alſo its ſovereign authority over its ſubjects. Thus princes will not become the leſs abſolute for entering into this confederacy, but will be more immoveably fixed on their reſpective thrones; while, by ſubmitting to the judgment of the Congreſs in their diſputes with their equals, and by diveſting themſelves of the dangerous power of ſeizing upon the property of others, they will render their actual rights more ſecure, by renouncing thoſe which are falſe or doubtful. Add to this, that there is a wide difference between a dependence on others, and on a body-corporate, of which each party is always a member, and in his turn the preſident: for in the latter caſe,

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his independency is only the more aſcertained by the guarantees afforded him. It would be alienated in the hands of a maſter, but is confirmed in thoſe of aſſociates.

This is confirmed by the example of the Germanic body; for, though the ſovereignty of its members be varied, in many reſpects, by the conſtitution of the Empire, and are of courſe in a leſs agreeable ſituation than they might be as members of the European confederacy, there is nevertheleſs not one among them, how jealous ſoever he may be of his authority, who would render his independence abſolute, were it in his power, by detaching himſelf from the reſt of the Empire.

It is farther to be obſerved alſo, that the Germanic body, having a permanent chief, his authority is conſtantly tending to uſurpation; a circumſtance that could never happen in the European Congreſs, where the preſidentſhip would be alternate, and no reſpect would be had to the inequality of the ſeveral potentates.

To all theſe conſiderations may be added another, ſtill more important to people who are ſo fond of money as princes always are: this is, the facility of amaſſing a great quantity, from the advantages reſulting, both to them and their people, from a perpetual peace; conſidering the vaſt expence that will be ſaved in the article of military preparations, in the keeping up of fortifications, and the ſupport of numerous troops, which eat up the revenues, and become every day more burdenſome both to prince and ſubject.

I am ſenſible it is not convenient for ſovereigns to diſband all their forces, and to have no troops ready to repel ſudden invaders, and to ſuppreſs po-

popular inſurrections. I am ſenſible, alſo, that the ſeveral members of the confederacy will be obliged to furniſh their contingents, as well for guarding the frontiers of Europe, as for the ſupport of the confederate army deſtined occaſionally to enforce the determinations of the Congreſs. But when all thoſe charges are defrayed, and the extraordinary expences of war totally ſuppreſſed, there will ſtill be a ſaving of more than half the preſent military expences; which will leſſen the burden laid on the ſubject, and fill the coffers of the ſovereign: ſo that the people will be ſubject to much fewer taxes; and the prince, being much enriched, would be enabled to give encouragement to trade, agriculture, and arts, as well as to lay the foundation of uſeful eſtabliſhments that would ſtill farther increaſe his and his people's wealth. Add to this, that the independence of the ſtate would derive from ſuch means a much greater ſecurity than it could do from the maintenance of national troops, and that military pomp, which is conſtantly exhauſting it in the midſt of peace.

It will be ſaid, perhaps, that the frontier-countries would be then in a more diſadvantageous ſituation, and would ſtill have as many wars to maintain againſt the Turks, the Tartars, and the Corſairs of Africa.

To this I anſwer, firſt, That thoſe countries are, as it is, in the ſame circumſtances; and that therefore our project would be of no poſitive diſadvantage to them, though leſs advantageous than it might be to others; this being an unavoidable inconvenience, to which their ſituation naturally expoſes them. Secondly, That by being freed from any apprehenſions of

danger on the ſide of Europe, they would be much better able to oppoſe their other enemies. Thirdly, That the demolition of the fortreſſes in the interior parts of Europe, and the ſaving of the expences neceſſary for their ſupport, would enable the confederacy to eſtabliſh a great number of fortreſſes on the frontiers, without expence to any particular member. Fourthly, That ſuch fortreſſes, built, garriſoned, and maintained at the common expence, would prove a ſecurity, as well as a ſaving of charges, to the potentates on the frontiers, whoſe ſtates they would more immediately protect. Fifthly, That the troops of the confederacy, ſtationed on the confines of Europe, would be always ready to repel any invader. And, ſixthly, That a body ſo powerful as the European Republic, would be too formidable to foreign princes, for them to entertain a deſign of attacking any of its members; ſince we ſee the Germanic body, though much leſs powerful, is yet ſufficiently ſo to awe its neighbours into reſpect, and to afford an uſeful protection to the princes compoſing it.

It may be objected farther, that, ſhould the Europeans ceaſe to make war on each other, the military art would ſoon fall into neglect and oblivion; that their troops would loſe their courage and diſcipline; that there would no longer exiſt either generals or ſoldiers; and that Europe would thus lie at the mercy of the firſt foreign invader.

To this I reply, that one of theſe two things muſt happen; either that our neighbours of the other parts of the world would make war on Europe, or that they would reſpect the confederacy ſo much as to leave it in peace.

Now

Now, in the firſt caſe, there would be opportunities enough of cultivating military talents, in raiſing and forming troops. The armies of the confederacy would be, in that reſpect, the ſchool of Europe; people would repair to the frontiers to learn the art of war, while the arts of peace would flouriſh in the interior parts, and thus the advantages of both would be united. Can it be thought neceſſary that we ſhould be always cutting one another's throats, to cultivate the art of war? or are the French leſs brave, becauſe the provinces of Anjou and Touraine are at peace with each other?

In the ſecond caſe, it muſt be owned, that no opportunity would be left of cultivating the military art; but then there would remain no longer any neceſſity for it. For, what purpoſe would it ſerve to train people to arms, who would have no enemy to attack? And which is to be preferred, the cultivation of a deſtructive art, or the project that renders it uſeleſs? If a ſecret were exiſting, by means of which mankind might enjoy conſtant health, would it not be abſurd to reject it, becauſe it would deprive the Phyſicians of the opportunities of acquiring experience? It remains to be ſhewn which of the two arts, in this parallel, is moſt ſalutary, and beſt deſerves to be retained.

Let us not be terrified with a ſudden invaſion; it is well known that Europe has, on that ſcore, nothing to fear, and that this firſt invader will never appear. This is not a time for the irruptions of Barbarians, who ſeemed to drop in ſwarms from the clouds. Since we have been able to take a nearer ſurvey of the whole ſurface of the earth, nothing can approach

us, that may not be ſeen at a great diſtance. There is no potentate in the world, at preſent, in a ſituation formidable againſt all Europe. And if ever there ſhould be ſuch a power, either we ſhall have time to prepare ourſelves, or ſhall be at leaſt in a better ſituation to oppoſe him, being united in one body, than when our long diſputes are to be terminated at once, in order to patch up an haſty union.

Thus we have ſhewn, that all the pretended inconveniencies of ſuch a confederacy are, on examination, reducible to nothing. We now aſk, if any man in the world will venture to affirm as much of thoſe inconveniences which ariſe from the preſent manner of deciding the diſputes of ſovereigns by the law of the ſtrongeſt? That is to ſay, from that impolitic ſtate of war, which neceſſarily reſults from the abſolute and mutual independence of ſovereigns, in the imperfect ſtate of ſociety which at preſent ſubſiſts between them in Europe?

To be better able to judge of theſe latter inconveniencies, I ſhall juſt recapitulate a ſummary of them in a few words; and leave it to the reader's examination.

1. No one's rights are ſecured but thoſe of the ſtrongeſt. 2. Continual and unavoidable changes in the relations ſubſiſting between nations, which hinder any of them from fixing in their own hands the power they actually poſſeſs. 3. No perfect ſecurity for any power till its neighbours be ſubdued or deſtroyed. 4. The general impoſſibility of deſtroying them; as even by deſtroying one, others are formed. 5. The precautions and immenſe expences attendant on being always upon one's guard. 6. The want

of

of forces and of defence in minorities and revolts; for when the ſtate is divided, who can ſupport one party againſt the other? 7. The want of ſecurity for the performance of mutual engagements. 8. Juſtice is never to be obtained from others without great loſs and expence, nor always then; while the object in diſpute ſeldom proves an indemnification. 9. The unavoidable riſk princes run of loſing their dominions, and ſometimes their lives, in the proſecution of their rights. 10. The neceſſity of taking a part in the quarrels of neighbours, and of being drawn into a war contrary to one's inclination. 11. The interruption of trade and public ſupplies, at a time when they are moſt required. 12 The continual danger from a powerful neighbour, if one is weak, and from a league, if one is ſtrong. 13. The inutility of prudence with regard to what is ſubject to fortune; the perpetual deſtruction of people; the diminution of the ſtrength of the ſtate both from good and ill ſucceſs; the total impoſſibility of eſtabliſhing a good government, of accounting any thing one's own, and rendering either ourſelves or others happy.

Let us recapitulate, in the ſame manner, the advantages which the confederate princes of Europe will reap from arbitration.

1. Abſolute ſecurity that their preſent and future differences will be always terminated without a war; a ſecurity incomparably more uſeful to ſovereigns, than that of never being engaged in a law-ſuit would be to any of their ſubjects.

2. The removal of all ſubjects in diſpute, or their reduction to little or nothing, by the ceſſa-

tion of all former pretenſions; which will compenſate for what they give up, and ſecure what they poſſeſs.

3. Complete and conſtant ſecurity for the perſon, family, and dominions of the prince, and of the order of ſucceſſion fixed by the laws of each country, as well againſt the ambitious views of unjuſt pretenders, as againſt the revolts of rebellious ſubjects.

4. Perfect ſecurity for the execution of all reciprocal engagements between prince and prince, by the guaranty of the whole European republic.

5. Perfect and perpetual liberty and ſecurity, in regard to commerce, as well that carried on between the ſtates of the confederacy, as that carried on ſeparately by each ſtate with diſtant nations.

6. A total and perpetual ſuppreſſion of the extraordinary military expence, both by ſea and land, in times of war, and even a conſiderable diminution of the ordinary expences in time of peace.

7. The ſenſible progreſs of agriculture and population, with the increaſing wealth of the people and the revenue of the prince.

8. The facilitating all eſtabliſhments, which may redound to the glory and authority of the ſovereign, increaſe the public reſources, or promote the happineſs of the people.

I now leave the reader, as I before obſerved, to his examination of all theſe articles, and to form a compariſon between the ſtate of peace reſulting from the propoſed confederacy, and the ſtate of war which reſults from the preſent impolitic ſtate of Europe.

If

If we have reaſoned rightly in laying down this project, it has been demonſtrated, firſt, That the eſtabliſhment of a perpetual peace depends ſolely on the conſent of the reſpective ſovereigns, and that there is no other obſtacle to it than their oppoſition. Secondly, That this eſtabliſhment would be every way uſeful; and that no compariſon is to be made, even with regard to them, between the inconveniences and advantages reſulting from it. Thirdly, That it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe their inclination will agree with their intereſts. And, laſtly, that this eſtabliſhment, if once formed on the plan propoſed, would be ſolid and laſting, and perfectly anſwer the end deſigned. We cannot, indeed, take upon us to ſay, that the ſovereigns of Europe will actually adopt our project, (who can anſwer for the judgment of others?) but we can ſafely ſay, they would adopt it, if they knew their true intereſts: for it ſhould be obſerved, that we have not ſuppoſed men to be ſuch as they ought to be, good, generous, diſintereſted, and public-ſpirited from motives of humanity; but, on the contrary, ſuch as they really are, unjuſt, avaricious, and more ſolicitous for their private intereſt than that of the public. The only ſuppoſition we have made, is, that mankind have ſenſe enough in general to know what is uſeful to them, and fortitude enough to embrace the means of their own happineſs. Should our project, nevertheleſs, fail of being put into execution, it will not be neglected becauſe it is chimerical, but becauſe the world is abſurd, and there is a kind of abſurdity in being wiſe among fools.

AN

EXPOSTULATORY

LETTER

FROM

J. J. ROUSSEAU,

Citizen of GENEVA.

TO

CHRISTOPHER de BEAUMONT,

Archbiſhop of PARIS.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,

The MANDATE of the ſaid Prelate,

AND ALSO

The Proceedings of the Parliament of Paris, relative to the New Treatiſe on Education entitled EMILIUS.

Da veniam ſi quid liberius dixi, non ad contumeliam tuam, ſed ad defenſionem meam. Præſumpſi enim de gravitate et prudentia tua, quia potes conſiderare quantam mihi reſpondendi neceſſitatem impoſueris. AUG. Epiſt. 238. ad PASCENT.

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The Proceedings of the Parliament of Paris, relative to the new Treatise on Education entitled EMILIUS.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE PARLIAMENT of PARIS.

ENTERED, this day, the officers of our Lord the King; M. Omer-Joly de Fleury, advocate of our ſaid Lord the King, preſenting an information to the Court, againſt a work entitled *Emilius*, &c. by J. J. Rouſſeau, citizen of Geneva, in words and to the effect following:

That the ſaid work appears to be compoſed only with a view to re-eſtabliſh natural religion; the author labouring, in the plan of education he affects to purſue with his pupil, to illuſtrate and recommend that criminal ſyſtem.

That the author affects to inſtruct his ſaid pupil according to nature, which he makes his only guide in the formation of his moral man; that he regards all religions as equally ſalutary, and as having all their peculiar reaſons in the climate, government, genius of the people, or other local cauſe, which makes the one preferable to another only according to the circumſtances of time and place.

That he would have man confine himſelf to that kind of knowledge which inſtinct alone prompts him to purſue; pretending that the paſſions are the principal inſtruments of our preſervation; and aſſerting that men may be ſaved without believing in God, on the ſuppoſition of an invincible ignorance, which he maintains ſome

ſome perſons may lie under with regard to the Deity, and which will excuſe their unbelief. That, according to the principles of this writer, we ſhould be directed in the choice of a religion by reaſon only; by the dictates of which we ſhould alſo leave the mode of that worſhip which mankind are to pay, to the Supreme Being; whom the author affects to honour, in ſpeaking with impiety of thoſe external ceremonies of religion, which that Being hath eſtabliſhed, or the church hath preſcribed, under the direction and influence of his holy Spirit.

That, in conſequence of this ſyſtem of admitting no other than natural religion, whatever form it aſſume among different people, he hath endeavoured to diſprove the truth of the holy ſcriptures and prophecies, the certainty of the miracles contained in the ſacred writings, the infallibility of revelation, and the authority of the church: that, in recurring on every occaſion to this natural religion, he undertakes to juſtify not only all religions indiſcriminately, pretending that ſalvation may be found in all; but even the infidelity and ſcepticiſm of all thoſe whom we may in vain endeavour to convince of the divinity of Jeſus Chriſt and the truth of the Chriſtian religion, which alone hath God for its author, and with regard to which he carries his blaſphemy ſo far, as to treat it as ridiculous and contradictory, and to inculcate a ſacrilegious indifference for its myſteries and tenets; all which he endeavours to deſtroy.

That ſuch are the impious and deteſtable principles which the writer propoſes to eſtabliſh in his ſaid treatiſe; throughout which he ſubjects religion to the examination of reaſon, which

can

can eſtabliſh only mere human creeds, and which admits of no other truths or dogmas in religion than ſuch as it may pleaſe the underſtanding, left to its own light, or rather its own darkneſs, to receive or reject.

That to theſe impieties the author hath added many indecent details and illuſtrations directly contrary to modeſty and decorum, as well as pretenſions tending odiouſly and falſely to miſrepreſent the ſovereign authority, to deſtroy the principles of that obedience which is due to it, and to leſſen the reſpect and affection of the ſubjects for their kings.

That the informants conceive theſe inſtances ſufficient to give the court an idea of the work in queſtion: that the maxims which are ſcattered throughout, unite to form a chimerical ſyſtem, as impracticable in the execution, as abſurd and criminal in its deſign: that ſubjects educated in ſuch maxims could not fail of being prejudiſed in favour of ſcepticiſm and toleration; of being abandoned to their paſſions, and devoted to the pleaſures of ſenſe; of becoming deaf to every thing but the voice of nature; and of ſubſtituting, inſtead of the noble deſire of true glory, this pernicious phrenzy of ſingularity. What rules for the formation of manners! What members of church and ſtate muſt ſuch children prove who are educated in principles that are equally ſhocking to the citizen and Chriſtian!

That the author of the ſaid book, not having ſcrupled to ſet his name to the work, cannot be too expeditiouſly proſecuted; for that it is of importance, ſince he is known, that juſtice ſhould make an example as well of the writer, as of thoſe who may be diſcovered to have aſſiſted,

ed either in the printing or diſtributing a work that deſerves, together with its author and publiſher, to be treated with the greateſt ſeverity.

That ſuch is the ſubſtance of the written information, now left, with a copy of the book, in court. On this the officers retired.

The matter of the ſaid information having been taken into conſideration, it is reſolved by the Court, That the ſaid printed book, entitled *Emilius*, &c. be torn to pieces and burnt, in the court of the palace, at the foot of the grand ſtairs, by the common executioner. All perſons poſſeſſed of copies of the ſaid book, are alſo enjoined to bring them to the regiſter of the court, in order to have them ſuppreſſed. And all bookſellers are expreſly forbidden to print, ſell, or publiſh the ſaid book; as are alſo all hawkers and others, either to vend or diſtribute the ſame, under pain of being immediately proſecuted to the utmoſt ſeverity of the law. It is alſo ordered by the Court, at the requeſt of the King's Attorney-general, That information be taken before the reporting counſel of all ſuch writers as may be found in Paris; and before the lieutenants-criminal of their reſpective bailiwicks, of all ſuch as may offer, without the ſaid city, to give evidence againſt the author, printers, or venders of the ſaid book. That the ſaid information, when taken, be communicated to the King's Attorney-general; to be proceeded on as he ſhall judge proper, or the Court order relating thereto. It is further ordered, That the ſaid J. J. Rouſſeau, mentioned in the title-page of the ſaid book, be in the mean time apprehended, taken, and committed to the priſons of the Conciergerie of the palace, in order to be

heard and interrogated before the ſaid reporting counſel, touching the matter of the ſaid book; and to anſwer to the information which the Attorney-general hath taken againſt him: and in caſe the ſaid J. J. Rouſſeau cannot be apprehended and taken, on ſearch after his perſon, for fourteen days, that his effects be ſeized, and an inventory thereof be taken, and lodged in the hands of the commiſſaries appointed for that purpoſe, till the ſaid Rouſſeau ſhall appear agreeable to this order. And to theſe purpoſes it is ordered, that a copy of the ſaid book be left with the regiſter of this court, to ſerve for the inſtructions relative to the proceſs. Ordered, laſtly, That the preſent arret be printed, publiſhed, and ſtuck up wherever it may be thought requiſite. Done in parliament, *June* 9, 1762.

Signed, DU FRANC.

On Friday the 11th of *June* 1762, the abovementioned book was torn to pieces, and burned at the foot of the great ſtair-caſe of the palace, by the public executioner, in the preſence of me Etienne Dagobert Yſabeau, one of the three principal commiſſaries of the great chamber, aſſiſted by the two ſerjeants of the court.

Signed YSABEAU.

THE MANDATE OF THE ARCHBISHOP of PARIS;

Condemning the New Treatiſe on Education, entitled Emilius, *&c. by* J. J. Rouſſeau, *Citizen of* Geneva.

CHriſtopher de Beaumont, by the grace of God, and by favour of the holy apoſtolic ſee, archbiſhop of Paris, duke of St Cloud, peer of France, commander of the order of the Holy Ghoſt, patron of the Sorbonne, *&c.* to all the faithful of our dioceſe, health and benediction.

St Paul, my dear brethren, hath foretold, that perilous times ſhould come, in which men ſhould be lovers of themſelves, proud, blaſphemers, unholy, falſe accuſers, high-minded, lovers of pleaſures more than of God, men of corrupt minds, reprobates concerning the faith *. And in what times hath this prediction been more literally fulfilled than in the preſent! Infidelity, encouraged by the paſſions, preſents itſelf in every ſhape, in order to accommodate itſelf in ſome meaſure to perſons of all ages, characters, and conditions of life. Sometimes, in order

* 2 Tim. iii. 1, 4, 8.

order to inſinuate itſelf into the minds of thoſe who are captivated with trifles, it aſſumes a light, agreeable, and frivolous ſtyle; hence we ſee a numerous tribe of romances, equally impious and obſcene, whoſe ſole end is to divert the imagination, with a view to ſeduce the underſtanding and to corrupt the heart. Sometimes, aſſuming an air of ſublimity, it affects to recur to the firſt principles of human knowlege, and pretends to deduce from thence authority for caſting off a yoke ſaid to be diſgraceful to humanity, even that of divinity itſelf. Sometimes it furiouſly declaims againſt religious zeal, and in a rage preaches up univerſal toleration. And again, ſometimes, uniting all the different modes of language, it mingles gravity with mirth, the maxims of purity with thoſe of charity, truth with error, and religion with blaſphemy; endeavouring, in a word, to reconcile light with darkneſs, and Chriſt with Belial. This, my dear brethren, appears in a particular manner the object of a recent publication, entitled *Emilius*, &c. A writer hath here ſtarted up, who, educated in the midſt of error, is full of the language of philoſophy, though no true philoſopher: poſſeſſed of a multiplicity of knowledge, which nevertheleſs hath not ſerved to enlighten his underſtanding, he hath made uſe of it to darken the underſtanding of others; he is given up to paradoxes both in opinion and practice, uniting ſimplicity of manners with oſtentation of doctrine, a zeal for ancient maxims with a paſſion for eſtabliſhing the moſt ſingular novelties, the obſcurity of retirement with a deſire of being known to the whole world. We have ſeen his invectives againſt thoſe very ſci-

ences which he himſelf cultivated; we hear him acknowledge the excellence of the goſpel, while he is endeavouring to depreciate its tenets; and ſee him deſcribing the beauty of virtue, at the ſame time that he is ſtriving to extinguiſh the love of it in the hearts of his readers. He hath aſſumed the preceptorſhip of human kind, in order to deceive them; he hath erected himſelf into a public monitor, to lead the world aſtray; and hath played the oracle of the age, in order to complete its deſtruction. In a former treatiſe, on the Inequality of Mankind, he hath reduced man to a level with the brutes: in another production, ſtill more recent, he hath inſinuated all the poiſon of inordinate pleaſure, under pretence of prohibiting it: and, in the preſent, he takes advantage of the earlieſt moments of life, to eſtabliſh in the mind of man the maxims of irreligion and infidelity.

What a horrid enterpriſe, my dear brethren! The education of youth is one of the moſt important objects of the zeal and ſolicitude of the paſtors of the church. We are ſenſible that, in order to reform the world, as far as the weakneſs and corruption of our nature will permit, it would be ſufficient to obſerve, under the direction and impreſſions of grace, the dawnings of human reaſon, and to direct it in the way that leads to all truth. By ſuch means, the mind, as yet exempt from prejudice, may be put for ever on its guard againſt error; and the heart, as yet a ſtranger to the violent paſſions, may receive impreſſions of every virtue. But to whom doth it more properly belong, than to us and our fellow-labourers in the miniſtry, thus to watch over the early progreſs of Chriſtian youth; to furniſh

furniſh them with the ſpiritual milk of the word, ſo that they may grow in grace †; to prepare them betimes, by ſalutary exhortations, to be ſincere worſhippers of the true God, faithful ſubjects to their king, and men worthy to become the ſupport and ornament of their country?

Now the author of *Emilius*, my dear brethren, hath laid down a plan of education, which, ſo far from being conſiſtent with Chriſtianity, is not even calculated to form either good citizens or good men. Under the vain pretence of reſtoring man to himſelf, and educating his pupil agreeable to nature, he aſſumes as a maxim, an aſſertion contradictory not only to the doctrines of religion, but alſo to the experience of all ages and nations. "We lay it down, ſays he, as an "inconteſtable maxim, that the firſt emotions "of nature are always right; and that there is "no original perverſity in the human heart." How contradictory is this to the doctrines of the holy Scripture and the church, reſpecting the change made in our nature by the fall! In this maxim, we loſe ſight of that divine ray which diſcovers to us the myſtery of our own hearts. Yes, my dear brethren, we find within us a ſtriking mixture of greatneſs and meanneſs, of a paſſion for truth and a love of error, of an inclination to virtue and a tendency to vice: an aſtoniſhing contraſt, which, diſconcerting the pagan philoſophers, left them to blunder on in vain ſpeculations! A contraſt, of which revelation diſcloſes the ſource, in the deplorable diſobedience of our firſt parents! In conſequence of their defection it is, that man finds himſelf drawn by a fatal tendency to vice: and how is he

† 1 Pet. ii. 2.

he to reſiſt and ſtand againſt it, if his infancy be not conducted by preceptors replete with attention, virtue, and prudence; and if, during the whole courſe of his life, he doth not, under the protection and by the grace of God, make continual and forcible efforts againſt it? Alas! my dear brethren, in ſpite of the moſt careful and virtuous education, in ſpite of the moſt encouraging promiſes and dreadful menaces of religion, the failings of youth are ſtill too frequent, too numerous. Into what errors, into what exceſſes, do they not, when left alone, precipitate themſelves! The torrent breaks in upon them, in ſpite of the ſtrongeſt mounds that may be thrown up to oppoſe it: what would be the caſe, then, if no obſtacle were raiſed to break its efforts and divert its force?

The author of *Emilius*, who profeſſes to be of no religion, points out the way, nevertheleſs, without deſigning it, which leads infallibly to true religion. "How ſhall we, ſays he, who, on all occaſions, pretend to caſt off the yoke of authority; we who pay no regard to opinion; who would teach our pupil nothing but what he might have learnt himſelf in any country; in what religion ſhall we educate Emilius? To what ſect ſhall we unite the man of nature? The anſwer appears to me very ſimple: We ſhall unite him neither to one nor another; but place him in a proper ſituation, and qualify him to make choice of that which the beſt uſe of his reaſon may induce him to adopt."

Would to God, my dear brethren, this object had been attained! Had the author really qualified his pupil to make choice of that religion which the beſt uſe of his reaſon would have

have induced him to adopt, he would infallibly have prepared him for receiving the doctrines of Chriſtianity. For certain it is, my dear brethren, that the light of nature conducts to the light of the goſpel; and the duty of a Chriſtian is indeed a *reaſonable* ſervice †. In fact, if the beſt uſe of our reaſon does not lead us to the Chriſtian revelation, our faith is in vain, and our hope of none effect. But in what manner you may ſay, doth the beſt uſe of our reaſon, conduct us to the ineſtimable bleſſing of faith, and from thence to the precious aſſurance of ſalvation? It is to reaſon itſelf, that we may ſafely appeal. If we acknowledge a God, our great concern is next to know whether he hath condeſcended to ſpeak to mankind in another manner than by the works of nature. To determine this, we muſt examine if the evidence of the facts on which revelation is founded be not ſuperior to all the efforts of the moſt artful chicanery.

Infidelity hath often attempted to invalidate the evidence of theſe facts, and as often hath been convinced of its importance. God hath borne witneſs of himſelf in the holy Scriptures, and this teſtimony is moſt worthy of belief. What remains, therefore, for a man who makes the beſt uſe of his reaſon, but to acquieſce in this teſtimony? It is thy grace, O Lord, which completes this work of illumination; it is that which determines the will, which forms the heart of the Chriſtian; but it is the diſplay of its evidence, and the force of its motives, that previouſly employ and purify the underſtanding; and in this work, not leſs noble than indiſpenſable, conſiſts that beſt uſe of our reaſon, which the

† Rom. xii. 1.

the author of Emilius undertakes to ſpeak of, without having any fixed or certain idea concerning it.

In order that a youth ſhould poſſeſs the requiſite docility to receive his tutor's inſtructions, this author would have him be deſtitute of every principle of religion. His reaſon for which extraordinary document is this: "To know good from evil, and to be ſenſible of the duties of a man, is not the province of a child.—I ſhould as ſoon, adds he, require a child to be five feet high, as to have judgement at ten years of age." Doubtleſs, my dear brethren, the human underſtanding hath its progreſs, and is improved by degrees: but doth it thence follow, that a child at ten years of age ſhould not know the difference between good and evil; that he ſhould confound prudence with folly, good nature with cruelty, and virtue with vice? May he not be ſenſible, at that age, that obedience to his parents is a virtue, and diſobedience a vice? To aſſert he is not, my dear brethren, is to calumniate human nature, in ſuppoſing it capable of a degree of ſtupidity to which it is a ſtranger. "Every child who believes in God, ſays this author, is an idolater or an anthropomorphite." But, if it be an idolater, it muſt believe in many gods, and attribute the divine nature to inſenſible images. If it be only an anthropomorphite, it inveſts the true God with a corporeal form. Now we can ſuppoſe neither the one nor the other of a child who is educated a Chriſtian. Its education may poſſibly be deficient in this particular; but it is highly unjuſt to impute that to religion, which is only owing to the defects of inſtruction. Add to this, that it cannot be

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expected a boy of ten years of age ſhould be a philoſopher; hence, though he may be well taught, he may but ill explain himſelf: but, when we teach him that the Deity is of a different nature from objects of ſenſe; that, poſſeſſed of infinite intelligence, and ſupreme power, it executes whatever it pleaſes; we certainly give him ſuch a notion of God as is adapted to his underſtanding. It is not to be doubted that an atheiſt might eaſily perplex and confound ſuch a young believer with his artful ſophiſms: but not all his addreſs can make it appear, that, when a child ſo inſtructed believes in God, he is nothing more than an idolater or anthropomorphite; that is to ſay, that he believes only in the exiſtence of a chimera.

But this author, my dear brethren, goes ſtill farther, and denies that even a young man of fifteen is capacitated to believe in God. Man at that age, therefore, muſt be ſuppoſed not to know whether there is a God or not; it is in vain the works of nature diſplay the glory of their Creator, he underſtands not their expreſſive language. It muſt be ſuppoſed that he exiſts without knowing to whom he owes exiſtence; and that reaſon itſelf contributes to involve him in this ignorance and darkneſs. It is thus, my dear brethren, that blind impiety endeavours to darken, with the clouds of obſcurity, the torch which religion preſents to mankind in every period of human life. St Auguſtine reaſoned juſtly on other principles, when, in ſpeaking of his early years, he ſaid, "I fell, at that time, Lord, into the hands of thoſe who are careful to call on thy name; and comprehended by their diſcourſes concern-

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ing thee, and agreeable to the capacity of my tender years, that thou wert ſomething great; and that, although inviſible, and removed beyond the reach of our ſenſes, thou couldeſt hear our prayers and relieve us. Hence I began, from my very infancy, to addreſs thee by prayer, and to regard thee as my protector and my ſupport; the earlieſt employment of my tongue being to call on thy holy name *."

Let us go on, my dear brethren, to the farther unaccountable paradoxes of the author of Emilius. Let us ſee whether, after having reduced young perſons to ſuch a ſtate of profound ignorance with reſpect to the attributes of the Deity, he will admit them to know more of themſelves. Do they know whether they are poſſeſſed of a ſoul diſtinct from the body? Or do they look on themſelves as beings purely material and ſubject to the laws of mechaniſm? The author of Emilius doubts whether it be time to teach a pupil, even at eighteen years of age, that he hath a ſoul; pretending, that "if he learns it ſooner, he runs a riſk of never knowing it ſo long as he lives." But will he not admit, that youth may be ſenſible of their moral duties? No. If we believe our author, "There are none but phyſical objects that will intereſt children, particularly thoſe whoſe vanity is not yet excited, and that are not corrupted by the poiſon of prejudice."

Agreeable to theſe notions, he would have all the pains we take in the earlier part of education confined to what is material and terreſtrial in man. Exerciſe, ſays he, their bodies, their organs,

* Lib. I. Confeſſ. chap. ix.

gans, their natural forces; but keep the ſoul as inactive as poſſible.

This mental indolence and inactivity appears to him neceſſary, in order to diſpoſe the mind to receive thoſe errors he means to inculcate. But to think of inſtructing mankind in wiſdom, at a ſeaſon when their growing paſſions are moſt prevalent, is to inculcate it in a manner which the author himſelf explodes.

How oppoſite, my dear brethren, is ſuch a mode of education as this, to that which right reaſon and true religion unitedly dictate! Theſe require that a prudent and vigilant preceptor ſhould be on the watch, as it were, to diſcover in the pupil the firſt dawnings of intelligence, in order to captivate the underſtanding with the beauty of truth; and for the firſt emotions of the heart, in order to engage it by the charms of virtue. How much better is it, in fact, to prevent obſtacles, than to leave them to be ſurmounted? How much is it to be feared, if the impreſſions of vice ſhould precede the precepts of virtue, that men, when arrived at a certain age, will want both courage and will to reſiſt vicious allurements? Doth not happy experience daily demonſtrate, that perſons educated in virtuous principles, recovering from the irregularities of an ill-ſpent youth, return at laſt to the ſalutary practice of thoſe maxims they were taught in their childhood?

We need not however be ſurpriſed, my dear brethren, that this author defers ſo long the knowledge of the exiſtence of a Deity, when he doth not believe it neceſſary to ſalvation. "It is clear, (ſays he, in the character of an imaginary perſonage,) that a man may, under

ſome circumſtances, live to grow old without believing in God; and yet he would not, for that reaſon, be deprived of his preſence in the other world, if his unbelief was involuntary."

Obſerve, my dear brethren, the author does not mean here a perſon who is incapable of the uſe of reaſon, but merely one whoſe reaſon might have received no aſſiſtance from information. Now ſuch a pretence is abſurd, particularly on the ſyſtem of this writer, who affirms human reaſon to be abſolutely perfect. St Paul indeed aſſures us, that, among the Pagan philoſophers, many had, by the force of reaſon alone, arrived at the knowledge of the true God. "That which may be known of God, ſaith the apoſtle, is manifeſt in them; for God hath ſhewed it unto them. For the inviſible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly ſeen, being underſtood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead: ſo that they are without excuſe; becauſe that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their fooliſh heart was darkened. Profeſſing themſelves to be wiſe, they became fools †."

Now, if ſuch was the crime of theſe men, who, being ſubjected by the prejudices of their education to the worſhip of idols, yet did not fail to attain to the knowledge of the true God; how can thoſe, who have no ſuch obſtacles to ſurmount, be ſo innocent and blameleſs as to merit the enjoyment of the preſence of God in another life? how can they be excuſeable, (poſſeſſed of right reaſon as our author ſuppoſes,)

† Rom. i. 19.

poſes,) in having contemplated during this life the magnificent proſpect of the univerſe, and yet remain ignorant of its Creator, Preſerver, and Governor?

The ſame writer, my dear brethren, takes openly the ſide of ſcepticiſm with regard to creation and the unity of God. Thus he makes the ſame imaginary perſonage ſay, "I believe that the world is governed by a wiſe and powerful Will. I ſee it, or rather I feel it, and this is of importance for me to know: but is the world eternal, or is it created? Are things derived from one ſelf-ſufficient principle, or are there two or more? And what is their eſſence? Of all this I know nothing, nor do I ſee that it is of any conſequence I ſhould.—I give up all ſuch idle diſquiſitions, which ſerve only to make me diſcontented with myſelf, are uſeleſs in practice, and ſuperior to my underſtanding." What is it this daring author means to ſay? He believes the world to be governed by a wiſe and powerful Will; he confeſſes it is of importance to him to know this: and yet he knows not, he ſays, whether things are derived from one ſelf-exiſtent principle, or from many; and he pretends it is of little conſequence whether he doth or no. If there be really a wiſe and powerful Being who governs the world, is it conceivable that he ſhould not be the ſole principle or efficient cauſe of all things? And can it be more important to know one than the other? What a contradiction! He knows nothing of the nature of God; and yet preſently after he acknowledges this Supreme Being to be poſſeſſed of intelligence, power, will, and goodneſs; is not this to have an idea of the divine nature? The uni-

ty of God appears to him a futile and indeterminate queſtion; as if the notion of a multiplicity of gods were not the greateſt of all abſurdities. *The plurality of Gods*, ſays Tertullian very expreſſively, tends to the *nullity of God.* To admit a God, is to admit a ſupreme and independent Being, to which all other beings are ſubordinate. This writer inſinuates, therefore, that there are many gods.

It is not ſurpriſing, my dear brethren, that a man who gives into ſuch errors reſpecting the Deity, ſhould ſtand up to oppoſe the religion he hath revealed. According to this author, all revelations in general debaſe the Deity, in aſcribing to him human paſſions. "So far from giving us enlightened notions of the Supreme Being, their particular tenets, in my opinion, give us the moſt obſcure and confuſed ideas. To the inconceivable myſteries by which the Deity is hid from our view, they add the moſt abſurd contradictions."

We may, with much greater juſtice, my dear brethren, reproach this author with inconſiſtence and abſurdity. It is he who degrades the Deity, who confounds and debaſes our notions of that great Being, by directly diſputing his eſſence, and queſtioning his unity.

He is ſenſible that the truth of the Chriſtian revelation is proved by facts; but concerning the miracles conſtituting the principal evidence of that revelation, he cries out, "Who were witneſſes to theſe miracles?——Men——Always human teſtimony! It is always men that tell me what other men have told them. What a number of theſe are conſtantly between me and the Deity!" To juſtify this complaint, my dear bre-

brethren, we ought to be able to affirm that a revelation muſt be falſe when it is not made to every individual; we ought to be able to ſay, "God cannot require us to believe any thing he hath ſaid, unleſs he had particularly addreſſed himſelf to us." But are there not an infinite number of facts, even prior to that of the Chriſtian revelation, of which it would be abſurd to doubt? Now by what means do we acquire the knowledge of theſe facts but by human teſtimony? By what other means did our author himſelf become acquainted with Sparta, with Athens, and with Rome, on whoſe laws, manners, and heroes, he laviſhes ſuch extravagant encomiums? What a number of men there muſt have been between him and the events which relate to the origin and cataſtrophe of thoſe ancient republics! What a number of men between him and even the hiſtorians that have tranſmitted to us an account of thoſe events! The ſcepticiſm of our author, therefore, with regard to this particular, is evidently founded on nothing but his own infidelity.

"What if a man (ſays he, a little farther) ſhould come and harangue us in the following manner: *I come, ye mortals, to announce to you the will of the Moſt High; acknowledge in my voice that of him who ſent me. I command the ſun to move backwards, the ſtars to change their places, the mountains to diſappear, the waves to remain fixed on high, and the earth to wear a different aſpect.* Who would not, at the ſight of ſuch miracles, immediately attribute them to the Author of nature?" Who would not think, my dear brethren, that a writer who ſpeaks in this manner wanted only to be a witneſs to a

miracle, to become a Chriſtian? But hear what he ſays further: "The moſt important examination, after all, remains to be made into the doctrines delivered.——After proving the truth of the doctrine by the miracle, you are reduced to prove the truth of the miracle by that of the doctrine.——Now, what is to be done in this caſe? There is but one ſtep to be taken, To recur to reaſon, and leave miracles to themſelves: better indeed had it been never to have had recourſe to them." That is, my dear brethren, as much as to ſay, "Shew me a miracle, and I will believe; and yet, when you have ſhewn me a miracle, I will not believe." What inconſiſtence and abſurdity! But it is well known, that, in the affair of miracles, we do not admit that ſophiſtry with which the author of this treatiſe reproaches us.

When the doctrine is acknowledged to be didine, and to be founded on the truth of poſitive revelation, we make uſe of it, indeed, to judge of the miracles; that is, to reject the pretended prodigies which impoſtors may ſet up againſt ſuch doctrine. When the point in queſtion is an entire new doctrine, which is ſaid to be dictated by the Spirit of God, miracles are produced as proofs of it: that is to ſay, the perſon who aſſumes the character of a miſſionary from the Moſt High, confirms his miſſion and the doctrines he preaches by miracles, which are the teſtimony of God himſelf. Thus the doctrine and the miracles are made uſe of reſpectively, according to the different points of view in which they are placed, in the ſtudy or illuſtration of religion. But in this there is no abuſe of argument, ridiculous ſophiſtry, or abſurd

ſurd reaſoning in a circle, as hath been frequently demonſtrated by thoſe who have undertaken to obviate this trite objection. Nor is it probable that the author of Emilius ſhould be ignorant of theſe demonſtrations: but according to the plan he hath purſued, of throwing obſcurity on all revealed religion and ſupernatural operations, he maliciouſly imputes to us ſuch arguments as are diſgraceful to reaſon. Thus he repreſents us as enthuſiaſts, whom a falſe and blinded zeal urges on to prove two principles, one by the other, without any diverſity in the ſtate of the queſtion or method. Where, my good brethren, is that philoſophical candour, that ſincerity, of which this writer makes ſo great a boaſt?

Will it be believed, that, after having taken the greateſt pains to invalidate the human teſtimony of the Chriſtian revelation, the ſame author ſhould pay it the moſt ſolemn and poſitive deference imaginable? To convince you, however, of his ſtrange inconſiſtence, and at the ſame time to ſerve for your edification, my dear brethren, I ſhall cite the paſſages wherein he hath done this in the plaineſt terms. "I will confeſs to you, ſays he, that the majeſty of the ſcriptures ſtrikes me with admiration, as the purity of the goſpel hath its influence on my heart. Peruſe the works of our philoſophers with all their pomp of diction; how mean, how contemptible are they, compared with the ſcriptures! Is it poſſible that a book, at once ſo ſimple and ſublime, ſhould be merely the work of man? Is it poſſible that the ſacred Perſonage, whoſe hiſtory it contains, ſhould be himſelf a mere man? Do we find that he aſſumed the tone

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of an enthuſiaſt or ambitious ſectary? What ſweetneſs, what purity in his manners! What an affecting gracefulneſs in his delivery! What ſublimity in his maxims! What profound wiſdom in his diſcourſes! What preſence of mind, what ſubtilty, what truth in his replies! How great the command over his paſſions! Where is the man, where is the philoſopher, who could ſo live and ſo die, without weakneſs and without oſtentation?——Yes, if the life and death of Socrates are thoſe of a ſage, the life and death of Jeſus are thoſe of a God. Shall we ſuppoſe the evangelic hiſtory a mere fiction? Indeed, my friend, it bears not the marks of fiction; on the contrary, the hiſtory of Socrates, which no body preſumes to doubt, is not ſo well atteſted as that of Jeſus Chriſt.——It is more inconceivable that a number of perſons ſhould agree to write ſuch a hiſtory, than that one only ſhould furniſh the ſubject of it. The Jewiſh authors were incapable of the diction, and ſtrangers to the morality contained in the goſpel; the marks of whoſe truth are ſo ſtriking and inimitable, that the inventor would be a more ſurpriſing character than the hero of it."

It would be difficult, my dear brethren, to expreſs a more explicit homage to the authenticity of the Goſpel: And yet the author acknowledges it only in conſequence of human teſtimony. It is always men that report what other men have reported. What a number of men between God and him! Nothing can be more evident than that the writer here contradicts himſelf, and is confuted on his own principle. How ſtrangely infatuated therefore is this author, to add, "And yet, with all this,

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the ſame Goſpel abounds with incredible relations, with circumſtances repugnant to reaſon, and which it is impoſſible for a man of ſenſe either to conceive or admit. What is to be done amidſt all theſe contradictions? Be modeſt and circumſpect: regard in ſilence what cannot be either diſproved or comprehended; and humble thyſelf before the Supreme Being, who only knows the truth. Such is the involuntary ſcepticiſm in which I remain." But can this ſcepticiſm, my dear brethren, be indeed involuntary, when he refuſes to admit the doctrines of a book, which, by his own confeſſion, cannot be the work of man! when this book bears the marks of truth, ſo ſtriking, ſo great, and ſo inimitable, that the inventor would be more aſtoniſhing than the hero of it? Surely we may here ſafely ſay, that iniquity hath belied itſelf.

It appears, my dear brethren, that this author hath rejected revelation, only to adopt natural religion. "What God requires us to do, ſays he, he doth not tell us from the mouths of others; but inſcribes it in the bottom of our hearts." But hath not God written in our hearts the obligation of believing in him, when we are convinced that it is he who hath ſpoken? Now what certitude have we not that the Scriptures are the word of God? The actions of Socrates, of which no one hath the leaſt doubt, are, by the confeſſion of this author himſelf, not ſo well atteſted as thoſe of Jeſus Chriſt. Natural religion, therefore, itſelf, directs us to receive that which is revealed. But it is not certain that this author really admits of natural religion; at leaſt he doth not acknowledge its neceſſity. No, my dear brethren: "If I am miſtaken, ſays he,

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it is without deſign. This is ſufficient to prevent my errors from being imputed to me as a crime. And though you ſhould be miſtaken in the ſame manner, it is of very little conſequence." That is to ſay, it is ſufficient, according to this writer, to be perſuaded you are in poſſeſſion of the truth, in order that ſuch perſuaſion, though attended with the moſt monſtrous errors, ſhould not be a ſubject of reproach; and that every man, who profeſſes himſelf to be ſincere and ingenuous, ſhould be accounted religious and wiſe, though adopting even the horrid doctrines of atheiſm. Is not this to throw open the door to all the modes of ſuperſtitution, fanatical ſyſtems, and chimerical notions of the human mind? is not this a maxim that would countenance as many different religions and modes of worſhip as there are different people in the world? Alas! my dear brethren, be not deceived in this particular. Sincerity is no farther to be eſteemed than as it is docile or enlightened. We are commanded to ſtudy our religion, and to believe its doctrines in ſincerity and truth. We have, for our warrant, the authority of the church; let us learn to know it, and to repoſe ourſelves ſafely therein. We may then place confidence in our ſincerity, and ſpend our lives in peaceful expectation of that moment which ſhall open to us the light of eternity.

A further inſtance, my dear brethren, of the flagrant inſincerity of the unbeliever we are refuting, is the manner in which he ſuppoſes the Catholic and the Chriſtian to reaſon on matters of religion. What futile and ridiculous arguments doth he put into the mouths, both of the one and the other, in order to render them contempt-

temptible! He hath written an imaginary dialogue between a Chriſtian whom he ſuppoſes inſpired, and an infidel whom he ſtyles a rationaliſt. Hear what they are made to ſay. The former begins. "Your reaſon tells you that the whole is greater than a part; but I tell you, from God, that a part is greater than the whole." To which the latter replies: "And who are you that dare to tell me that God contradicts himſelf? In whom ſhall I rather believe? in him who inſtructs me, by means of reaſon, in the knowledge of eternal truths; or in you who would impoſe on me, in his name, the greateſt abſurdity?"

But with what aſſurance, my dear brethren, doth this writer impute ſuch arguments to Chriſtians? The God of reaſon, we affirm to be the God of revelation alſo. Reaſon and revelation are the two organs by which he hath been pleaſed to make himſelf known to mankind, either by way of teaching them the truth, or inſtructing them in the knowledge of his will. Should one of theſe organs contradict the other, it is certain that God would contradict himſelf. But can God be ſaid to contradict himſelf, becauſe he commands us to believe incomprehenſible truths? You tell us, ye impious infidels, that the tenets, which we look upon to be revealed, contradict eternal truths: but it is not ſufficient for you merely to aſſert this; and could you have proved it, you would have done it long ago, and triumphed in the victory. The inſincerity of the author of *Emilius*, is not leſs reprehenſible in the language of his pretended catholic. "We catholics, ſays he, make a great noiſe about the authority of the church: but what

what do we gain by it, if it requires as many proofs to eſtabliſh this authority, as other ſects require immediately to eſtabliſh their doctrines? The church determines that the church has a right to determine. Is not this a ſpecial proof of its authority?" Who would not think, my dear brethren, from the pretences of this impoſtor, that the authority of the church is to be proved only by its own deciſions; and that it proceeds arbitrarily thus, "I determine that I am infallible; therefore, I am infallible." A ſcandalous imputation, my dear brethren! The grounds of Chriſtianity, the ſpirit of the goſpel, and even the errors and weakneſs of the human underſtanding, all ſerve to demonſtrate that the church eſtabliſhed by Jeſus Chriſt is an infallible church. We are aſſured, that, as the divine Legiſlator always inſtructed mankind in the ways of truth, the church of Chriſt will ever do the ſame. We prove the authority of the church therefore, not from that authority itſelf, but from that of Jeſus Chriſt; a method of reaſoning not leſs exact than that which he reproaches us with is ſenſeleſs and ridiculous.

It is not only in our times, my dear brethren, that the ſpirit of irreligion hath been a ſpirit of independence and revolt. And, in fact, how is it to be expected that men, ſo daring as to refuſe to ſubmit to the authority of God himſelf, ſhould reſpect that of kings, who are repreſentatives of God; or that of magiſtrates, who are the repreſentatives of kings? "Mankind, ſays the author of Emilius to his pupil, is eſſentially made up of the common people; ſo that, were there not a king left upon the face of the earth, they would not be miſſed, and things would go on

on juſt as well without them.—The many (ſays he a little farther) will be always ſacrificed to the few, and public intereſt to that of particulars. The ſpecious names of juſtice and moderation will be made the inſtruments of violence and the weapons of iniquity. Hence it follows, (continues he) that thoſe diſtinguiſhed orders of men, which pretend to be uſeful to the reſt, are in reality, at the expence of the reſt, uſeful only to themſelves: and hence may be determined in what conſideration they ought to be held, according to the rules of right reaſon and juſtice." Thus, my dear brethren, doth impiety preſume to queſtion the intentions of Him *by whom kings reign*; thus doth it take delight in corrupting the ſources of public felicity, and in propagating thoſe maxims which tend to confuſion and anarchy, with all their dreadful conſequences! But what doth religion teach us in this caſe? "Fear God, honour the king *——Let every ſoul be ſubject unto the higher powers; for there is no power but of God; the powers that be, are ordained of God. Whoſoever therefore reſiſteth the power, reſiſteth the ordinance of God: and they that reſiſt, ſhall receive to themſelves damnation *."

Yes, my dear brethren, in every thing relative to civil objects, you ought to be as obedient to your prince, and to thoſe who are deputed to exerciſe his authority, as unto God himſelf. Your duty to that ſupreme Being alone ſhould ſet bounds to your ſubmiſſion; and if then you ſhould be deemed culpable, and ſuffer for your obedience to his great commands, you ſhould

* 1 Peter ii. 17. * Rom. xiii. 1, 2.

ſubmit without murmur or complaint. Even Nero and Domitian themſelves, who choſe rather to be a ſcourge to the earth than the fathers of their people, were accountable only to God for the abuſe of that power he put into their hands.

" Chriſtians (ſays St *Auguſtine*) are obedient to their temporal lord, for the ſake of their eternal one."

We have taken notice, my dear brethren, but of a few of the many impieties contained in this treatiſe of *Education*; a work equally meriting the anathemas of the church, and the ſeverity of the laws: and what more can be neceſſary to inſpire you with horror againſt it? Miſerable would it be for you, and unhappy for ſociety, if your children were educated in the principles of this author. As nothing but religion hath taught us to know the nature of man, his greatneſs, his miſery, and future deſtiny, it belongs only to that religion to form the underſtanding of youth, to improve their manners, and to procure for them laſting happineſs both in this life and that which is to come. We are not inſenſible, my dear brethren, how laborious and difficult a taſk is the work of a truly Chriſtian education; nor that a very conſiderable ſhare of prudence and knowledge is neceſſary to diſcharge it. What an admirable mixture of good nature and reſolution it requires! What prudence, to adapt ourſelves to all conditions, ages, diſpoſitions and characters, without departing from our duty! what zeal, what patience, to nouriſh in young and tender minds the precious ſeeds of innocence and virtue; to root up, as far as poſſible, thoſe vicious inclinations,

tions, which are the ſad effects of our original depravity; and, in a word, to teach them, according to St *Paul*, to "live ſoberly, righteouſly, and godly in this preſent world; looking for that bleſſed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God, and our Saviour Jeſus Chriſt *!" We ſay therefore unto all thoſe who are charged with ſo important and honourable a function as the education of youth, Plant ye and water, in the firm hope that the Lord, aſſiſting your endeavours, will give an increaſe: "Be inſtant in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon," according to the directions of the ſame apoſtle; "reprove, rebuke, exhort, with all long-ſuffering and doctrine †." Above all, be careful to unite inſtruction with example: inſtruction without example is a diſgrace to the inſtructor, and a ſubject for ſcandal to him who is inſtructed. Let the pious and charitable Tobit be your model; "carefully inſtruct your children, in doing the works of juſtice, in giving alms, in calling to mind the Lord, and in praiſing him at all times in ſincerity and with all their might;" and your poſterity, like that of this holy patriach, will be loved of God and of man.

But at what time ought the education of children to commence? At the firſt dawn of intelligence: and this dawn is ſometimes premature. "Train up a child in the way he ſhould go, (ſaith the wiſe man;) and when he is old, he will not depart from it ‡." Such is in fact the ordinary courſe of human life: even in the midſt of licentiouſneſs, and during the empire of the paſſions, the principles of a Chriſtian

* Titus ii. 12. † 2 Tim. iv. 2. ‡ Prov. xxii. 6.

education afford a light which occaſionally diſcovers to the ſinner the horror of that abyſs into which he is plunged, and diſplays the means of his eſcape. How many are there, I ſay again, who, after having ſpent their youth in vice and libertiniſm, are brought back by this light into the paths of virtue; and, purſuing, though late, the principles of religion and humanity, become an honour to themſelves and to their country!

It remains, my dear brethren, that, in the cloſe of this exhortation, I conjure you by the mercy of God, to attach yourſelves inviolably to that holy religion in which you have had the happineſs to be educated; to defend yourſelves againſt the approach of an abſurd philoſophy, which hath nothing leſs in view than to rob you of the inheritance of Jeſus Chriſt, to render his promiſes void, and to ſet him on a footing with the founders of thoſe religions whoſe frivolous or pernicious doctrines have proved their impoſture. The Chriſtian faith is deſpiſed, rejected, and inſulted, only by thoſe who are ignorant of it, or on whoſe irregularities it is too great a reſtraint. But the gates of hell ſhall never prevail againſt it. The Chriſtian and catholic church is the commencement of the eternal kingdom of Jeſus Chriſt: "Nothing is ſtronger (ſays St *John Demaſcene*) than the church; it is a rock which the waves beat againſt in vain; it is a mountain which nothing can ſhake."

For the foregoing cauſes, reſpecting the new treatiſe on education, entitled *Emilius*, &c. by *J. J. Rouſſeau, citizen of Geneva;* after conſulting with divers perſons diſtinguiſhed for their learning and piety, and calling upon the name

of

of the Lord, we condemn the ſaid book, as containing abominable doctrines, calculated to invalidate the principles of natural juſtice, and to ſubvert the foundations of the Chriſtian religion: as inculcating maxims contrary to the morality of the goſpel; tending to diſturb the peace of ſociety, and to excite ſubjects to revolt againſt the authority of their lawful ſovereigns: as containing a great number of propoſitions ſeverally falſe, ſcandalous, full of rancour againſt the church and its miniſters, derogatory from the reſpect due to the holy ſcriptures and the traditions of the church, erroneous, impious, blaſphemous and heretical. We therefore expreſly forbid the inhabitants of our dioceſe to read or keep the ſaid book, under the ſevereſt penalty of the law. We alſo direct that this our Mandate be read in all the parochial churches of the city, ſuburbs, and dioceſe of *Paris*; and alſo to be publiſhed and affixed wherever it may be judged needful. Given at our Archiepiſcopal palace in *Paris*. Aug. 20. 1762.

Signed, CHRISTOPHER Archbiſhop of *Paris*,

By M. DE LA TOUCHE.

AN

Expoſtulatory Letter

TO

CHRISTOPHER DE BEAUMONT, Archbiſhop of *Paris*.

WHEREFORE, my Lord, ſhould there be any altercation between you and me? what language can we ſpeak, or how ſhall we underſtand each other, when there is hardly any thing in common between us?

I am compelled, nevertheleſs, to make you a reply; you yourſelf have compelled me to it. Had you only attacked my book, your cenſures might have paſſed unanſwered: but you have attacked my perſonal character; and by ſo much the greater ſanction your authority bears in the eye of the public, the leſs it becomes me to be ſilent when I am the object of your defamation. But before I proceed to my defence, I cannot forbear reflecting a little on the peculiarity of my deſtiny: peculiar indeed to myſelf alone. I was born with ſome ſhare of natural genius; the public have authoriſed me to make this boaſt. I ſpent my youth, nevertheleſs, in a happy obſcurity, out of which I never attempted to emerge. Had I made ſuch an attempt, indeed, it would have been as great a peculiarity, that, during

during the vivacity of youth, I ſhould not have ſucceeded, as that I ſhould ſucceed too well in the ſequel, when that vivacity began to decay. In this obſcurity, my Lord, inſtead of a fortune I always deſpiſed, and a name I have ſince bought too dear, I poſſeſſed the only bleſſings my heart was deſirous of, thoſe of tranquillity and friendſhip. Thus, eaſy in my mind, and happy in my friends, I drew near my fortieth year; when, unluckily, an academical queſtion engaged my attention, and drew me into a profeſſion for which nature never intended me. The unexpected ſucceſs of my firſt eſſay proved ſeductive. A numerous party of opponents ſtarted up againſt me, and, without underſtanding my arguments, anſwered them with a petulance that piqued me, and a degree of vanity that perhaps excited mine. I ſtood up, of courſe, in my own defence; and, being urged from one diſpute to another, found myſelf engaged in a career of controverſy almoſt before I was aware. Thus I became an author at a time of life when authors uſually throw up their profeſſion, and a man of letters even from my contempt for that character. From this time I have been a writer of ſome little conſequence with the public: but from this time, alas! my friends and my repoſe have left me. My labour was all I got for my pains; and a little reputation was to make up for every thing elſe. If this be an indemnification to thoſe who are ever abſent from themſelves, it never was any to me.

Had I placed even for a moment any hopes on ſo frivolous a gratification, I ſhould have been ſoon undeceived. In what a fluctuation hath the public opinion conſtantly been with

regard

regard to my abilities and character! Being at a diſtance, I was judged of only by intereſt or caprice, and for hardly two days together was ever looked upon in the ſame light. Sometimes I was a dark and gloomy being, at others an angel of light. I have ſeen myſelf, within the ſpace of a year, applauded, courted, entertained, and requeſted even at court; and again ſpeedily after, inſulted, threatened, hated, and condemned. Over night, aſſaſſins lay in wait for me in the ſtreets; and in the morning, I was threatened with a lettre-de-cachet. The good and the evil came from almoſt the ſame ſource; and both of them were the effect of a mere ſong.

I have written, it is true, on ſeveral ſubjects, but always on the ſame principles; I had conſtantly the ſame ſyſtem of morals, the ſame faith, the ſame maxims, and, if you will, the ſame opinions. Very different, however, have been the opinions that have been paſſed on my books, or rather on the author of my books; becauſe I have been judged rather from the ſubjects I treated of, than from my ſentiments on thoſe ſubjects. After the publication of my firſt diſcourſe*, I was ſaid to be a writer fond of paradoxes, who amuſed himſelf in proving things he did not believe. After my Letter on the French Muſic, I was called a profeſſed enemy to that nation, and was very near being treated as a conſpirator and traitor: one would have thought, by the zeal ſhewn on that occaſion, that the fate of the French monarchy depended on the reputation of their opera. After my diſcourſe on the Inequality of Mankind, I was deemed

* In anſwer to the queſtion, Whether the cultivation of the arts and ſciences had contributed to the purity of manners?

deemed an atheiſt and miſanthrope: after my Letter to Mr d'Alembert on the theatres, I was celebrated as the defender of Chriſtian morals: after Eloiſa, I was ſuppoſed to be paſſionate and tender: at preſent, I am a monſter of impiety, and ſhall probably by and by be a miracle of devotion.

Thus fluctuating is the public opinion concerning me; thoſe who adopt it being as ignorant why they deteſt me now, as why they once reſpected me. As to myſelf, however, I have always remained the ſame; more zealous, perhaps, than enlightened in my reſearches, but ſincere in all, even againſt myſelf; ſimple and well-meaning, but ſuſceptible and weak; often doing wrong, yet always reſpecting what was right; connected by friendſhip, never by circumſtances, and ever more ſtrongly influenced by ſentiment than intereſt; requiring nothing from others; unwilling to render myſelf dependent on any; ſubmitting to their prejudices as little as to their will, and preſerving my own as free as my reaſon; fearing God, without being afraid of the devil; reaſoning on matters of religion, without licentiouſneſs; approving neither impiety nor fanaticiſm, but hating perſecutors ſtill worſe than infidels; without diſguiſing my ſentiments from any one, without affectation, without artifice, without deceit; telling my faults to my friends, my ſentiments to all the world, and to the public thoſe truths which concern it, without flattery and without pride; equally careleſs whether I ſhould pleaſe or offend it. Such are my crimes, and ſuch are my merits.

At length, totally diſguſted with that intoxicating vapour of reputation, which inflates without

without ſatisfying; wearied with importunities of indolent viſitors, who, over-burdened with their own time, were prodigal of mine; and ſighing after the neceſſary repoſe my heart is ſo fond of, I had joyfully laid down my pen. Satisfied with the reflection that I had never taken it up but for the good of my fellow-creatures, I required only, as the reward of my zeal, that I might be permitted to live unmoleſted in my retreat, and to die in peace. In this, however, I was miſtaken: the officers were ſent to apprehend me, and juſt at the moment that I flattered myſelf the troubles of my life were at an end, my greateſt misfortunes began. There is ſomething very particular in all this; yet this is nothing.

A citizen of Geneva gets a book printed in Holland; and by an arret of the Parliament of Paris, this book is burnt by the common hangman, without any reſpect ſhewn to the ſovereign whoſe privilege it had obtained. A Proteſtant propoſes, in a Proteſtant country, certain objections againſt the Church of Rome; and he is condemned by the parliament of Paris. A republican makes objections, in a republican ſtate, againſt monarchy; and he is condemned by the parliament of Paris. The parliament of Paris muſt ſurely have ſtrange notions of their juriſdiction, to ſuppoſe it extends over the whole human race.

The ſame parliament, ever ſo remarkably circumſpect in their proceedings when individuals of their own nation are concerned, break thro' all order in paſſing ſentence on a poor foreigner. Without knowing whether he was really the author of the book imputed to him, whether he acknow-

acknowledged it, or cauſed it to be printed; without any regard to the unhappineſs of his ſituation, or pity for his bodily infirmities, they began their proceſs by ordering him to be clapped up in priſon. Thus they would have had him taken out of his bed, and dragged from his houſe, to be thrown among infamous criminals to rot in a jail. Nay, who knows but they might have burnt him at the ſtake, without ſuffering him to ſpeak in his defence! for what reaſon is there to think they would have proceeded more regularly afterwards than at firſt, in a proſecution ſo violently commenced, as to be almoſt without example, even in the countries of the inquiſition! Thus it is, in my caſe alone, that this ſagacious tribunal forgets its prudential maxims: it is againſt me only, that a people, who boaſt ſo much of their humanity, and by whom I thought myſelf beloved, act with the ſtrangeſt barbarity: it is thus, the country I preferred as an aſylum above all others, juſtifies my giving it that preference! I know not how far ſuch proceedings may be conſiſtent with the laws of nations; but I know very well, that where they are carried on, a man's liberty, and perhaps his life, lies at the mercy of the firſt printer who chuſes to ſet his name to a book.

A citizen of Geneva owes no reſpect to ſuch unjuſt magiſtrates, who order perſons to be apprehended and committed to priſon, on the firſt ſcandalous information given them, without citing the accuſed to appear and anſwer for himſelf. Now, not having been cited to appear, he is not obliged to do it. But, being thus attacked by force and violence, he is juſtified in flying from perſecution. He ſhakes the duſt off his

feet,

feet, therefore, and leaves an inhoſpitable country, where the ſtrong are ſo ready to oppreſs the weak, and to load the ſtranger with chains, without hearing his defence; without knowing whether the act he is accuſed of be criminal; or being ſo, whether he hath indeed committed it. He abandons with regret the pleaſing ſolitude he had choſen, leaving all his poſſeſſions, his few, but valuable friends, behind. Weak and infirm as he is, he is obliged to undergo the fatigues of a long journey; hoping at the end of it to breathe freely in a land of liberty. He repairs to his own country, flattering himſelf his reception there will conſole him for his paſt diſgrace—But what am I going to ſay? My heart ſinks, my hand trembles, and my pen falls to the ground: I will be ſilent, nor be guilty of expoſing my country.

And wherefore am I thus treated? I do not aſk for what reaſon, but on what pretence? The magiſtrates have been raſh enough to judge me guilty of impiety, without reflecting that the book containing the pretended inſtances of it is in every body's hands. What would they not give effectually to ſuppreſs that authentic teſtimony in my favour; that they might then be able more boldly to ſay it contains what they pretend to have found there! But this proof of my innocence will remain in ſpite of all their efforts to ſuppreſs it; and poſterity will be amazed, in looking therein for the enormous crimes imputed to the author, to find only the errors and miſtakes of a ſincere friend to virtue.

I ſhall avoid ſpeaking of my contemporaries, becauſe I would be hurtful to none. But the Atheiſt Spinoza was peaceably ſuffered to teach

his

his doctrines to the world; he met with no oppoſition in printing or ſelling his works. He came to France, and was well received there; all the ſtates of Europe were ready to afford him countenance, or at leaſt protection. He was offered profeſſorſhips by ſome princes, and particularly honoured by others; living and dying peacefully, and even reſpected. And yet, in an age ſo much celebrated as the preſent for philoſophy, reaſon, and humanity, a defender of the cauſe of truth is proſcribed and purſued from ſtate to ſtate, from aſylum to aſylum, without the leaſt regard for his indigence, or pity for his infirmities; and all for having propoſed, with great circumſpection, and even with great reſpect and tenderneſs for mankind, ſome doubts founded on the honour of the ſupreme Being. For this he is hunted through the world, with a bitterneſs of perſecution the vileſt malefactor never experienced, and which would be even cruel to exert againſt a man poſſeſſed of health and ſtrength to ſupport him under it. Prohibited the uſe of the common elements of fire and water in almoſt every part of Europe, he is driven from his very retreat in the woods; and is only ſafe in the fortitude of an illuſtrious protector, and the goodneſs of an enlightened prince; all which became neceſſary to enſure him an aſylum in the midſt of the mountains. Inſtead of ſafety thus procured, he had, in all probability, ſpent the remainder of his miſerable life in chains, or periſhed beneath the torture, had he been found during the firſt phrenzy which ſeized on governments, at the mercy of his inhuman perſecutors.

Eſcaped from the hangman, he fell next into

the hands of the prieſts: not that I ſhall mention any ill treatment, as ſurpriſing, he might meet with from them: but ſurely it is ſomething wonderful, that a man of virtue, whoſe mind is as noble as his birth, an illuſtrious archbiſhop, who ought to ſuppreſs their baſeneſs, ſhould authoriſe it! Yet ſo it is; this Catholic prelate iſſues out a mandate againſt a Proteſtant author; he mounts his tribunal to examine into the particular doctrines of an heretic; and although he condemns indiſcrimnately every one that is not of his church, yet he refuſes to permit the accuſed to err his own way, but preſcribes in a manner the path in which he muſt deſcend to hell. No ſooner have the inferior clergy received his ſanction, but they fly with virulence on the enemy whom they imagine to be levelled with the ground, and to lie at their mercy. There is not the meaneſt vicar or ignorant curate of a country pariſh, who doth not take a pride in inſulting the devoted author, whom the ſenate and their biſhop have united to cruſh.

Thus, my Lord, have I diſplayed the unhappy circumſtances peculiar to my ſituation, of which there is no precedent. Nor is this all. The preſent is perhaps one of the moſt difficult paſſages of my life; one of thoſe in which revenge and ſelf-love are the moſt eaſily ſatisfied, and leaſt permit a man of integrity to be moderate. Ten lines more, and I cover my perſecutors with eternal ridicule. Oh that the public did but know two anecdotes, without my being at the trouble of telling them! oh that they did but know who were the perſons that meditated my ruin, and what ſteps they have taken to effect it! They would ſee by what con-

contemptible inſects, by what dark means, the powers of government are ſometimes moved: they would ſee by what ſour leaven the parliament was put into a ferment. They would ſee from what a ridiculous cauſe the ſeveral ſtates of Europe united in league together againſt the ſon of a watchmaker! How greatly ſhould I enjoy their ſurpriſe, were I not myſelf ſo nearly concerned in it!

Hitherto my pen, though bold in relating the truth, hath always kept itſelf free from ſatire; it hath always reſpected the character of others in defending my own. Shall I now, therefore, when I am going to lay it aſide, dip it into calumny, or copy the ſtyle of my enemies? No; be theirs all the advantage of ſtabbing men in the dark. For my part, I would only defend myſelf openly, and would do nothing more than act in my own defence. To this end, what the public already know, is ſufficient; or at leaſt what they may know without my giving any one offence.

A ſurpriſing thing of this kind, and what I may ſafely ſay, is to ſee the intrepid Chriſtopher de Beaumont, whom no power could reduce to make peace with the Janſeniſts, become, without knowing it, the dupe of their animoſity: to ſee their moſt irreconcileable enemy raging againſt me, becauſe I would not be of their party; becauſe I would not write againſt the Jeſuits, whom I do not love, though I have no cauſe of complaint againſt them, and think them ill treated. If your Lordſhip pleaſes to caſt your eye over the ſixth volume of the New Eloiſa, you will there diſcover, in a note, page 138, the true ſource of my misfortunes. I have pro-

phesied in that note, (for I intermeddle also sometimes with prophesying,) that as soon as the Jansenists should gain the superiority, they would be more persecuting and severe than their enemies. I did not then know, however, that my prediction would be verified on myself. The thread of this clue would not be difficult for those to unravel who know how my book hath been treated. I cannot say more on this head without saying too much; but I may at least inform you, what sort of people you have been influenced by without suspecting it.

Will it be believed that you would have attacked my book had it not been first censured by the parliament? Some people may believe it, or at least say it; but you, whose conscience will not permit of deceit, will not say so. My Discourse on the Inequality of Mankind was generally read throughout your diocese, and yet you published no mandate against it. My Letter to M. de Alembert was as general, and yet you published no mandate against it. The New Eloisa was universal, and yet your Lordship issued no mandate. All these books, however, which you must have read, since you judge of them, contain the same maxims, and display, without disguise, the same modes of thanking.

If the subject of them did not admit of their being so fully explained, they gained in force what they lost in extent, and express the author's profession of faith with less reserve than that of the Savoyard curate. Wherefore, my Lord, did you not exert yourself on these occasions? Was your flock then less dear to you? did they read my books less? did they dislike my writings more? were they less exposed to error?

error? No—But the Jeſuits were not then laid under proſcription. I had not then fallen into the ſnares my enemies have ſince laid for me. That fatal note was not then known: and when it was known, the public had already paſſed their judgment of approbation on the book. It was too late to think of raiſing their reſentment on that ſcore for the preſent; it was thought proper to defer it to a more convenient opportunity. The occaſion was attentively watched for, and eagerly ſeized, with all that fury which is common to partial zealots; nothing now was talked of but impriſonment and tortures. My book was ſaid to be the ſignal for anarchy, and the trumpet of atheiſm; the author was ſtigmatiſed as a monſter of iniquity, and it was thought amazing that he had been ſo long permitted to live.

Amidſt this univerſal clamour, your Lordſhip would have been aſhamed to be ſilent; you choſe therefore rather to commit an act of cruelty, than to be accuſed of wanting zeal. You choſe rather to ſerve your enemies, than to bear the inſult of their reproaches. Such, my Lord, you muſt own, was the true motive of your mandate; and ſuch are the facts whoſe concurrence may, in my opinion, be very juſtly denominated ſingular.

Juſtice, I know, hath long given place to the maxims and formalities of ſtate. I am not inſenſible, that, in ſome circumſtances, a man inveſted with a public character is unhappily compelled againſt his will to act againſt honeſt men. To be moderate among zealots, is to expoſe one's ſelf to their fury; and I can eaſily conceive, that, in ſuch a combination as that

to

to which I have fallen a victim, it is neceſſary to join the cry and hunt with the wolves, or run the riſk of being devoured by them. I do not complain therefore that your Lordſhip has iſſued a mandate againſt my book; but I complain that you have done it againſt myſelf, and that with as little candour as truth. I complain, that, authoriſing by your own language that which you reproach me for having put into the mouth of a dogmatiſt, you load me with calumnies which, without hurting my cauſe, attack my honour, or rather your's. I complain that you have wantonly, without reaſon, without neceſſity, and without regard to my misfortunes, abuſed me in a manner the moſt unworthy your own character. And after all, my Lord, what is it I have done? I, who have always ſpoken of you with ſo much eſteem; I, who have ſo often admired your unſhaken fortitude, tho' lamenting, it is true, the uſe which your prejudices induced you to make of it; I, who have always reſpected, and ſtill reſpect, your virtues, even though you have ſo groſsly injured me.

But thus it is that people extricate themſelves from difficulties, when they are determined to find fault, and are themſelves in the wrong. As you could not anſwer my objections, you have imputed them to me as crimes; you imagined you ſhould make me deſpicable, by ill-treating me; but you have been miſtaken. On the contrary, without invalidating my arguments, you have made every humane and generous mind take part in my ſufferings; you have given occaſion for every perſon of ſenſe to reflect, that a man who judged ſo ill of the author, was ſtill leſs qualified to judge well of his book.

You

You have ſhewn yourſelf, my Lord, neither humane nor generous; and yet you might have been ſo, without omitting any of the arguments you have made uſe of againſt my book: nay, I will take upon me to ſay, they would in that caſe have had much more weight. I muſt acknowledge, alſo, that I have no right to require thoſe virtues of you, nor to expect any thing like them from an eccleſiaſtic. We ſhall inquire however, if you have at leaſt been equitable and juſt; for this is a duty impoſed on all mankind, nor are the ſaints themſelves excuſed in the breach of it.

Your Lordſhip's mandate hath two points in view; the one is to cenſure my book, and the other to abuſe my perſon. I ſhall think I have made a ſufficient reply to it, therefore, if I prove, that, wherever you have endeavoured to refute me, you have reaſoned falſely; and that where you have inſulted me, you have been guilty of calumny. But when we prove our aſſertions as we go on, and are compelled by the importance of the ſubject and the quality of our adverſary to proceed ſedately, and to follow him ſtep by ſtep through all his cenſures, every word almoſt requires a page; thus while a ſhort ſatire is amuſing to the reader, a long defence becomes irkſome and tedious. Notwithſtanding this inconvenience, however, I muſt make a defence, or ſit down contented under your falſeſt imputations. I am reſolved, therefore, to defend myſelf; but ſhall rather defend my honour than my book. It is not the creed of the Savoyard curate that I examine, but the mandate of the archbiſhop of Paris; the ſcandal thrown on the editor only obliging him to

ſpeak

ſpeak of the work itſelf. I will endeavour to do myſelf juſtice, becauſe it is my duty; I owe it to my own character. At the ſame time, however, I am very ſenſible how diſagreeable a circumſtance it is to contend with ſuch a powerful adverſary, and that the mere juſtification of the innocent can afford but very dull entertainment to the reader.

The fundamental principle of all morality, that on which I have reaſoned in all my writings, and which I explained in the laſt with all the perſpicuity I was maſter of, is this: That man is naturally good; that he loves juſtice and order; that there is no original perverſity in the human heart, and that the firſt emotions of nature are always right. I have ſhown, that the only paſſion which is born with man, to wit, ſelf-love, is in itſelf indifferent either to good or evil; that it becomes good or evil only by accident, and according to the circumſtances in which it is diſplayed. I have ſhewn that none of the vices imputed to the human heart are natural to it: I have deſcribed the manner in which they ariſe; have traced, as it were, their genealogy; and ſhewn the manner in which, by a ſucceſſive deviation from their original goodneſs, mankind are become what they are.

I have explained farther what I underſtand by this original goodneſs, which does not ſeem to flow from that indifference to good and evil which is natural to ſelf-love. Man is not a ſimple, but a compound being, formed of two ſubſtances. It is true, that all the world do not agree in this; but you and I, my Lord, are agreed in it, and I have endeavoured to demonſtrate it to others. This being admitted then, ſelf-love

is not a ſimple paſſion; but hath two principles, *viz.* the intelligent being and the ſenſitive being, whoſe happineſs is not one and the ſame. The ſenſual appetites tend to the gratification of the body, and the love of order to that of the mind. This laſt paſſion, expanded and become active, is denominated conſcience; but conſcience diſplays itſelf, and acts only from knowledge. It is by acquiring knowledge only that man acquires a ſenſe of order; and it is from his acquiring this ſenſe, that his conſcience induces him to love it. Conſcience is, therefore, nothing in thoſe men who have never compared different objects and ſeen their relations. In ſuch a ſtate as this, a man knows nothing but himſelf; he doth not ſee his own happineſs to be conſiſtent with, or oppoſed to, that of others: he neither loves nor hates; but, confined ſolely to phyſical inſtinct, is a mere ſenſitive being, an idiot. This I have ſhewn at large in my Diſcourſe on the Inequality of Mankind.

When, by a developement of the paſſions, the progreſs of which I have traced out, men begin to look round on their fellow-creatures, they begin alſo to ſee the relation they ſtand in to one another, and to the objects about them; hence ariſe their ideas of agreement or diſagreement, of juſtice, of order, and the like. It is now that moral beauty becomes perceptible, and the conſcience begins to act. They now poſſeſs virtues; and if they have vices alſo, it is becauſe their ſeparate intereſts increaſe, and their ambition is excited in proportion as their knowledge grows extenſive. So long alſo as the oppoſition of their intereſts is leſs than the concurrence of their knowledge, men are eſſentially

good.

good. Such is the ſecond ſtate of mankind

But when all the particular intereſts of individuals interfere, and claſh againſt each other; when ſelf-love is converted, by its fermentation, into ſelf-intereſt; and opinion, by rendering the whole univerſe neceſſary to each individual, makes them all enemies from their birth, and cauſes the happineſs of one to depend on the miſery of another; then conſcience, too feeble to withſtand the violence of the paſſions, is ſilenced by their impetuoſity, and remains a mere empty word, which mankind reciprocally make uſe of to deceive each other. Then every one pretends to ſacrifice his own intereſt to that of his country, and all are liars. Not one is deſirous of the public good, unleſs it coincides with his own; and hence this coincidence between the public and private good becomes the object of that true policy, which alone is calculated to make men virtuous and happy. But I am now beginning to talk a ſtrange language, as little underſtood by the majority of readers as by your Lordſhip. This is the third and laſt ſtate, beyond which nothing remains to be done; and thus we ſee how man, being naturally and originally good, individuals become wicked. The great object of my book is the means of preventing this defection. Not that I affirmed it, in the preſent order of things, to be abſolutely poſſible; but this I affirmed, and do ſtill, that there are no other means of effecting it but thoſe I have pointed out.

Your Lordſhip is, nevertheleſs, pleaſed to ſay, my plan of education is ſo far from being conſiſtent with Chriſtianity, that it is not adapted to either form citizens or men. Your only

proof

proof of this aſſertion, however, is the doctrine of original ſin. Now baptiſm, my Lord, is the only means of deliverance from original ſin and its effects. Whence it follows, according to your arguments, that there never were any citizens or men in the world but Chriſtians. You muſt either deny this conſequence, therefore, or own that you have proved too much.

As you go ſo far back for your proofs, I muſt do the ſame for my objections to them. And firſt it appears to me, that this doctrine of original ſin, ſubject as it is to the moſt ſtriking difficulties, is not to be found in the ſcriptures, ſo clearly or ſo ſtrictly expreſſed as the rhetorical Auguſtine and other theologues have been pleaſed to maintain. It is farther hardly poſſible to conceive, that God ſhould create ſo many innocent ſouls, with a view to join them to corrupt bodies, there to contract a moral impurity, for which he ſhould damn them to all eternity in hell, though guilty of no other crime than what was the immediate effect of that union which was his own work. I ſhall not ſay, whether (as you have boaſted) by this ſyſtem you have cleared up the myſtery of the human heart; but I affirm that you have greatly obſcured by it the juſtice and goodneſs of the ſupreme Being. If you have removed one objection, it hath been only to ſubſtitute others much greater in its place.

But after all, what hath this doctrine to do with the author of Emilius? It is certain, that notwithſtanding he conceived his book might be of uſe to mankind in general, he wrote it more particulary for Chriſtians; for the uſe of men, cleanſed from the guilt of original ſin and its

its effects, at leaſt with regard to their ſouls, by the ſacrament inſtituted for that purpoſe. According to that doctrine, we all recovered our primitive innocence in our infancy, being rendered by baptiſm as pure of heart as Adam came out of the hands of God. Will you ſay, that we have contracted new impurities? How? As we began the world with being thus cleanſed, in what manner can we have contracted them ſince? Is not the blood of Chriſt ſufficiently efficacious to waſh away the ſtain? or is our guilt the effect of the natural corruption of the fleſh; and hath God made us originally corrupt, indedendent of original ſin, on purpoſe to have the pleaſure of puniſhing us? You attribute to original ſin the vices of thoſe whom you affirm to be cleanſed from it; and yet blame me for having attributed their vices to another cauſe. Is it juſt to make it criminal in me not to reaſon ſo bad as your Lordſhip?

It may be ſaid, indeed, that the effects which I attribute to baptiſm * do not appear by any external ſigns; that Chriſtians are not leſs prone to vice than infidels; whereas, according to my ſuppoſition, the native virulence of ſin ſhould ap-

* Burnet ſuppoſes, that the corruption and mortality of the human race, in conſequence of the fall of Adam, were the natural effect of the forbidden fruit; that aliment containing ſome poiſonous juices, which proved deſtructive to the animal œconomy, by irritating the paſſions, weakening the underſtanding, and diffuſing principles of vice and mortality throughout the whole man. In this caſe, however, the nature of the remedy being adapted to that of the diſeaſe, it is plain that baptiſm ought to have a phyſical operation on the body of man, by reſtoring to him that conſtitution he enjoyed in a ſtate of innocence, and, if not the immortality dependent on it, at leaſt all the moral effects of ſuch a re-eſtabliſhment of the animal œconomy.

appear in the latter, and make an evident diſtinction between them. With the aſſiſtance, it might be ſaid, of goſpel morality, added to baptiſm, all Chriſtians ought to reſemble angels; while infidels, being not only uncleanſed from original ſin, but alſo given up to falſe worſhip, would be little better than devils. I can imagine, that, if this difficulty were artfully inſiſted on, it would prove very embarraſſing: for what anſwer can we make thoſe who are ready to demonſtrate, that the effects of a redemption, purchaſed at ſo high a price, are, with regard to the moral virtues of mankind, next kin to nothing? But, ſetting aſide my ſuſpicion, that no expedient, agreeable to ſound theology, can be found to get over this difficulty, were I to admit that baptiſm does not effectually remedy the corruption of our nature, your Lordſhip will not be found to have reaſoned a jot better. We are ſinners, you ſay, becauſe of the ſins of our firſt parents: but how came our firſt parents to be ſinners themſelves? Why is not the ſame reaſon, by which you would explain Adam's ſin, applicable to his poſterity, without imputing to them his guilt? and why muſt we impute injuſtice to God, in that we are made ſinners, and ſubjected to puniſhment from the vice of our birth, when our firſt parents were ſinners, and were puniſhed in like manner, without it? Original ſin may ſerve to explain every thing but its own principle, and this is the very thing to be explained.

You advance that, according to my principle, we loſe ſight of that ray of light which diſcovers to us the myſtery of our own hearts; and at the ſame time do not ſee that my principle, more

univerſal than yours, explains even the ſin of the firſt man Adam *, which your's leaves in obſcurity. You behold man only as being in the hands of the devil, and I explain the manner of his fall. The cauſe of evil is, according to you, the corruption of our nature; and this very corruption

* To demur againſt an uſeleſs and arbitrary prohibition, is nothing but what is natural; but it is ſo far from being vicious in itſelf, that it is conformable to the order of things, and the conſtitution of human nature: for man would not be in a ſtate to provide for his own preſervation, if he had not a very lively ſenſe of ſelf-love, and of all thoſe rights and privileges he hath received from nature. An omnipotent Being would require nothing but what is uſeful; but a feeble being, whoſe power is farther limited and reſtrained by law, loſes part of himſelf by ſuch reſtraint, and is urged doubtleſs to reclaim what he is thus deprived of. To impute this to him as a crime, is to make it criminal in him to be himſelf and not another perſon; it is to require him to be, and not to be, at the ſame time. For this reaſon, the command which was broken by Adam appears to me to have been rather a paternal advice, than an abſolute prohibition; a kind of friendly warning to him, to abſtain from a pernicious and deadly fruit. This idea is ſurely more conformable to our notions of the goodneſs of the Deity, and even to the text, than that which divines have been pleaſed to teach us; for, with regard to the twofold death, it hath been ſhewn, that the phraſe *morte morieris* is not ſo emphatical as they pretend; being only an hebraiſm, made uſe of in other parts of ſcripture where ſuch emphaſis could not take place. There is, beſides, ſo natural a motive for indulgence and commiſeration in the ſubtilty of the ſerpent, and the ſeduction of the woman, that, all circumſtances conſidered, the crime of Adam appears really but a venial ſin. And yet, according to our divines, what a ſhocking puniſhment attends it! it is impoſſible to conceive any thing more terrible! For what greater puniſhment could Adam have been ſubjected to, even for the greateſt of crimes, than that of being condemned, together with his poſterity, to death in this world, and to ſuffer to all eternity amidſt the flames of hell in the next? Can ſuch a puniſhment be inflicted by the God of mercy on a poor unhappy being, merely for ſuffering himſelf to be deceived? How do I abominate this diſcouraging doctrine of our cruel theologues? I ſhould think myſelf a blaſphemer indeed, if I were tempted but for a moment to believe it.

ruption is the evil of which I would diſcover the cauſe. We both are agreed, I imagine, that man was created originally good; but you ſay he is wicked becauſe he is wicked, and I endeavour to ſhew how he became ſo. Which of us, do you think, approaches neareſt to firſt principles?

And yet you proceed in a triumphant manner, as if you had levelled my argument with the ground. You oppoſe againſt me, as an immoveable obſtacle, "that ſtriking mixture of greatneſs and meanneſs, of zeal for truth and love for error, of inclination to virtue and tendency to vice," which is to be found in man. "Aſtoniſhing contraſt! (ſay you,) which diſconcerts the pagan philoſophy, and leaves it to wander in vain ſpeculation!"

The theory of man, however, is not a vain ſpeculation, as it is founded in nature, and proceeds only on the ſupport of well-connected facts, which, leading us to the ſources of the paſſions, teach us how to regulate their courſe. If you are pleaſed to call the Savoyard's creed heathen philoſophy, I can make no reply to ſuch an imputation, becauſe I cannot comprehend your meaning *; but I think it ludicrous enough that you ſhould borrow his own terms to tell us he hath not explained what he hath explained ſo clearly.

Your Lordſhip will permit me to remind you of the concluſion you have drawn from an objection ſo well diſcuſſed, with all the chain of conſequences attending it. "Man finds himſelf

* Unleſs, indeed, it relates to what his lordſhip charges me with in the ſequel, of admitting a plurality of Gods.

ſelf impelled by an unhappy tendency to vice: and how ſhall he make head againſt it, if he be not, in his infancy, put under the direction of preceptors, abounding in virtue, diligence and wiſdom; or if, during his whole life, he does not, under the protection and with the grace of God, make continual and powerful efforts to withſtand it?" This is as much as to ſay, We ſee mankind are wicked, notwithſtanding they are kept under the moſt tyrannical ſubjection, from their infancy; if, therefore, they are not kept under ſuch early ſubjection, how ſhall they ever become virtuous and prudent, ſince by conſtantly tyrannizing over them, it is impoſſible to make them ſo!

The force of our arguments concerning education will become more ſenſible if we apply them to a different ſubject. Let us, therefore, ſuppoſe, my Lord, a man ſhould addreſs himſelf to us in the following manner. "You give yourſelves a great deal of trouble to make choice of the moſt equitable governments, and to procure good laws. But I will demonſtrate to you, in the firſt place, that your forms of government themſelves occaſion thoſe evils for which you think them a remedy. I will prove to you farther, that it is impoſſible you ſhould ever have either good laws or equitable governments; and laſtly, I will point out to you the true way to prevent all the evils you complain of, without government, and without laws."

Let us ſuppoſe, that, after this, he ſhould lay down his ſyſtem, and point out his pretended means, I do not inquire whether his ſyſtem be reaſonable, or his means practicable. If they were not, it is poſſible he would only be looked upon

as

as a lunatic, and be very juſtly confined to a dark chamber. But if unhappily his ſyſtem ſhould be well founded and practicable, it would go much worſe with him; and you will readily conceive, my Lord, or others will do it for you, that it would be difficult to find racks and tortures enough to puniſh the deteſtable wretch for being in the right. But this is not ſtrictly the preſent caſe; and whatever might befal the perſon of ſuch a victim, it is certain an inundation of writings would burſt out againſt his book. There would not be a ſingle ſcribbler in the town, or under-graduate of the college, but, in order to pay his court to thoſe in power, and proud of a *cum privilegio* to his writings, would load him with a pamphlet of abuſe, and boaſt of having ſilenced the man, who might either be prevented ſpeaking, or might hold ſuch antagoniſts in too much contempt to anſwer them. But this caſe alſo is not exactly to the preſent point. We will ſuppoſe then, laſtly, that ſome grave perſonage, intereſted in the affair, ſhould think himſelf obliged to follow the example of others, and, amidſt other declamatory abuſes, ſhould addreſs the culprit as follows. "What doſt thou mean, abandoned wretch? wouldeſt thou overturn all government and law, when theſe are our only check on vice, and even theſe can hardly reſtrain it within moderate bounds? Good God! what would become of us, if we had neither laws nor government? Take away our priſons and our gibbets, and theſts and robberies would become univerſal: O, thou art an abominable wretch!"

If, after ſo harſh a reproof, the poor man might venture to ſpeak, he would doubtleſs expreſs

himſelf thus: "Excuſe me, my noble Lord, your honour is guilty of a *petitio principii*. I did not ſay that vice ought not to be ſuppreſſed: But I ſay it would be better to prevent its exiſtence. I would provide againſt the inſufficiency of the laws; and you object to me that very inſufficiency. You accuſe me of introducing abuſes, becauſe, inſtead of remedying, I chuſe rather to prevent them.—What! if there were a method by which we might live always in health, muſt it be ſuppreſſed becauſe the phyſicians would have nothing to do? Your honour is deſirous of ſeeing racks and gibbets, and I of ſeeing no malefactors to require them; with all due ſubmiſſion, therefore, I do not think myſelf that abominable wretch your honour pronounces me."

But to return to your Lordſhip's mandate. "Alas! my dear brethren, in ſpite of the principles of the moſt ſalutary and virtuous education, and notwithſtanding the moſt encouraging promiſes and the moſt terrible menaces of religion, the errors of youth are ſtill too frequent." But I have proved that the education which you call the moſt ſalutary, is the moſt abſurd and ſenſeleſs; that the education you call the moſt virtuous, is in fact the cauſe of all the vices of children: I have proved, that all the celeſtial glories of paradiſe have leſs influence over them than a lump of ſugar-candy, and that they are much more afraid of being tired at veſpers than of burning in hell: I have proved, that all the errors and extravagancies of youth, which you complain cannot be prevented by your means, are really effected by them. "Into what errors and exceſſes doth not youth, when let alone, precipitate itſelf!" Youth, my Lord, when let alone, never

never goes aſtray; all its errors ariſe from being miſled. The companions and miſtreſſes of young men, only complete what their prieſts and preceptors begun. This, my Lord, I have proved. But your Lordſhip proceeds: "It is a torrent that ruſhes forth, in ſpite of the moſt powerful dykes that can be raiſed to oppoſe it: what then would be the conſequence, if no obſtacles were made uſe of to withſtand its efforts?" In anſwer to this, I might ſay, "It is a torrent which breaks down your feeble dykes, and carries all before it. Enlarge its bed, and let it flow without obſtacle, and it will do no harm." But I am aſhamed of employing on ſo ſerious a ſubject ſuch a florid declamation as each party makes uſe of at pleaſure, and which proves nothing on either ſide.

It appears, however, that, notwithſtanding the extravagancies of youth are too numerous and frequent on account of original ſin, your Lordſhip ſhip is not at ſo great variance with them on the whole; as you ſeem to be ſo well ſatisfied with that ſalutary and virtuous method of education, which is practiſed by your preceptors ſo full of virtue, diligence, and wiſdom; ſo that you think youth would be ſtill greater loſers were they educated in any other manner; and it ſeems that you do not in fact think quite ſo ill of the preſent age, *the ſink of all ages*, as you affect to ſpeak in your mandate.

I confeſs, indeed, it is quite ſuperfluous for thoſe people to project new ſchemes of education, who are well ſatisfied with the preſent; but if this be the caſe with your Lordſhip, you muſt agree with me that you are not very nice or difficult in this matter. Had you been ſo eaſy

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with regard to doctrines, your dioceſe had not experienced the troubles with which it hath been long agitated; the ſtorm you raiſed would not have fallen on the Jeſuits; I ſhould not have been oppreſſed for the ſake of company; and you would have enjoyed a greater ſhare of tranquillity as well as myſelf.

You confeſs, that to reform the world as far as the weakneſs, and, according to you, the corruption of our nature, will permit, it is ſufficient to obſerve, under the direction and influence of grace, the dawnings of human reaſon, and to direct them carefully to the paths of truth. "By ſuch means (ſay you) thoſe minds, which are as yet exempt from prejudices, may be put always upon their guard againſt error; thoſe hearts which are as yet free from violent paſſions, may take the impreſſion of every virtue." So far then we are agreed, for this I have ſaid myſelf. It is true, I did not add that children ſhould only be educated by prieſts; nor did I even think it neceſſary in order to make them citizens or men; but this error, if it be one, is ſo common among Catholics, that it ſurely ſhould not be thought ſo very great a crime in a Proteſtant. I do not inquire whether, in your country, the prieſts themſelves are accounted very good citizens; but as it has been your buſineſs to educate the preſent generation, it lies between you on one part, and your former mandates on the other, to decide whether the pupils have profited ſo much by the ſpiritual milk of the world, as to become ſuch good ſaints, ſuch ſincere worſhippers of God, ſuch great men, "as to be worthy of being the ſupport and ornament of their country." I might add to this, another obſervation which ought to

ſtrike

ſtrike all good Frenchmen, and of courſe your Lordſhip as ſuch; and this is, That of all the ſeveral kings that have reigned over your nation, the very beſt of them is the only one who was not educated by prieſts.

But of what conſequence is this, ſince I do not exclude them from that taſk! Let them educate youth, if they are capable of it; I pretend not to oppoſe it; ſo that what you have ſaid on that head, doth not in the leaſt affect my book. Will you aſſert that my plan is a bad one, merely becauſe it is better adapted to other people than it is to thoſe of the church?

If a man is naturally good, as I think I have ſufficiently demonſtrated; it follows, that he will remain ſuch, unleſs ſome foreign cauſe corrupts him: and if men be originally wicked, (which great pains have been taken to make me believe;) it ſtill follows, that the wickedneſs comes from ſome foreign cauſe. Cloſe up, therefore, all the avenues of vice, and the human heart will be always good.

On this principle I lay down the negative plan of education as the beſt, or rather as the only one that is good for any thing. I prove that all poſitive education acts contrary to the end deſigned, and ſhew in what manner the point aimed at may be attained.

I call that poſitive education which tends to form the underſtanding before the proper time, and to give a child prematurely the knowledge of the duties of a man. I call that negative education, which tends to perfect the corporeal organs, the inſtruments of our knowledge, and which prepares us for reaſoning by exerciſing our ſenſes. Do what we will, however, negative

tive education is not inactive. It is true, it does not inculcate virtue, but it prevents the introduction of vice: it doth not teach us the truth, but preſerves us from error. It diſpoſes a child towards every thing that may lead to truth, when he is in a capacity to comprehend it; and to good, when he is in a capacity to love and admire it.

This fact diſpleaſes and offends you; it is eaſy to ſee the reaſon of it. You begin by calumniating the deſign of the propoſer. According to you, this inactivity of the mind appeared to me neceſſary in order to diſpoſe it to receive the errors I wanted to inculcate. It is not, however, very eaſy to conceive what error a tutor can want to inculcate, who teaches his pupil nothing ſo carefully as to be ſenſible of his own ignorance, and to know that he knows nothing. You agree that the underſtanding is progreſſive, and is formed by degrees. "But doth it thence follow, (ſay you,) that a child at the age of ten years ſhould not know the difference between good and evil, that he ſhould confound wiſdom with folly, gentleneſs with cruelty, and virtue with vice?" Doubtleſs all this will follow, if the judgment doth not ſooner unfold itſelf. "What!" you proceed, "will he not perceive that it is good to obey his parents, and that it is evil to diſobey them?" So far from it, my Lord, that I maintain he will, on the contrary, perceive, that to leave his play to go to his book, notwithſtanding it may be done in obedience to his parents, is an evil; and that to diſobey them, in poſſeſſing himſelf of ſome delicious forbidden fruit, is a good. I muſt confeſs, indeed, he will perceive that it is an evil to be puniſhed, and that it is

good

good to be rewarded; and it is by the balance of this contradictory good and evil that infantine prudence is always regulated. This I think I have fully demonſtrated in my two firſt volumes, and particularly in the dialogue between the preceptor and the child. But you, my Lord, refute my two volumes in as many lines: thus, "To aſſert this, my dear brethren, is to calumniate human nature, in imputing to it a degree of ſtupidity which is foreign to it." It is certainly impoſſible to make uſe of a keener or more conciſe argument. But this ignorance, which you are pleaſed to call ſtupidity, is conſtantly found in every mind lying under the reſtraint of imperfect organs or under the want of due cultivation: this is an obſervation eaſily made, and may be confirmed by the whole world. To impute this ignorance, therefore, to human nature, is not to calumniate or revile it: it is you, my Lord, who have done this, in imputing to it a malignity to which it is a ſtranger.

But you go on: "To think of inſtructing mankind only at a ſeaſon when their growing paſſions are moſt prevalent, is to inculcate it in a manner which the author himſelf explodes."

Here is another ſiniſter intention, which your Lordſhip is ſo good as to impute to me, though I dare ſay no other perſon would ever have found it in the book. I have ſhewn, in the firſt place, that a child educated after my method would not be under the tyranny of the paſſions at the time you ſpeak of: ſecondly, I have ſhewn in what manner the leſſons of prudence may retard the developement of thoſe very paſſions. It is the bad effects of your own mode of education that you impute to mine; while

you

you object to me thoſe faults which I teach you how to prevent. I have ſecured the heart of my pupil till he arrive at the age of manhood; and when I ſee the paſſions ready to break forth, I even then take meaſures to retard their progreſs. Prudential inſtructions are of no uſe to a child when very young, as he can neither intereſt himſelf in them nor underſtand them. They are alſo uſeleſs when he is grown up and his heart is already agitated by the paſſions. It is at the period only which I have pointed out that they can be really uſeful; for then, whether it be to inſtruct or to divert the attention of youth, it is equally neceſſary that ſuch attention ſhould be engaged.

You ſay, "In order that youth ſhould poſſeſs the requiſite docility to receive our inſtructions, I would have them be deſtitute of every principle of religion. The reaſon, my Lord, is plain; I would have them be of ſome religion, and am therefore againſt teaching them any thing the truth of which they are not capacitated to underſtand. But had I ſaid, my Lord, that, "in order to find youth poſſeſſed of the requiſite docility to receive our inſtructions, we muſt be careful to begin with them before they come to years of underſtanding;" ſhould I have reaſoned worſe than your Lordſhip? and can this be any prepoſſeſſion in favour of the inſtructions you give to children? According to you, I made choice of the age of reaſon to inculcate error; and you anticipate that age to inculcate truth. You are ſolicitous, and in haſte, to inſtruct a child, before he is capable of diſcerning right from wrong; while I am indifferent, and wait to deceive him, till he is capable of judging for him-

himſelf. Is this a natural concluſion? Which, my lord, is moſt to be ſuſpected of impoſture, he who would addreſs himſelf only to men, or he who would have to do ſolely with children?

You cenſure me for having affirmed and demonſtrated, that every child who believes in God is neceſſarily an idolater or anthropomorphite; and controvert that aſſertion, by affirming that we can ſuppoſe neither one nor the other of a child that receives the education of a Chriſtian. This, my Lord, is the matter in queſtion: it remains to examine the proofs. Mine is, that no education, however truly Chriſtian, can confer a degree of underſtanding on a child, which is above his years, or detach his ideas from material objects, from which even grown perſons cannot detach theirs. I will appeal farther to experience; adviſing my readers to conſult their own memory, and to recollect whether in believing a God, during their infancy, they did not always attach ſome corporeal image to their idea of the Deity. When you tell a child "that the Deity is like nothing which comes under the cogniſance of our ſenſes," his mind is either ſo perplexed as to underſtand nothing, or he underſtands that the Deity is nothing. When you talk to him of *infinite intelligence*, he is ignorant what *intelligence* is; and ſtill more ſo of what you mean by the term *infinite*. You may, indeed, make him repeat after you the words you dictate to him; you may alſo, if it be required, make him ſay he underſtands them; for that conceſſion coſts him little, and he had much rather ſay he comprehends you, than be chid or beaten for want of apprehenſion. The ancients, not even excepting the

Jews, univerſally repreſented the Deity as a corporeal Being; and are there not many Chriſtians, particularly Roman Catholics, who do the ſame at this day? If your children talk like men, it is becauſe your men are ſtill children; and this is the very reaſon why your inexplicable myſteries no longer puzzle any one, the terms of them being as eaſily got by rote as any other. It is, indeed, one of the great conveniences of modern Chriſtianity, to be ſatisfied with a certain jargon of words without ideas.

From an examination into that intelligence which leads to the knowledge of God, I find it unreaſonable to believe this knowledge "always neceſſary to ſalvation." As proof of this, I cite the caſe of idiots and children; with whom alſo I rank thoſe perſons who have not acquired ſufficient knowledge to comprehend the exiſtence of God. On this occaſion you ſay, "We need not be ſurpriſed, however, my dear brethren, that this author defers ſo long the knowledge of the exiſtence of a Deity, when he doth not believe it neceſſary to ſalvation." Thus you begin, by rendering my propoſition more obnoxious, in charitably ſuppreſſing the word *always*; which not only ſoftens, but in fact gives it a different ſenſe; for, according to the manner in which I have expreſſed myſelf, it is admitted that this knowledge is uſually neceſſary; and according to that you impute to me, it never is neceſſary. After this little piece of deceit, your Lordſhip proceeds thus: "It is clear (ſays he, in the character of an imaginary perſonage,) that a man may, under ſome circumſtances, live to grow old, without believing in God; and yet he would not, for that reaſon, be deprived of his

his preſence in the other world, if his unbelief were voluntary: and this I affirm to be ſometimes the caſe."

Before I proceed to tranſcribe your remark on this paſſage, you will permit me to make mine; and this is, that the pretended perſonage you ſpeak of here, is really myſelf, and not the curate; this paſſage, which you imagined to be in his creed, being in a different part of my work. You muſt read, my Lord, very carelelly, and quote very inaccurately, thoſe writings you nevertheleſs ſo ſeverely condemn. A perſon in office, who takes upon him thus to cenſure others, ought ſurely to be a little more exact. I come now to your remark: "Obſerve, my dear brethren, the author doth not mean here a perſon who is incapable of the uſe of reaſon, but merely one whoſe reaſon might have received no aſſiſtance from information." After this you affirm the propoſition to be abſurd. "St Paul, you ſay, aſſures us indeed, that, among the pagan philoſophers, many had, by the force of reaſon alone, arrived at the knowledge of the true God; and thereupon you quote the words of that apoſtle."

It is often, my Lord, but a ſmall fault, not to underſtand the author we read; but it is a great one not to underſtand him before we attempt to refute him, and ſtill a much greater not to do it before we take upon ourſelves to abuſe him. Now, you have not underſtood that paſſage of my book, which you have here attacked, any more than you have done many others. The reader will judge, however, whether this be my fault or yours, when I have quoted the paſſage itſelf throughout.

"We Proteſtants hold, that no child, who dies before he arrives at the age of reaſon, is deprived of ſalvation: the Roman Catholics believe the ſame of every child that is baptized, though it ſhould never once have heard the name of God. There are ſome caſes, therefore, in which men may be ſaved without believing in God, as in infancy and imbecillity of mind, as in idiots and madmen, where the underſtanding is incapable of the operations requiſite to infer an acknowledgment of the Deity. All the difference that I ſee here between me and you, is, that you think children of ſeven years of age capacitated to believe in God, and I do not think them capable of it even at fifteen. Whether I am right or wrong in this particular, it is not in itſelf an article of faith, but only a ſimple obſervation in natural hiſtory.

"On the ſame principles it is evident, that if a man ſhould arrive at old age without believing in God, he would not be deprived of his preſence in the other world, provided his infidelity be not wilful; and this, I ſay, may ſometimes happen. You will admit that, with reſpect to madmen, a malady deprives them of their intellectual faculties, but not of their condition as men, nor of courſe their claim to the beneficence of their Creator. Why then will you not admit the ſame claim, in thoſe who, ſequeſtered in their infancy from all ſociety, have lived the real life of a ſavage, deprived of that information which is to be acquired only by converſation with mankind? For it is a demonſtrable impoſſibility, that ſuch a ſavage ſhould ever raiſe his ideas to the knowledge of the true God. Reaſon tells us, that man is pu-

punishable only for his wilful errors, and that invincible ignorance can never be imputed to him as a crime. Hence it should follow, that, in the eye of eternal justice, every man who would have believed, had he had the opportunities of information, will appear as a believer; and that none will be punished for infidelity but those whose hearts refuse to admit the truth."

Such is the passage as it stands in my book; on the perusal of which, your error must be evident to every reader. Your mistake lies, in that you understood, or would have others to understand, that, according to my notions, a person must be instructed in the existence of God, to believe in such existence: whereas my sentiments are very different. I say, that a man's understanding must be ripened, and his mind cultivated to a certain degree, before he is in a capacity to comprehend the proofs of the existence of God, and more particularly so to enable him to discover them himself, without having been informed of them. I speak of barbarians and savages, and you object to me the case of philosophers. I say, that some degree of philosophy is necessary to elevate our minds to the ideas of the true God; and you quote St. Paul against me, who acknowledges, that the pagan philosophers did acquire ideas of the true God. I say, that some men of ignorant and uncultivated minds, may not be in a capacity to form just notions of the Deity; and you say, that people properly instructed may form such notions; and on these allegations it is that you pronounce my opinion a manifest absurdity. How! my Lord, will you say, that, because a professed Civilian ought to understand the laws

of his country, it is abſurd to ſuppoſe a child who cannot read can be ignorant of them?

When a writer is careful to avoid perpetual repetition, and hath once clearly expreſſed himſelf on any one point, he is not bound to recur always to the ſame proofs in reaſoning on the ſame ſubject. The ſeveral parts of his writings ſerve to explain each other; and the latter, if he preſerves any method, always ſuppoſe the former. This is what I have endeavoured always to do, and have particularly effected as to the matter in queſtion.

You ſuppoſe, with almoſt all thoſe who treat theſe ſubjects, that man comes into the world with a perfect capacity of reaſoning, and hath nothing to do but employ it. Now, this is not true; for reaſon is an acquiſition, and that one of the ſloweſt of the human mind. Man learns to ſee with his intellectual as well as with his corporeal eyes: but he is much longer about the former than the latter; becauſe the relations between intellectual objects, being not commenſurable like thoſe of material bodies, they are diſcoverable only by eſtimation; and becauſe our firſt deſires and neceſſities being merely phyſical, they do not make the examination of ſuch objects ſufficiently intereſting. We muſt learn to view two objects at a time, and to form a compariſon between them; we muſt even learn to compare a variety of objects together, to recur by degrees to their cauſes, and thence to trace them down to their effects; it is neceſſary for us to have combined an infinite number and diverſity of relations, in order to acquire the ideas of agreement, proportion, harmony, and order. The man who, deprived of the aſſiſtance

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of his fellow-creatures, and inceſſantly occupied in providing for his neceſſities, is reduced to the ſimple progreſs of his own ideas, will make but little advances in this kind of knowledge; he will grow old and die, without ever emerging from the infancy of reaſon. Now, can you ſincerely believe, my Lord, that out of a million of men, living and dying in that manner, there would be one who ſhould attain a thought of God?

The order of the univerſe, admirable as it is, doth not appear equally ſo to every eye. The vulgar pay but little attention to it, being in want of that knowledg which is neceſſary to render it apparent, and having never learned to reflect on what they ſee. It is neither perverſeneſs nor obſtinacy that prevent their being ſenſible of his wonderful harmony of things; it is only ignorance and dulneſs. The leaſt ſtudy fatigues ſuch people, as the leaſt manual labour fatigues the ſtudent. They have heard of the works of God and the wonders of nature. They repeat the ſame words indeed, but without annexing to them the ſame ideas; and are but little affected by thoſe circumſtances that elevate the mind of the philoſopher to the contemplation of his Creator. Now if, even among us, the common people, who have the opportunity of ſo much inſtruction, are ſtill ſo very dull and ſtupid; what muſt be the caſe with thoſe poor people, who, being left to themſelves from their infancy, have learnt nothing from others? Can you believe that an Hottentot, or Laplander, philoſophiſes much on the revolutions of the planets and the generation of things? And yet the Hottentots and Laplanders, living together

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in ſocieties, have a multitude of acquired and communicated ideas, by the help of which they may form ſome groſs notions of a Deity. They have ſome ſort of a catechiſm; but a ſavage, wandering ſolitarily in the woods, can have none at all. You will ſay, perhaps, no ſuch creature actually exiſts: be it ſo. He may be ſuppoſed, nevertheleſs, to exiſt; and certainly there are men in the world who never entered into any kind of philoſophical converſation in their lives, and whoſe whole time is ſpent in ſeeking out their ſubſiſtence, eating, and ſleeping. What ſhall we do with theſe people, the Eſkimaux, for example? Shall we make theologiſts of them?

My opinion, therefore, is, that the human mind, ſuch as it comes out of the hands of nature, deſtitute of inſtruction and improvement, is not in a capacity of itſelf to raiſe its ideas to the ſublime conceptions of the Deity; but that theſe conceptions preſent themſelves in proportion as the mind is cultivated and enlightened. I am of opinion, that God manifeſts himſelf, in his works, to all thoſe who have thought and reflected thereon; that he reveals himſelf to every one that is enlightened by knowledge, in the proſpect of the univerſe; that when our eyes are once opened to his works, we muſt wilfully ſhut them, to be blind to their great Author; that every atheiſtical philoſopher muſt be inſincere, or be blinded by pride; but that a man, groſsly incapacitated, though ſimple and ſincere, whoſe mind is without error and without vice, may not be able, through involuntary ignorance, to raiſe his ideas to the Author of his being, or form conceptions of God, without being ſubject

to have this ignorance imputed to him as a crime, or being puniſhable for a fault in which his heart had no ſhare. The one is not enlightened, and the other refuſes to be ſo; between which there appears to me a very wide difference.

Apply the paſſage you quoted from St Paul to this opinion, and you will ſee, that, inſtead of contradicting, it is perfectly conſiſtent with it: you will ſee that this paſſage relates ſolely to thoſe pretended ſages, to whom the things that are to be known of God have been made manifeſt; and of whom he ſays, "The inviſible things of him, that is, his eternal power and Godhead, are ſeen by the creation of the world, being conſidered in his works, to the intent that they ſhould be without excuſe. But that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their thoughts, and their fooliſh heart was full of darkneſs; who, while they profeſſed themſelves to be wiſe, became fools."

The reaſon, for the apoſtle's reproaching the philoſophers with not having glorified the true God, not being applicable to my ſuppoſition, is altogether in my favour; and confirm, what I have myſelf ſaid, "that every philoſopher who is an unbeliever, is to blame; becauſe he makes a bad uſe of the underſtanding he hath cultivated, and is in a capacity of underſtanding the truths he rejects." It appears, in fine, from the very paſſage itſelf, that you did not underſtand me; and that you charge me with having ſaid what I neither ſaid nor thought, viz. that men believe in God only upon the authority of others *: in

* His Lordſhip indeed doth not expreſsly ſay this; but it is

in which you are so wide of the mark, that, on the contrary, I have only distinguished between the case wherein men may acquire the knowledge of God of themselves, and that in which they must be obliged to the assistance of others.

But supposing, my Lord, that you had been right in your criticism, and that you had solidly refuted my opinion, it would not thence follow that such opinion must be palpably absurd, as you are pleased to term it: a man may be mistaken without being extravagant or ridiculous, as every error is not an absurdity. My respect for your Lordship makes me more sparing of my epithets: it is not my fault, also, if the reader should supply their omission.

It is thus, my Lord, proceeding always to censure without understanding me, you pass on from one imputation, equally false and important, to another which is more so. After having unjustly accused me of denying the evidence of the Deity, you charge me, still more unjustly, with calling in question his unity. Nay, on this head you go still farther, and take the pains, contrary to your usual custom, of entering into an argument on the subject; the only part of your Mandate, where you have Reason on your side, being that wherein you refute an extravagant position which I never laid down.

The passage you object to is this; or rather the passage in which you relate mine; for the Reader must remember, it is your Lordship that always sets me forth. "I believe, *he makes the same imaginary personage say*, that the world is go-

is the only meaning I can reasonably annex to his words, supported by those of St Paul; and I can reply only to what I understand.

governed by a wiſe and powerful will. I ſee it, or rather I feel it: and this is of importance for me to know: But is the world eternal, or is it created? Are things derived from one ſelf-ſufficient principle, or are there two or more? And what is their eſſence? Of all this I know nothing, nor do I ſee it is of any conſequence I ſhould *.—I give up all ſuch idle diſquiſitions, which ſerve only to make me diſcontented with myſelf, are uſeleſs in practice, and above my comprehenſion."

I muſt here obſerve, by the way, that this is the ſecond time you call the Savoyard Curate a chimerical or ſuppoſed perſonage. Pray, my Lord, how do you know this to be the caſe? I have aſſerted what I knew; you have ventured to deny what you know nothing of: Which of us is, in this caſe, the moſt daring? It is well known, I confeſs, that there are few prieſts who believe in God; it is not therefore proved, however, that there are none at all. But, to proceed with your Mandate.

"What is it this daring Author means to ſay?—The unity of God appears to him a futile and indeterminate queſtion; as if the notion of a multiplicity of Gods was not the greateſt of abſurdities. *The plurality of Gods*, ſays Tertullian very expreſſively, *tends to the nullity of God*. To admit a God, is to admit a ſupreme independent Being, to whom all the other Beings are ſubordinate †. This Writer inſinuates, there-

* This break indicates an omiſſion of two lines, by which the paſſage is moderated, and which the Archbiſhop would not tranſcribe. See Mandate, page 235. and Emilius, vol. ii. page 144.

† Tertullian is here guilty of a ſophiſm very common with the

therefore, that there are many Gods."

But who is it ſays there are many Gods? Ah! my Lord, you would have been glad, very probably, that I had been guilty of ſuch an abſurdity; in which caſe, you certainly would not have taken the pains to write a Mandate againſt me.

I neither know how, nor why, things are as they are; and many others, who pique themſelves on explaining their cauſes, know juſt as little as myſelf. But I can evidently ſee, there is but one firſt moving Cauſe, as every thing clearly tends to the ſame end. I acknowledge, therefore, the exiſtence of one ſole ſupreme Will, which directs and governs all things; and one ſole ſupreme Power, which animates and influences all things. I attribute this power and will to one and the ſame Being; becauſe of their perfect agreement and union, which is more eaſily conceived in one than in two; and becauſe it is unreaſonable to admit of more Beings than are neceſſary. And indeed, even the evil itſelf, of which we are ſenſible, is not abſolute, and is ſo far from operating fundamentally againſt the good, that it concurs with it to the production of univerſal harmony.

But the reaſon why things are, is preciſely to be diſtinguiſhed under two ideas, viz. the thing which makes, and the thing which is made: nay, it requires ſome conſiderable effort of the mind to

the fathers. He defines the word *God* after the manner of the Chriſtians; and then accuſes the Pagans of contradiction, becauſe, contrary to his definition, they admit of many gods. It was not worth while to impute an error to me which I have not committed, merely to introduce ſo unſeaſonably a ſophiſm of Tertullian.

to unite theſe two ideas in the ſame object; as we cannot conceive how any thing acts, without ſuppoſing at the ſame time the exiſtence of ſome other being on which it acts. It is farther certain, that we have ideas of two diſtinct ſubſtances; viz. Matter and Spirit; of a thinking ſubſtance, and an extended ſubſtance; and theſe two ideas are very eaſily conceived, the one without the other.

There are, therefore, two methods, in which we may conceive the origin of things: either as they proceed from two different cauſes; the one alive, the other dead; the one moving, the other moved; the one active, the other paſſive; the one efficient, the other inſtrumental: or otherwiſe, as they are derived from one ſole cauſe, poſſeſſed in itſelf of every thing which is, and every thing which is made. Neither of theſe opinions, however, though ſo long agitated by the metaphyſicians, can be eaſily reconciled to human reaſon: for, if the eternal and neceſſary exiſtence of matter hath its difficulties, the creation of it muſt be attended with no leſs; the philoſophers who have in all ages meditated on this ſubject, having unanimouſly rejected the poſſibility of its creation; except a very ſmall number, perhaps, who appear to have ſincerely ſubmitted their reaſon to authority: though, whether theſe were truly ſincere or not, the motives of intereſt, eaſe or ſecurity, render juſtly doubtful; and, indeed, it will be impoſſible to come to any aſſurance on this head, ſo long as we run a riſk in ſpeaking the truth.

On the ſuppoſition that things are derived from one ſole eternal principle; this principle being ſimple in its eſſence, cannot be a com-

pound of matter and ſpirit, but is either matter or ſpirit alone. Now, from the deductions of the Savoyard Curate, he cannot conceive that this principle ſhould be matter; and if it be ſpirit, he cannot conceive how matter could receive its being from ſuch a cauſe; for, to this end, it is neceſſary to conceive its creation: Now, the idea of creation, viz. the idea by which we conceive that, from a ſimple act of volition, nothing becomes ſomething, is, of all ideas that are not evidently contradictory, the leaſt comprehenſible by the human mind.

Beſet by ſuch difficulties on both ſides, the good prieſt remained undetermined, reſolving not to perplex himſelf with doubts of mere ſpeculation, which could have no manner of influence on his moral duties. For, after all, to what purpoſe ſhould I explain the origin of things, provided I know in what manner they actually ſubſiſt; if I know my own place among them, and, in conſequence of that, the obligations impoſed on me?

But ſhould we even ſuppoſe two original principles*, (a ſuppoſition, however, which the Curate doth not make,) we ſhould not thereby ſuppoſe the exiſtence of two Gods; unleſs indeed we ſuppoſed, with the Manicheans, that theſe principles are both active; a doctrine diametrically oppoſite to that of our Curate, who very poſitively, and in the moſt expreſs terms, admits only of one firſt intelligence, one active prin-

* He who knows only two ſubſtances, can imagine the exiſtence only of two principles; ſo that the words, *or more*, annexed, are in ſome meaſure expletive, ſerving to intimate, that it is of as little conſequence to know the number of theſe principles as their nature.

principle, and, of courſe, but one God.

I muſt own indeed, that, the creation of the world being clearly related in our tranſlations of the book of Geneſis, to reject that account would be to reject the authority, if not of the holy Scriptures, at leaſt of the tranſlations given us of them; and this is the very reaſon of the Curate's retaining thoſe doubts, which might not have ariſen without ſuch authority. For, ſetting this conſideration aſide, the co-exiſtence of two principles * ſerves better to explain the conſtitution of the univerſe, and to remove thoſe difficulties which cannot be ſolved without it; and particularly, among others, that of the origin of evil. Add to this, that we ought to be perfectly acquainted with the Hebrew tongue, and even to have been contemporary with Moſes, to know preciſely what ſenſe he attached to the word which is rendered to us *created*. This term is too philoſophical to have had originally that known and popular acceptation which we give it at preſent on the credit of our divines. The acceptation of this term may have been changed, and have miſled even the Septuagint themſelves, poſſeſſed as they already were with

* It may not be amiſs to remark, that this queſtion about the eternity of matter, which ſo ſtartles our modern divines, gave but little concern to the fathers, whoſe ſentiments were more ſimilar to thoſe of Plato. Not to ſpeak of Juſtin Martyr, Origen, and others, Clement Alexandrine takes the ſide of the affirmative ſo ſtrongly in his Hypotipoſes, that Photius would have it, on this account, that his book had been interpolated. The ſame opinion, however, appears again in the Stromates, where Clement relates that of Heraclitus without amendment. This father indeed endeavours, in the fifth book, to eſtabliſh one ſole principle; but this is, becauſe he refuſes to give that name to matter, even admitting its eternity.

the terms and queſtions of the Greek Philoſophy. Nothing is more common than for words to change their meaning in proceſs of time; and thereby cauſe us to attribute to ancient authors, who have uſed them, ideas they never entertained. It is very doubtful whether the Greek word was uſed in the ſenſe we pleaſe to give it; and it is very certain that the Latin term had not the ſame ſenſe, as Lucretius, who expreſsly denies the poſſibility of all *creation*, makes frequent uſe of the ſame term to expreſs the formation of the univerſe and its parts. In fine, M. de Beaufobre hath proved, that the notion of Creation is not to be met with in the ancient Jewiſh Theology; and you have too much learning, my Lord, to be ignorant, that many writers, who have had the greateſt reſpect for the ſacred writings, have not been able, nevertheleſs, to diſcover the abſolute creation of the univerſe, in the account given by Moſes. Thus our Curate, who was not impoſed on by the arbitrary authority of the divines, might very well doubt, without being the leſs orthodox, whether there exiſted two eternal firſt principles, or only one.

This is, indeed, a matter purely philological and philoſophical, in which revelation hath nothing to do. Be this, however, as it will, this is not a ſubject of diſpute between you and me. I do not undertake to defend the ſentiments of the Curate; but to point out the fallacies and miſtakes of your Lordſhip.

Now, you are totally in the wrong, to advance that the unity of God appeared to me an idle queſtion, and above the human underſtanding; as, in the very work you condemn, this unity

unity is eſtabliſhed and maintained by argument. Again, you are quite wrong in bringing the teſtimony of Tertullian, to prove againſt me, that the paſſage in queſtion implies there are many Gods; for, without having recourſe to Tertullian, I agree with you that it doth imply there are many Gods. You are wrong, nevertheleſs, to call me, on this account, raſh and daring: for where there is no poſitive aſſertion, there can be no temerity. Is it to be conceived that an author muſt be ſtigmatized with preſumption, only for being leſs preſumptuous than yourſelf?

You are farther wrong in conceiving that you have juſtified thoſe particular tenets, which attribute human paſſions to the Deity, and which, ſo far from clearing up our notions of that great Being, ſerve only to obſcure and debaſe them. You are wrong in falſely accuſing me of perplexing and debaſing thoſe notions; of controverting the divine eſſence which I have not controverted, and of calling in doubt his unity which I never queſtioned. But ſuppoſing I had done it, what is the conſequence? To recriminate on others, is not to juſtify one's ſelf! but he whoſe ſole defence is to accuſe the ſuppoſed criminal, may very juſtly be ſuſpected of being the only one who is guilty.

The contradiction you reproach me with, in the ſame paſſage, is alſo as ill founded as the preceding accuſation. "He knows, ſay you, nothing of the nature of God; and yet preſently after he acknowledges this Supreme Being to be poſſeſſed of intelligence, power, will, and goodneſs: is not this to have an idea of the divine nature?"

The anſwer I ſhall make your Lorſhip on this head is as follows. "God is intelligent; but in what manner? Man is intelligent by the act of reaſoning, but the ſupreme Intelligence lies under no neceſſity to reaſon. He requires neither premiſes nor conſequences; not even the ſimple form of a propoſition: His knowledge is purely intuitive; he beholds equally what is and will be; all truths are to him as one idea, as all places are but one point, and all times one moment. Human power acts by the uſe of means, the divine power in and of itſelf. God is powerful becauſe he is willing, his will conſtituting his power. God is good: nothing is more manifeſt than this truth. Goodneſs in man, however, conſiſts in a love to his fellow-creatures; and the goodneſs of God in a love of order: for it is on ſuch order that the connection and preſervation of all things depend. Again, God is juſt: this I am fully convinced of, as it is the natural conſequence of his goodneſs. The injuſtice of men is their own work, not his; and that moral diſorder, which, in the judgment of ſome philoſophers, makes againſt the ſyſtem of providence, is in mine the ſtrongeſt argument for it. Juſtice in man, indeed, is to render every one his due; but the juſtice of God requires, at the hands of every one, an account of the talents with which he has intruſted him.

In the diſcovery, however, by the force of reaſon, of thoſe divine attributes of which I have no abſolute idea, I only affirm what I do not clearly comprehend, which is in effect to affirm nothing. I may ſay, it is true, that God is this or that; I may be ſenſible of it, and fully convinced within myſelf that he is ſo. I am yet

never

never the better able to conceive how or in what manner he is ſo.

In ſhort, the greater efforts I make to contemplate his infinite eſſence, the leſs I am able to conceive it: but I am certain that he is, and that is ſufficient; the more he ſurpaſſes my conceptions, the more I adore him. I humble myſelf before him, and ſay, "Being of beings, I "am becauſe thou art; to meditate continual-"ly on thee is to elevate my thoughts to the "Fountain of exiſtence. The moſt meritorious "uſe of my reaſon is to be annihilated before "thee: it is the delight of my ſoul to feel my "weak faculties overcome by the ſplendor of "thy greatneſs."

Such is my anſwer, and I flatter myſelf it is ſatisfactory. Will it be neceſſary for me to tell your Lordſhip from whence it is taken? I have taken it, word for word, from the very paſſage wherein you accuſe me of contradiction *; and you have made juſt ſuch a uſe of it as all my adverſaries do, who tranſcribe the objections I myſelf raiſe, and ſuppreſs my ſolutions. Their anſwer is therefore already written, and is contained in the work they refute. But we proceed, my Lord, to the diſcuſſion of matters of the utmoſt importance.

After having attacked my ſyſtem and my book, you make an attack alſo on my religion; and becauſe the Roman-Catholic Curate had objections againſt his church, you endeavour to make me paſs for an enemy to mine; as if, to propoſe the difficulties attending any particular opinion, were to renounce it; as if all human knowledge had not its particular difficulties; as if

* Emilius, Vol. ii. p. 166.

if even geometry itſelf were entirely free from them, or that the geometricians made it a rule to be ſilent leſt they ſhould depreciate the certainty of their art.

The anſwer I have ready to make, is to declare, with my uſual frankneſs and ſincerity, my ſentiments with reſpect to religion; ſuch as I have conſtantly profeſſed them to be in all my writings, and ſuch as they have always been both on my lips and in my heart. Nay, I will go ſtill farther, and declare why I publiſhed the Curate's creed; and why, in ſpite of all the clamours that have been raiſed againſt it, I ſhall ever eſteem it to be the beſt and moſt uſeful performance this age hath produced. Neither perſecution, nor arrets, ſhall ever make me change my tone: the divines, in bidding me be humble, ſhall not make me an hypocrite; nor ſhall the philoſophers, by taxing me with hypocriſy, make me profeſs myſelf an infidel. I will ſpeak of my religion, becauſe I have one: and I will ſpeak of it boldly, becauſe I have the courage to declare what it is; and it were to be wiſhed, for the happineſs of mankind, it were that of the whole human race.

My Lord, I am a Chriſtian, a ſincere Chriſtian, according to the doctrine of the Goſpel. I am a Chriſtian, not as a diſciple of prieſts, but as a diſciple of Jeſus Chriſt. My great Maſter refined but little on doctrinal tenets, but inſiſted ſtrongly on moral obligations. He preſcribed fewer articles of faith than good works; he commanded us to believe only ſo much as is neceſſary to make us good. When he ſuperſeded the law and the prophets, it was more by acts of virtue than articles of belief. And he hath told

me,

me, as well in his own words, as by thoſe of his apoſtles, "That whoſo loveth his brother hath fulfilled the law."

With regard to myſelf, being firmly convinced of the eſſential truths of Chriſtianity, which are the foundation of all good morality, I endeavour to nouriſh my heart with the ſpirit of the Goſpel, without perplexing my head about what appears in it dark and obſcure; and being as fully perſuaded, that whoſoever loveth God above all things, and his neighbour as himſelf, is a true Chriſtian, I ſtrive to prove myſelf ſuch, laying aſide all thoſe doctrinal ſubtilties, thoſe important trifles with which the Phariſees ſo perplex our duty and confound our belief; placing, with St Paul, even faith itſelf below charity.

Happy in having been educated in a religion the moſt rational and pure upon earth, I remain inviolably attached to the worſhip of my fathers: Like them, I take ſcripture and reaſon for the only rules of faith: Like them, I pay no implicit regard to human authority, nor ſubſcribe to their formulas till I perceive the truth of them: Like them, I heartily join with the true ſervants of Jeſus Chriſt, and the real worſhippers of God, to pay him homage, with the communion of the faithful in his church. It is pleaſing and conſolatory, to be numbered among its members, to aſſiſt in this public worſhip of the Deity, and to reflect, while I am in the midſt of them, Here am I with my brethren.

Penetrated with due reſpect for a worthy paſtor, who, reſiſting the torrent of example, and judging in the truth, hath not excluded from his church a defender of God's cauſe, I ſhall preſerve

ſerve to the lateſt hour of my life a grateful remembrance of charity ſo truly Chriſtian. I ſhall ever think it an honour to be numbered among his flock, and hope never to bring a ſcandal on its members either by my ſentiments or conduct. But when injurious prieſts arrogate to themſelves a power to which they have no juſt pretenſions; when they take upon them to dictate what I ſhall believe, and inſolently bid me explain this, diſown that, retract my words, or diſguiſe my meaning; their arrogance hath no effect on my ſincerity: they cannot make me be guilty of falſehood in order to be orthodox, or ſay what I do not think merely to pleaſe them. And though my veracity may give them ſo much offence as to make them eager to cut me off from the church, I am little terrified by a menace which it is not in their power to put in execution. They cannot prevent my heart from being united to the faithful; they cannot blot out my name from among the elect, if it be written in that number. They may deprive me, indeed, of many of the comforts of this life, but they cannot deprive me of my hope in that which is to come; where it is my moſt ſincere and ardent wiſh to have Jeſus Chriſt himſelf the umpire and judge between them and me.

Such, my Lord, are my real ſentiments; which, however, I do not lay down as a rule for others, but only declare them to be mine, and that ſuch they will remain, as long as it pleaſes, not men, but God, who alone is capable of changing my heart and mind. For ſo long as I may be what I am, and think as I now do, I ſhall ſpeak as I now ſpeak. Very oppoſite, I muſt own, is this conduct to that of your nominal Chriſtians;

who

who are always ready to believe, or to ſay, what their eaſe, or intereſt, require them to ſay or believe; being ſatisfied they are good Chriſtians enough, provided their writings are not burnt, and no arret be iſſued out againſt them. They live like people firmly perſuaded, that it is not merely neceſſary they ſhould confeſs this or that article, but that ſuch confeſſion is ſufficient to entitle them to heaven: whereas I am perſuaded, on the contrary, that the eſſential part of religion conſiſts in the diſcharge of practical duty; and that it is not merely neceſſary that a man ſhould be juſt, compaſſionate, humane, and charitable, but that whoever is truly ſo, believes enough for his ſalvation. As for the reſt, indeed, I muſt own their doctrine is much more commodious than mine, and that it would coſt a man much leſs trouble to get himſelf ranked among the number of the faithful for his opinions than for his virtues.

Whether I ought to have kept my ſentiments on theſe matters to myſelf, as it is inceſſantly told me; or whether, when I had the courage to publiſh and own them, I attacked the laws and diſturbed the peace of ſociety; we ſhall enquire preſently. But before I enter on this inquiry, permit me to intreat your Lordſhip, and every reader of this letter, to place ſome confidence in the ſolemn declarations of a friend to truth, and not to follow the example of thoſe who, without proof or probability, and ſolely on the ſuggeſtions of their own hearts, accuſe me of atheiſm and irreligion, and that in contradiction to the moſt ſerious and poſitive proteſtations, and which nothing on my part ever rendered ſuſpected. I ſhould not think I have

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the appearance of a man who diſguiſes his ſentiments; nor is it eaſy to ſee what intereſt I can have in ſo doing. It ought to be preſumed, at leaſt, that a man, who expreſſes himſelf ſo freely concerning what he doth not believe, muſt be ſincere in what he actually profeſſes; and that when his converſation, his actions, and his writings, all perfectly agree on this head, whoever ſhall dare to affirm he is guilty of falſehood, without having the omniſcience of the Deity, muſt be guilty of a notorious falſehood himſelf.

I had not always the happineſs of a retired life; I have mixed with people of all characters, have known men of all parties, believers of all ſects, and freethinkers of all ſyſtems. I have ſeen the high and the low, the libertine and the philoſopher. I have had friends who have been ſincere, and others who were not ſo: I have been beſet with ſpies and with enemies; and the world is full of people who hate me for the injuries they have done me. I conjure them all, notwithſtanding, of what kind ſoever, publicly to declare what they know of my belief as to matters of religion; to declare, whether during the moſt conſtant familiarity, the moſt intimate connection, whether in the midſt of convivial gaiety, or in the moſt ſecret confidence of private converſation, they ever found me different from myſelf in this reſpect. Let them declare, if, when they were pleaſed to rally or argue with me, they found me at any time affected with their arguments or railleries; if they ever caught me varying in my ſentiments, or if they could diſcover any thing in the bottom of my heart which I concealed from the public. Let them

ſay,

ſay, if, at any time whatever, they have found in me even the ſhadow of impoſture or hypocriſy; let them declare what they know, and expoſe me to the world. I not only conſent to it, but beg them to do it; diſpenſing with every obligation they may think themſelves under to the contrary. Let them ſpeak out boldly, not what they would have me be, but what they know I am. Let them judge of me from their conſciences; I am not afraid to truſt my honour in their hands, and promiſe to take no exceptions at what they may truly aver.

Let thoſe who charge me with the want of religion, becauſe they themſelves have none, and cannot conceive how others can have any; let theſe, I ſay, firſt agree, if they can, among themſelves. Some of them diſcover only an atheiſtical ſyſtem in my works; others again pretend, that in my writings I aim at glorifying God without believing in him in my heart. They tax my writings with impiety, and my ſentiments with hypocriſy. But if I publicly teach atheiſm, I am not in that, according to their notions, an hypocrite; and if I affect to believe what I do not, in that I inculcate no impiety. Thus by comparing their contradictory imputations, their calumny expoſes itſelf; but malevolence is blind, and paſſion is incapable of reaſon. I do not, indeed, pretend to that degree of faith which is ſo much the boaſt of perſons of indifferent probity, that implicit belief which heſitates at nothing, but readily admits of every thing that is propoſed to it, and throws aſide or diſſembles concerning thoſe objections it cannot reſolve. I have not the happineſs to ſee in revelation the evidence they pre-

tend to find there; and if I declare myſelf in its favour, it is becauſe my heart induces me to it, becauſe it preſents nothing to me but conſolation, and becauſe there appear to me as many difficulties in rejecting it; but it is not becauſe its evidence appears to me demonſtrative, for in reality it doth not. Indeed I am not ſufficiently learned ever to underſtand a demonſtration which requires ſuch profound erudition to deduce and comprehend. Is it not, however, very whimſical to conclude, that I, who openly profeſs my doubts and objections, am an hypocrite; and that thoſe people who are ſo very poſitive, and who decide ſo abſolutely on moſt points, and are ſo certain of every thing, without having better proof than myſelf; that thoſe people, in ſhort, who are not a jot more learned than I am, and who, without obviating my objections, reproach me with propoſing them, ſhould be accounted ſincere?

But to what end ſhould I be a hypocrite, and what ſhould I gain by it? I have openly made an attack on particular intereſts, have ſtirred up all parties againſt me; the cauſe of God and of humanity is what I have maintained, and who is there concerns himſelf about that? What I have written on this ſubject hath not made the leaſt impreſſion; nor is there a ſoul who thinks himſelf obliged to me for it. Had I declared myſelf openly in favour of atheiſm, the devotees could not have uſed me worſe, and my other enemies, not leſs dangerous, would not have given my reputation ſuch frequent ſtabs in ſecret. Had I declared myſelf openly in favour of atheiſm, the one party would have attacked me with more reſerve, in ſeeing me defended by

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the other, and obſerving me diſpoſed in myſelf to revenge: But a man who fears God, is himſelf little to be feared; his party is not formidable; he is alone, or nearly ſo, and the world may ſafely do him a great deal of wrong, before he will think of returning it. Had I declared myſelf openly in favour of atheiſm, in thus ſeparating myſelf from the church, I ſhould at once have deprived its miniſters of the means of inceſſantly harraſſing me, and making me bear all the little airs of their eccleſiaſtical tyranny: I ſhould not have been ſubject to ſo many idle cenſures; but, inſtead of ſo furiouſly condemning my writings, they would have been under the neceſſity of refuting them, which would not have been quite ſo eaſy. In ſhort, had I declared myſelf openly in favour of atheiſm, they would at firſt have made a little clamour, which would have ſoon ſubſided; and I ſhould have been ſoon at peace, as have been all others: the people of God would have taken no cogniſance of me, nor thought they did me a favour in not treating me as a perſon excommunicated; ſo that I ſhould thus have been quit with the world. The ſaints of Iſrael would not have writ me anonymous letters, venting their charity in pious abuſes; they would not have taken the trouble to aſſure me, in all meekneſs and humility, that I was a wicked wretch, an execrable monſter, and that it had been but too happy for the world had ſome good Chriſtian but taken care to ſtifle me in my cradle. Again, the well-meaning part of mankind, regarding me, on their part, as a reprobate, would never have tormented themſelves or me to bring me back into the right way: they would not have pulled me to the right and to the left,

nor have wearied me out with their remonſtrances: they would not have reduced me to the neceſſity of commending their zeal, while I condemned their importunity; or of gratefully acknowledging they were called, to plague me to death with their good-will.

No, my Lord, to be an hypocrite, I muſt be both a madman and a fool: I ſhould be mad to turn impoſtor for any thing I require of mankind; and a conſummate fool, not to ſee that the method I have taken, could lead only to misfortunes in this life; and that, if even I might reap ſome advantages by it, I could not do it without contradicting myſelf. It is not too late, indeed, to take theſe advantages now; I need only bring myſelf to impoſe on the world for a moment, and I might triumph over my enemies. I am not as yet arrived at old age, and may poſſibly have long to ſuffer; the public opinion reſpecting me may change once again! But if ever I arrive at honours or fortune, by whatever means I may attain them, I ſhall then be aſſuredly an hypocrite.

A friend to truth doth not ſtake his reputation on one opinion or another; whatever he ſays, provided it be what he thinks, conduces to his purpoſe. He who is intereſted only in being ſincere, hath no temptation to deceive; and there is no man of common ſenſe, who doth not prefer the moſt ſimple method when it is alſo the moſt certain. My enemies may make the moſt of their abuſe; they will not be able to deprive me of the honour of being a man who ſpeaks truth on all occaſions; of being the only author of theſe times, as well as of many preceding ages, that hath written ſincerely, and hath ſaid

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only what he believed. They may for a while ſully my reputation by dint of falſe reports and calumnies; it will, ſooner or later, however, triumph over them; for while they will be varying in their ridiculous imputations, I ſhall remain the ſame, and, without any other art than my native frankneſs, ſhall have it always in my power to diſappoint them.

"But this frankneſs, it may be ſaid, is unſeaſonable with regard to the public. The truth is not to be ſpoken at all times; and though ſenſible people may be of your opinion, it is not proper the vulgar ſhould adopt ſuch ſentiments." Such are the reflections which are made me on all ſides; and perhaps ſuch is the reflection you yourſelf would make me were we alone in your cloſet. Such changeable creatures are men! They vary their language as they do their habit, and ſpeak the truth only in their night-gowns. When they are dreſſed, they are equipped only to deceive; and are not only knaves and impoſtors in the face of the world, but are not aſhamed to puniſh, againſt the dictates of their own conſciences, every one who dares not be as knaviſh and deceitful as themſelves. But is the maxim itſelf true, that truth ought not to be ſpoken at all times? or rather, that all truth ought not to be divulged? Were it alſo true, would it thence follow that no error ſhould be diſproved? or that the extravagances of mankind are ſo ſacred, that we ſhould reſpect them all without exception? This is a point which ought to be examined, before I admit ſo vague and ſuſpicious a maxim; which, were it true in itſelf, might be rendered falſe by miſappplication. I have a great inclination, my Lord, to adopt here my

uſual method, and to give the hiſtory of my ideas as a reply to my accuſers; for I conceive I cannot more fully juſtify all I have dared to ſay, than by repeating all I have dared to think.

No ſooner was I of an age to obſerve mankind, than I took notice of their actions, and liſtened to their diſcourſe; when ſeeing their behaviour agreed but little with their converſation, I endeavoured to find out the reaſon of that difference; and diſcovered, that to be and to appear were two things, as different as thoſe of ſpeaking and acting; this latter difference being the cauſe of the former, and ariſing itſelf from a cauſe which remains to be pointed out.

This I found to exiſt in the preſent defective ſtate of ſociety, in every reſpect contrary to nature, which nothing can totally ſuppreſs; inceſſantly tyrannizing over her, and forcing her to reclaim her juſt rights. I traced the conſequences of this contradiction, and ſaw that it was alone ſufficient to account for all the vices of individuals, and all the evils of ſociety. Hence I concluded, it was unneceſſary to ſuppoſe men naturally wicked, when I could thus trace the origin and progreſs of their depravity. Theſe reflections naturally conducted me to farther reſearches into the human mind, conſidered in a ſtate of civil ſociety; in which I found that the cultivation of ſcience, and the propagation of vice, went hand in hand together, and increaſed in the ſame proportion, not indeed with regard to individuals, but to a whole people; a diſtinction which I have always been careful to make, though none of my opponents have attended to it.

I ſought the truth in books; but there I found no-

nothing but falſehood and errors. I conſulted authors themſelves: but they were mere quacks, who diverted themſelves with impoſing on mankind; who had no rule of action but ſelf-intereſt, and had no other God than reputation; ever ready to decry and calumniate the great who did not treat them as they pleaſed, and ſtill more ready to laviſh panegyric indiſcriminately on thoſe who might hire them.

By attending on thoſe who were authoriſed to ſpeak in public, I ſoon found they were either afraid or unwilling to ſay any thing diſagreeable to thoſe by whom they were authoriſed; and that being hired by the ſtrong to direct the weak, they could only ſpeak to the latter of their duties, and the former of their privileges. Thus public inſtruction will always tend to impoſture, ſo long as thoſe who adminiſter it find their intereſt in deceit; and it is for them only that the truth is not proper to be ſpoken. But wherefore ſhould I be an accomplice with men of this ſtamp?

Are there any public prejudices which ought to be reſpected? This may poſſibly be; but it muſt be when thoſe prejudices are ſo intimately connected with the order of ſociety, that they cannot be eradicated without rooting up at the ſame time thoſe things by which they are counteracted; ſo that it may be expedient to permit the evil on account of the good. But when things are brought to ſuch a ſituation that every change muſt be for the better, can there be any prejudices ſo reſpectable that we muſt ſacrifice to them reaſon, virtue, juſtice, and all the benefits which truth may be productive of to mankind? For my part, I have engaged myſelf

ſelf to ſpeak the truth, whenever it may be uſeful, as far as it is in my power: This is an engagement alſo which I ought to fulfil to the utmoſt of my abilities, and which no one can fulfil in my ſtead; becauſe, every one being equally bound to all, no one can diſcharge the obligation of another. "Divine truth, ſaith St Auguſtin, is neither mine, your's, nor his; but belongs to us all, on whom it forcibly calls to act in concert to make it known to the world, under the penalty of being uſeleſs to ourſelves if we do not communicate it to others: for whoever would appropriate to himſelf a bleſſing which God would have every one enjoy, loſes by that very uſurpation the good of which he robs the public, and finds himſelf involved in error for having betrayed the truth."

Mankind ought not to be inſtructed by halves. If they ought to remain in error, why ought they not to be left in ignorance? To what purpoſe are there ſo many ſchools and univerſities, to teach them what they ought not to know? What is the deſign of your colleges, your academies, and ſo many other learned inſtitutions? Is it merely to amuſe and deceive the public, by vitiating their reaſon, and preventing their diſcovering of the truth? Yes, ye profeſſors of falſehood, it is to abuſe, that ye pretend to inſtruct us, and, like the mercileſs robbers who hang up lanthorns on the rocks to deceive the unhappy mariner, ye light us on to deſtruction.

Such were my notions when I firſt took up the pen; and in laying it down, I have no reaſon to change my ſentiments. I have always obſerved, that the mode of public inſtruction had two eſſential defects, which it is impoſſible to re-

remove. The one is, the inſincerity of the inſtructors; and the other, the blindleſs of the inſtructed. If men without paſſions were to inſtruct men without prejudices, their knowledge might indeed be more confined, but it would be more certain, and reaſon would always bear the ſway. Now, the intereſt of public inſtructors will be ever the ſame; but the prejudices of the people, having no fixed foundation, are variable, and may be altered, perverted, augmented, or diminiſhed. It is only on this ſide, therefore, that inſtruction can have any certain hold of mankind, and it is to this every friend to truth ſhould incline. He may have ſome hope of making the people more reaſonable, but can have none of making their leaders more honeſt.

I have ſeen the ſame deceit prevail in religion as in politics, and have been much more concerned at it. The evils of government may render its ſubjects miſerable only upon earth; but who knows how far miſtakes in point of conſcience may not be injurious to unhappy mortals hereafter? I have obſerved the world full of creeds, tenets, and modes of worſhip, all followed without any real belief therein; and have ſeen, that nothing of all theſe affecting either the underſtanding or the heart, they had but very little influence on moral conduct. I muſt ſpeak to you, my Lord, on this head, without diſguiſe. The true believer cannot accommodate himſelf to this grimace: He is ſenſible that man is an intelligent being, requiring a reaſonable worſhip; and that he is a ſocial being, whoſe ſyſtem of morals ſhould be adapted to the purpoſes of humanity. Let us find, in the firſt place,

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this worſhip and this morality, which would be applicable to mankind in general. If, after this, it be requiſite to diſtinguiſh them into national forms, we ſhould examine into their foundations, relations, and conveniences; and, after having determined what are the religion and morality of the man, determine what are thoſe of the citizen. In doing this, we ſhould be particularly careful not to imitate your good friend M. *Joli de Fleury*, who, to eſtabliſh his Janſeniſm, would root up all natural law and moral obligation: ſo that, according to him, a contract between a Chriſtian and an infidel muſt be void, becauſe there is no law common to both.

Hence I ſaw there were two methods of examining and comparing different religions: the one relative to the truth and falſehood they contained, either with regard to the natural or ſupernatural facts on which they were eſtabliſhed, or with regard to the ideas we derive from reaſon of the Supreme Being and the religious worſhip he requires of us; the other relative to their moral and temporal effects upon earth, according to the good or evil they might be of to ſociety and to mankind. Now, we muſt not, in order to prevent this two-fold examination, begin by affirming, that both theſe things go together, and that the trueſt religion is alſo the moſt ſalutary for ſociety; this being preciſely the point in queſtion: nor ought men to raiſe an outcry of impiety and atheiſm againſt thoſe who treat this queſtion; as it is one thing to believe, and another to examine into the effects of our belief.

It appears very certain, indeed, that if man be naturally formed for ſociety, the trueſt religion

gion muſt be alſo the moſt ſocial and humane: for God would certainly have us to be what he made us; and if it be true that we are naturally wicked, we ſhould be diſobedient to him in wiſhing to be otherwiſe. Add to this, that religion, conſidered as a kind of relation between God and man, cannot contribute to the glory of the former, but by the happineſs of the latter; becauſe the other term of the relation, which is God, is above every thing that man can do either for or againſt it.

This opinion, however, probable as it is, is ſubject to great difficulties, on account of hiſtorical facts which contradict each other. The Jews were enemies by birth to all other people; and founded their own eſtabliſhment on the deſtruction of ſeven nations, according to the expreſs orders which they received from God. Again, the Chriſtians have had their holy wars; and war is undoubtedly deſtructive to mankind. All parties have perſecuted and been perſecuted in their turn; and perſecution is undoubtedly hurtful to mankind. Many ſects of them profeſs, and make a merit of celibacy; but celibacy is undoubtedly ſo hurtful to mankind, that if it were adopted univerſally, the whole human race muſt periſh *. If theſe conſiderations be not ſuf-

* Chaſtity and continence have their uſe, even with regard to population; it is always good to have the command over one's ſelf; hence a ſtate of virginity is always reſpectable: but it does not thence follow, that it is good or commendable to perſevere in that ſtate during life, in contradiction to nature and the end of our being. We have generally more reſpect for a marriageable girl, than for a young married woman; but we have more for the mother of a family, than for an old maid: and this appears to me very reaſonable. As we do not marry ſo ſoon as we are born, nor is it proper to marry very young,

ſufficient to authoriſe us to decide concerning religion, they afford a ſufficient reaſon for us to examine into it; and I require nothing elſe but permiſſion to make this examination. I neither ſay nor think, that there is no good religion upon earth; but I affirm, and it is but too true, that there never has been a religion publicly eſtabliſhed which hath not given the moſt cruel wounds to humanity. All parties have occaſionally tormented their fellow-creatures, and offered human ſacrifices to the Deity. Whatever may be the ſource of theſe contradictions, certain it is they ſubſiſt; and can it be a crime to wiſh their removal? Charity never thirſts after blood, nor doth the love of one's neighbour inſpire us with the thoughts of maſſacre. In like manner, it is not zeal for the ſalvation of ſouls that is the cauſe of perſecution; pride, arrogance, and ſelf-love, are the cauſe. The more unreaſonable any religion is, the more it is propagated by force: he who profeſſes abſurd tenets, cannot bear that others ſhould ſee them repreſented in their true light. Reaſon in ſuch

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a ſtate of virginity, which all ought to ſupport and eſteem, is uſeful and neceſſary, as it is ſalutary and honourable; but it is ſo only with a view, at a proper time, to beſtow its purity on that of marriage. How! will it be ſaid, with an air of triumphant raillery, do theſe old batchelors pretend to preach up the obligations of matrimony? Why do not they themſelves marry? Very true, why do they not indeed? It is becauſe your abſurd inſtitutions have made a ſtate, which is ſacred and delightful in itſelf, ſo ridiculous and unhappy, that it is almoſt impoſſible to ſupport it without being either a knave or a fool. Ye ſceptres of iron, abſurd laws! it is you whom we may reproach for our not having fulfilled our duties on earth: it is from us the cry of nature is heard againſt your barbarity. How can you preſumptuouſly reproach us with the miſery to which you have ſeduced us?

a caſe, becomes the greateſt of crimes, and muſt at all events be ſuppreſſed, as men are aſhamed to want it in the eyes of others. Thus abſurdity and perſecution have the ſame ſource. Mankind muſt be conſtantly terrified and intimidated. Leave them a moment to the uſe of their reaſon, and you are undone.

On this conſideration alone it appears to me an act of public good, to inſtruct people under ſuch circumſtances to reaſon on the ſubject of religion: for by ſo doing they are inſtructed in their moral obligations, perſecution is deprived of its ſting, and humanity is reſtored to its native rights. To this end, however, it is neceſſary to recur to general principles, to ſuch as are common to all mankind; for if, when you begin to reaſon, you lay any ſtreſs on the authority of prieſts, you put a ſword into the hand of fanaticiſm, and furniſh her with the means of perſecution.

Thoſe who love peace alſo ſhould never recur to the authority of books. This is the way never to come to any determination. Books have been the ſource of inexhauſtible diſputes. Take a view of the hiſtories of nations, and you will find that ſuch as had no books had no diſputes among them. Would you ſubject mankind to human authority, they would all be ſo differently affected by it, that though every one ſhould be poſſeſſed of the greateſt ſincerity and the ſoundeſt judgement, it would be impoſſible for them ever to agree. Never reaſon, therefore, on the maxims or arguments of others. Human language is not ſufficiently clear and explicite: Not even God himſelf, ſhould he deign to ſpeak to us after our mode of ſpeech, could ſay

any thing which would not afford us ſome occaſion for diſpute.

Our languages are the work of men, and men are creatures of confined talents. Our languages are the work of men, and men are deceitful. Hence, as there is no truth ſo clearly announced but that chicanery will find it in ſome degree equivocal, ſo there is no falſehood ſo groſs that it may not be ſupported by ſome pretended reaſoning.

We will ſuppoſe, for inſtance, that a man ſhould ſurpriſe us at midnight, by declaring it to be broad day; our ſurpriſe would, doubtleſs, be accompanied with laughter, and we ſhould treat him with ridicule: but give him only time and means to eſtabliſh a ſect, and ſooner or latter you would ſee his partiſans labouring to prove that he was in the right. They would ſay, that when he pronounced it was day, it certainly was ſo in ſome part of the world or other; and nothing could be more true. Others again might refine upon the aſſertion, and maintain, that, as there are always ſome particles of light ſcattered up and down in the atmoſphere, it is daylight even all night long. And thus a number of ſubtle caſuiſts joining in the diſpute, they would preſently make you ſee the ſun ſhine at midnight. This evidence, indeed, might not prevail univerſally; the debate degenerating, according to cuſtom, into cruelty and bloodſhed. One party would be for the explication, another againſt it; one would be for taking the matter in a figurative ſenſe, and the other in a ſimple one. Some would ſay, He affirmed at midnight, that it was then day, and it was night. Others would ſay, He affirmed at midnight that

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it was day, and it was day. Each would tax his opponent with inſincerity and obſtinacy: A battle or maſſacre muſt end the diſpute; ſtreams of blood would flow on all ſides; and if the new ſect ſhould in the end be victorious, it would be demonſtrated that it is day at midnight. Such is the hiſtory of almoſt all the quarrels that have ariſen about religion.

The innovations of moſt religious ſectaries have been eſtabliſhed by fanaticiſm, and maintained by hypocriſy: hence it is that they are ſo repugnant to reaſon and virtue. Enthuſiaſm never reaſons; ſo that, whilſt its frenzy laſts, any thing goes down, nor is it very nice about articles of faith. Its method alſo is extremely convenient; doctrines are ſo eaſily adopted, and morals ſo difficult to practiſe, that, taking the eaſieſt way, they ſupply the want of good works by the merit of an implicit faith. But after all, fanaticiſm is a critical ſtate which cannot laſt forever. It hath its fits long and ſhort, more or leſs frequent; and hath its intermiſſions, during which indifference prevails. During theſe intervals, the believer comes a little to himſelf, and is aſtoniſhed to find himſelf ſurrounded with ſuch a heap of abſurdities. But the religion is eſtabliſhed, its forms preſcribed; laws are enacted in ſupport of them, and tranſgreſſions are puniſhed. Who will venture to ſtand up, of himſelf, to proteſt againſt all theſe, to except againſt the laws of his country, and deny the religion of his fathers? It is held more prudent to ſubmit in ſilence; it is our intereſt to be of the opinion of thoſe whoſe poſſeſſions we are to inherit. Every one acts the ſame farce, therefore, with his neighbours; laughing in his

ſleeve at what he affects publicly to revere. Such, my Lord, is the behaviour of the greater part of the profeſſors of moſt religions, and particularly of yours; and ſuch is my key to the inconſiſtency which is ſo remarkable between their doctrines and their practice. Their belief is all affectation, and their manners the ſame as their faith.

Why is it that one man is intereſted to take cognisance of the belief of another, or the ſtate of that of the citizens? It is, doubtleſs, becauſe it is ſuppoſed that our faith hath an influence on our morals, and that on our ideas of the life to come depends our conduct in the preſent. But, if this be not the caſe, of what conſequence is our belief, or the affectation of it? The appearance of religion is no longer of any other uſe than to diſpenſe with the reality.

In a ſtate of ſociety, every one is entitled to inform himſelf, whether another believes himſelf under any obligation to be juſt; the ſovereign having the right to examine into the reaſons on which every one founds ſuch obligation. Add to this, that eſtabliſhed national forms ought to be obſerved; this is what I have particularly inſiſted on. But with regard to opinions merely ſpeculative, and that have no influence on morals, and which do not tend to the tranſgreſſion of the laws; every perſon ſhould be at liberty to think as he pleaſed, nor would any one be either entitled or intereſted to dictate their ſentiments to others. Thus, for example, ſhould any perſon, tho' inveſted with authority, come to aſk me my opinion concerning the famous queſtion of the hypoſtatical union; of which the Bible ſays not a word, though ſo many grown chil-

children have held councils, and ſo many unhappy men have ſuffered on that account; I ſhould civilly deſire him, after having owned I did not underſtand nor give myſelf any concern about the matter, to trouble himſelf about his own buſineſs; and, if he ſtill perſiſted, I ſhould take my leave of him.

This is the only principle on which any thing determinate and equitable can be deduced from diſputes about religion; and without which, every one laying down on his part the thing in queſtion, nothing is agreed on or underſtood; while religion, which ought to contribute to the happineſs of mankind, is productive of their greateſt evils.

But as religions grow old, they loſe ſight of the object they had firſt in view; they increaſe in ſubtilties, while every thing is to be underſtood, explained, and determined: thus the doctrine grows daily refined, and the moral practices of it as conſtantly decay. There is undoubtedly a wide difference between the ſpirit of Deuteronomy and that of the Talmud; between the ſpirit of the Goſpel and the quarrels about the Conſtitution. St Thomas aſks, and determines it in the affirmative, Whether articles of faith do not multiply by proceſs of time? That is to ſay, The ſucceſſive profeſſors, refining upon one another, come in time to know much more than hath been ſaid by Jeſus Chriſt and his Apoſtles. St Paul ingenuouſly confeſſes, "that he ſaw things but as through a glaſs, darkly, and in part." Our Theologues have made a much greater progreſs: they ſee every thing, know every thing: they have cleared up all the obſcurities of Scripture; have determined what

appeared indeterminate; and have ſhewn us, with their uſual modeſty, that the ſacred writers ſtood in great need of their aſſiſtance to become intelligible, and that the Holy Spirit knew not how to explain itſelf clearly without them.

When men have loſt ſight of their moral duties, to buſy themſelves only about the opinions and frivolous diſputes of prieſts, a Chriſtian is no longer aſked if he believes in God, but if he be orthodox: he is required to ſubſcribe to a ſet form of uſeleſs and ſometimes unintelligible tenets; and when he hath ſo done, all is well, he is aſked no further queſtions. Provided he doth nothing to get himſelf hanged, he may live almoſt as he pleaſes; his morals are nothing to the purpoſe, his belief is ſecure. When religion is come to this paſs, of what uſe is it to ſociety, or advantage to individuals? It ſerves only to ſtir up diſſenſions, troubles, and quarrels, of every kind, among them; and to ſet them a-cutting each others throats about the ſolution of ænigmas. Certainly it would be better to have no religion at all, than a religion ſo egregiouſly miſapplied. Let us preſerve it, if poſſible, from degenerating to that point; and be aſſured, in ſpite of chains and perſecution, that you will do a meritorious ſervice to mankind.

Let us ſuppoſe, that, wearied out with ſuch deſtructive quarrels, mankind ſhould aſſemble to put an end to them, and agree about a religion adapted to the different peoples upon earth. Every one would begin, undoubtedly, by propoſing his own as the only true, rational, and demonſtrable religion, as the only one agreeable to God and uſeful to man: but his proofs would by no means

means confirm his perſuaſions, at leaſt in the opinion of other ſects. Each party would have no voice but its own. It is no leſs certain that all the others would unite againſt it. In this manner the deliberation might go round, one propoſing, and all the reſt rejecting; this would never be the way to come to an agreement. It is to be conceived, therefore, that after much time loſt in ſuch puerile altercations, men of ſenſe would ſeek the means of conciliation. To this end, they would begin by baniſhing all profeſſed divines from the aſſembly; nor would it be difficult for them to ſee how indiſpenſible this preliminary ſtep would be. This good work being done, they would ſay to the reſt, Till you can agree upon ſome one principle, it is impoſſible you ſhould ever underſtand each other; and it is an argument by which no perſon ever was convinced, to ſay you are in the wrong becauſe I am in the right. You ſay, this is right, becauſe it is agreeable to God; but this is preciſely the very thing in queſtion. If we knew what religion was moſt agreeable to him, there would be no farther diſpute between us. You ſay that is right, becauſe it is uſeful to mankind. This is quite another thing. Men may judge of this particular. Let us take this utility, therefore, as our guide; and proceed to eſtabliſh thoſe doctrines which are moſt conducive to it. We may thus hope to come as near the truth as it is poſſible: for it is to be preſumed, that, whatever is moſt uſeful to his creatures, muſt be moſt agreeable to the Creator.

"Let us ſee, then, if there be any natural affinity between us; if there be any thing held in common by us all. Ye Jews, what think you

of

of the origin of mankind? We think they are all the offspring of one common father. And you Chriſtians, what is your opinion on this ſubject? The ſame as that of the Jews. And you Turks, what ſay you? We think the ſame as the Jews and Chriſtians.—Very well, ſo far is good; as men are all brothers, they ought undoubtedly to love each other as ſuch.

"But of whom, ſay you, did our common father receive his being? for he certainly did not make himſelf.—Of the Creator of heaven and earth. Jews, Turks, and Chriſtians, all agree in this: here is another great point gained. Again, of man, the work of this Creator, is he a ſimple or compound being? Is he formed of one ſubſtance, or of many? Anſwer, ye Chriſtians! He is compoſed of two ſubſtances, the one mortal, and the other immortal.—And you Turks! We think the ſame.—And you Jews! We had formerly but confuſed ideas of this matter, as may be ſeen by the expreſſions of the ſacred writings; but we have been ſince enlightened, and at preſent are of the ſame opinion as the Chriſtians."

In proceeding thus, by way of interrogatories, on divine providence, the life to come, and other matters eſſential to the peace of ſociety and the good of mankind; and having obtained almoſt uniform anſwers from every one; the queriſts would ſay to them, (By the way, it is to be remembered that the Prieſts are baniſhed the aſſembly,) "Wherefore, my friends, do you thus torment yourſelves? You appear to be all agreed as to thoſe points which are of conſequence for you to know; and though you may differ in ſentiment as to other matters, I ſee very little

little inconvenience. Draw up a few articles of an univerſal religion, which may be called, if you will, the Humane and Social Creed, and which every perſon living in ſociety may be obliged to receive. And if any one ſhould ſpeak or write againſt it, he ſhould be baniſhed from ſociety as an enemy to its fundamental laws. As to thoſe matters on which you are not all agreed, form of your particular creeds ſo many national religions, and profeſs them in ſincerity and truth; but do not go on tormenting yourſelves in order to make other nations receive them, as you may reſt aſſured God Almighty doth not require this at your hands. For it is as unjuſt to inſiſt on ſubjecting others to your opinions as to your laws; miſſionaries appearing to me to be juſt as wiſe as conquerors.

"In purſuing each your different doctrines, however, ceaſe to imagine them ſo fully demonſtrated, that thoſe who do not look upon them in that light are inſincere. Ceaſe to believe, that all thoſe who examine your proofs and reject their evidence, are for that reaſon obſtinate infidels, whoſe incredulity is criminal. Ceaſe to think, that reaſon, a regard for truth, and ſincerity, are confined to yourſelves. Do what we will, we are always induced to treat thoſe as enemies, whom we accuſe of wilfully reſiſting the force of evidence. We may lament their error, but we hate their obſtinacy. Give the preference to your own reaſons, if you will; but always remember that ſuch as are not converted by them, may alſo have theirs.

"Honour, in general, all the founders of your reſpective modes of worſhip. Let every one pay the reverence which he conceives due to that

of

of his own; but let him not deſpiſe thoſe of others. They might be men of great genius and great virtues; and theſe are always reſpectable. They have declared themſelves meſſengers from God; this might be, might or might not; it is a ſubject which the generality of mankind cannot judge of, in an uniform and conſiſtent manner, the proofs of it not being equally adapted to the comprehenſion of all. But, though this be the caſe, they ſhould not be haſtily treated as impoſtors. Who knows how far continual meditations on the Deity, or the enthuſiaſm of virtue, may have diſturbed, in their ſublime imaginations, the mean and regular order of their common ideas? A too great elevation of mind ſometimes turns the brain, and things are no longer ſeen in their ordinary light. Socrates himſelf imagined he had a familiar; but no one hath dared, on that account, to accuſe him of being a knave. Shall we treat the founders of a whole people, the benefactors of nations, with leſs regard than a particular individual?

"In a word, let there be no more diſputes among you, about the preference due to your ſeveral religions. They are all good when they are eſtabliſhed by law, and contain what is eſſential to your happineſs. The form or mode of worſhip, is the police of religions, and not its eſſence, and it belongs to the ſovereign of every country to regulate it."

I have thought, my Lord, that a perſon, who ſhould reaſon thus, would not be therefore a blaſphemer or impious; but that the conciliatory expedient he might thus propoſe, would be juſt, rational, and uſeful to mankind. I did not think, alſo, that it would prevent his having

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a particular religion or mode of worſhip, any more than other people, or his being as ſincerely attached to it. A true believer, knowing that an infidel is alſo a man, and probably an honeſt one, may, without a crime, intereſt himſelf in his fate. He may juſtly prevent the introduction of any foreign mode of worſhip in his country: but let him not conſign to damnation all thoſe who think differently from himſelf; for whoever pronounces ſo raſh a judgement, becomes a profeſſed enemy to the whole human race. I am conſtantly told, that civil toleration ſhould be admitted, but not a theological: for my part, I am of a contrary opinion; and believe that a good moral man, be his religion what it will, may be ſaved. But I do not for that reaſon think it lawful to introduce foreign modes of worſhip in any country, without the permiſſion of its ſovereign: For tho' it may not be directly to diſobey God, it is to diſobey the laws; and diſobedience to the laws is diſobedience to God.

With regard to ſuch religions as are once eſtabliſhed or tolerated in any country, I conceive it is both cruel and unjuſt to ſuppreſs them by violence, and that the ſovereign is his own enemy who injures the religious ſectaries of his country. There is a wide difference between embracing a new religion, and profeſſing that in which we are born and bred: it is the firſt only that can in any ſhape be criminal. One ought neither to eſtabliſh a diverſity of religions, nor ſuppreſs thoſe which are once eſtabliſhed: for a ſon cannot be to blame in adopting the religion of his father. All the arguments in behalf of public tranquillity make againſt the advocate

vocate for perſecution. Religion never cauſes any troubles in a ſtate, unleſs when the prevailing party would oppreſs the weak, or when the weaker party, being of a perſecuting ſpirit, cannot live in peace with any other. But no lawful worſhip, that is to ſay, a worſhip comprehending any thing of the eſſence of religion, the profeſſors of which require of courſe nothing but peace and toleration, ever gave riſe to rebellions or civil wars; unleſs when it was forced to act in its own defence, and repel its perſecutors. Never did the Proteſtants, for inſtance, take up arms in France, unleſs when they have been perſecuted. Had they been permitted, they would have been contented to live in peace and quiet. I muſt frankly confeſs, indeed, that the reformed religion had at firſt no right of eſtabliſhment in France contrary to the laws. But when tranſmitted from fathers to children, it became that of a conſiderable part of the French nation, and the Prince had ſolemnly treated with this party in the edict of Nantz: that edict became an inviolable contract, which could not be annulled without the joint conſent of both parties: ſo that, ever ſince that time, the profeſſion of the proteſtant religion is, in my opinion, lawful in France.

Indeed, were it not ſo, the ſubject ſhould ſurely be left at liberty to chuſe the alternative of leaving the kingdom with his effects, or of remaining, on condition of his conforming to the eſtabliſhed religion. But to compel them to ſtay, and yet refuſe to tolerate them; to inſiſt on their exiſtence and annihilation at the ſame time; to deprive them of the common pri-

privilege of nature, to annul their marriages *, to declare their children baſtards—But hold, I ſhall ſay too much in ſpeaking the truth here.

I may venture to obſerve, however, that it might be political to deprive the *French* Proteſtants of their chiefs: but the government ſhould have ſtopped there. Political maxims have their applications and diſtinctions. In order to prevent diſſenſions, which there is no longer any juſt reaſon to fear, the government hath deprived itſelf of very conſiderable reſources of which it ſtood in great need. What hurt can a party do, in ſuch a kingdom as *France*, which hath neither great men nor nobility at their head? Examine into all your preceding wars, called *religious*, and you will find them to have taken their riſe at court and amidſt the cabals of the great. When the intrigues of the cabinet had embroiled public affairs, the chiefs excited the people in the

* In an arret of the parliament of Tholouſe, concerning the affair of the unfortunate *Calas*, the Proteſtants are reproached with intermarrying with each other; *marriage being, according to the Proteſtants, an act merely civil, and of courſe ſubject, both in its form and effects, to the will and pleaſure of the King.* So becauſe marriage is reckoned by the Proteſtants a civil act, it muſt follow that they are obliged to ſubmit to the will of the king, who makes it an act of the Roman Catholic religion. Thus the Proteſtants, to be legally entitled to marry, are obliged to become Catholics, notwithſtanding, according to them, it is an act purely civil. Such is the logic of Meſſrs. the parliament of Tholouſe.—The kingdom of France is ſo very extenſive, that the French imagine the whole human race ſhould have no other laws than theirs. Their parliaments and tribunals appear to have no idea of the law of nature and of nations; and it is very remarkable, that in all this great kingdom, in which are ſo many univerſities, colleges, and academies, wherein are taught ſo many frivolous arts and ſciences, there is not one profeſſor of natural law among them. The French are the only people in Europe who have looked on this ſtudy as uſeleſs.

name of the Lord. But what intrigues, what cabals, can be formed by a parcel of tradeſmen and peaſants? By what means can they form a party, in a country that contains nothing but ſervants and maſters, and in which equality of condition is either unknown or looked upon with diſhonour? A tradeſman propoſing to raiſe troops might be liſtened to in *England*, but would ſet every body a-laughing in *France**.

If I were a King—No—a Miniſter—ſtill leſs; but if I were a man in power in *France*, I ſhould ſay, Every one among us is ambitious of poſts, of employments; every one is for purchaſing the power to do ill; *Paris* and the court ſwallow up every thing. Let us leave theſe poor people to fill up the void of the Provinces; but let them be tradeſmen and always tradeſmen, labourers and always labourers. Not being able to emerge from their ſituation, they will make the moſt of it. They will ſupply the place of our people, in thoſe conditions of life which we all aſpire to get out of; they will make commerce and agriculture flouriſh, which we abandon; they will furniſh out our luxury; they will labour, and we ſhall reap the fruits of it.

If this project would not be more equitable than thoſe which are now purſued, it would at leaſt

* The only ſituation in which a people, thus deſtitute of chiefs, will take up arms, is that of deſpair, to which being reduced by their perſecutors, they have no other choice than in the manner of their deſtruction. In which caſe, the world beholds with aſtoniſhment the power which a contemptible party may deduce from their deſpair; a circumſtance which perſecutors never have calculated beforehand. And yet theſe wars have occaſioned ſo much bloodſhed, that they ought ſeriouſly to think of the conſequence before they render them inevitable.

leaſt be more humane, and undoubtedly more uſeful. It is leſs the tyranny and ambition of the great, than their prejudices and confined views, which are ſo injurious to the common people of all nations.

I will conclude what I have to ſay on this ſubject, by tranſcribing a ſhort diſcourſe which bears ſome relation to it.

A Parſis of Suratte having ſecretly married a Turkiſh woman, was diſcovered, ſeized, and, having refuſed to embrace Mahometaniſm, was condemned to death. Before he went to execution, he addreſſed his judge in the following manner:

"Will you, then, take away my life? For what crime is it you puniſh me? I have rather tranſgreſſed my own law than yours: My law ſpeaks to the heart, and is without cruelty; my crime hath been puniſhed by the cenſure of my brethren. But what have I done to you deſerving of death? I have behaved to you as if you were of my family, and have choſen a ſiſter from among you. I have left her to her own faith, and for her own intereſt ſhe hath reſpected mine. Confining myſelf willingly to her alone, I have honoured her as the inſtrument of that worſhip which the author of my being requires, and have by her means paid that tribute which every man owes to his ſpecies. Love beſtowed her on me, and virtue hath endeared her to me; ſhe hath not lived in a ſtate of ſervitude, but hath entirely poſſeſſed the heart of her huſband; my fault hath made her no leſs happy than myſelf. To expiate ſo venial a crime, however, you would have had me turn liar and impoſtor; you would have compelled

me to profeſs your ſentiments, without reſpecting or believing them: as if the violator of our laws deſerved to be ſubjected to yours, you have offered to my choice perjury or death; and I have choſen the latter, for I will not deceive you. I die, then, ſince it muſt be ſo; but I die worthy to revive and reanimate the body of another juſt man. I die a martyr to my religion, without fear of changing it after death for yours. May I come again to the Mahometans to teach them to become humane, merciful, and juſt! For ſerving the ſame God as we do, as there are not two Gods, you are blinded by your zeal to torment his ſervants, and are only ſanguinary and cruel becauſe you are inconſiſtent.

"You are mere children, that in your play are capable only of doing miſchief to mankind. You imagine yourſelves wiſe, and you know nothing of God. Can your new-fangled tenets be agreeable to him, who exiſts and hath been adored from all eternity? How can ſuch a modern people ſpeak of the religions eſtabliſhed before them? Our rites are as old as the ſtars in the firmament: The firſt rays of the ſun lighted and received the homage of our forefathers. The great Zerduſt beheld the infancy of the world; he foretold and deſcribed the order of the univerſe: And yet you, ye men of yeſterday, you would ſet yourſelves up to be our prophets. Twenty ages before Mahomet, before the birth of Iſhmael or his father, the Magi were of ancient ſtanding. Our ſacred books had given law to Aſia and the world, while three great empires had ſucceſſively flouriſhed and paſſed away under our anceſtors, before yours had exiſtence.

"Such

"Such, ye prejudiced mortals, is the difference between you and us. You call yourſelves believers, and you live like barbarians. Your inſtitutions, your laws, your religion, nay even your virtues, ſerve only to vex and debaſe human nature. The duties you preſcribe are all gloomy and painful. Such are your faſtings, ſelf-denial, ſtripes, mutilations, and ſeclusion; ye know not how to lay yourſelves under any obligations but ſuch as are attended with affliction and reſtraint. You make men hate life, and the means of their preſervation; your women are without men, your lands without cultivation; you devour the brute creation, and maſſacre the human; you delight in blood and cruelty, and by means of the twofold yoke of fanaticiſm and deſpotic power impoſe cuſtoms that are deſtructive to our ſpecies and ſhocking to nature.

"As to us, we are men of peace; we neither do, nor wiſh, ill to any thing that breathes, not even to our tyrants themſelves: We give them, without reluctance, the fruits of our labour, contented to be uſeful to them, and to diſcharge our own duty. Our numerous herds ſtill cover your paſtures; the trees we planted afford you fruit and ſhade; your lands, which we cultivate, ſupply you with nouriſhment by our means; a ſimple and harmleſs people increaſe and multiply under your oppreſſion, and draw from the boſom of our common mother that plenty and abundance which you could not have procured for yourſelves. The ſun, which lights us at labour, is a witneſs of our patience and your injuſtice: when it riſes, it finds us conſtantly employed in well-doing; and when it ſets

it attends us home to our families, there to prepare ourſelves for new labour.

"The truth is known only to God. If, notwithſtanding all this, therefore, we are deceived in our religion, it is hardly to be believed that we ſhall be condemned to Hell; we, who are employed only in doing good upon earth; and that you ſhould be of the number of the elect and choſen of God, who do nothing but ill. But, ſuppoſing we are really in an error, you ought to ſhew it ſome reſpect, for your own advantage. Our piety makes you fat, and yours makes you lean; thus we repair the miſchiefs which are done you by a deſtructive religion. Believe me, you had better let us enjoy our own opinions, which are ſo uſeful to you; there being juſt reaſon to fear, that if we ſhould adopt yours, it would prove the greateſt evil that could happen to you."

I have thus endeavoured, my Lord, to give you an idea of that ſpirit in which the Savoyard's creed was written, and of thoſe conſiderations which induced me to publiſh it. On which, I now take the liberty to aſk you, in what reſpect can you call his doctrines blaſphemous, impious, or abominable? and what you find in it ſo ſcandalous and pernicious to mankind? I aſk the ſame of thoſe who have charged me with publiſhing what I ought to have kept ſecret, and with the intention of diſturbing the public peace and good order of ſociety; a vague and impertinent imputation, with which thoſe, who reflect leaſt on what is uſeful or hurtful, excite the credulous public againſt a well meaning author. To recal people to the true faith which they have thrown aſide, is this to teach them to believe

believe nothing? To adviſe every one to ſubmit to the laws of their country, is this to diſturb the peace and good order of ſociety? Do I write againſt all religious worſhip, by exhorting every people to abide by the eſtabliſhed modes of their country? Do we deprive a man of what he has, by adviſing him not to change it? Is the paying a reſpect to every religion, making a mock of all religions? In a word, is it ſo eſſential to the profeſſors of each, to hate one another, that, if that hate be removed, religion itſelf is aboliſhed?

Yet this is what the people are told by thoſe who are in power, when the public odium is to be excited againſt the advocate for truth. So now, ye cruel perſecutors, your arrets, your mandates, and your journals, exaſperate and abuſe the public on my account. On the credit of your clamours the world conceives me a monſter of wickedneſs: Your clamours, however, will, ſooner or latter, ſubſide, and my writings will remain to your ſhame. The more moderate Chriſtians will ſearch them, with aſtoniſhment, for thoſe horrid ſentiments you pretend to find there, and will only ſee the morals of their divine Maſter mixed with leſſons of peace, concord, and charity. May they learn thence to be more juſt than their fathers! May the virtues they gather from thence avenge me one day of your maledictions!

With regard to ſuch objections as relate to the particular ſects into which the world is divided, would I could give them ſufficient force to make every one leſs opiniated of his own, and leſs an enemy to others; to induce every one to be indulgent and candid, from the natural and ſtriking conſideration, that if he had been born

born in a different country, or among a different ſect, he would have infallibly taken that for error which he now takes for truth, and that for truth which he now takes for error! It is of ſo much conſequence to mankind to regard leſs the opinions which ſerve to divide, than thoſe which unite them! On the contrary, by neglecting what they approve in common, they are embittered againſt each other on account of their particular ſentiments; ſtickling moſt for thoſe opinions which ſeem the moſt unreaſonable, while every one ſupplies with confidence that authority which reaſon refuſes. Thus, while we are all agreed at the bottom about every thing which is truly intereſting, and of which we take little notice, we ſpend our lives in diſputation, in quarrelling, and in perſecuting each other, on account of thoſe things we underſtand the leaſt, and which it is leaſt neceſſary for us to underſtand. Deciſions after deciſions are made to no purpoſe, and their contradictions palliated in vain by an unintelligible jargon; we find every day new queſtions to reſolve, and new ſubjects to quarrel about; becauſe every doctrine hath infinite branches, and becauſe every body, full of the importance of his petty refinement, believes that to be eſſential which is not ſo, and neglects what really is ſo. Hence, if any one propoſes objections which they can not reſolve, which, on account of the perplexity of their doctrines, becomes every day more eaſy to do, they are as fretful as children; and becauſe they are more attached to their party than to the truth, and have more pride than ſincerity, the leſs they are able to prove, the leſs are they diſpoſed to pardon any doubt.

My

My own hiſtory may ſerve to ſhew, better than any other, the judgment we ought to form of our modern Chriſtians; but as this would ſay more of them than is credible, it may perhaps one day give riſe to an opinion directly oppoſite: that which is now the opprobrium of my contemporaries may be their glory; when the well-meaning reader of my work ſhall cry out, in the ſimplicity of his heart, "What heavenly times muſt thoſe have been when ſuch a book as this was burnt as impious, and its author perſecuted as a malefactor! Doubtleſs, the productions of that age muſt have breathed the moſt ſublime devotion, the whole earth muſt have been covered with ſaints!"

But other books will likewiſe remain. It will be known, for example, that the ſame age produced a panegyriſt on the feaſt of St Bartholomew, a Frenchman, and, as it may well be believed, an Eccleſiaſtic, without exciting either Parliament or Prelate againſt him. Then indeed, by comparing the morals of the two books, and the crimes of their reſpective authors, the language of the world might be changed, and a different concluſion drawn.

Thoſe are abominable doctrines which excite people to injuſtice, to murder, and fanaticiſm. For what can be more abominable than to reduce violence and injuſtice to a ſyſtem, and to deduce them from the mercy of God? I ſhall abſtain here from drawing a parallel that may diſpleaſe you. So far, however, your Lordſhip will agree with me, that if France had profeſſed the religion of the Savoyard Prieſt, a religion ſo pure and ſimple, inculcating the fear of God and the love of man, your fields would not have

ſo often been dyed with blood; a people ſo gay and agreeable would not have aſtoniſhed the reſt of mankind with their cruelties in ſo many maſſacres and perſecutions, from the time of the inquiſition of Tholouſe * to the feaſt of St Bartholomew; the Counſellor Du Bourg would not have been gibbeted for having given his opinion in favour of the Proteſtants; the inhabitants of Merindol and the Cabrieres had not been put to death by an arret of the Parliament of Aix; nor in our own times the unhappy Calas been put to the torture and expired on the wheel, for a crime of which he could not be guilty. But we ſhall now return, my Lord, to your cenſures, and the reaſons on which you found them. It is always men, ſays the Curate, who tell us the word of God, and who tell us it alſo in unknown tongues. On the contrary, we often ſtand in great need of God to aſcertain the word of men; it is, at leaſt, certain he might have given us his own word, inſtead of making uſe of ſuch ſuſpected inſtruments. The Curate complains that ſo much human teſtimony is requiſite to aſcertain the divine word: *How many men are there*, ſays he, *between God and me!*

To this you reply: "To juſtify this complaint, my dear brethren, we ought to be able to

* It is true that St Dominic, a Spaniſh ſaint, bore a conſiderable part in this inquſition. This ſaint, according to a writer of his order, had ſo much charity in preaching againſt the Albigenſes, as to unite himſelf to certain devout perſons, who, being zealous for the faith, took care to extirpate thoſe heretics by the material ſword, who could not be ſubdued by the ſword of the ſpirit.—This kind of charity little reſembles that of our good Curate, and was indeed differently rewarded. The profeſſors of the one are perſecuted, while thoſe of the other are canonized.

to affirm that a revelation muſt be falſe, when it is not made to every individual; we ought to be able to ſay, that God cannot require us to believe any thing he has ſaid, unleſs he had particularly addreſſed himſelf to us."

On the contrary, however, this complaint is juſtifiable only by admitting the truth of revelation. For if you ſuppoſe it falſe, what complaint have you a right to make againſt the means God hath made uſe of, when he hath confeſſedly made uſe of none? Ought he to account to you for all the abuſes of an impoſtor? When you permit yourſelves to be duped, it is your fault, and not his. But if God, doubtleſs at liberty to uſe his own means, hath given the preference to thoſe which require on our part ſo much erudition and ſuch profound inveſtigation, is the Curate to blame to wiſh, "That, being always reduced to the neceſſity of examining, comparing, and verifying the evidence, God had deigned to have ſaved him all that trouble?" ſhould he have ſerved him with a leſs willing heart?

Your minor, my Lord, is ſo admirable, that I ſhall tranſcribe it verbatim. I am indeed fond of making uſe of your own words; this is my greateſt partiality. "But is there not an infinite number of facts even prior to that of the Chriſtian revelation, of which it would be abſurd to doubt? Now by what means do we acquire the knowledge of theſe facts but by human teſtimony? By what other means did our author himſelf become acquainted with Sparta, with Athens, and with Rome, on whoſe laws, manners, and heroes, he laviſhes ſuch extravagant encomiums? What a number of men between

him

him and even the hiſtorians that tranſmitted to him an account of thoſe events!"

If the ſubject were leſs ſerious, or had I leſs reſpect for your Lordſhip, this manner of reaſoning would furniſh me with an opportunity of diverting my readers; but God forbid that I ſhould forget what is due to the ſubject I am treating, or to the perſons whom I addreſs. At the hazard, therefore, of being flat and inſipid in my reply, I ſhall content myſelf with barely pointing out your error.

You will pleaſe to conſider, then, that it is perfectly conſiſtent with the order of things, that human facts ſhould be atteſted by human witneſſes. They cannot be confirmed by any other means; for how ſhould I know that Sparta and Rome ever exiſted, unleſs by means of contemporary authors? Now between me and authors, who lived ſo far diſtant from me, there muſt neceſſarily be intermediate communicants: But where is the neceſſity of any ſuch between God and me? and wherefore at leaſt ſuch as lived at ſo great a diſtance of place and time, that they muſt ſtand in need of ſo many others? Is it ſimple or natural that God ſhould have made choice of Moſes to ſpeak to John-James Rouſſeau?

Add to this, that no one is obliged, under pain of damnation, to believe that Rome or Sparta have exiſted; nor is any one conſigned to eternal flames for having doubted it. Every fact, of which we are not eye-witneſſes, muſt gain credit with us from the moral evidence of its truth, and all moral evidence is capable of a greater or leſs degree of certitude. Can I believe, therefore, that divine juſtice will caſt me for ever into hell, merely for not determining exactly

exactly the point at which ſuch evidence becomes irrefragable?

There is not an hiſtorical fact in the world more fully atteſted than that of the Vampires. It is confirmed by regular information, certificates of Notaries, Surgeons, Vicars, and Magiſtrates. And yet, with all this, who believes in the Vampires? And ſhall we be all damned for not believing? However well atteſted, even in the opinion of the incredulous Cicero, are many of the prodigies related by Livy, I cannot help regarding them as ſo many fables, and certainly am not the only perſon who doth ſo. My conſtant experience, as well as that of mankind in general, is much more convincing in this reſpect than the teſtimony of individuals. If Sparta and Rome were in themſelves prodigies, they were prodigies of the moral kind; ſo that we ſhould be like the Laplanders, who fix the natural ſtature of man at four foot, if we ſhould circumſcribe the human mind within the ſtandard of thoſe little ſouls which exiſt in modern times.

You will pleaſe to remember, my Lord, that I go on to examine your arguments in themſelves, without defending thoſe you have controverted. After this neceſſary intimation, I will take the liberty to make another ſuppoſition on your method of argumentation.

I will ſuppoſe that an inhabitant of St James's ſtreet ſhould addreſs himſelf to the Archbiſhop of Paris, in the following manner: "I know, my Lord, that you neither believe in the beatification of St John de Paris, nor in the miracles which it pleaſed God to work openly on his tomb in the ſight of the moſt enlightened and

numerous multitude. I think it my duty, therefore, to assure you, that I myself saw that Saint in person rise up from the place where his bones were deposited."

To this, we will suppose, he adds a detail of those particular circumstances which would be most striking to the spectator of such a fact. I am persuaded, that, on receiving this piece of information, you would begin your reply by inquiring into the situation and sentiments of the informant; concerning his confessor, and other matters of that kind: and when you had comprehended, both by his manner and discourse, that he was a poor mechanick, who could not produce his certificate of confession, you would be confirmed in the opinion of his being a Janseniſt. In which case, you would doubtless answer him in a tone of raillery: "Ay, ay, my friend, you are a convulsionary, and have seen the resurrection of the Abbe Paris? It is not at all surprising in you, who have seen so many other miracles."

In reply to this, I go on to suppose he persists in the truth of his relation. He will tell you, that he was not alone when he saw this miracle; that there were two or three persons with him who saw the same thing; and that others, to whom he had spoken of it, assured him also they themselves had seen the same. On this, you would ask him if all these witnesses were Janseniſts too? "Yes, my Lord, they were; but this is no matter; they are sufficient in number, of irreproachable manners, of great good sense, and in every respect unexceptionable; the proof is complete, and nothing is wanting to our declaration to ascertain the veracity of the fact."

Some

Some leſs charitable Biſhops might ſend for a commiſſary, and conſign the honeſt man, who had been honoured with this extraordinary viſion, to the hoſpital for lunatics. But you, my Lord, more humane, without being more credulous, would content yourſelf, after giving him a ſerious reprimand, to diſmiſs him thus: "I know that two or three witneſſes, of good morals and common ſenſe, are ſufficient to atteſt the life or death of a man; but I know not how many are requiſite to confirm the reſurrection of a Janſeniſt. Go then, my friend, and till I know this, endeavour to rectify and compoſe your brain. I diſpenſe with your faſting; and here is ſomething to buy you a good dinner."

This, my Lord, is nearly what you would ſay to him, and what every other ſenſible man would ſay in the ſame caſe. Hence I conclude, as well from your Lordſhip, as from every other man of ſenſe, that the moral proofs, ſufficient to aſcertain the facts which are in the order of poſſibilities, are not ſufficient to aſcertain facts of a different order, or thoſe which are ſupernatural: On which I leave you to judge of the juſtice of your compariſon. And yet, the following is the exulting inference you bring forth againſt me: "The ſcepticiſm of our author, therefore, with regard to this particular, is evidently founded on nothing but the intereſts of his own infidelity."

If my infidelity, my Lord, ſhould ever procure me a biſhoprick worth an hundred thouſand livres per annum, you might then talk of the intereſts of my infidelity.

I proceed to tranſcribe your remarks; taking the liberty only of reſtoring, when neceſſary,

thoſe paſſages of my book which you have omitted.

"What if a man (ſays he a little further) ſhould come and harangue us in the following manner: *I come, ye mortals, to announce to you the will of the Moſt High; acknowledge in my voice, that of him who ſent me. I command the ſun to move backwards, the ſtars to change their places, the mountains to diſappear, the waves to remain fixed on high, and the earth to wear a different aſpect.* Who would not, at the ſight of ſuch miracles, immediately attribute them to the Author of nature?"—"Who would not think, my dear brethren, that a writer, who ſpeaks in this manner, wanted only to be a witneſs to a miracle to become a Chriſtian?—You might have ſaid ſtill more, my Lord, as I do not even ſtand in need of miracles to be a Chriſtian.

"But hear what he ſays farther; "The moſt important examination, after all, remains to be made into the truth of the doctrine delivered; for as thoſe who ſay that God is pleaſed to work theſe miracles, pretend that the devil ſometimes imitates them, we are no nearer than before, though ſuch miracles ſhould be ever ſo well atteſted. As the magicians of Pharaoh worked the ſame miracles, even in the preſence of Moſes, as he himſelf performed by the expreſs command of God; why might not they, in his abſence, pretend, on the ſame proofs, to the ſame authority? Thus, after proving the truth of the doctrine by the miracle, you are reduced to prove the truth of the miracle by the doctrine, leſt the works of the devil ſhould be miſtaken for thoſe of God. What is to be done in this caſe? There is but one ſtep to be taken;

and that is to recur to reaſon, and leave miracles to themſelves: better indeed had it been never to have had recourſe to them *."

This is as much as to ſay, continues your Lordſhip, *ſhew me a miracle and I will believe*. Yes, my Lord, it as much as to ſay, Shew me a miracle, and I will believe in miracles. And again, *Yet when you have ſhewn me a miracle, I will not believe*. Yes, my Lord, it is ſaying, agreeable to the precept of Moſes, that though a miracle be ſhewn me, I will not therefore believe in any abſurd or unreaſonable doctrine it may be calculated to ſupport. I ſhould ſooner believe in the power of magic, than acknowledge the voice of God in ſuch injunctions as contradict my reaſon.

I have ſaid that the plaineſt arguments of common ſenſe might in this particular be obſcured and perplexed by ſubtle diſtinctions: This is alſo one of my predictions; of which the following paſſage is the accompliſhment.

"When a doctrine is acknowledged to be divine, and to be founded on the truth of poſitive revelation, we make uſe of it indeed to judge of miracles; that is, to reject the pretended prodigies which impoſtors may ſet up againſt ſuch doctrine. When the point in queſtion is an entire new doctrine, which is ſaid to be dictated by the ſpirit of God, miracles are produced as proofs of it; that is to ſay, the perſon who aſſumes the character of a miſſionary from the Moſt High, confirms his miſſion and the doctrines he

* I have been obliged here, after his Lordſhip's example, to confound the text and the notes. The reader may conſult both by turning to Emilius, vol. ii. p. 196, &c.

preaches by miracles, which are the teſtimony of God himſelf. Thus the doctrine and the miracles are made uſe of reſpectively, according to the different points of view in which they are placed, in the ſtudy or illuſtration of religion. But in this there is no abuſe of argument, ridiculous ſophiſtry, or abſurd reaſoning in a circle."

Of this I leave the reader to judge. For my part, I ſhall not add a ſyllable. I have ſometimes replied to your arguments by others of my own; but ſhall here leave you to be anſwered by yourſelf.

Where then, my good brethren, is that philoſophical candour and ſincerity of which this writer makes ſo great a boaſt?

In anſwer to this queſtion, my Lord, I can only reply, that I never piqued myſelf on any philoſophical ſincerity, for I know of no ſuch thing. Nay, I cannot ſay much in favour even of Chriſtian ſincerity, while the profeſſed Chriſtians of our own times take it ſo ill that we do not ſuppreſs every objection they are not able to remove. But for pure candour and ſimple ſincerity, I may boldly aſk, whether yours or mine be more evident in the caſe before us?

The farther I advance, the more intereſting is the ſubject between us; I muſt therefore continue to tranſcribe your mandate: in a diſcuſſion of ſo much importance I ſhould not omit even a ſingle word.

Will it be believed, that, after having taken the greateſt pains to invalidate the human teſtimony of the Chriſtian revelation, the ſame author ſhould pay it the moſt ſolemn and poſitive deference imaginable?

There would, doubtleſs, be a reaſon for it; as

I hold every doctrine to be revealed, in which I acknowledge the traces of the divine Spirit. It is requiſite only to render your expreſſion leſs equivocal. If, by ſaying a deference to *it*, you mean to the Chriſtian revelation, you are in the right; but if you mean to the human teſtimony of it, you are certainly wrong. But be this as it will, I appeal to your teſtimony againſt thoſe who pretend that I reject all revelation; as if to confeſs that a doctrine is attended with difficulties inſuperable by the human underſtanding, is to reject it; and as if the not admitting it upon human teſtimony were to reject it, when there are other equivalent or ſuperior proofs, on account of which that may be well diſpenſed with.

To convince you of this ſtrange inconſiſtence, and at the ſame time to ſerve for your edification, my dear brethren, I ſhall cite the paſſage wherein he hath done this in the plaineſt terms. "I will confeſs to you, ſays he, that the majeſty of the ſcriptures ſtrikes me with admiration; as the purity of the goſpel hath its influence on my heart. Peruſe the works of our philoſophers with all their pomp of diction: How mean, how contemptible are they, compared with the ſcriptures! Is it poſſible that a book, at once ſo ſimple and ſublime, ſhould be merely the work of man? Is it poſſible that the ſacred Perſonage, whoſe hiſtory it contains, ſhould be himſelf a mere man? Do we find that he aſſumed the tone of an enthuſiaſt or ambitious ſectary? What ſweetneſs, what purity in his manners! What an affecting gracefulneſs in his delivery! What ſublimity in his maxims! What profound wiſdom in his diſcourſes! What preſence of mind, what

what ſubtilty, what truth, in his replies! How great the command over his paſſions! Where is the man, where the philoſopher, who could ſo live and ſo die, without weakneſs and without oſtentation? * When Plato deſcribed his imaginary good man loaded with all the ſhame of guilt, yet meriting the higheſt rewards of virtue, he deſcribes exactly the character of Jeſus Chriſt: The reſemblance was ſo ſtriking, that all the Fathers perceived it.

"What prepoſſeſſion, what blindneſs muſt it be, to compare the ſon of Sophroniſcus to the Son of Mary? What an infinite diſproportion there is between them! Socrates, dying without pain or ignominy, eaſily ſupported his character to the laſt; and if his death, however eaſy, had not crowned his life, it might have been doubted whether Socrates, with all his wiſdom, was any thing more than a vain ſophiſt. He invented, it is ſaid, the theory of morals. Others, however, had before put them in practice; he had only to ſay, therefore, what they had done, and reduce their examples to precept. Ariſtides had been *juſt* before Socrates defined *juſtice*: Leonidas had given up his life for his country, before Socrates declared patriotiſm to be a duty; the Spartans were a ſober people before Socrates recommended ſobriety; before he had even defined virtue, Greece abounded in virtuous men. But where could Jeſus learn, among his compatriots, that

* I have thought proper, as I came along, to fill up the breaks made by the archbiſhop; not only to ſupply thoſe omiſſions which he may have made with an inſidious deſign, but alſo every other, as the want of connection frequently weakens the paſſage, and as my enemies are very ſolicitous to ſuppreſs every thing I have ſaid in favour of religion.

that pure and ſublime morality, of which he only hath given us both precept and example. The greateſt wiſdom was made known amidſt the moſt bigotted fanaticiſm, and the ſimplicity of the moſt heroic virtues did honour to the vileſt people on earth. The death of Socrates, peaceably philoſophiſing with his friends, appears the moſt agreeable that could be wiſhed for; that of Jeſus expiring in the midſt of agonizing pains, abuſed, inſulted, and curſed by a whole nation, is the moſt horrible that could be feared. Socrates, in receiving the cup of poiſon, bleſſed indeed the weeping executioner who adminiſtered it; but Jeſus, in the midſt of excruciating tortures, prayed for his mercileſs tormentors. Yes, if the life and death of Socrates were thoſe of a ſage, the life and death of Jeſus are thoſe of a God. Shall we ſuppoſe the Evangelic Hiſtory a mere fiction? Indeed, my friend, it bears not the marks of fiction; on the contrary, the hiſtory of Socrates, which nobody preſumes to doubt, is not ſo well atteſted as that of Jeſus Chriſt. Such a ſuppoſition, in fact, only ſhifts the difficulty, without obviating it: It is more inconceivable that a number of perſons ſhould agree to write ſuch a hiſtory, than that one only ſhould furniſh the ſubject of it. The Jewiſh authors were incapable of the diction, and ſtrangers to the morality contained in the goſpel; the marks of whoſe truth are ſo ſtriking and inimitable, that the inventor would be a more aſtoniſhing character than the hero *." *It would be difficult, my dear brethren, to expreſs a more explicit homage to the authenticity of the Goſpel.* I am obliged

* Emilius, vol. ii. p. 215, *&c.*

bliged to you, my Lord, for this conceſſion, as you are by ſo far leſs unjuſt than my other enemies. *And yet*, ſay you, *the author acknowledges it only in conſequence of human teſtimony.* Here, my Lord, you are miſtaken; I acknowledge ſuch authenticity in conſequence of the goſpel itſelf, and that ſublimity which I find in it, abſtracted from any moral evidence. I do not want any aſſurance that a goſpel exiſts, when I I am myſelf in poſſeſſion of it. *It is always men that report what other men have reported*, and nothing more: they do not report the exiſtence of a goſpel; this I ſee with my own eyes; and ſhould the whole world maintain that there is no ſuch thing, I ſhould be firmly convinced the whole world was miſtaken. *What a number of men between God and him!* Not one. The goſpel itſelf determines this point, and this is in my own hands. By what means ſoever it came there, and by whomſoever written, I acknowledge in it the dictates of the Divine Spirit. This is as immediately preſent as poſſible; there are no human witneſſes between this evidence, and my own heart; the ſenſe in which human teſtimony intervenes, regarding the hiſtory of this ſacred book, its authors, the time when it was written, *&c.* all which points enter into thoſe critical diſcuſſions in which moral evidence univerſally is admitted. Such is the reply of the Savoyard Curate.

Nothing can be more evident, you ſay, *than that the writer here contradicts himſelf, and is confuted on his own principles.* Your Lordſhip is welcome to enjoy my confuſion.—*How ſtrangely infatuated therefore is the author to add*, " And yet, with all this, the ſame goſpel abounds

bounds with incredible relations, with circumſtances repugnant to reaſon, and which it is impoſſible for a man of ſenſe either to conceive or admit! What is to be done amidſt all theſe contradictions? Be modeſt and circumſpect: regard in ſilence * what cannot be either diſproved or comprehended, and humble thyſelf before the Supreme Being, who only knows the truth. Such is the involuntary ſcepticiſm in which I remain." *But can this ſcepticiſm, my dear brethren, be indeed involuntary, when he refuſes to admit the doctrines of a book, which, by his own confeſſion, cannot be the work of man? when this book bears the marks of truth, ſo ſtriking, ſo great, and ſo inimitable, that the inventor would be more aſtoniſhing than the hero of it? Surely we may here ſafely ſay, that iniquity hath belied itſelf.*

You charge me with iniquity, my Lord, without a reaſon; and often impute to me falſehood, of which you gave no example. You will pleaſe to

* In order that mankind ſhould impoſe on themſelves this reſpectful ſilence, it is requiſite that ſomebody ſhould give them for once the reaſons for ſo doing. He, who is ſenſible of theſe reaſons, may give them; but thoſe who cenſure others without giving them, may as well be ſilent. To addreſs the public boldly and with frankneſs, is the right of every man, and even his duty on ſubjects of utility: But it is not right for one individual publicly to cenſure another; this is attributing to himſelf too great a ſuperiority of virtue and abilities. It is for this reaſon I have never taken upon me to criticiſe or reprimand any one. I have told the age indeed ſome harſh truths; and I have not been ſevere on individuals; but when I have occaſionally controverted or mentioned the writings of others, I have always ſpoken of living authors with the utmoſt tenderneſs and circumſpection. The public is witneſs of the return they have made me. Indeed, all thoſe gentlemen, who are ſo very forward and ambitious to teach me humility, appear to find this advice much eaſier to give than to take.

to obſerve, I take a contrary method with you.

The ſcepticiſm of the Curate is involuntary, for the very reaſon you give that it is not ſo. He would have rejected the goſpel indeed, for the reaſons before given, if ſupported only by thoſe feeble authorities you would give it, and if that Divine Spirit which breathes in its morals and doctrines did not give it all that authority which human teſtimony muſt ever want in a matter of this kind.

He admits, therefore, of this ſacred book, with all the admirable things it contains, and which the human underſtanding may comprehend: But *as to thoſe incredible things which are repugnant to reaſon, and which it is impoſſible for a man of ſenſe either to conceive or admit*, he regards them in ſilence without comprehending or rejecting them, and humbles himſelf before that Great Being who only knows the truth. Such is his ſcepticiſm; and this ſcepticiſm muſt needs be involuntary, ſince it is founded on irrefragable proofs both on one ſide and the other, which force the underſtanding to remain in ſuſpenſe. This ſcepticiſm is that of every rational and ſincere Chriſtian, who is deſirous of knowing the things of heaven only ſo far as he can comprehend them, of knowing thoſe only which are of importance to his moral practice; rejecting, with the apoſtle, all fooliſh and uninſtructive queſtions, which ſerve to engender ſtrife.

You ſuppoſe me to reject revelation, in order to adopt natural religion; now I have not, in the firſt place, rejected revelation. After this, *you accuſe me of not even admitting natural religion, or at leaſt of not acknowledging the neceſſity of it.* And your only proof of it is in the following

lowing paſſage, which you quote for that purpoſe. "If I am miſtaken, it is without deſign. This is ſufficient to prevent my errors from being imputed to me as a crime. And though you ſhould be miſtaken in the ſame manner, it is of very little conſequence." "That is to ſay," continues your Lordſhip, "It is ſufficient, according to this writer, to be perſuaded you are in poſſeſſion of the truth, in order that ſuch perſuaſion, tho' attended with the moſt monſtrous errors, ſhould not be a ſubject of reproach; and that every man, who profeſſes himſelf to be ſincere and ingenuous, ſhould be accounted religious and wiſe, tho' adopting even the horrid doctrines of atheiſm. Is not this throwing open the door to introduce all the modes of ſuperſtition, fanatical ſyſtems, and chimerical notions of the human mind?"

For your part, my Lord, I am perſuaded, you cannot here ſay, with the Curate, *If I am miſtaken, it is without deſign.* For it is very evident that it is with deſign you are pleaſed to give into a miſtake yourſelf, and then impoſe it on your readers. This, my Lord, I engage unanſwerably to prove; and make this previous declaration, that you may be more attentive to what I ſay.

The profeſſion of faith by the Savoyard Curate is compoſed of two parts. The firſt, which is the longeſt, of the greateſt importance, and abounds moſt with new and ſtriking truths, is intended to controvert the doctrines of modern materialiſm, and to confirm the exiſtence of God and the principles of natural religion, with all the force the author's abilities would amit of. Neither your Lordſhip, nor the prieſts, have ta-

ken any notice of this part, the ſubject of it being indifferent to you; for, in fact, the cauſe of God affects you but little, provided the intereſts of the clergy are ſecure.

The ſecond part, much ſhorter, more irregular, and more ſuperficial, contains certain doubts, and difficulties relative to revelations in general; aſcribing, however, to ours that real certitude which is evident in the purity and ſanctity of its doctrines, and in that ſublimity altogether divine which diſtinguiſhed its great Author. The deſign of this ſecond part, is to make every one more moderate and reſerved in the profeſſion of his own religion, and in taxing others of different perſuaſions with inſincerity; by ſhewing, that the proofs of the beſt were not ſo demonſtrative as to authoriſe them to treat thoſe as criminals who do not ſee ſo clearly as themſelves. This ſecond part, written modeſtly and with all poſſible reſpect, is that only which hath attracted the attention of your Lordſhip and of the magiſtrates. But you have nothing but perſecution and abuſe to offer in refutation of my arguments. You have weighed the evil conſequences of doubting what is really doubtful; but you have not conſidered the good conſequences of proving what is really true.

In fact, the firſt part, which contains every thing which is really eſſential to religion, is abſolute and deciſive. The author here neither deliberates nor doubts. Both his conſcience and reaſon are fully determined; he believes, he affirms, and is moſt ſtrongly perſuaded of the truth of what is laid down.

As to the ſecond part, he begins it, on the contrary, with declaring, that "the examination

tion he is going to make is very different from the former; preſenting to his view nothing but perplexity, myſteriouſneſs, and obſcurity;" that no farther authority ſhould be placed on his diſcourſe than that of reaſon; that he was ignorant himſelf whether he was right or wrong, and that all his affirmations are only ſo many rational doubts.

He propoſes, therefore, his objections and difficulties. At the ſame time, alſo, he propoſes the reaſons and grounds of his belief: So that from the whole diſcuſſion there reſults a certitude in all the eſſential points of religion, and a reſpectful ſcepticiſm concerning the reſt. Towards the end of the ſecond part, he inſiſts again on the circumſpection with which he ought to be heard.

"If I were more poſitive in myſelf, I ſhould have aſſumed a more deciſive and dictatorial air; but I am a man ignorant and ſubject to error. What can I do more? I have opened to you my heart without reſerve: What I have thought certain, I have given you as ſuch; my doubts I have declared as doubts, my opinions as opinions; and have given you my reaſons for both. It remains now for you to judge."

When the author of that paper, therefore, ſays, "If I am miſtaken, it is without deſign, which is ſufficient to prevent my errors from being imputed to me as a crime;" I will aſk every reader of common ſenſe and the leaſt ſincerity, Whether it be on the firſt or ſecond part that the ſuſpicion muſt fall of his being in an error? Whether it muſt fall on that which he poſitively affirms to be true, or on that which he heſitates upon? Whether this ſuſpicion relates

to his falsely believing in a God, or his being in the wrong as to his doubts concerning revelation? You, my Lord, have declared the first, against all reason, and with the sole view of making me appear criminal; I may defy your Lordship to assign any other motive. Where then is, I will not say justice, or Christian charity, but your sense and your humanity?

But, supposing you could have been mistaken as to the object of the Curate's suspicion in this case, the very passage you quote would have undeceived you in spite of yourself. For, when he says, *This is sufficient to prevent my error from being imputed to me as a crime*, he acknowledges that such an error might be a crime, and might be imputed to him, if he were not sincere: But on the supposition that there is no God, where is the crime of believing there is one? And supposing it to be a crime, who is to impute it to us? The fear, therefore, of being in an error, cannot relate to what is said of natural religion; the discourse of the Curate being, in fact, a very strange heap of absurdities indeed in the sense you have ascribed to it. It is then impossible to infer, from the passage you quote, either that *I do not admit of natural religion*, or that *I do not acknowledge its necessity*. It is still much less possible to infer from thence, *that every man who professes himself sincere and ingenuous should be accounted religious and wise, though adopting the horrid doctrines of atheism*. I will add also, that it was equally impossible for you to think the inference you thus drew a just one. If this be not demonstrated, nothing can possibly be so, or I must be totally void of common understanding.

To

To ſhew that no divine miſſion can authoriſe a man to propagate abſurdities, the Curate conceives a diſpute to ariſe between a pretender to inſpiration, whom you are pleaſed to ſtyle a Chriſtian, and a rationaliſt, whom you are pleaſed to call an unbeliever; theſe he ſuppoſes to talk in their own language, which he diſapproves, and which is aſſuredly neither his nor mine. On this head, you charge me with notorious partiality and inſincerity, and you prove it by the fooliſhneſs of the diſcourſe of the firſt of theſe characters. But if what he ſays be ſo very fooliſh, why do you honour him with the name of Chriſtian? And if the rationaliſt refutes only futile aſſertions, what right have you to tax him with infidelity? Doth it follow, from the abſurdities advanced by a pretender to inſpiration, that he muſt be a Catholic? or from thoſe which a rationaliſt refutes, that the latter muſt be an infidel?

"*If reaſon and revelation contradict each other*, you ſay, *it is certain that God would contradict himſelf.*" This is a very great conceſſion, my Lord; for it is very certain that God cannot contradict himſelf. Again, "*You tell us, ye impious infidels, that the tenets which we look upon to be revealed, contradict eternal truths: But it is not ſufficient for you merely to aſſert this.*" Certainly it is not; let us endeavour, therefore, to do ſomething more.

I dare ſay, you already foreſee the point I aim at. Indeed, it is plain, you paſſed over this myſterious article as if you had walked on burning coals, on which you were afraid to truſt your feet. You oblige me, however, to ſtop you for a moment, even in this painful ſituation. I

ſhall be prudent enough, however, to detain you as little as poſſible.

You will agree with me, I imagine, that one of thoſe eternal truths, which ſerve as the firſt principles of ratiocination, is, that *a part is leſs than the whole*; and it is for having affirmed the contrary that the dogmatiſt appears to you to talk fooliſhly and abſurdly. Now, according to your doctrine of tranſubſtantiation, when Jeſus held his laſt ſupper with his diſciples, and having broken bread gave unto each of them his body, it is clear that he muſt hold his whole body in his hand; and if he eat of the conſecrated bread himſelf, as he probably might, he muſt put his head into his mouth. Here then is a clear and ſufficient proof that a part is greater than the whole, and that the thing containing is leſs than the thing contained. What ſay you to this, my Lord? For my part, I know nobody but the Chevalier de Cauſans *, who can get you out of this difficulty.

I am not inſenſible, indeed, that you have the reſource of St Auguſtin: but that amounts to the ſame thing; this good father, after having piled up a heap of unintelligible arguments about the Trinity, very ingenuouſly confeſſing they had no meaning: *But*, adds he, very frankly, *we expreſs ourſelves in this manner, not with the view of ſaying any thing, but only that we may not be totally ſilent* †.

Every thing conſidered, my Lord, I think the beſt method you can take with regard to this article,

* A gentleman who undertakes to demonſtrate various impoſſibilities.

† Dictum eſt tamen tres perſonæ, non ut aliquid diceretur, ſed ne taceretur. *Aug. de Trinit. l.* v. *c.* 9.

article, as well as many others, is that which you have already taken with M. de Montazet, and for the very ſame reaſon.

"*The inſincerity of the author of Emilius is not leſs reprehenſible in the language of his pretended Catholic.*" We Catholics, ſays he, make a great noiſe about the authority of the Church: But what do we gain by it, if it requires as many proofs to eſtabliſh this authority as other ſects require immediately to eſtabliſh their doctrines: The church determines, that the church hath a right to determine: Is not this a ſpecial proof of its authority? "Who would not think, my dear brethren, from the pretences of this impoſtor, that the authority of the church is to be proved only by its deciſions, and that it proceeds arbitrarily thus; I determine that I am infallible, therefore I am infallible. A ſcandalous imputation! my dear brethren."—This, my Lord, is your aſſertion; now let us examine your proofs. In the mean time, will you venture to affirm, that the Catholic divines have never eſtabliſhed the authority of the church on that very authority itſelf, *ut in ſe virtualiter reflexum?* If they really have done it, I lay on them no ſcandalous or calumniatory imputation.

The conſtitution of Chriſtianity, the ſpirit of the Goſpel, and even the errors and weakneſs of the human underſtanding, all ſerve to demonſtrate, that the church, eſtabliſhed by Jeſus Chriſt, is an infallible church. All this, my Lord, is vague and indeterminate; theſe things, which you ſay ſerve to demonſtrate, in fact demonſtrate nothing. Let us proceed, therefore, directly to the ſubſtance of your demonſtration. "*We are aſſured, that*

that, as the divine legiſlator always inſtructed mankind in the ways of truth, the church of Chriſt will ever do the ſame. But who are you that give us this as a ſole and unanſwerable proof! Are not you the church, or its heads? By the manner in which you argue, you ſeem to make yourſelves very ſure of the aſſiſtance of the Holy Spirit. Yet what is it you have ſaid, and what ſays the impoſtor? You will examine this point yourſelves; as I really have not the courage to do it.

I ought, however, to remark, that the force of the objection which you have thus attacked, lay in the words which you took care to ſuppreſs toward the end of the paſſage here pointed at, *And yet, depart from this, and we enter into endleſs diſcuſſions* *. The Curate's argument, in plain terms, is this: To make choice of one religion out of ſeveral, ſays he, one of theſe two methods is requiſite: either to hear the proofs of every different ſect, and then compare them together; or to rely altogether on the authority of thoſe who inſtruct us in ſuch tenets. Now the firſt method requires ſuch a degree of knowledge as few perſons are in a ſtate of acquiring, and the ſecond would juſtify every one in profeſſing the religion of the country where he was born. As an inſtance of this, he brings that of the Roman Catholics, in which the authority of the church is held ſacred; and on that he eſtabliſhes his ſecond dilemma. Either the church arrogates to itſelf this authority, and ſays, *I determine that I am infallible, therefore I am ſo:* by which means it falls into the ſophiſtical error of reaſoning in a circle: or elſe it muſt prove

* Emilius, vol. ii. p. 207.

prove that it received this authority from God; in which caſe, there is as great a multiplicity of proofs required to ſhew that the Romiſh church hath received this authority, as other ſects require to eſtabliſh directly the truth of their doctrine. No advantage, therefore, is gained in the way of inſtruction; nor are the people more capacitated to examine into the proofs of the authority of the church among the Catholics, than into thoſe of the doctrine among the Proteſtants. How then are they to determine in any reaſonable manner, otherwiſe than by the authority of their inſtructors? But, granting this, the Turk will determine in the ſame manner; and how will he in that be more to blame than you? This, my Lord, is the argument to which you have made no reply, and which I conceive indeed to be unanſwerable *. But your Epiſcopal liberality hath extricated you from the difficulty, by diſengenuouſly mangling the paſſage of the author.

Thank heaven I have now finiſhed this very pain-

* This is one of thoſe terrible objections which my opponents are very cautious of meddling with. Nothing is more eaſy than to reply by abuſe and pious declamations. It is not very difficult to ſhift off what is embarraſſing. Hence it muſt be confeſſed, that the divines have, in their controverſies, many advantages, which they want, in diſputing with the ignorant, and with whom they muſt make up the defect as well as they can. They can reciprocally amuſe each other by ſuppoſitions which cannot be objected to by thoſe who have themſelves nothing better to offer. Of this nature is the expedient of I know not what kind of faith, which, in order to get rid of the difficulty, they oblige the Deity to tranſmit from father to ſon. This jargon, however, they reſerve for their diſputations with their own profeſſion: Should they make uſe of them in their diſputes with us profane cavillers, they would juſtly be afraid of being turned into ridicule.

painful task; in which I have pursued your arguments, quotations, and censures, step by step; having shewn, that as often as you have attacked my book you have been in the wrong. There remains only the single article of government. I am very ready however to forgive every thing that may be said on this head; being very certain, that when the man who groans under the miseries of a people, and himself experiences them, is accused by you of poisoning the sources of public felicity, every reader must be sensible of the weight of your arguments. If my Treatise on the Social Compact did not exist, and it were necessary to prove anew the important truths which are there displayed, the compliments you pay to governments at my expence would be one of the facts I should bring in proof of them; and the fate of the author would be still a more striking one. There remains nothing more for me to say on this head; my own example hath said every thing, and the passion of private interest ought not to obscure useful truths. The decree that hath been issued against my person; the burning of my book by the common hangman; these are the authentic pieces which I shall transmit to posterity in my justification; my sentiments are not less confirmed by my writings than by my misfortunes.

Thus, my Lord, have I discussed every thing you have alledged against my book. I have not passed over one of your propositions without examination; but have shewn you to be wrong in every particular, and am not in the least afraid any exception will be taken against my proofs: they must appear, indeed, unanswerable, to all persons of common sense.

But

But ſuppoſing, after all, that I had been in ſome places miſtaken, nay, if I had been miſtaken throughout, ſurely a book might meet ſome indulgence, in which ſo ſincere a love for virtue, and a real regard for truth, are manifeſted even in the midſt of error, or the evil that may be found there! Surely ſome indulgence is due to an author ſo little dogmatical and poſitive, that he often cautions his readers againſt truſting to his notions, adviſes them to weigh his arguments, and to give them no authority but that of reaſon! A book that breathes nothing but peace, candour, patience, the love of harmony, and obedience to the laws in every thing, even in affairs of religion! A book, in ſhort, wherein the cauſe of God is ſo boldly defended, the utility of religion ſo firmly eſtabliſhed, good manners ſo much inculcated and reſpected; in which vice is diſarmed of the weapons of ridicule, wickedneſs is deſcribed ſo void of ſenſe, and virtue ſo truly amiable! Were there not even one word of truth in the work, the reveries it contains ought indeed to have been commended and encouraged as the moſt pleaſing and delightful chimeras that could be invented to ſoothe a heart of ſenſibility and virtue. Yes, I will be bold to ſay, that a government truly enlightened, a government whoſe views are truly ſalutary and uſeful, if ſuch a one exiſted in Europe, would have done public honour, would have erected a ſtatue, to the Author of Emilius. I know mankind too well, indeed, to expect ſo much gratitude from them; but I did not know enough of them to expect what hath really happened.

After having proved that you are unreaſonable

in

in your cenſures, it remains for me to prove that you have calumniated me by your abuſes. But, as you abuſe me only in conſequence of the errors you impute to my book, when I ſhew that thoſe pretended errors are yours, not mine, do I not in fact ſhew that the conſequent abuſes belong to yourſelf, not to me! You load my work with the moſt odious epithets; and call me an abominable, raſh, and impious impoſtor. What ſtrange language doth Chriſtian charity dictate to the miniſters of Jeſus Chriſt!

But pray, my Lord, what do you, who reproach me with blaſphemy, when you make the apoſtles your accomplices in that calumny which you are pleaſed to load me with? To hear you talk, one would imagine that St Paul had done me the honour to think very particularly of me, and to predict my coming as that of Antichriſt. And in what manner, pray, hath he predicted it? You tell, us in the beginning of your mandate,

"St Paul, my dear brethren, hath foretold that perilous times ſhould come, in which men ſhould be lovers of themſelves, proud, blaſphemers, unholy, falſe accuſers, high-minded, lovers of pleaſures more than of God, men of corrupt minds, reprobates concerning the faith."

I will not conend that this prediction of St Paul is not fully accompliſhed; but if he had foretold, on the contrary, that there would ever be a time when ſuch people were not to be found, I muſt confeſs I ſhould have been more ſtruck with the prediction, and ſtill much more ſo at its accompliſhment.

After this prophecy, ſo remarkably well applied, you have the goodneſs to draw my portrait,

trait, in which your Epiſcopal gravity condeſcends to amuſe itſelf with antitheſes, and I find myſelf a very droll perſonage indeed. This part, my Lord, appears to me the beſt of your whole Mandate. It is certainly not very eaſy to write a more agreeable ſatire, or to defame a man with more wit and ſpirit. *A writer hath here ſtarted up* [not very high,] *who, educated in the midſt of error*, [it is very true, I was brought up in the Romiſh religion,] *is full of the language of philoſophy* [it is ſomewhat ſtrange I ſhould ſpeak in a language I do not underſtand,] *though no true philoſopher.* [Oh! granted; I ſhall never be ambitious of that title, to which I acknowledge I have no juſt pretenſions; nor do I renounce it, I aſſure you, out of modeſty.] *Poſſeſſed of a multiplicity of knowledge* [I have learned to be ignorant, indeed, of a multiplicity of things which I imagined I knew] *which nevertheleſs hath not ſerved to enlighten his underſtanding*, [it hath taught me to think it enlightened,] *though he hath made uſe of it to darken the underſtanding of others.* [The darkneſs of ignorance is much better than the falſe light of error.] *He is given up to paradoxes both in opinion and practice;* [certainly he is a great loſer by not thinking and acting like the reſt of the world!] *uniting ſimplicity of manners with oſtentation of doctrine;* [ſimplicity of manners elevates the ſoul—as to oſtentation of doctrine, I know not what is meant by it;] *A zeal for ancient maxims, with a paſſion for eſtabliſhing the moſt ſingular novelties;* [there is nothing more new to us than ancient maxims;] *the obſcurity of retirement, with the deſire of being known to the whole world.* [Here, my Lord, you

perfectly reſemble our romance-writers, who know every thing their heroes ſaid, or thought, even in their cloſets. If it were the deſire of being known that made me take up the pen, how comes it that this deſire influenced me ſo late, or that I delayed ſo long to gratify it?] *We have ſeen his invectives againſt thoſe very ſciences which he himſelf cultivated.* [This proves, that I do not imitate the generality of men of letters, and that in my writings I prefer the intereſts of truth to my own.] *We hear him acknowledge the excellence of the Goſpel,* [always, and with the greateſt ſincerity,] *while he is endeavouring to depreciate its tenets.* [Not ſo; I would promote the charity it inculcates, which is almoſt ſuppreſſed by the prieſts.] *We ſee him deſcribing the beauty of virtue, at the ſame time that he is ſtriving to extinguiſh the love of it in the hearts of his readers.* [Is this true, ye honeſt and well-meaning readers, have I extinguiſhed in your hearts the love of virtue?]

He hath aſſumed the preceptorſhip of human kind, in order to deceive them; he hath erected himſelf into a public monitor, to lead the world aſtray; and hath played the oracle of the age, in order to complete its deſtruction. [I have already examined your proofs of this.] *In a Treatiſe on the Inequality of Mankind, he hath reduced man to a level with the brutes:* [I will appeal to the reader, whether a man be debaſed moſt, by being accounted merely ſtupid, or naturally wicked?] *In another production ſtill more recent, he hath inſinuated all the poiſon of inordinate pleaſure, under pretence of prohibiting it.* [Oh that I could but, indeed, ſubſtitute the real charms of pleaſure inſtead of the falſe ones of debauchery!

ery! But be aſſured, my Lord, the clergy of your dioceſe are proof againſt *Eloiſa*; they have got a preſervative in *Aloiſia* *.] *In the preſent, he takes advantage of the earlieſt moments of life, to eſtabliſh in the mind of man the maxims of irreligion and infidelity.* [This imputation hath been already examined and refuted.]

Such, my Lord, and even yet more cruel, is the manner in which you treat me; with whom you are not acquainted, and of whom you know nothing but by hearſay. Is this behaviour dictated by that evangelical morality of which you pretend to be the defender? We will ſuppoſe you deſirous of preſerving your flock from the contagious principles contained in my book; but why ſhould you, on this account, break out into perſonal abuſe of the author? I know not what end you promiſe yourſelf by ſuch unchriſtian-like conduct; but I know, that, to defend one's religion by ſuch means, is the way to render it very ſuſpicious among all honeſt well-meaning people.

And yet it is you who call me raſh and preſumptuous! Can I have deſerved that appellation merely for propoſing my doubts, and even that with the greateſt modeſty, without attacking or naming any one? In particular, my Lord, it ill becomes you to treat, in this manner, one whom you ſpeak of with ſo little juſtice and decorum, and whom you ſo wantonly and ſo indecently abuſe.

You treat me as impious; but of what impiety can you accuſe me, who never ſpeak of a Supreme Being but to render him the honours which are his due, nor of my neighbour but to

* An infamous, obſcene book, well known in France.

excite every one to love theirs? The impious are thoſe who unworthily profane the cauſe of God, in making him act ſubſervient to the paſſions of men. The impious are thoſe who, ſetting themſelves up for interpreters of the divine will, the arbiters between God and man, exact to themſelves thoſe honours which ſhould be paid only to the Deity. The impious are thoſe who aſſume the right of exerciſing the power of God upon earth, and would open and ſhut the gates of heaven at pleaſure. The impious are thoſe who order libels to be read in their churches—At this horrible idea my blood is all inflamed, and tears of indignation ſtart from mine eyes. Ye prieſts of the God of peace, doubt not but ye will one day be called on to give an account of the uſe you have made of his temples!

You treat me as an impoſtor; and why? I am in your opinion in an error; but where is my impoſture? Is to reaſon and to be miſtaken, an impoſition? Even a Sophiſt, who deceives others without deceiving himſelf, is not an impoſtor, while he confines himſelf to the authority of reaſon, tho' he abuſes it. An impoſtor deſires to be credited on his own word; he would even have it taken implicitly. An impoſtor is a knave who impoſes on others for his own intereſt; but pray, my Lord, what intereſt could I propoſe to myſelf in this buſineſs? Impoſtors, according to Ulpian, are thoſe who play deluſive tricks, and uſe imprecations and exorciſms: now, my Lord, I have never done any thing of this kind.

You men of place and dignity can talk away at your eaſe. Acknowledging no other prerogative than your own, no other laws than ſuch

as

as yourſelves impoſe, you are ſo far from thinking yourſelves under a neceſſity to be juſt, that you do not think yourſelves obliged to obſerve the common rules of humanity. You proudly oppreſs the feeble, without being called to account by any one for your injuſtice; and whenever your own intereſt or the policy of ſtate requires it, you ſweep us before you like the duſt. Some pronounce ſentence or burn, others diſhonour and abuſe, without right, without reaſon, without diſdain, and even without anger; but merely becauſe they are on their route of buſineſs, and the unhappy wretch falls in their way. While you inſult us with impunity, it is not even permitted us to complain; but if we attempt to demonſtrate our innocence and your injuſtice, we are ſtill farther accuſed of wanting reſpect for you.

You, my Lord, have openly inſulted me: I have proved that you have falſely aſperſed my reputation. Were you a private man, as I am, that I might cite you to appear before an equitable tribunal, there to have a fair hearing, I on the behalf of my book, and you with your Mandate, you will certainly be caſt, and ſentenced to make me a reparation as public as hath been the offence. But you, my Lord, are in ſo high a ſtation, that you can eaſily diſpenſe with being juſt: and I am nothing. As you profeſs the Goſpel, however, as you are a Prelate, whoſe buſineſs it is to teach others their duty, you certainly know your own, in ſuch a caſe. For my part, I have done mine, and have nothing farther to ſay. *I am, my Lord,*

A *Motiers*, *Nov.* 18, 1762. } *With profound reſpect*, &c.

J. J. ROUSSEAU.

ANECDOTES

Relative to the

PERSECUTION

OF

Mr J. J. ROUSSEAU;

CONTAINED IN

A LETTER from a Gentleman at *Neufchatel* to his FRIEND.

YOU require of me, Sir, a particular account of the disturbances Mr Rousseau hath occasioned and received, in the new asylum he lately made choice of in this country. I am not surprised to find you so greatly interested in the minutest circumstances respecting a writer almost as famous for his personal misfortunes, as celebrated for his literary merit.

I know not if it be in my power, however, to gratify your curiosity so far as it may extend; being ignorant of many of the steps which Rousseau's enemies have taken to persecute him, as well as of the greater part of their motives for such persecution. Indeed the few that have come to my knowledge have by no means encouraged me to inquire after the rest. It would give

give too much pain to a candid and ingenuous mind to contemplate ſuch means and motives. I ſhall leave their recapitulation, therefore, to the ſevere and cauſtic pen of the Satiriſt, who may poſſibly take a cruel pleaſure in delineating a picture at once diſgraceful both to religion and humanity.

From me you will receive only a faithful narrative of facts, elucidated by a few annotations, and authenticated by copies of the original papers which have appeared in the courſe of this extraordinary ſcene of inquiſitorial perſecution.

It will be neceſſary, firſt of all, to inform you, that towards the latter end of laſt year, Mr. Rouſſeau had propoſals made to him for the publication of a complete edition of his works, as well thoſe in manuſcript as what have been already printed. The conditions were accepted; and, on the firſt application to government, permiſſion was readily granted for the publication intended.

This undertaking appearing very lucrative, it excited the envy and diſguſted the avarice of many who could not come in for a ſhare. Being, at the ſame time, advantageous to the author, who would have derived from it a little fortune, ſufficient for his wants, and equal to his deſires, it gave no little umbrage to the invidious diſpoſitions of his enemies.

Things were in this train when his *Letters written from the Mountains* made their appearance; a work which hath ſerved as the pretended foundation for all that diſturbance of which I am going to give you an account.

I need not tell you, Sir, with what avidity thoſe

thoſe letters were received by the public, or in how many countries they were proſcribed and burnt by the common hangman. For our part, we remained peaceable ſpectators of ſuch ridiculous bonfires, till about the end of February, when the zeal of our eccleſiaſtics, which had ſo long lain ſmothering in darkneſs, had acquired ſufficient warmth and fuel to burſt into a blaze. The Reverend Aſſembly of our Clergy complained to the Government and to the Magiſtrates againſt the *Letters written from the Mountains*; repreſenting that work as an impious and ſcandalous performance, and ſoliciting its proſcription, as alſo the ſuppreſſion of the projected edition of the author's works in general.

This proceeding of the Reverend Aſſembly bore ſo ſtriking a contraſt to the ſilence they kept on the publication of *Emilius* *, when its author was admitted to the holy communion, that one would have been apt to ſuſpect ſome perſonal intereſt affected by the work in queſtion, had it not been certainly known, that thoſe members of the ſacred college who were the moſt zealous for the proſcription of the *Letters from the Mountains*, had never once read them.

The Council of State, indeed, does not eaſily take fire at this kind of Remonſtrances; but the Civil Magiſtracy took the complaint into conſideration, and proſcribed the book. The officer charged with the execution of this buſineſs acquitted himſelf alſo to a miracle; proclaiming the ſaid *Letters* to be prohibited, as attacking every

* As alſo his letter to the archbiſhop of Paris. It is true, that letter makes no attack on the Proteſtant clergy any more than *Emilius*.

very thing the moſt *reprehenſible* † in our holy religion. What do you think, Sir, of this blunder? How egregiouſly pertinent was it to ſtumble ſo luckily on the truth!

The reverend Aſſembly adjourned, however, to the 13th of March, when they determined to proceed againſt the author; who, being adviſed of the diſturbance which the fermentation of this venerable body might occaſion in the ſtate, thought it his duty, as a good citizen, to endeavour to prevent the ſtorm. To this end he ſent the following paper to Profeſſor de Montmollin, the paſtor of his church, in order to have it communicated to the reverend Aſſembly.

The Declaration of Mr Rouſſeau *to the Aſſembly of the Clergy; tranſmitted them by Profeſſor* de Montmollin.

" Out of the deference I owe to Profeſſor " de Montmollin my paſtor, and the reſpect I " bear to the reverend Aſſembly of the Clergy, " I offer *, if they will admit of it, to engage " myſelf, by a writing ſigned with my own " hand, never to publiſh any new work relative " in any ſhape to matters of religion; nor ever " to treat of religion curſorily in any new work " I may hereafter publiſh on any other ſubject: " Promiſing farther, to continue to diſplay, " both in my ſentiments and conduct, the va-

lue

† Probably inſtead of *reſpectable*.

* This offer, which has lately been made public, hath diſſipated much of that prepoſſeſſion which had irritated the people againſt Mr ROUSSEAU: and this conſequence of its being made known, ſufficiently accounts for this declaration's being ſo long and ſo carefully kept ſecret.

" lue I ſet upon the happineſs of being united
" to the church.

" Mr Profeſſor is deſired to communicate this
" Declaration to the venerable Aſſembly.

Motiers, March 10, 1765. J. J. ROUSSEAU."

Would you not think, Sir, you who know the extent of Chriſtian charity, and are a lover of peace and tranquillity—would you not readily conceive, I ſay, that the reverend Aſſembly ſhould, on the receipt of this paper, accept the offer it contained, publiſh it abroad, and have it tranſcribed in letters of gold in their Regiſters?

But, no—Undeceive yourſelf; and gueſs, if you can, at the motives which induced the clergy to make no reply to this offer of Mr. Rouſſeau; to keep it from tranſpiring; and to proceed precipitately, the ſame day, to their final determination of this buſineſs.

You may gueſs, alſo, at the reaſon for the members then preſent entering into a ſolemn and inviolable engagement of ſecrecy, with regard to the queſtions determined to be propoſed to Mr Rouſſeau, as well as with regard to every thing that had paſſed, or ſhould paſs, in this *inquiſitorial Synod*. Their ſilence on this head was thought a matter of importance; as by this means thoſe members of the clergy who were not preſent at their deliberations, could not penetrate the ſecret. Vain precaution! This impenetrable ſecret was even known long before the Aſſembly had begun to deliberate: in conſequence of which, ſome perſons, who correſpond with the court, had time to inform the king, and that even on the ſtrength of ad-

advices received from Paris and Geneva. You may be ſurpriſed, Sir, at all this; and indeed ſo am I; but the fact is nevertheleſs true. For certain it is, that M. M * * *, Counſellor of State and Solicitor-general, received ſoon after the following letter:

"The King is diſpleaſed that your fellow-"countrymen are exaſperated at a man whom "he protects; and hath declared, that he will "highly reſent any farther perſecution of Mr. "Rouſſeau. This I have from his Majeſty's "own mouth; you may report it to whom you "pleaſe."

This letter was dated the 10th of March, and came from my Lord Marſhall; that illuſtrious Briton, who is ſo good a judge of merit, ſo firm a protector of oppreſſed innocence, and, in a word, ſo truly worthy the friendſhip and confidence of a king, who is himſelf ſo eminently ſkilled in the knowledge of mankind.

Compare the date of this letter with the diſtance of places, and you will ſee it required very early advice, to be informed, at ſuch a diſtance, of what ſhould happen in the Aſſembly of our Clergy, appointed for the 13th of March.

Notwithſtanding this circumſtance, however, a report prevailed, which every day increaſed, that Mr Rouſſeau had written a new tract, entitled *Des Princes*. Nobody pretended, indeed, to have ſeen it; but it was boldly affirmed, notwithſtanding, that all ariſtocratical governments, and in particular that of Berne, were very ill treated in it. So mighty officious, indeed, were ſome perſons in this affair, that they even

even wrote from Berne, to Mr F***, Printer at Yverdon, desiring him to procure the book of Mr Rousseau, in order to print and publish it; in consideration, as they said, that it was a *very good thing*.

Mr Rousseau saw into the design of this officiousness, and accordingly wrote to Mr F*** in the manner following, desiring him to print and publish his letter.

"SIR, *Motiers, March* 14, 1765.

"I did not write the work, entitled *Des* "*Princes*; I have not even seen it; nay, I "doubt whether any such work exists. I can "easily guess whence such a story proceeds, "and for what purpose it is calculated. At the "same time, my enemies do themselves justice "in attacking me with arms so worthy of their "cause. As I have never disavowed any work "I have really written, I ought to be believed "when I speak of such as are not mine. I de- "sire, Sir, you will publish this Declaration, "for the sake of truth, and in justice to a man "who hath no other defence.

"Your humble servant,

"J. J. ROUSSEAU."

I observed, that the reverend Assembly proceeded precipitately to pass sentence on Mr Rousseau, without allowing a second day for their deliberations. In fact, Sir, during their convocation on the 13th of March, they fulminated against him, in direct opposition to the constitution of this country, a sentence of Excommunication. Very prudently, however, this

As-

Aſſembly ſuppreſſed this irregular ſentence, on the receipt of the following anonymous letter, very probably addreſſed to it by one of its own members.

LETTER *to the Aſſembly of the* CLERGY.

" I find you are ſolemnly met to ſit in judge-
" ment on Mr Rouſſeau, or rather on his *Let-*
" *ters from the Mountains.* I have not entered
" into your ſanctuary; permit me nevertheleſs
" to offer the advice of one of its beſt friends.
" This advice is, that the Writer in queſtion,
" if we conſider him in the light of a Chriſtian,
" as he appears in the firſt volume, needs ra-
" ther to be ſlightly reprehended, than perſe-
" cuted by Proteſtant churches: and as to his
" character of a citizen, which he diſplays in
" the ſecond volume; ſo far from deſerving to
" be reprehended, he merits almoſt to be cano-
" nized in every republican ſtate. The reaſon
" is, that tyranny and arbitrary power are ſub-
" jects he underſtands better than either the
" Goſpel or the Reformation. He hath pur-
" ſued the phrenſy of deſpotiſm into its inmoſt
" receſſes, and expoſed its moſt refined artifi-
" ces; without having ſuffered the enchanting
" beauty of ſtyle in the leaſt to enervate the
" maſculine vigour of his reaſoning. But as
" for the Scriptures and the Reformation, he
" appears to have overlooked ſeveral eſſential
" points which he ſhould have obſerved in the
" one, and to be ignorant of many uſeful things
" he might have learned from the other. Add
" to this, that it is unfortunate, or rather for-
" tunate, that the more attractive we find his

" diction, the leſs ſeductive will be the ſcepti-
" ciſm of his arguments; becauſe the oftener we
" are induced to read them, the more ſhall we
" perceive them to be only a legendary farrago
" of chimeras, dropt from a fantaſtical pen,
" under the influence only of an imagination
" perhaps itſelf already too chimerically affected.
" As to what relates to the holy communion,
" or the alternative of prohibiting or permitting
" his attendance at the Lord's table; I am a-
" fraid, that, ſo long as it pleaſes our Sovereign
" to protect him, it would be an hazardous at-
" tempt to deny him ſuch privilege; as, by
" thus endeavouring to build caſtles in the air,
" you may come down yourſelves to the ground.
" It would be dangerous alſo to infringe the
" judgement of the Conſiſtories in this matter;
" whoſe independence hath been too often
" occaſionally pretended and acknowledged
" by the reverend Aſſembly itſelf. It is not
" proper it ſhould act inconſiſtently; the mat-
" ter may become intricate; and it is equally
" important both to Religion and to the State,
" that the Aſſembly ſhould not expoſe itſelf.
" The only buſineſs in which the Aſſembly can
" with propriety interfere, is an examination
" into the works of the writer; the diſperſion
" and propagation of which it is its duty to op-
" poſe, by prudent admonitions addreſſed to
" the author by means of his paſtor, exhorting
" him to write and publiſh no more; and alſo
" by making earneſt remonſtrances to the Go-
" vernment, in order that the privilege granted
" for printing the projected edition be repeal-
" ed. If the aſſembly act prudentially, they will
" inſiſt no farther than to obtain theſe ends;

" which

" which will be two very conſiderable and dif-
" ficult points gained *.

" It is certain, that it is of very dangerous
" conſequence to extend the privilege of tolera-
" tion to foreigners; as this would be, in a
" manner, giving an invitation to the authors
" and editors of pernicious books to ſeek an a-
" ſylum in this country, and riſk the making it
" a rendezvous for thoſe paultry ſcribblers of
" the preſent times, whoſe diſpoſition princi-
" pally induces them to employ their pens a-
" gainſt the doctrines of religion and morality.

" There is yet another reaſon why the

* Not at all. On the contrary, nothing ſo eaſy. For, with regard to the firſt, the aſſembly had nothing to do but to admit of Mr Rouſſeau's offer. And as to the ſecond, it might have been obtained on ſpeaking half a word to him. Witneſs the following extracts of letters written to one of his friends on theſe occaſions.

" I muſt confeſs to you, I ſhall look with ſome anxiety on
" the engagements I am going to form with the company in
" queſtion, ſhould we come to an agreement; ſo that if we
" break off, I ſhall not be much mortified."——Again, in an-
other letter to the ſame, he ſays: " You will pleaſe to proceed
" no farther with the company, till they have got the formal
" conſent of the Council of State; which I doubt, however, of
" their being able to obtain. And, as to the permiſſion they
" have ſolicited from the Court, I doubt the grant of that ſtill
" more. My Lord Marſhall is well acquainted with my ſen-
" timents on that head: he knows very well that I not on-
" ly aſk for nothing for myſelf, bnt that I am determined ne-
" ver to make uſe of his intereſt at Court, to obtain any thing
" whatever relative to the country I live in, which may be diſ-
" agreeable to the particular government of it. I do not mean
" to interfere in any ſhape with theſe matters, nor to proceed
" farther in our treaty till they are determined."

The light which Mr Rouſſeau then looked upon the projected edition of his Works, was well known to the ſix perſons who were deſirous to engage in it; and could not, therefore, be a ſecret to all the members of the reverend Aſſembly of the Clergy.

" Aſſembly, convened to deliberate on the pre-
" ſent affair, ſhould act with caution. It is
" ſaid that the firſt mover of all its proceedings
" reſides in a neighbouring capital, in the per-
" ſon of an apoſtate eccleſiaſtic; one who ſeeks
" only, in this buſineſs, to do himſelf credit
" with a D'Alembert or a Voltaire; the rivals
" or enemies of our celebrated Rouſſeau.
" Would it not be ſcandalous for an Aſſembly
" of Divines and Paſtors, ſo greatly diſtinguiſhed
" in the reformed part of Europe, to permit
" themſelves thus to be actuated, in a matter
" of religious importance, by an intriguing
" eccleſiaſtic, given up wholly to worldly pur-
" ſuits and perſonal proſpects? How can they
" think of liſtening to ſuch a perſon, when the
" matter in queſtion relates to the means of ſi-
" lencing or reclaiming a poor and honeſt, tho'
" miſtaken unbeliever? How can they think of
" being adviſed or directed by a man, who is
" known to have the ſtricteſt connection with
" an inventor of bawdy tales, defamatory hi-
" ſtories, and the revivers of ſyſtems of impiety
" and materialiſm? by one who piques himſelf,
" as the higheſt merit, on being the creature,
" the favourite, of the Ambaſſadors of a Crown
" which is daily impriſoning or hanging up his
" countrymen and brethren for preaching the
" Goſpel in its purity; rendering himſelf by
" this means even an accomplice in all the anti-
" chriſtian cruelties of Popery *? What a con-
" traſt! Of what influence ſhould be the ſug-
" geſtions of ſuch a cabal over an Aſſembly of
" Proteſtant Divines?"

This

* Let not any reader be offended at theſe expreſſions, as they are conſecrated by the preachers of the goſpel.

This letter occaſioned a new deliberation on the 13th; when, at the requeſt of Mr de Montmollin, paſtor at Motiers, a written order was formally given him, to cite J. J. Rouſſeau to appear before the Conſiſtory, and to propoſe to him the following queſtions:

Firſt; Whether John James Rouſſeau doth not believe in Jeſus Chriſt, who died for our ſins, and roſe again for our juſtification?

Secondly; Whether he doth not believe in Revelation, and regard the Holy Scripture as divine.

Mr de M*** was further commiſſioned and directed, that, in caſe Mr Rouſſeau did not make ſatisfactory anſwers to the above queſtions; he, the ſaid Paſtor, ſhould proceed to excommunicate him, doubtleſs *at all events*. There is good reaſon, at leaſt, to conclude as much from the meaſures that were taken in the church of Motiers to bring about this concluſion; all, as it was pretended, for the greater glory of God. In the firſt place, endeavours were uſed to ſtagger the conſciences, and intimidate the elders of the church, being members of the Conſiſtory, by telling them, that J. J. Rouſſeau was the Antichriſt; that the ſecurity of the country depended on his excommunication; that all the different members of the State highly intereſted themſelves in it; that the allied Cantons, and particularly that of Berne, had threatened to renounce its ancient alliance with this country, if Rouſſeau was not excommunicated. Nay, reports were even ſpread among the women in the town and its neighbourhood, that Rouſſeau, in his laſt work, had affirmed that women had no ſouls, but were

merely on a footing with the brutes. By theſe, and a thouſand other ſtories calculated for the ſame purpoſe, the common people ſeemed very ripe for ſerving poor Rouſſeau like another Orpheus †, or at leaſt making him to undergo the fate of a Servetus.

Matters were in this ſituation when our pretended Antichriſt addreſſed the following letter to Mr N * * *, Solicitor-general.

" *Motiers, Mar.* 23, 1765.

" I know not, Sir, whether I ought not to " rejoice at misfortunes which are accompa- " nied with ſo many conſolations. Thoſe I ex- " perienced from your letter were very agree- " able, tho' leſs ſo than what I received from " the pacquet it contained. I had communi- " cated to my Lord Marſhall the reaſons which " made me deſirous of quitting this country, to " ſeek tranquillity for myſelf, and to leave it " here behind me. I have the ſatisfaction to " find he approves of thoſe reaſons, and is of " my opinion that I ought to go. Thus, Sir, " my reſolution is taken; and, though I proteſt " it is taken with regret, it is irrevocable. Is " it poſſible the goodneſs of any of my friends " can diſapprove of a deſire, in my preſent me- " lancholy ſituation, to find ſome peaceful ſpot " whereon

* This is by no means an exaggerated ſtate of the caſe. It is well known that we have here more than one zealot, who, for the love of God, and the ſalvation of ſouls, would willingly have furniſhed faggots on this occaſion for an Auto-da-fe. The friends of Mr Rouſſeau were very glad indeed, that the ſeverity of the ſeaſon confined him to his room; he might otherwiſe have been in great danger of being torn to pieces by our modern Bacchants, whoſe termagant ſpirits were enraged to the higheſt degree in behalf of their ſouls.

" whereon to lay my bones? With a greater " ſhare of health and ſtrength, I ſhould have " conſented, for the good of the public, to meet " my perſecutors face to face: but, debilitated " by infirmities and misfortunes without ex- " ample, I am very unfit to act a part, which, " indeed, it would now be cruel to impoſe on " me. Wearied out with diſputes and quarrels, " I can no longer ſupport them. Let me go " hence, therefore, and die elſewhere in peace; " for here that would be impoſſible, though leſs " on account of the ill diſpoſition of the inha- " bitants, than from their too great vicinity to " Geneva; an inconvenience, which all the " good-will in the world cannot enable them " to remove.

" My reſolution, Sir, of leaving this coun- " try, being what my enemies have ſought to " reduce me to, it ought naturally to prevent " any farther proceedings againſt me. I am " not, indeed, as yet in a ſtate of health to un- " dertake a journey; and it will require ſome " little time to ſettle my affairs here before I " go. In the mean time, I hope not to be " treated worſe than a Turk, a Jew, a Pagan, " or an Atheiſt; but that I may be permitted, " for a few weeks at leaſt, to enjoy that hoſpi- " tality which is not refuſed to the greateſt " ſtranger. Not that I mean, Sir, for the fu- " ture, to conſider myſelf as ſuch: On the con- " trary, the honour of being enrolled among " the citizens of this country, will be always " dear to me, as well for its own ſake as for " that of the hand by which it was preſented to " me. At the ſame time, the zeal and fidelity " which I owe the king, as my prince and pro-

" tector,

" tector, will be numbered among the firſt of " my duties. Let me add to this, that I leave " behind me ſome poſſeſſions truly to be re- " gretted, but of which I do not mean altoge- " ther to diveſt myſelf; theſe are, the love and " eſteem of thoſe friends which I have been ſo " happy as to find even in the midſt of my diſ- " graces, and which I hope to preſerve tho' at " a diſtance.

" As to the reverend gentlemen the Clergy, " if they think proper to proceed againſt me " before a Conſiſtory, I ſhall crawl as well as I " can to appear on their citation, ſince they " will have it ſo; but they will find, that, for " any thing I ſhall have to ſay to them, they " might have diſpenſed with all this formality " and parade. They have the power, and are " at liberty, to excommunicate me, if it affords " them any amuſement; and, indeed, I ſhould " be greatly amuſed too, were I only excom- " municated after the manner of Mr. de Vol- " taire *.

" Permit me, Sir, to addreſs this letter in " common to the two gentlemen who have " had the goodneſs to write to me in ſo gene- " rous and intereſting a manner on this occa- " ſion. You will readily perceive, that, in my " preſent ſtate of embarraſſment, I have nei- " ther

* The reader will poſſibly be ſurpriſed to find the name of this celebrated writer ſo cloſely connected with that of the reverend Aſſembly of our Clergy. It was occaſioned, however, by a letter which M. de Voltaire is ſaid to have written to Paris; and in which it is aſſured, that he piqued himſelf much on his power and intereſt to get poor Rouſſeau expelled from his new country, in ſpite of the protection afforded him by its ſovereign.

" ther time nor words to expreſs how much I " am affected with your and their concern for " my welfare.

" I am, Sir,

" with greateſt reſpect, *&c.*

" J. J. ROUSSEAU."

On Sunday the 24th of March, twelve days after the deliberations of the reverend Aſſembly, the paſtor of Motiers convened the admonitory Conſiſtory: having, by the election of two new elders, completed the number required, ſo as to ſuit with his plan of reſerving two voices to himſelf.

The Conſiſtory being met, he produced the orders, which he had brought in his pocket from the Aſſembly; and which he now diſplayed with ample reflections on the ſubject, concluding at length, as might be very naturally expected, with a charge adapted to his deſign.

This interval of twelve days had been fully employed, and that with ſo much ſucceſs, that M. de Montmollin, writing to a friend at Geneva, is ſaid to have poſitively aſſured him, the ſentence of excommunication would paſs on Mr Rouſſeau.

This being reſolved on, it was to no purpoſe that the King's officer, who is always preſent at the meetings of the Conſiſtory, reminded it of infringing the laws and conſtitution of the State. It was in vain he exclaimed againſt that ſpecies of inquiſition which the aſſembly of the Clergy had introduced, in open defiance of that conſti-

ſtitution, and in direct violation of the rights and privileges of the people: his voice was not heard; or, if heard, was neglected; whilſt the majority determined, that Mr Rouſſeau ſhould be cited, on the 28th inſtant, to appear before the Conſiſtory on the 29th.

This determination was accordingly tranſmitted and received with politeneſs on the ſide of both parties. But Mr Rouſſeau, by the advice of his friends, which was founded on very ſufficient reaſons, very prudently declined making his perſonal appearance; ſending in writing what he had to ſay to the Conſiſtory on this occaſion, accompanied with the declaration he made to Mr de Montmollin when he was received to the holy communion in 1762.

Letter from Mr ROUSSEAU *to the Conſiſtory, conſiſting of the Paſtor and the Elders of the Church of* Motiers.

"GENTLEMEN,

"On receiving your citation of yeſterday, I "determined, in ſpite of my ill ſtate of health, "to appear before you to-day; but find it im- "poſſible, notwithſtanding the goodneſs of my "inclination, to ſuſtain the fatigue of a tedious "audience: having reflected alſo, that, with "regard to the matter of faith, which is the "ſingle object of that citation, I may as well "explain myſelf in writing. I doubt not alſo "that the charity, which muſt ever accompany "your zeal for religion, will induce you to ad- "mit of the ſame reply by letter, as I ſhould "give to the queſtions of Mr de Montmollin, "ſhould I have done it by word of mouth.

"It

"It appears to me, then, Gentlemen, that "the ſeverity, with which the reverend Aſſem- "bly have thought proper to proceed againſt "me, ſhould have been founded on ſome poſi- "tive law; which I am aſſured does not now "exiſt in *this* country *. Nothing, indeed, "can be more novel, more irregular, and more "deſtructive to civil liberty, and, above all, "more contrary to the true ſpirit of our holy "religion, than ſuch violent proceedings in a "matter of pure faith †.

"For

* And which never did exiſt there, but to the terrible misfortune of the inhabitants.

† Mr Rouſſeau might have added, that nothing could be a greater contraſt to ſuch proceedings, than even the conduct of our own clergy; who, towards the end of the laſt century, abſolutely refuſed to adopt the *Conſenſus*, notwithſtanding it was the profeſſion of faith adopted by all the other Proteſtant churches of Switzerland, becauſe they would lay no reſtraint on the conſcience. Nay, the ſame clergy have even perſiſted to this day in the like refuſal; though *now* they are deſirous of impoſing on individuals the yoke which they and their Proteſtant forefathers were unable to bear. Let theſe gentlemen begin at leaſt by laying down a regular and uniform creed of their own. For till then we ſhall hardly be diſpoſed to forget a notorious and recent fact; which is, that in the laſt edition of a little work, received into all our public ſchools, and publiſhed under the immediate direction of our paſtors, without any regard to the inſpection of the civil magiſtrate, there are a number of texts of Scripture omitted, (doubtleſs for very good reaſons,) and among others the following: 1 John v. 7. "For there are *three* that bear record in heaven, the Father, "the Word, and the Holy Ghoſt; *and theſe three are* ONE." 1 Cor. xiv. 40. "Let all things be done *decently* and in *or-* "*der*."

Ibid. xiii. 13. "And now abideth faith, hope, charity, "theſe three; but *the greateſt of theſe is charity*."

See alſo, 1 Tim. i. 5. John v. 39, 58. Rom. x. 9, 13. Tit. iii. 8. 1 Pet. iii. 13. Jude 20, 21, *&c.*

It is certainly high time for the clergy to make ſome alteration in the doctrines commonly received. But to pretend to add an inquiſition to their inſtruction, is rather too great a ſtride,

" For let me beg of you to conſider, that, " having long been received into the boſom of " the church; and, being neither Paſtor nor " Profeſſor, nor inveſted in any manner with " the authority of public inſtruction, but only " a ſimple individual among the number of the " faithful; I ought not to be ſubjected to any " examination or inquiſition concerning matters " of belief. Such an inquiſition, unheard of " in this country, tends indeed to ſap all the " foundations of the reformed religion; at once " infringing both goſpel-liberty and Chriſtian " charity, as well as the authority of the Prince " and the rights of the ſubject, whether we " conſider the latter as a member of the church " or of the ſtate. An account of my actions, or " moral conduct, is certainly due, at all times, " to the magiſtracy and to my fellow-citizens. " But theſe not admitting of any infallible " church that hath the authority to preſcribe " what their members ſhall believe; as I have " been once received into its communion, I am " reſponſible only to God for the articles of " my future faith.

" To this let me add, that, when I was ad- " mitted to the holy communion in this pariſh, " about three years ago, ſoon after the publi- " cation of *Emilius*, I gave to Mr de Mont- " mollin himſelf, a declaration in writing; " with which he ſeemed fully ſatisfied, requi- " ring

ſtride, in a country whoſe inhabitants have imbibed the love of liberty with their mother's milk. Let our paſtors reflect on the rivers of blood which ſuch an attempt once cauſed to be ſhed in the Netherlands, and the *ſpirit of party* will certainly yield, either through probity or compaſſion, to the *ſpirit of patriotiſm*.

" ring no farther explanation of me with regard " to matters of belief, but promiſing he never " ſhould require any other.

" I abide by his promiſe; and particularly " by my own declaration: how inconſiſtent, " how abſurd, how ſcandalous will it be, there- " fore, to have been ſatisfied with it on the " publication of a book in which Chriſtianity " itſelf appeared to be ſo violently attacked; and " yet not to be ſatisfied with it on the publica- " tion of another book, in which the author " may doubtleſs be guilty of ſome errors, the " natural attendants on human frailty; but in " which he certainly errs like a Chriſtian *, " as he conſtantly refers to the authority of the " goſpel. In the former caſe, they might in- " deed, with ſome propriety, have denied me " the participation of the holy communion, but " in the preſent they ought to allow it me. If " you act otherwiſe, gentlemen, at the peril " of your own conſciences be it; for my part, " act as you will, mine is at eaſe.

" I am ready, gentlemen, to pay you all " that deference which is juſtly your due; I " therefore heartily wiſh you would not entirely " forget the protection with which I am ho- " noured by the King, leſt you compel me to " apply for that of the government.

" Let me beg of you, gentlemen, to receive

* It might be alſo added, And with one of the principal advocates for the reformation, the celebrated Theodore de Beza; who nevertheleſs was not cited before a Conſiſtory for having ſaid, in a note on John ii. 23, 24. " *Non ſatis tuta* " *fides eorum qui miraculis nituntur.*" It is true, that in his time the word *Reformation* was not an unmeaning term.

" in good part the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of my " profound reſpect.

" Annexed, you will find a copy of the de- " claration abovementioned; on which I was " admitted to the holy communion in 1762, " and which I now confirm.

" J. J. ROUSSEAU."

This declaration hath appeared in public long ſince; but I think it would not be improper to inſert it on this occaſion. Here, therefore, it is.

The Declaration of Mr ROUSSEAU, *previous to his being admitted to the holy communion, after the publication of his* Emilius: *Addreſſed to the Paſtor of the church of* Motiers.

" SIR,

" The reſpect I owe your character, and my " duty as a pariſhioner, obliges me, before I " offer to approach the communion-table, to " impart to you my ſentiments reſpecting the " objects of our faith; a declaration which is " become neceſſary from the ſtrange prejudices " that have ariſen againſt ſome of my writings.

" It is to be lamented, that the Miniſters of " the goſpel ſhould, on this occaſion, revenge " the cauſe of the church of Rome, for want of " hearing what I have to offer, or even of ha- " ving read my book.

" You, Sir, do not ſtand, indeed, in this " predicament; I expect, therefore, at your " hands, more equitable treatment. Be this, " however, as it may, the work carries its " own explanation with it; and as I can juſtify " it only by means of itſelf, I abandon it, ſuch " as it is, either to the approbation or cenſure

" of

" of the judicious reader, without undertaking " to defend or pretending to diſavow it.

" Confining what I have to ſay at preſent, " therefore, to my own perſon, I declare to " you, Sir, with all reſpect, that, ſince my " being re-united to the church in which I was " born, I have always made profeſſion of the " reformed religion; the leſs ſuſpected, in- " deed, as in the country where I reſided no- " thing farther was required of me than to keep " ſilence; even ſome doubt of ſuch profeſſion " being ſuffered to remain, in order that I " might continue to enjoy thoſe political advan- " tages, of which I ſhould otherwiſe have been " deprived on account of my religion. To this " true and holy religion I now profeſs myſelf " alſo ſincerely attached, and ſhall continue " ſo to the lateſt hour of my life: I deſire, " therefore, to be externally united to the " church, as I am internally from the very bot- " tom of my heart. And this I proteſt to you, " Sir, I deſire not only from the conſolation " which I promiſe myſelf from a participation " in the communion of the faithful, but even " as much with a view to their public edification " as my own private advantage; for it is by no " means proper, that a ſincere and ingenuous " reaſoner ſhould not openly appear a member " of the church of Chriſt.

" I ſhall wait on you, Sir, to receive a verbal " anſwer to this letter, and to conſult you re- " ſpecting the manner in which I ought to con- " duct myſelf on this occaſion; that I may give " no cauſe of offence to a Miniſter whom I ho- " nour, nor of ſcandal to the congregation I " would wiſh to edify."

After many difficulties, which aroſe on the part of Mr de Montmollin reſpecting the reception of theſe papers, the King's officer carried his point ſo far as to obtain the permiſſion of having this read: in doing which, the paſtor reverſed the order of their miſſion, and recited the declaration firſt. During the lecture alſo, he was obſerved to be greatly agitated; every now and then ſhrugging up his ſhoulders, and ſtopping ſhort to comment on what he had read, in a manner very expreſſive and edifying, though not a little ſingular in a paſtor who for two years and a half paſt had judged this very declaration ſufficient to juſtify his admitting the author to the communion.

Nor was this the only indecency committed in this Aſſembly, the ſame ſervant of God endeavouring conſtantly to interrupt the ſervant of his Prince, when the latter made any repreſentation on the ſubject. Nay, he went ſo far as to propoſe an adjournment of the Aſſembly, when he ſaw what turn their deliberations were likely to take; and that merely on the frivolous and unprecedented pretext of one of the elders being abſent; on whoſe voice he doubtleſs imagined he could depend.

Theſe efforts, however, being inſufficient, he tried another ſcheme; and modeſtly pretended, that he himſelf had two voices in the chapter. Yet one would have naturally thought his delicacy ſhould have made him refrain from voting at all on this particular occaſion, as he was now become in a manner a party in the affair, by repreſenting the Aſſembly of the Clergy in exhibiting the orders they had given him; and which he now inſiſted ſhould be conformed to,

in the deliberations of the conſiſtory: but it appears he was determined to carry his point *per fas & nefas.*

At the breaking up of the Conſiſtory, our Paſtor's diſſatisfaction broke forth, in the rudeſt manner, againſt thoſe of the elders who had differed from him in opinion. He reproached them in the ſevereſt terms for not having liſtened to the voice of their ſpiritual conductor; to all which, however, they honeſtly and plainly told him, "they thought it much ſafer to liſten "to the voice of their own conſciences."

They had, in fact, had time ſufficient to reflect on the conduct of this ſpiritual guide; on the meaſures he had taken to deceive them, and the falſe ſteps he would have them take in this buſineſs. Being apprehenſive of the ill conſequences that might attend on their proceedings, therefore, four of them thought it expedient to addreſs themſelves to the Council of State, the proper Aſſembly to judge of order.

But here I imagine that I hear you exclaiming with ſurpriſe, in the words of Boileau,

Tant de fiel entre-t-il dans l'ame des devots!

Whence, ſay you, can ſuch ſpleen and malice ariſe? What can afford a ſufficient cauſe for this furious animoſity? A Paſtor, of whom Mr Rouſſeau had ſpoken more than once with high encomiums*, muſt ſurely have very ſingular

* Particularly in his letter to the archbiſhop of Paris, and in the firſt volume of the *Letters written from the Mountains.* In regard to theſe encomiums, a lady of this country, who knows the world well, very pleaſantly ſaid, that ſhe had been offended, as well as others, at the writings of Mr Rouſſeau, and that not leſs with his aſſertions than with his doubts; in proof of

motives to falsify these encomiums by his own conduct! Doubtless, Sir! It is, indeed, whispered, that he was certainly touched with that powerful influence, which is usually denominated the *Auri sacra fames*.

I leave you to gess the rest; and pass on to the abovementioned address of the four elders.

To the President and members of the Council State.

" *Respectable Lords*,

" The subscribing elders, members of the " admonitory Consistory of Motiers and Bove- " resse, take the liberty of addressing your Ex- " cellencies; being greatly surprised to find " themselves required to deliberate on a case " which surpasses the bounds of their very limi- " ted knowledge. For which reason they in- " treat your Lordships to give them directions " for their conduct with regard to the three " following points:

" 1. Whether we are obliged to engage in a " rigorous scrutiny concerning matters of " religious belief?

" With regard to this first article, we must " ingenuously avow the incompetence of our " knowledge in theology; nor can we think it " reasonable that such knowledge should be re- " quired of us, who have always imagined the " duties of our charge confined to the repre- " hension and suppression of indecencies and " irregularities of manners; without venturing " to

of which, she alledged these passages respecting his pastor. All the world were of her opinion; and when it was told Mr Rousseau, he answered in the bitterness of his heart, " True, I " ought to have been aware of the danger of commending an " ecclesiastic while he was living."

" to encroach upon the *ſovereign authority* on
" which we depend.

" 2. Whether a Paſtor has, or ought to
" have, two votes in the Conſiſtory?

" On this ſecond point we beg leave to ob-
" ſerve, that the Conſiſtory of Motiers and
" Bovereſſe being compoſed of ſix elders, with
" the Paſtor as preſident, if this maxim were
" eſtabliſhed, the members of the ſaid Conſiſtory
" would ſerve only for mere cyphers in any fu-
" ture debate.

" 3. and laſtly, Whether the deacon of Val
" de Travers hath a right to ſit and vote
" in the Conſiſtory of Motiers and Bove-
" reſſe?

" With regard to this laſt article, it appears
" to us, that if the deacon is deſirous to inter-
" fere in matters of *correction*, he ought alſo to
" labour in thoſe of *inſtruction* and *edification*.
" Nor ſhould the Paſtors prevent his catechiſing,
" as he is legally bound to do, in the chapel of
" Bovereſſe *.

" Your

* For the explanation of this circumſtance, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that, at the inſtance of the paſtors, the communities of Val de Travers, who enjoyed a foundation for a ſchoolmaſter, conſented to ſuppreſs that place, and to transfer the penſion to a deacon, charged to aſſiſt the clergy in the execution of their functions. The inhabitants of Bovereſſe ſtipulated in particular, that the deacon ſhould come every fortnight to teach and explain the catechiſm in their chapel, in order to prevent their children being deprived of all inſtruction. For theſe two years paſt, however, the poor people ſolicit in vain for their catechiſm and their abandoned chapel.

Our modern paſtors are by no means like thoſe of the primitive churches, who would brave the croſs and ſtake to ſpread abroad their inſtructions, and ſolicit the people to receive them *gratis*. Ours, on the contrary, find it more eaſy and commodious to confine their paſtoral ſolicitude to the emolument of the prebend. To do juſtice to all parties, however,

it

" Your Lordſhips will pleaſe to take under " conſideration the *firſt* article of our moſt hum- " ble remonſtrances; which gives us the more " concern, as the object of it ſo far ſurpaſſes " our judgment and abilities. In regard to the " *two latter*, we are alſo by ſo much the more " intereſted in them, as we are anxious for the " faithful diſcharge of our duty, and may ſub- " ject ourſelves to cenſure, while our intentions " are perfectly innocent. We flatter ourſelves " that your Lordſhips will pleaſe to direct our " conduct by an arret of Council; which will " be an additional motive to thoſe already ſub- " ſiſting for putting up our moſt earneſt pray- " ers to the Almighty for your preſervation.

Signed,

A. H. BAZENCENET, A. FAVRE,
L. BARRELET, A. JEANRENAUD."

This requeſt being preſented the firſt of April, the government judged it neceſſary to expedite the following preliminary orders.

" *April* 1.

" The Council of State, having received the " informations of Mr. Martinet, member of " the Council, and Captain-governor of Val de " Travers, bearing date the 25th and 30th of " March laſt, with regard to what paſſed in the " Admonitory Conſiſtory, aſſembled on Sunday " the 24th and on Friday the 29th of the ſame " month, reſpecting the Sieur Rouſſeau; as alſo " the joint repreſentations of four elders of the " church, Favre, Bazencenet, Barrelet and " Jean-

it muſt be owned, that theſe emoluments are but ſmall, and little proportioned to the value of that inſtruction for which they were intended as a ſalary.

" Jeanrenaud, and deliberated thereon; it is " *reſolved*, That the conduct of the ſaid Gover- " nor hitherto is fully approved; and that, in " expectation of receiving further orders con- " cerning the final determination of this affair, " he do ſignify to the ſaid Sieur Rouſſeau, that " the Council of State will ſecure to him the full " enjoyment of the protection granted him by " the King, of the favour he is honoured with " by my Lord Marſhall, and of that which is " due to him as a ſubject of the ſtate. In con- " ſequence of which, the Council diſpenſe with " his paying any regard to all or any of the ci- " tations which may be ſent him from the Con- " ſiſtory; whoſe whole procedure againſt him " is hereby ſuperſeded, and with regard to " which a definite order will ſpeedily be iſſued."

The next day was publiſhed the Arret follow- ing.

" *April* 2.

" At the requeſt of the four elders of the " Conſiſtory of Motiers and Bovereſſe, Favre, " Bazencenet, Barrelet, and Jeanrenaud, it is " *reſolved*, That the delicacy and prudence with " which the ſaid elders proceeded in the pre- " ſentation of their addreſs to the Council of " State, is approved and commended.

" *Reſolved* concerning the three articles con- " tained in their ſaid requeſt, That the council " pronounce, in order,

" On the *firſt*, That the Admonitory Con- " ſiſtory is to take cogniſance only of diviſions, " diſorders, and licentious of manners; having " no right to interfere in any other buſineſs " whatever, but particularly having no autho-

" rity

" rity to call any one to account for matters of " faith or private judgment: That the mem- " bers of the Conſiſtory have ſtill leſs right or " pretenſion to proceed rigorouſly in the proſe- " cution of any ſuch buſineſs; as the Conſiſto- " ry itſelf depends on a ſuperior power, to " which its members ſhould refer their diſcove- " ries of this kind when of importance to the " ſtate; and to which alone it belongs to take " cogniſance and to puniſh in its own prudence, " if the caſe require, agreeable to the forms of " law.

" That the ſaid four elders are conſequently " juſtifiable in refuſing to take cogniſance of " ſuch ſubjects, notwithſtanding they may be " required ſo to do by their paſtor; as they " ought not in any manner to aid or aſſiſt in " ſuch proceedings as are contrary to the con- " ſtitution of the State, whatever means may be " taken to engage them therein *.

" With regard to the *ſecond* article, *reſolved*, " That it is unprecedented for the paſtor " preſiding over the Admonitory Conſiſtory to " have more than one vote; and that whoſoever " hath, in ſuch a caſe, aſſumed a double vote, " be properly reprehended and reſtrained to the " due diſcharge of his proper functions: That " it is not permitted ſuch preſiding paſtor to " preſent to the Conſiſtory the reſolutions, or e- " ven final determinations, of the Aſſembly of " the Clergy; by which the Conſiſtory cannot, " and ought not, to be affected, that Aſſembly " having no authority over the Conſiſtory:

" That

* Obſerve this, ye miniſters of the God of peace, who commands obedience to the powers that be.

" That a paſtor may, indeed, conſult ſuch Aſ-
" ſembly for his own particular direction, and
" even follow their advice, if he thinks proper;
" but that he ought in no caſe whatever to lay
" any the leaſt reſtraint on the free votes and
" ſuffrages of the other members of the ſaid
" Conſiſtory; and of this the officer of the
" State, who is preſent, is required to take par-
" ticular note.

" As to the *third* article of the ſaid requeſt
" of the four elders abovementioned, it is *or-*
" *dered*, That Mr Martinet, Counſellor of State,
" Captain and Governor of Val de Travers, do
" make proper inquiry into the late practices,
" as well as into the former cuſtoms on which
" ſuch practices may have been founded, reſpect-
" ing the pretended right of the deacon of Val
" de Travers to ſit and vote in the Admonitory
" Conſiſtory of Motiers and Bovereſſe; and
" upon his report deliberation will be held, and
" farther reſolutions taken therein *."

Such, my dear Sir, is the preſent ſituation of things here: and it is hoped the reverend Aſſembly of the Clergy will, on this occaſion, have the good ſenſe to apply the ancient maxim, *noli movere camarinam*, and ſo much patriotiſm at leaſt to be quiet †; eſpecially after Mr Rouſ-

ſeau

* This arret, coming directly from the Council of State, and ſerving to authenticate the facts above recited, reflects no little honour alſo on our government; and will, to every good citizen, be as valuable as the *Magna Charta* to Engliſhmen.

† We are aſſured, indeed, that our clergy will now ſit down in tranquillity; and that M. de Montmollin, in particular, comforts himſelf with the pleaſing hope, that in *another reign* things will go better both with him and with the venerable Aſſembly. This may ſerve as another encomium on that ſovereign, under whoſe government we have the happineſs to live.

ſeau hath ſent the following letter to Mr N***, Solicitor-general: with a coppy of which I ſhall conclude mine.

Letter from Mr ROUSSEAU *to Mr* N***, *Solicitor-general.*

"*Motiers, April* 6, 1765.

"Permit me, Sir, before your departure, to "intreat you to add another favour to the many "you have obligingly conferred upon me; "that is, to preſent my ſincereſt acknowledge- "ments and profound reſpects to the mem- "bers of the Council of State. It is greatly "conſolatory for me to enjoy, under the au- "ſpices of government, that protection with "which the King hath honoured me, and the "favours which my Lord Marſhall hath ſo "kindly beſtowed. Theſe inſtances of genero- "ſity and goodneſs are ſo great and valuable, "that they lay me under new obligations, which "my heart will ever duely acknowledge, not "only as a faithful ſubject to the State, but as "a man particularly obliged to that illuſtrious "body by which it is governed. I flatter my- "ſelf, that hitherto a perfect ſimplicity hath "been obſerved in my conduct, and as great "an averſion to controverſy, as a love for peace "and tranquillity. I will venture to ſay, no "man hath endeavoured leſs to ſpread his opi- "nions, or hath been leſs an author in his ſo- "cial and private character: and tho', during "the courſe of my misfortunes, the ſolicita- "tions of my friends, my duty, and even my "honour, may have obliged me to take up the "pen in my own defence, or in that of others,

I can

" I can ſafely ſay I have always diſcharged this " diſagreeable office with regret; regarding the " cruel neceſſity of it as an additional misfor- " tune †.

" At preſent, Sir, I thank heaven, I am " quit of this duty; and am determined, for " the future, to be ſilent. For the ſake, " therefore, of my own repoſe as well as that " of the State in which I have the happineſs " to live, I voluntarily engage myſelf, ſo long " as I poſſeſs the ſame advantages, not to write " upon any ſubject which may give offence " to the people of this country, or of thoſe " adjacent. I will even do more, and return " with pleaſure to that ſtate of obſcurity, in " which I ought always to have lived, and hope " never more to excite the attention of the pu- " blic, in any ſhape, regarding myſelf.

" I heartily wiſh I could offer my new coun- " try a tribute more worthy of it. The ſacrifice

† Mr Rouſſeau received, indeed, during ſeveral months together, repeated and multiplied ſolicitations, even from Geneva itſelf, to urge him to write in his juſtification. It is therefore not to be wondered at, if his friendſhip, his duty, his honour, at length yielded to them. It is ſurpriſing, however, that people ſhould be ſo fond of diſcovering, in the *Letters from the Mountains*, ſentiments which are not expreſſed there. For my part, I ſincerely avow, that the prudent, reſerved, and patriotic * conduct of the citizens of Geneva, ſince the publication of that work, appears to tally exactly with the maxims and advice which thoſe Letters inculcate. Not but I can eaſily diſcern, that a perſon, whoſe love of liberty and averſion to deſpotiſm were leſs than mine, might not approve of the publication of that Work, or labour to inveſt its author with the title of *a Profeſſor of truth and liberty*.

* Notwithſtanding all that has been inſituated to the contrary by the author of the *Dialogues between a citizen of Geneva and a foreigner*; this writer making his *citizen* talk like a *child*, and his *foreigner* very foreign to the purpoſe indeed!

" I here make it, indeed, is of little value, and " as little to be regreted: ſince I prefer the " friendſhip of its inhabitants, and the fa- " vour of its Governors, infinitely above the " breath of popularity and the vain applauſe of " the world.

" Let me intreat you, Sir, to accept of my " moſt humble and reſpectful acknowledgments.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Neufchatel,
April 14, 1765, J. J. ROUSSEAU.

" P. S. In taking a review of my letter, I " perceive, Sir, I have not ſtrictly kept " my promiſe; but have ſometimes loſt " ſight of my deſign, by dwelling too mi- " nutely, perhaps heavily, on particulars. " But the heart was afflicted, and it was " impoſſible to do otherwiſe. Who could " forbear expatiating on ſo copious a ſub- " ject? I do not flatter myſelf, however, " that I have told you every thing; and " am, therefore, ſatisfied that I have not " altogether broken my promiſe."

ADVERTISEMENT.

ON the publication of the foregoing letter, written, as it afterwards appeared, by Mr du Peyrou of Neufchatel, the reverend Paſtor M. de Montmollin undertook, in defence of himſelf, a refutation of the facts and reaſonings contained in it. This he publiſhed in the form of Letters, to the number of nine; the ſubſtance of which is contained in the following ſummary.

Ab-

Abſtract of Profeſſor de MONTMOLLIN'*s Refutation of the foregoing Libel.*

" If I had conſulted only my own peace and tranquillity, I ſhould have been ſilent with regard to the anonymous libel which hath lately appeared againſt me; and which, being only a farrago of miſrepreſentation, falſehood, calumny, and abuſe, can excite only the contempt of men of underſtanding and probity.

" A writer who is aſhamed to ſubſcribe his name to aſſertions or inſinuations reſpecting the moral character and reputation of another, hath been in all ages held in juſt deteſtation, as the moſt dangerous enemy to ſociety. Such a writer, indeed, may be truly compared to an aſſaſſin, who ſtabs a man in the dark, or deſtroys him while he ſleeps ſecurely in his bed. His word, at leaſt, ought to paſs for nothing with the public, as I have often heard Mr Rouſſeau himſelf acknowledge.

" For my own part, I am not afraid to ſubſcribe my own name, nor to mention thoſe of others who may be intereſted in this affair; as I ſhall write nothing but what is exactly true, and ſhall beſides ſtrictly abide by that moderation which is ſo conformable both to my miniſterial and perſonal character."

After this introduction, the reverend profeſſor goes on to relate the affair of Mr Rouſſeau's firſt application to him, on that gentleman's arrival at Motiers, in order to be admitted to the holy communion; giving a tranſcript of his letter on that occaſion; which, being before

printed *, is here omitted. In the copy of a ſecond letter, addreſſed to a brother paſtor at Geneva, on the ſame occaſion, M. de Montmollin proceeds, after the cuſtomary preamble, as follows:

" It is now about three † months ſince Mr " Rouſſeau arrived at Motiers, and took up his " reſidence in the houſe wherein he now lives. " My friends and relations recommended him " to me as a perſon of merit and probity, who " ſought only a peaceful retreat where he might " end his days in tranquillity, *without writing* " *any more* ‡: a circumſtance which was af- " terwards confirmed to me by the verbal aſ- " ſurance of Mr Rouſſeau, whoſe health is very " precarious, and is daily on the decay. On " his arrival, he wrote to my Lord Marſhall, " deſiring permiſſion to reſide in this country; " which was readily granted him. His Excel- " lence alſo informed the King, who was pleaſed " to admit of Mr Rouſſeau's petition; *ſuppoſing* " he would behave himſelf in a proper manner. " From that day to this, Mr Rouſſeau, whom " I have had frequent occaſion to ſee, hath ap- " peared in a very favourable light; comport- " ing

* See page 390.

† This letter is dated Sept. 25, 1762.

‡ The paſſages marked in italics throughout this letter are thoſe which Mr Rouſſeau either retrenched, added, or altered, in the copy ſubmitted to his peruſal by M. de Montmollin, when the latter was called upon, in his own vindication, to ſend it to ſeveral perſons of eminence, both eccleſiaſtical and civil, who thought he had extended his toleration too far with regard to Mr Rouſſeau. Providentially, ſays the profeſſor, I have retained this copy with the alterations and corrections written by Mr Rouſſeau's own hand. The profeſſor had written, *without troubling himſelf to write any more.*

" ing himſelf with great prudence and diſcre-
" tion, and politely refuſing to ſatisfy the im-
" pertinent curioſity of thoſe who came hither
" to aſk him imprudent or unneceſſary que-
" ſtions.

" In the mean time, he hath aſſiduouſly fre-
" quented the church, with ſuch an external
" appearance of religious reſpect and devotion,
" that the people have entertained a very good
" opinion of him. For my own part, I have
" frequently converſed with him, and have ſtart-
" ed ſeveral objections againſt a number of pro-
" poſitions contained in his writings. On all
" which occaſions he hath replied with great
" moderation; complaining bitterly that he
" hath been miſrepreſented, not only as an infidel
" and an enemy to religion, but even as an
" atheiſt; whereas he proteſted to me, that he
" was ſincerely a Chriſtian, and that of the re-
" formed religion.

" On the twenty-fourth of Auguſt, he wrote
" me the letter before mentioned; and the next
" day waited on me, in conſequence of its con-
" tents; when I had an opportunity of entering
" into a more particular converſation with him,
" with regard to the nature and tendency of
" his writings, and principally that of Emilius.
" On that head, I obſerved to him, that there
" appeared to me a manifeſt contradiction be-
" tween the principles eſtabliſhed in his wri-
" tings, and that ardent deſire he teſtified to be
" admitted to the communion of the faithful.

" He again proteſted, that he was at heart a
" Chriſtian and a Proteſtant; that he was de-
" ſirous of acting as ſuch; and that he looked
" upon his participation at the Lord's table as

" one of the moſt conſolatory events that could " happen to him; expreſſing his hopes that my " paſtoral charity would not refuſe him the ad- " vantage of ſuch conſolation. To all which " he added, as a proof of his ſincerity, and of " his requeſt's ariſing from motives purely con- " ſcientious, that, being under the immediate " protection of the king, he might reſide at " eaſe in this country, without being under any " neceſſity of complying with any external " modes of religion: but that he deſired from " his heart to know Jeſus Chriſt for his Saviour, " whenever he ſhould be called to appear before " his ſovereign Judge.

" With regard to his *Emilius*, alſo, in parti- " cular, he again aſſured me, that he meant to " ſay nothing in that work againſt the reform- " ed religion; having in view only the three " following objects: *Firſt*, To combat the church " of Rome, and particularly that doctrine which " affirms that there is no ſalvation out of her " pale; as there can be no doubt that a Pagan " of probity and virtue, Socrates, for inſtance, " although he never had heard the name of " Chriſt, might be ſaved.

" On this occaſion he admitted, that he was " led to exalt the idea of natural religion, as " being the foundation of revealed; and that " he might poſſibly have dropped ſome expreſ- " ſions that might be miſapplied, and ſeem to " have a tendency to depreciate the Proteſtant " religion; but that this was never his inten- " tion.

" In the *ſecond* place, it was his deſign to op- " poſe, though not directly, yet ſufficiently " plain, that infernal performance *De l'Eſprit;*

" in

" in which the author maintains the deteſtable
" principle, that to perceive and to judge is the
" ſame thing; *a principle which evidently tends*
" *to eſtabliſh materialiſm* *.

" *Thirdly*, To demoliſh thoſe of our modern
" philoſophers, whoſe vanity and preſumption
" have induced them to ſap the foundations of
" all religion, both natural and revealed.

" In anſwer to all this, I freely repreſented
" to Mr Rouſſeau, that, if theſe were his in-
" tentions, his readers had indeed greatly mi-
" ſtaken them; and that they were very na-
" turally led into ſuch miſtake, by the ſcepti-
" cal and ludicrous manner in which he had
" treated the moſt eſſential doctrines of Chri-
" ſtianity.

" Being thus preſſed, he replied, that he ad-
" mitted and believed every doctrine that was
" eſſential, or that any miniſter ought to deem
" eſſential, in the Chriſtian religion: *that he*
" *was ſo far from ludicrouſly endeavouring to*
" *bring religion into ridicule, he had never ſpo-*
" *ken of it but with the moſt profound reſpect;*
" *although, in oppoſing two adverſaries to each*
" *other, and imitating their manner, which he*
" *cenſures, he ſometimes makes one of them ſpeak*
" *of it with leſs reverence* *. He ingenuouſly
" confeſſed, that he had many doubts and ſcru-
" ples which he could not get over; but that he
" deſired nothing more ardently than to have
" theſe doubts removed, and in the mean time
" adhered to that way of thinking which was
" generally acknowledged the ſafeſt. He farther
" de-

* This was added by Mr Rouſſeau.
† Added by Mr Rouſſeau.

" declared, that, if he was ſuppoſed to have an " indifference for all religions, it was a * *falſe* " imputation; for that he looked upon the " Chriſtian religion as the only one that was " true, and capable of making us wiſe to ſal- " vation. At the end of this conference, I told " him I would communicate the purport of it, " as well as his letter, to the Conſiſtory, and " that I ſhould afterwards return him my an- " ſwer.

" The Conſiſtory unanimouſly determined, " that Mr Rouſſeau might be admitted to the " communion, on the ſuppoſition of his ſince- " rity, and with the proviſo that I ſhould again " converſe with him on that head. I imparted " this determination accordingly to Mr Rouſſeau, " and in the mean time made farther inquiries " after his character and conduct, for my own " ſatisfaction and juſtification. After all which " precautions, to prevent any ſcandal ariſing " from the propoſed admiſſion, I waited again " on Mr Rouſſeau, and told him that I was " charged, on the part of the Conſiſtory, to re- " preſent to him, " That every perſon who " came to the holy communion made a public " profeſſion of believing in Jeſus Chriſt, and " that conſequently the members of the church " regarded him as a member of Chriſt: but " that if in this caſe he only made an external " and verbal profeſſion, I thought myſelf obli- " ged to tell him, he would be the moſt vile " and deceitful of all hypocrites: that he was " accountable, however, only to God; and that " if he acted ſincerely, as I was bound in Chri- " ſtian charity to believe, I bleſſed God for the " happy

* Added by Mr Rouſſeau.

" happy circumſtance, and felicitated him there-
" on with all my heart." To this I added,
" that I doubted not, if he ſeconded the opera-
" tions of grace which appeared to act in his
" favour, but he would find, by happy experi-
" ence, that the doubts and ſcruples he had
" mentioned would inſenſibly diſſipate; and
" that, having a clear head and a good heart,
" the work of grace would ſoon be compleated.
" I then ſpoke to him again of his Emilius, and
" of the public profeſſion he was going to make
" of Chriſtianity: to which he replied, that in
" time the prejudices conceived againſt him
" would vaniſh.

" Mr Rouſſeau received the communion the
" Sunday following, with an humility and de-
" votion that edified the whole church; and
" ſeemed to carry with them all the appearance
" of ſincerity. A number of very ſenſible and
" pious perſons in the congregation were in
" particular highly rejoiced at the religious de-
" portment of Mr Rouſſeau, who hath made
" himſelf loved and eſteemed in theſe Cantons
" by his candour, affability, moderation, and
" charity. For though he is not rich, he is
" very charitable, and that without oſtentation;
" of which he gave ſome extraordinary proofs
" on the day of his receiving the ſacrament."

Under theſe circumſtances, M. de Montmollin thinks he ſhould have been wanting in his duty as a miniſter of Chriſt, had he refuſed Mr Rouſſeau the privileges he was deſirous of as a member of his church; it belonging only to him who ſearcheth the heart and trieth the reins, to judge whether or not the participant was actually ſincere. " It is to be wiſhed, indeed," continues

the

the reverend paſtor, "for the ſake of my own peace and tranquillity, that my toleration, tho' founded both on the principles of humanity and Chriſtian charity, had been more reſerved and confined. I ſhould not in that caſe have been the dupe to the goodneſs of my own heart, nor have had ſo much reaſon to complain of having been unjuſtly traduced in the opinion of the public. Where is there a paſtor, who would not have been rejoiced as I was, to ſee Mr Rouſſeau, whoſe celebrity was ſo general and extenſive, preſent himſelf in a light ſo deſirable to the cauſe of truth and religion? I will frankly confeſs to you, Sir, that, independent of the ſatisfaction I felt in regard to the ſalvation of Mr Rouſſeau, and the edification of my fellow Chriſtians, my ſelf-love was not a little flattered by this event, which I looked upon as one of the moſt honourable of my life. The conſequences, however, have taught me the propriety of adopting the remark which the anonymous Libeller hath put into the mouth of a certain lady of his acquaintance reſpecting Mr Rouſſeau's commending an Eccleſiaſtic in his life-time. Yes, my friend, I may well ſay, in like manner, that I have learned, to the ſorrow of my heart, the danger of commending an author during his life-time, eſpecially when he piques himſelf ſo greatly on his reputation. To promiſe to write no more, yet ſtill to write on, and that more than ever againſt religion, is a conduct ſo inconſiſtent and problematical, that, I confeſs frankly, I am unable to account for it. But to confine myſelf to facts, which I ſhall leave to explain themſelves: During the time in which I imagined Mr Rouſſeau enjoyed at leiſure that tran-

tranquillity which he had by his abovementioned conduct procured to himſelf, without thinking of writing any more on religious ſubjects, it appears that he was very differently employed: For at the latter end of the year, behold his Letters from the Mountains made their appearance; in the peruſal of which I ſaw the author diſcovered himſelf by his writings, and that it was no longer the Savoyard Curate who ſpoke, but Mr Rouſſeau himſelf. A copy of this work was ſent me by the author, with the following letter *.

Motiers, Dec. 23, 1764.

"What a pity, Sir, that a man, who is ſo "fond of peace, ſhould be always engaged in "war! It was impoſſible for me to refuſe ſtanding up in defence of my compatriots, as they "had done in mine. This is what I could not "do, without reſenting thoſe inſults, which, "with the blackeſt ingratitude, the miniſters of "Geneva have had the baſeneſs to load me in "the midſt of my misfortunes; and which they "have carried even ſo far as to abuſe me from "their pulpits, which they are unworthy to aſcend. But as they are ſo fond of war, they "ſhall

* Let the reader put himſelf in my place, and judge what I ought to think of Mr Rouſſeau, when I ſaw to what degree he had inſulted ſo diſtinguiſhed and reſpectable a body as the clergy of Geneva. I confeſs, I was very little flattered with the exception this writer made of me in the Amſterdam edition of his book; as the odium he endeavoured to throw on the miniſtry in general, muſt neceſſarily in ſome degree affect me. But it is no wonder, that a writer, who could ſo indecently inſult a reſpectable body of magiſtrates, ſhould abuſe the miniſters of religion, who have no other arms to defend themſelves than charity and patience.

" ſhall have it; this, however, is my firſt act of " hoſtility, tho' I have ſuffered many from them " who have been the aggreſſors. In this work, " I have nevertheleſs defended one of their chief " prerogatives; which they have tamely ſub- " mitted to be deprived of, voluntarily ſtooping " under the yoke of tyranny themſelves, that " they may be ſupported in their inſolent au- " thority over others. As for the reſt, the quar- " rel is merely perſonal between them and me; " or, if I have introduced the Proteſtant reli- " gion, it is as its defender againſt thoſe who " would ſubvert it. Such are my reaſons, Sir, " for having written this performance; and you " may be aſſured, that the more I am laid under " the neceſſity of explaining myſelf, the greater " honour will redound to you for your conduct " towards me and the juſtice you have already " done me.

J. J. ROUSSEAU."

"The Company of Paſtors, being informed of the manner in which the *Letters from the Mountains* were received throughout Europe, and particularly by the churches of this country, thought themſelves under an obligation to take notice of this work, as well as of the new edition projected of Mr Rouſſeau's other pieces.

" The Libeller is pleaſed to repreſent it as an offence, that the reverend claſs were ſilent on this head for the ſpace of two months. But could a body of men diſperſed throughout the country take up leſs time to examine the work in queſtion, and to judge properly of the effects it might produce? Theſe, and theſe only, were the ſprings of their ſubſequent zeal and activity.

Will

"Will it be ſaid that the clergy had no buſineſs to take theſe objects into their conſideration? Surely their quality of miniſters of the goſpel neceſſarily called upon them to ſupport the cauſe and intereſts of their Divine Maſter! The clergy of every communion would have done the ſame; and I can take upon me to aver, that both ours and the neighbouring churches, tho' of a different communion, were greatly edified by that conduct and reſolution, which are ſo conformable to the avowed principles of a company of defenders of the truth, who ought to maintain the cauſe of Chriſt.

"The anonymous libeller was not well informed, when he intimated that the clergy took no notice of *Emilius* at the firſt appearance of that work; the venerable claſs having made remonſtrances on this head to the Government in the year 1762, in order to prevent its being circulated in this country; a proof of which fact the writer may find by recurring to the regiſters of the Council of State. It is farther obſervable, that in this remonſtrance the claſs did not mention the author's name; an inſtance of that moderation for which they have been ever diſtinguiſhed, notwithſtanding the libeller's malicious inſinuations to the contrary.

"The miſtake of the crier, who proclaimed the prohibition of Mr Rouſſeau's performance, was not leſs ridiculous than the anonymous writer's remark on it. But to proceed to facts of greater importance.

"The Aſſembly of the Clergy appointed the 12th and 13th of March *, in order to deliberate

* M. de Montmollin was not preſent at the former meeting

on the means of removing the ſcandal which the publication of Mr Rouſſeau's laſt work had occaſioned. And here, with all the deference due to the anonymous writer, I muſt take the liberty to obſerve, that, according to the eccleſiaſtical conſtitutions of this country, the clergy have a right and authority to take notice of matters of faith, as well as morality, when any ſcandal ariſes from them. This is the very letter and the ſpirit of our diſcipline; of which I might cite numerous examples. The anonymous writer compares the proceedings of our clergy, with thoſe of an inquiſition. Abſurd and ridiculous! The objects of inquiſitorial proſecution are concealed facts, that of our Aſſembly was notorious and open.

"Not having ſeen Mr Rouſſeau during my illneſs, I thought my paſtoral duty required of me to pay him a viſit before the meeting of the appointed Aſſembly. I accordingly waited on him, though hardly recovered, on Friday the 8th of March, in the afternoon; in order to prevail on him, if poſſible, to take ſuch meaſures as might beſt agree with my ſentiments reſpecting him, and the diſcharge of my own duty. I ſignified to him the apprehenſions I was under on his account, and the conſequences which I foreſaw would be the reſult of the Aſſembly. I opened my heart freely to him on this occaſion, as a citizen, a Chriſtian, a paſtor, and a friend; in doing which perhaps I did too much, but it was a proceeding which my heart dictated. I own Sir,

I

ing of the clergy, being, as he ſays, confined by ſickneſs, and having no knowledge, either directly or indirectly, of what was done there; much leſs that Mr Rouſſeau's books were the objects of their deliberation.

I was deſirous of preventing Mr Rouſſeau's ſuffering any chagrin this account, becauſe I then firmly believed him to be ſincere in his error. I propoſed to him therefore ſeveral expedients which ſuggeſted themſelves; and among others, that he would promiſe me not to receive the communion at Eaſter, as well for his own ſake as for that of general edification; hoping that, in a ſhort interval, the fermentation which had been raiſed in the minds of the people on his account might poſſibly ſubſide. Was this, Sir, the conduct of a perſecutor? Mr Rouſſeau heſitated ſome time; and at length gave me for anſwer, that if I would aſſure him he ſhould participate on the enſuing feſtivals, he might be induced to acquieſce in my propoſal. I repreſented to him, that this did not depend on me; that I was only a ſingle member of a numerous body, and could anſwer only for my own vote. He perſiſted, however, in telling me, that his fortune was in my hands, and that he was determined to have all or nothing; while I continued to aſſure him, that I would do him all the ſervice in my power, conſiſtent with my duty. Mr Rouſſeau then ſaid, that he would enter into an engagement with me, not to write any thing more upon the ſubject of religion; in conſequence of which he hoped he ſhould not be farther diſturbed: to which he added haſtily and abruptly, "Well, Sir, my fortune depends upon you: if "you return with good news, I ſhall be heartily "glad to ſee you; if not, we have nothing to "ſay to each other." To this I replied, being much concerned at his prepoſſeſſion, "As you "pleaſe, Sir," and returned to my own houſe heartily afflicted. As I was not to ſet out till

Monday, I conceived Mr Rouſſeau might in the interim be better adviſed, and that I ſhould hear from him: but I heard nothing of him till Sunday evening; when Mr Guyenet, Lieutenant of Val-de-Travers, who has the honour to be in the good graces of Mr Rouſſeau, came to inform me, that Mr Rouſſeau had ſent for him to complain againſt me for the coldneſs with which I had received his declaration; and to tell him, that if I had required it in writing, he would certainly have given it me. He hath nothing more to do then, ſaid I, then to ſend it to me; I am ready to receive it, and will preſent it to the Aſſembly: but I conjure you, added I, by that intereſt which you take in Mr Rouſſeau's affairs, as well as that which you are ſenſible I take myſelf, to let his declaration be clear and poſitive. Mr Guyenet would have had me return to Mr Rouſſeau: but the weather was too ſevere to permit me to riſk my health; and as I had nothing new to ſay to to him, Mr Guyenet went himſelf, and brought me ſoon after a written paper from Mr Rouſſeau, which I told him I thought inſufficient, giving him my reaſons for thinking it unſatisfactory. To theſe he told me he would bring an anſwer, and accordingly brought me a ſecond paper * on Monday morning: to which I objected, in like manner, that inſtead of making our Clergy eaſy, it would rather irritate them the more againſt him †: deſiring that he would alter the words "*I*

* The anonymous writer ſays, this declaration was not known till within a ſhort time before his writing; whereas it was notoriouſly known in the very beginning of the affair, not only in the country, but even in Geneva. Mr Guyenet told me he had orders to make it public, as I alſo did to every one who had a mind to ſee it.

† The terms of his former declaration were ſtill more exception-

" *I will continue* to ſhew by my ſentiments and " conduct the value I ſet upon the happineſs of " being united to the church," into, " *I will* " *endeavour* to ſhew, *&c.*"; the expreſſion *I will continue*, after ſo flagrant an inſtance of his late defection, being more than ſufficient to give offence. The Lieutenant was loath to return with this meſſage; but ſeeing I was going to proceed on my journey, he went out haſtily, deſiring I would wait his return. I did ſo; when he informed me, that he could not prevail on Mr Rouſſeau to alter a ſingle letter of his declaration. So much the worſe ſaid I; I am really ſorry for his obſtinacy: but pleaſe to tell him, that he is himſelf the cauſe of thoſe troubles in which he will poſſibly be involved; but it is his own affair, as he is determined not to liſten to the advice of his friends.—

" Being arrived at Neufchatel, I found there the ſame fermentation as in my own and the neighbouring pariſhes. The *Letters from the Mountains*, the projected edition of Mr Rouſſeau's writings, the remonſtrances of our company, and the proſcription of his works by the civil magiſtrate, all together did did not a little agitate the minds of the people. Every body had their eye on the conduct of the Clergy in this circumſtance. What will our miniſters do? ſaid they publicly. Will they defend the goſpel, which hath been ſo openly attacked; or will they ſuffer it to be torn in pieces by its enemies? And what will you do, Sir? ſaid they to me. Will not this laſt per-

tionable; for he there made the offer of being ſilent, on condition of their not moleſting him: but it is not for culpable individuals, as I then told Mr GUYENET, thus to make conditions, and give law to their legal ſuperiors.

formance of Mr Rouſſeau's put an end to your toleration? He is your pariſhioner. Will you do nothing for the ſake of religion, for the edification of the faithful, and for your own character? Had a native of the country, added they, dared to ſpeak or to write any thing like what hath been advanced by Mr Rouſſeau, the clergy would have been readily inflamed againſt him. What! is Mr Rouſſeau, a citizen of yeſterday, inveſted with greater privileges than a natural born ſubject? Is he not ſubjected, like every other citizen, to the laws of the ſtate, and thoſe cuſtoms which have prevailed from times immemorial.

"At the meeting of the Aſſembly, the Chriſtianity of Mr Rouſſeau was brought on the tapis for examination; when I preſented the declaration given me by Lieutenant Guyenet on the preceding Sunday. This, being taken into conſideration, was deemed inſufficient to repair the miſchiefs which had been already effected by the publication of the *Letters from the Mountains*; and that ſomething more was required of Mr Rouſſeau, in regard to the injured honour of religion. So that, ſo far were the Aſſembly from thinking that his declaration ſhould be tranſcribed in letters of gold in their regiſters, that they conceived it included its own condemnation: for if the book in queſtion had not inſulted religion, Mr Rouſſeau had no need to enter into engagements to write no more againſt it.

"Agreeable to the cuſtom of the Aſſembly, I was then called upon to give in my information; which, I appeal to all preſent, was done in the ſpirit of toleration and charity, which I have ever diſplayed toward Mr Rouſſeau. After this I went

went out of the Aſſembly, conformably alſo to the ſame cuſtoms *.

" I know not where the anonymous libeller learned, that the reverend Aſſembly fulminated a ſentence of excommunication againſt Mr Rouſſeau, in defiance of the laws and conſtitution of the country. They were by no means ignorant of the limits of their ſpiritual juriſdiction; but at the ſame time they knew themſelves authoriſed to give directions to the members of their own body, reſpecting their behaviour in their reſpective conſiſtories, without pretending to lay any reſtraint on the ſuffrage of the elders. It is falſe, it is abſolutely falſe, that the Aſſembly deliberated on the anonymous letter which the libeller has inſerted, and which was addreſſed only to ſome few members, of which I was one. On the contrary, it was not even publicly read, becauſe it was anonymous.

" The following is a copy of the directions given me by the Aſſembly to regulate my particular conduct towards Mr Rouſſeau.

Neufchatel, March 13, 1765.

" The Aſſembly being this day met to deli-
" berate on the meaſures it ought to take with
" regard to Mr Rouſſeau, whoſe antichriſtian
" ſentiments, diſplayed in his writings, and par-
" ticularly in his *Letters from the Mountains*
" lately publiſhed, have given the greateſt ſcan-
" dal to the whole Chriſtian church, and par-
" ticularly to that of our own country; it was
" judged proper to begin with the examination
" of

* It is the cuſtom in this aſſembly, for the paſtor of any pariſh to withdraw, when any matter is under deliberation reſpecting any one or more of his own pariſhioners.

" of Mr de Montmollin paſtor of Motiers-
" whoſe pariſhioner Mr Rouſſeau at preſent is.
" The information of the ſaid paſtor being heard,
" the Aſſembly were given to underſtand, that
" Mr Rouſſeau, having been previouſly adviſed
" of the object of the preſent deliberations, had
" ſent him a paper, ſigned with his own hand,
" to be delivered to the Aſſembly *: Which
" paper being read, and maturely conſidered,
" the Aſſembly is of opinion that it is inſuffici-
" ent to atone for the ſcandal which the publi-
" cation of his miſchievous and impious wri-
" tings have raiſed.

" They think themſelves, therefore, indiſpen-
" ſably obliged to declare to M. de Montmollin,
" that, after the publication of the *Letters from*
" *the Mountains*, he ought to not to look upon
" Mr Rouſſeau as a Chriſtian or member of the
" church. At his requiſition alſo the Aſſembly
" judge it expedient to give him directions for
" his future conduct towards Mr Rouſſeau,
" whom he ought to cite to appear before the Con-
" ſiſtory, in order to be properly admoniſhed,
" and to be made acquainted with their reſolu-
" tion concerning his being adjudged unworthy
" of communion with the faithful, until he ſhall
" have manifeſted, in every reſpect, the ſenti-
" ments of a true Chriſtian, firſt, By ſolemnly
" declaring in the Confiſtory, that he believes in
" *Jeſus Chriſt, who died for our tranſgreſſions,*
" *and roſe again for our juſtification;* ſecondly,
" By acknowledging his regret for having writ-
" ten any thing contrary to that belief, and a-
" gainſt revelation; and, laſtly, By conſenting
" that ſuch declaration and acknowledgment
" ſhould

* See page 373.

" ſhould be made public for the edification of " the church, and the reparation of the ſcandal " he hath occaſioned.

Signed, A. DE LUZE,
Paſtor of the church at Cornaux, and Secretary of the venerable Aſſembly.

" On the next day I quitted Neufchatel, in order to return home to my particular affairs. How then can the author of the libel raſhly advance, that ſecret practices had been uſed in the church of Motiers? No ſecret practices were made uſe of, either on my part, or on that of the friends to religion and tranquillity. I call on all my pariſhioners to witneſs this, as alſo on the very elders themſelves who voted againſt me in the affair of Rouſſeau.

" The public were curious and impatient to know the reſolution taken by that Aſſembly; that ſtrict ſilence, however, was obſerved, to which the oath taken by the members neceſſarily obliged them; a ſilence which, nevertheleſs, the anonymous letter-writer affects, I know not why, to make ſo very myſterious. For my own part, I am ſtill ignorant whether the miniſters preſent made a ſecret of the above reſolution to thoſe who were abſent: but I know very well that I made no myſtery of it to any of my abſent brethren, when I had an opportunity of ſeeing them. And why ſhould I? when it is well known that the *Letters from the Mountains* were cenſured by the paſtors in general, who were juſtly apprehenſive of their dangerous effects on their reſpective flocks.

" On Sunday, the twenty-fourth of March, the Conſiſtory met, according to the practice of all the

the churches of this country, to proceed on the ſubject of accuſations *; at which time two new elders were preſented and choſen; who, if they had not been prevented by various circumſtances, would have been choſen ſome time before. But Eaſter was approaching; and the elders inſiſted on the election of colleagues, becauſe they were become too few in number to ſuſtain the burden of the church. Yet with what malignity doth the anonymous libeller take upon him to charge me "with having fixed on this opportunity to "complete the Conſiſtory, in order that I might "have more of its members at my devotion?" But did not the officer of the Prince alſo vote at this election?

"On this very day, the Conſiſtory came to my houſe, according to cuſtom, before the morning ſervice, with the two new elected elders; at which time, and not before, I informed them of the affair of Mr Rouſſeau, which was to be propoſed in the Aſſembly of the Conſiſtory after the ſermon.

"In this Aſſembly I repreſented to them, that it was not without great concern and reluctance that I laid before them the affair of Mr Rouſſeau, with whom I had had perſonal connections; but that the honour of religion and the edification of the churches in general, and that of Motiers in particular, induced me to lay aſide all private conſiderations; and that the more eſpecially, as all

* Theſe accuſations conſiſt in the inquiry made by the paſtor, of the elders, whether any ſcandal hath come to their knowledge, and what he ought to do for their better edification? The paſtor alſo relates what he knows of ſuch things, and they all enter into ſuch meaſures as they think moſt efficacious to remove them.

all the world had eye, ſince the publication of the *Letters from the Mountains*, on the conduct we ſhould adopt with regard to Mr Rouſſeau, and more particularly the Aſſembly of the Clergy, and the neighbouring churches. I thought it would be proper, therefore, for the diſcharge of our duty, that Mr Rouſſeau ſhould be cited to appear in the Conſiſtory, and that, if they judged it expedient, I would confine myſelf to the merely aſking him two general queſtions, viz. "Whether he believed the Scriptures to be the "revealed will of God? And whether he alſo "believed that Jeſus Chriſt died for our tranſ-"greſſions, and roſe again for our juſtification?" Two queſtions very ſimple; the affirmative anſwer to which is eſſential to the faith of a Chriſtian *.

"In ſupport of my opinion I made uſe of the direction which the reverend claſs had given me, and which the elders deſired me to read. This I did; at the ſame time expreſsly declaring that I did not pretend to lay any reſtraint on their ſuffrage; and appealing to them, in the preſence of the officer, whether I had ever ſo done. On which they all unanimouſly replied, that I always left them at perfect liberty in this reſpect, and that they were happy in having a paſtor who behaved ſo well to them.

"On giving their votes, the majority were for citing Mr Rouſſeau to appear before the Conſiſtory, to be held at the miniſter's houſe on the 29th, after ſermon, according to cuſtom. Mr Rouſ-

* *Sanctify the Lord God in your hearts, and be ready always to give an anſwer to every man that aſketh you a reaſon for the hope that is in you*, 1 Pet. iii. 15.

Rouſſeau was, in conſequence, properly cited, and returned the anſwer above inſerted †.

" I paſs over in ſilence what the anonymous writer has falſely imputed to me, in regard to my affirming in the Conſiſtory that Mr Rouſſeau was the *antichriſt*. Never did I ſay or think of ſuch an abſurdity. I know not what it is to abuſe any one, though I can ſtand up boldly in the defence of truth when my duty calls upon me. Now my duty called upon me to repreſent to the Conſiſtory what I thought we were bound to do in ſuch a caſe, for the edification of the whole Chriſtian church."

Mr Montmollin proceeds to refute ſome other paſſages contained in the anonymous letter; but as every thing is already extracted that is of moment to his juſtification, it is here judged expedient to cloſe this abſtract of the profeſſor's letters.

A Letter from Mr ROUSSEAU, *relative to the preceding.*

Motiers-Travers, Aug. 8, 1765.

" No, Sir; let them ſay what they will, I " ſhall never repent the praiſe I have beſtowed " on M. de Montmollin: I thought him worthy " my greateſt acknowledgments, and praiſed in " him what I had experienced, his truly paſtoral " conduct with regard to me. I have not ex- " tolled his character, with which I am unac- " quainted.

" I praiſed neither his truth nor probity. I " will even confeſs that I received at firſt no " very agreeable impreſſions from his outward " ap-

† Page 386.

" appearance; which is not calculated to pre-
" judice one much in his favour. His tone of
" voice, his deportment, and unpleaſing aſpect,
" gave me an involuntary diſguſt; I was amazed
" to find ſuch affability, humanity, and ſweet-
" neſs of temper, ſuch virtues concealed under
" ſo gloomy a phyſiognomy. But I ſoon ſmo-
" thered that unjuſt prepoſſeſſion; for ought we
" to form an opinion of a man on ſuch deluſive
" ſigns, which are ſo plainly contradicted by
" his conduct? Muſt one pry, with malignant
" curioſity, into the ſecret principle of a per-
" miſſion ſo little expected? I have the ſtrongeſt
" averſion for that baſe artifice of viewing the
" good actions of others only on the dark ſide,
" and never had ſufficient ſagacity to find out
" bad motives for doing good. The more I per-
" ceived an indifference for M. de Montmollin
" ariſing in my mind, the more I ſtrove to ſub-
" due it, by reflecting on the gratitude I owed
" him: Let us ſuppoſe the ſame caſe poſſible
" to happen again, and I ſhould juſt act in the
" manner I did.

" M. de Montmollin now unmaſks, and ſhews
" what he is in reality. His preſent conduct is
" an explanation of his former behaviour. It is
" eaſily ſeen that his pretended moderation,
" which he loſes at the very time it is moſt proper,
" is derived from the ſame ſource as that perſe-
" cuting zeal with which he is ſo ſuddenly in-
" ſpired. What was his original view? What
" are his preſent deſigns? I really know not;
" but I am ſure his intention was never good.
" He not only admitted me to the communion,
" with an obliging warmth of friendſhip; but
" ſought me earneſtly and induced me to hear

" him, whenever I ſeemed to be cheerful, on the " ſubject of Chriſtianity: and when I proved " that I did not attack it, or denied I had any " ſuch intention, he would in his turn rally me " ſeverely on my confidence in religion, on my " perſon, and belief; he would have me excom- " municated, baniſhed; he raiſed the whole pa- " riſh againſt me. He purſued me with a re- " morſeleſs violence, bordering on madneſs.

" Are theſe extraordinary diverſities conſiſt- " ent with his duty! No; charity is unchange- " able, virtue never contradicts itſelf, and con- " ſcience knows no equivocation.

" After ſhewing himſelf ſo little moderate at " the beginning, he reſolved to be more ſo when " it was too late. That affectation did not ſerve " him; and as every one ſaw thro' the diſguiſe, " he did well to return to his natural diſpoſi- " tion. By deſtroying his own work, in doing " me more harm than good, he has acquitted me " of all obligations. I owe him nothing but an " acknowledgment of the truth: it is what I owe " to myſelf; and ſince he obliges me to confeſs " it, I ſhall do ſo.

" You deſire to know what paſſed between " us relative to that affair.—M. de Montmol- " lin gave his account to the public as a church- " man; and dipping his pen in that poiſoned " honey which proves mortal, took all the ad- " vantages his ſituation afforded. For my part, " Sir, I ſhall unfold my narrative in that plain " unaffected ſtyle which perſons of probity al- " ways uſe to each other. I ſhall waſte no time " in proteſtation of my ſincerity. I leave it to " your good underſtanding and love of truth to " ſettle that affair between him and me.

" I

" I am not, thank heaven, one of thoſe " whom the church makes bigots, and after- " wards deſpiſes. I have the honour to be one " who is eſteemed, and at the ſame time perſe- " cuted. When I took refuge in this country, " I brought letters of recommendation to no " perſon whatever, not even to my Lord Mar- " ſhal. I had but one letter, which I carried " every where, and which with my Lord Mar- " ſhal would have been alone ſufficient. Two " hours after my arrival, as I was writing to " his Excellency to inform him of it, and to beg " his protection, a ſtranger, whom I had never " ſeen, entered, and called himſelf the miniſter " of the place, paying his compliments with " great familiarity; and ſeeing I wrote to my " Lord Marſhal, made me an offer of adding a " few lines, by way of recommendation, with " his own hand. I did not accept his offer, but " ſent away my letter; and met with ſuch a " reception as oppreſſed innocence might hope " to find wherever virtue is held in eſteem.

" Having no expectation of ſo much civility " from a paſtor, who was an entire ſtranger to " me, I told every body the circumſtance the " ſame day; and among others to colonel Ro- " quin, who teſtified the moſt affectionate re- " gard for me, and would have very willingly " accompanied me hither.

" M. de Montmollin continued his aſſidui- " ties; I thought this might be of ſome advan- " tage to me, and as the September communion " was approaching, I wrote him a letter, to " know if, notwithſtanding the public report, " I might preſent myſelf there. I choſe rather " to write than to pay him a viſit, which might

" be productive of tedious explanations, and " thoſe I endeavoured to avoid. For if I ſhould " make a declaration neither to diſavow nor de- " fend my book, that would in effect be con- " ſtrued as if I declined entering on any diſ- " cuſſion of that point; and indeed, whenever " I was obliged to vindicate my honour and my " perſon with reſpect to that book, I always " condemned what errors it might contain, ſa- " tisfied with ſhewing that the author meant " not to attack Chriſtianity, and that it was " wrong to proſecute him as a criminal on that " account.

" M. de Montmollin anſwered, that I might " come the next morning and know his reſo- " lution. I ſhould have done ſo, if he had not " prevented me by coming himſelf. I may " forget theſe trifles; but I think he came, and " I certainly remember with what demonſtra- " tion of joy he teſtified the pleaſure he recei- " ceived from my requeſt. He told me very " politely, that he and his congregation ſhould " be much honoured, and that a ſtep ſo unex- " pected would greatly edify all the faithful. " That moment I confeſs was the happieſt I had " ever known. A man muſt be ſenſible of miſ- " fortunes like mine, and experience the diſtreſs " of a tender heart torn from every object of " its affection, in order to judge what conſola- " tion I received in belonging to a ſociety of " brethren, who might indemnify me for the " loſſes I had ſuſtained, and for thoſe whoſe " eſteem I could no longer cultivate. I ima- " gined, that by heartily joining with this ſmall " congregation, in an affecting and rational wor- " ſhip, I ſhould more eaſily forget all my ene-

" mies.

" mies. The firſt time I went to the church,
" I was affected, even to the ſhedding of tears.
" Having never lived among Proteſtants, I form-
" ed notions that they and their Clergy were
" angels. Their worſhip, ſo pure and void of
" oſtentation, was exactly what ſuited my
" mind; it ſeemed inſtituted on purpoſe to in-
" ſpire the miſerable with hope and reſolution.
" All thoſe that partook of it appeared ſo ma-
" ny true Chriſtians united in bands of the
" moſt perfect charity. How have they unde-
" ceived me, in depriving me of the pleaſure
" of enjoying an error ſo agreeable! My eyes
" were at laſt opened, and it was but from the
" effect of imagination that I judged of the value
" of being admitted amongſt them.

" Perceiving that M. de Montmollin never
" mentioned a word with reſpect to my ſenti-
" ments in matters of faith during his ſhort vi-
" ſit, I believed he had reſerved that converſa-
" tion for another opportunity; and knowing
" how fond theſe gentlemen are of aſſuming a
" right which doth not belong to them, of jud-
" ging of the faith of Chriſtians, I declared to
" him that I did not underſtand ſubmitting to
" any interrogation or ecclairciſſement whatever.
" He anſwered, that he ſhould never require
" it; and has ſo well kept his promiſe, that I
" have always found him very circumſpect in
" avoiding any diſcuſſion on the ſubject of doc-
" trine, and till the laſt affair he never hinted
" any thing of it, though I happened to ſpeak
" to him ſometimes on that head.

" In this manner things went on, both before
" and after the communion; ſtill the ſame af-
" fectionate concern on the part of M. de Mont-

" mollin, and the ſame ſilence with reſpect to " theological ſubjects. He even carried the " ſpirit of toleration ſo far, and ſhewed it ſo " openly in his ſermons, that I was often in " pain for him. As I had a real regard for " him, I concealed not the fears I began to " have on his account; and I remember, that " preaching one day very ſtrenuouſly againſt the " want of toleration amongſt the Proteſtants, I " was very much ſtartled to hear him maintain, " with earneſtneſs, that the reformed church " had ſtill need of a farther reformation, both " in manners and doctrine. I then little ima- " gined he would afterwards have ſhewn in " himſelf ſo convincing a proof of the neceſſity " of that reformation.

" This doctrine of toleration, and the uni- " verſal eſteem it met with, excited the jealouſy " of many of his brethren, particularly at Ge- " neva. They loaded him with continual re- " proaches, and ſpread thoſe nets which have " at laſt caught him; I am ſorry for it, but " this was not my fault. If M. de Montmollin " had ſupported his paſtoral character by ho- " nourable means; if he had been ſatisfied to " have only employed in his defence, with bold- " neſs and freedom, the weapons of Chriſtiani- " ty and the truth; what an example would he " have given to the church and to all Europe, " and what a glorious triumph would he have " gained to himſelf! He made uſe of the arms " of his profeſſion; and finding them ſoften in " defending himſelf, contrary to the truth, he " then wanted to render them offenſive by at- " tacking me. But he was miſtaken; theſe " ruſty weapons, ſtrong indeed againſt thoſe

" who

" who fear them, but weak and uſeleſs when " courageouſly reſiſted, are now broken: He " took a wrong method to ſucceed.

" Some months after my admiſſion into this " congregation, M. de Montmollin entered my " apartment one evening, with an air of per- " turbation. He ſat down, and continued a " long time ſilent; he at laſt ſpoke, beginning " with one of thoſe tedious prefaces which cu- " ſtom had rendered eaſy. He came then to " the point, telling me, that his admitting me " to the communion had very much chagrined " his brethren, whoſe cenſure he had attracted " on that account; that he had been reduced " to the neceſſity of juſtifying himſelf in ſuch " a manner as muſt undoubtedly ſtop their " mouths; and if his good opinion of my prin- " ciples had ſuppreſſed the demand of thoſe " explanations which any other perſon in his " ſituation would have exacted, he could not, " however, ſuffer it to be believed, without " hurting his credit, that I had never yet given " him any account of my ſentiments with regard " to religion. Thus ſaying, he drew a paper " from his pocket, and began to read, in a " rough draft of a letter to a miniſter at Gene- " va, ſome parts of a converſation between us " that never paſſed, but wherein he inſerted, " very artfully, ſome words here and there, " ſpoken at random, and on quite a different " ſubject. Judge, Sir, what was my ſurpriſe: " it was ſuch, that I recovered not my attention " till he had read the whole letter. In thoſe " places where fiction was moſt prevalent, he " interrupted himſelf, ſaying, *If you perceive* " *the neceſſity—my ſituation—my profeſſion—one*

" *muſt*

" *muſt take a little care if one's ſelf.* On the " whole, this letter was written with a good " deal of addreſs; and, except in a few particu- " lars, great care was taken to make me ſay " what I might very naturally have ſaid. When " he had done, he aſked me if I approved of " that letter, and if he ſhould ſend it juſt as it " was?

" I anſwered, I was ſorry he was obliged to " have recourſe to ſuch methods; but that as to " myſelf, I could ſay no ſuch thing: But that " ſince he had taken upon him to ſay it, it was " his own affair and not mine; and that I " ſaw nothing there to which I ſhould be ob- " liged to give the lie. As this can prejudice " nobody, replied he, and may be of uſe to " you, I eaſily paſs over a ſmall ſcruple, which " can anſwer no end, but to prevent a good act.

" But tell me if, on the whole, you are ſatiſ- " fied with this letter, or if you ſee any thing " in it that might be altered for the better. I " told him, I thought it very proper for the " end it was intended. He urged me ſo much, " that, to humour him, I pointed out ſome tri- " fling corrections, of no conſequence. Now I " muſt tell you, that in the ſituation we ſat, the " ſtandiſh was oppoſite to M. de Montmollin; " but whilſt we were talking, he puſhed it, as " by chance, to me; and as I held his letter, " to read it again, he reached me the pen to " make the neceſſary amendments; which I " did, with all the frankneſs natural to me. " That done, he put up his letter, and retired. " Excuſe my being ſo particular, it is abſolutely " neceſſary.

" But I ſhall not be ſo explicit with reſpect

" to

" to my laſt interview with M. de Montmollin, " which is much eaſier conceived. You com- " prehend what might be ſaid to a perſon who " coldly tells you, ' Sir, I am ordered to break " your head; but if you would have your leg " broke, perhaps that may ſatisfy them.' M. de " Montmollin muſt undoubtedly have been " concerned in difficult affairs ſometimes, and " yet I never ſaw a man more confuſed during " that whole tranſaction. In ſuch a caſe, no- " thing can be more embarraſſing than to be " at odds with a man of a free and open diſpo- " ſition, who, inſtead of uſing ſubtle and equi- " vocating arguments, anſwers abruptly, and " affronts you, contrary to reaſon and good " manners. M. de Montmollin affirms, that I " told him at parting, that if he returned with " agreeable news, I ſhould embrace him; if " not, that we ſhould turn our backs on each " other. I might have ſaid ſomething of that " kind, but in politer terms; but as to theſe " laſt expreſſions, I am certain I never made uſe " of them. M. de Montmollin may recollect, " that he did not make me turn my back ſo eaſi- " ly as he imagined.

" As to the devout pathetic he employs to " prove the neceſſity of uſing rigour, it may be " perceived for what kind of perſons it was in- " tended; perſons, with whom neither you nor " I have any concern. But ſetting aſide the " jargon of this inquiſitor, I ſhall examine his " reaſons, as they relate to myſelf, without en- " tering into thoſe that may have a reference to " others.

" Quite diſguſted with the miſerable profeſ- " ſion of an author, to which I was ſo little ad-

" apted,

" apted, I had long ſince reſolved to renounce
" it. When Emilius was publiſhed, I had de-
" clared to my friends at Paris, Geneva, and
" elſewhere, that it ſhould be my laſt work; and
" that in completing it, I had laid down the pen,
" never to reſume it. I received many letters to
" diſſuade me from that deſign. At my arrival
" here, I told the ſame to every body; even to
" to you and M. de Montmollin. He is the
" only perſon who thought of changing that
" propoſal into a promiſe; and to pretend that
" I had engaged myſelf to him to write no more,
" becauſe I ſhewed ſuch an intention. Suppoſe
" I told him I ſhould go to-morrow to Neuf-
" chatel, muſt that be taken as an engagement
" from my words; and if I ſhould fail in going,
" muſt I be proſecuted? This is exactly the caſe;
" and I no more thought of making a promiſe
" to M. de Montmollin than I did to you, only
" from a bare intention, of which I equally in-
" formed both.

" Dare M. de Montmollin affirm, that he e-
" ver underſtood the matter in any other light?
" Dare he be poſitive, as he has had the bold-
" neſs to report, that it was on that condition
" he admitted me to the communion? As a
" proof of the contrary, when I publiſhed my
" Letter to the Archbiſhop of Paris, M. de
" Montmollin, far from accuſing me with
" breach of promiſe, was very well pleaſed with
" that piece, which he extolled to me and eve-
" ry body, without ſaying a word of that fabu-
" lous promiſe which he now accuſes me of
" having made him. Take notice, however,
" that my Letter to the Archbiſhop is much
" ſtronger on the ſubject of myſteries, and even

" mi-

" miracles, than that about which he makes ſo " great a noiſe. Beſides, obſerve, that I there " ſpeak in my own name, and no longer in the " character of the Vicar. Could they find mat- " ters of excommunication in the one, which " have not even been ſubjects of complaint in " the other?

" If I had actually made ſuch a promiſe to " M. de Montmollin, which I really never " thought of doing, would he infer, that it was " of ſo abſolute a nature as to admit of no ex- " ception; not even to publiſh a memorial of " defence, in caſe I ſhould be attacked by a pro- " ceſs at law? And what exception would be " more permiſſible than that, where, in juſtify- " ing myſelf, I alſo juſtified him, by ſhewing " the falſehood of his admitting a profaner of " religion into his church? What promiſe could " acquit me of what I owed to myſelf and to o- " thers? How could I avoid writing in defence " of my honour, the honour of my ancient " countrymen, which ſo many extraordinary " motives rendered neceſſary, and in diſcharge " of ſuch ſacred duties? Who will believe that " I promiſed M. de Montmollin ſilently to en- " dure reproach and ignominy? Even now that " I have entered into a ſolemn engagement with " a reſpectable ſociety, who can accuſe me of " breaking my covenant, if, forced by the out- " rageous violences of M. de Montmollin, I " have repulſed him as publicly as he dared to " offer them? Whatever promiſe an honeſt " man may give, it will never be required, " much leſs preſumed, that it ſhould extend ſo " far as to be the witneſs of his diſhonour.

" In publiſhing the Letters written from the

" Moun-

" Mountains, I discharged my duty to myself,
" and at the same time did not neglect what I
" owed to M. de Montmollin. He judged so
" himself; for when the work was printed, of
" which I sent him a copy, he continued to act
" in the same manner as before. He read it
" with pleasure; spoke of me with praise; not
" a word that savoured of objection. He saw
" me often since, he always testified the greatest
" friendship; no complaint of my book. There
" was then a report of an intended edition of
" all my works. He not only approved that
" design, but even desired he might be con-
" cerned. He was so anxious, that I did not
" think proper to give any encouragement,
" knowing the present company was already too
" numerous, and wanted no more associates.
" He was displeased at my coldness, which he
" resented more than it deserved; and some time
" after covered his disappointment by casting
" a reflection, That the dignity of his station
" forbad his engaging in any such design. It
" was then the Synod began to oppose him,
" and made remonstrances to the Court. In
" fine, our good understanding was still so en-
" tire, and my last work so little affected it,
" that, for a long time after that publication,
" M. de Montmollin, among other conversa-
" tion, told me, he had a mind to solicit the
" Court for an augmentation of his stipend, and
" requested I would insert a few lines in a letter
" he intended to write to my Lord Marshal for
" that purpose. That method of recommend-
" ing himself, and making his interest, seeming
" too familiar, I asked fifteen days, in order to
" draw up an address to my Lord Marshal be-
" fore-

" forehand. He gave me no anſwer, and ne-
" ver mentioned the affair afterwards. From
" that time he began to look on the Letters
" from the Mountains with another eye, tho'
" he never in the leaſt hinted his diſapprobation
" in my preſence. He only ſaid once, *For my*
" *part, I believe in miracles.* I might have an-
" ſwered, *I believe in them as much as you.*

" Since I am on the ſubject of my treatment
" from M. de Montmollin, I ſhould acquaint
" you, that I have more matters of complaint
" to mention. Touched with a ſenſe of grati-
" tude, I have ſought all occaſions of teſtifying
" it, both in public and private; but I never
" proſtituted ſo noble a principle to the baſe
" purpoſes of intereſt; I was never governed by
" example, and know not how to traffick in
" holy things. M. de Montmollin wanted to
" meddle in all my affairs, to be acquainted
" with all my correſpondents, to direct and
" be the depoſitary of my laſt will, and ſuper-
" intend my little houſehold. This is what I
" would never permit. M. de Montmollin
" liked ſitting long at table; for my part, it is
" a pain to me. He ſeldom eat at my houſe,
" and I never at his. In effect, I repulſed all
" the familiar intimacy he wanted to eſtabliſh
" between us, in as gentle and polite a manner
" as poſſible; which always becomes improper,
" when it is not equally convenient on both
" ſides. Theſe are the wrongs I complain of;
" I confeſs them, without repenting the hand-
" ſome things I have ſaid. My injuries are
" great, but they are the only ones I received;
" and I call to witneſs every perſon who knows
" this country, if I have not often made myſelf

" diſagreeable to honeſt people, by commend-
" ing what I thought praiſe-worthy in M. de
" Montmollin.

" Notwithſtanding any ſecret animoſity he
" might have had againſt me, he would ne-
" ver have blazed it abroad at ſo improper a
" time, if other motives had not preſſed him to
" reſume the opportunity he had ſuffered to e-
" ſcape. He perceived too well that his con-
" duct began to be diſguſting and contradictory
" to me. What conflicts muſt he have had
" with himſelf, before he preſumed to charge
" me with ſo apparent a falſehood? For let us
" condemn the Letters from the Mountains as
" much as we pleaſe, will they ſay more againſt
" me in effect than Emilius; after the publi-
" cation of which I was not refuſed, but readi-
" ly admitted to the holy communion? Do they
" condemn me more than my letter to M. de
" Beaumont Archbiſhop of Paris, which never
" ſeemed to give any offence? Suppoſe theſe
" works were a complication of errors, as they
" would inſinuate, of what conſequence is that?
" Why then let me not be juſtified by them,
" and let the author of Emilius remain inex-
" cuſable. But I can never admit, that the au-
" thor of the Letters from the Mountains de-
" ſerves the ſame cenſure on this account. Is
" it uſual, after pardoning a criminal, to puniſh
" him for having made a bad defence on his
" trial? Yet this is the caſe with M. de Mont-
" mollin: and I defy either him, or his bre-
" thren, to produce any of thoſe ſentiments in
" my laſt writings, they ſo ſtrongly cenſure,
" which I cannot prove to be more firmly eſta-
" bliſhed in thoſe that precede them.

" But

" But being inſtigated underhand by others,
" he ſeized the pretext they offered; certain,
" that by exclaiming, right or wrong, againſt
" an infidel, the people would be immediately
" excited to fury; he rings the alarm-bell of
" Motiers, when all was over, becauſe a poor
" man durſt defend himſelf againſt the Gene-
" vans; and finding that nothing but ſucceſs
" could ſave him from contempt, he ſpared no
" pains to make his point ſure. I ſaw it plainly
" at Motiers, and ſhall forbear troubling you
" with a repetition of what paſſed there, as you
" are better acquainted than I with the whole
" procedure; every one at Neuſchatel knows
" it; ſtrangers that came to the town ſaw it,
" and ſighed; for my part, I was ſilent. M. de
" Montmollin excuſed himſelf on account of the
" orders he had received from the Synod. But
" ſuppoſe theſe orders had been legally execu-
" ted; if they had been juſt, why did he not
" know of them ſooner? Why did he not pre-
" vent them, whoſe particular province it was?
" Why, after reading over and over the Let-
" ters from the Mountains, could he find no-
" thing in them worthy of cenſure? or why was
" he ſilent on that head to me, that was his pa-
" riſhioner, as often as he came to viſit me?
" What became of all his paſtoral zeal? Would
" he paſs for a blockhead, who can ſee nothing
" in a book relative to his own profeſſion, but
" what is pointed out to him by others? But,
" on the contrary, if theſe orders were unjuſt;
" why did he ſubmit to them? Ought a mi-
" niſter of the Goſpel, a paſtor of the church,
" to perſecute a man, whoſe innocence he is
" aſſured of, in obedience to any power what-

" ever? Did he not know, that to appear in " judgement before the Conſiſtory, is an indig- " nity, an affront, too cruel for a man of my " time of life, eſpecially in a country-town, " where they are ignorant of all conſiſtorial " matters but admonitions againſt pravity of " manners? Ten years ago my appearance in " the Conſiſtory at Geneva was excuſed on a " much more lawful occaſion, (and for which " I almoſt blame myſelf,) contrary to the ex- " preſs words of the law. But it is not the " leaſt ſurpriſing that they ſhould know theſe " forms of decency and regularity at Geneva, " of which they are ignorant at Motiers.

" I cannot tell whence M. de Montmollin " took his inſtructions, when he ſaid there was " nothing of the Inquiſition in this affair. He " might have ſaid as juſtly that there was no " Conſiſtory, for it is the ſame thing on that " occaſion. He gives out, nay, he inſiſts, that " no matter of temporal cogniſance ought to " be within its juriſdiction. The contrary is " known to every one in the affair of the pro- " ject; and who is ignorant, that impoſing on " the credulity of the Council of State, with " regard to matters of religion, they engaged " them in meaſures which had well nigh de- " prived me of the King's protection? The " proper ſtep to be taken was, firſt an excom- " munication; after which, freſh remonſtrances " to the Council of State would have done the " buſineſs; they actually tried thoſe methods, " and their preſent uneaſineſs proceeds from " their diſappointment in failing of ſucceſs. " For otherwiſe, what is it to M. de Montmol- " lin? Is he afraid I ſhould not come to receive

" the

" the communion from his hands? Let him be
" ſatisfied; I am not ſo very anxious about
" communions as many perſons are. I admire
" the voracious holineſs with which they de-
" vour the conſecrated bread: for my part, my
" ſtomach is not ſo ſtrong.

" He ſays he had but one plain queſtion to
" aſk me on the part of the Conſiſtory. Why
" did he not let me know it, when I was ſerved
" with the citation? What a piece of artifice
" was it, firſt to ſurpriſe a man, and then oblige
" him to anſwer that moment, without giving
" the leaſt time for reflection. This was the
" queſtion mentioned by M. de Montmollin,
" which he reſerved *in petto*, as the principal,
" among others he has not told us, and for
" which he was unwilling I ſhould be prepared.
" It is well known, that his deſign was to catch
" me tripping, and puzzle me with ſo many
" litigious interrogatories as muſt in the end
" anſwer his purpoſe. He very well knew my
" weakneſs and bad ſtate of health. I do not
" think he intended to exhauſt my ſtrength;
" but at the time I was cited I was extremely
" ill, and not in a condition to go abroad, ha-
" ving kept my room for ſix months: it was the
" winter ſeaſon, and very cold weather; a
" ſtrange remedy for a poor infirm creature, to
" remain many hours ſtanding, and to be inter-
" rogated before elders concerning matters of
" divinity, of which the moſt learned among
" them declared they underſtood nothing! No
" matter: they never inquired even if I was
" able to leave my bed, if I had ſtrength enough
" to walk without ſupport; they gave themſelves
" no trouble on that account. Paſtoral charity,

" entirely taken up with matters of faith, never " ſtoops to the mean and ſordid concerns of ter- " reſtrial affairs.

" You are no ſtranger to what paſſed in the " Conſiſtory, during my abſence; of the read- " ing of my letter there, and the methods that " were propoſed to hinder its effect. Your in- " formation in that affair was well grounded. " Can you imagine, that, after this, M. de " Montmollin all at once changed his condition " and title, and, transforming himſelf into an " eccleſiaſtical ſolicitor to manage the cauſe, " reſumed his former character in order to " become its judge. *I acted* (ſays he) *as Paſtor,* " *as Preſident of the Conſiſtory, and not as re-* " *preſentative of the venerable Synod.* It was " too late to change his part, when he had till " then played one ſo indifferent. We ought, " Sir, to dread thoſe who can voluntarily act two " parts in the ſame piece. It would be ſtrange " if one good character could be made out of both.

" He reſts the neceſſity of being rigorous, on " the ſcandal raiſed by my book. Here are new " ſcruples, which he had not at the publication " of Emilius, the ſcandal of which was at leaſt " as great, and the Clergy and news-writers " made no leſs noiſe. They burnt my book, " railed at and inſulted me all over Europe. " M. de Montmollin finds now thoſe reaſons to " excommunicate me, in the ſame arguments " that were then no impediment then to my ad- " miſſion to the communion. His zeal, accord- " ing to the precept, acts in all forms, agreeable " to time and place. But pray, who raiſed the " ſcandal in his pariſh on account of my laſt " book of which he now complains? Who was

" it

" it affected to make a frightful uproar, both by
" himſelf and by his friends? Who, among all
" that people ſo full of ſanctified rage; who
" could have known that I had committed ſo e-
" normous a crime, as to prove that the Council
" of Geneva had wrongfully condemned me, if
" pains had not been taken to paint ſo extra-
" ordinary an act in colours that ſtruck every
" eye? Who, amongſt theſe people, was capa-
" ble of reading my book, and judging of the
" matters it contained? If you pleaſe, the zea-
" lous follower of M. de Montmollin, that learn-
" ed blackſmith, whom he ſo often cites as an
" evidence; that profound ſcholar, who is at
" once ſo good a judge of horſe-ſhoes and books
" of theology. I am willing to believe he can
" juſt read, and go through a whole line with-
" out ſpelling; and who elſe of the conſpiring
" rabble can do ſo much? If they ſhould glance
" at the words *goſpel* and *miracles* in the pages
" of the book, they would imagine they were
" reading a book of devotion; and knowing I
" was a good man, they might have ſaid, *God*
" *bleſs him! he edifies us greatly.* But they had
" been well aſſured that I was an impious abo-
" minable wretch, who ſaid there was no God,
" and that women had no ſouls; ſo that, with-
" out reflecting on what they might read to the
" contrary, they repeated in their turn, like
" parrots, *He is a wicked man, a villain; he is*
" *Antichriſt; he ſhould be excommunicated, and*
" *burnt.* They were charitably anſwered, no
" doubt: *Go you on with your clamours; leave*
" *the buſineſs to us, and all will be well.*

" The uſual method of the church-gentry
" ſeems to me extremely well calculated to an-

" ſwer

" ſwer their purpoſe. After eſtabliſhing their " competency of juriſdiction over all matters of " ſcandal, they raiſe a ſcandal out of every ſub- " ject they pleaſe; and then, on account of " that ſcandal, take cogniſance of the cauſe in " order to judge it. Here is a ſure way to ren- " der themſelves maſters of all the people, of all " the laws, of all the kings, and of the whole " world, without the contradiction of any per- " ſon whatever. You remember the ſtory of " the ſurgeon, whoſe ſhop was at the corner of " two ſtreets, and who going out at one door, " wounded the paſſengers, and ſuddenly retreat- " ing, came out at the other in order to dreſs " them. This ſtory will ſuit all the clergy in " the univeſe, except in this particular, that the " ſurgeon at leaſt cured thoſe he wounded, " whereas theſe gentlemen deſtroy all they attack.

" Let us not enter into the hiſtory of their " ſecret intrigues, which will not bear the " light. But if M. de Montmollin did nothing " but in obedience to the ſynod, or in diſcharge " of his conſcience, why has he ſhewn ſo much " acrimony in this affair? Why was all the mob " of the country raiſed? Why his violent ſer- " mons, flaming with remorſeleſs zeal and un- " relenting bitterneſs? Why theſe private petty " Councils? Why ſo many idle reports ſpread, " to terrify me with the roarings of the popu- " lace? Is not all this public and notorious? " M. de Montmollin denies it. Why ſhould he " not, who denied his pretending to have two " voices in the Conſiſtory? Yet I find three " voices, if I do not greatly miſtake; that of " his deacon, who was there only as his re- " preſentative; then his own voice, which

" made

" made the odd one; and, laſtly, that which " he claimed in order to divide the ſuffra- " ges. Three voices in himſelf had been a " great advantage, even to abſolve or acquit a " delinquent. But he would make uſe of them " in order to condemn, and could not obtain " them. Where was the harm? M. de Mont- " mollin was too happy, that his Conſiſtory, " wiſer than himſelf, had drawn him out of a " ſcrape with the ſynod, with his brethren, with " his correſpondents, and with himſelf. *I have* " *done my duty*, might he have ſaid, *I have vi-* " *gorouſly purſued the cauſe: the Conſiſtory have* " *not judged the affair according to my ſenti-* " *ments. Rouſſeau has been abſolved, contrary* " *to my opinion. That is no fault of mine; I have* " *done: I can carry matters no farther, with-* " *out flying in the face of the laws, without diſ-* " *obeying the prince, and diſturbing the public* " *peace. I am too good a Chriſtian, too honeſt a* " *citizen, too devout a paſtor, to attempt any* " *ſuch thing.* Though he had been foiled, he " might ſtill, with a little addreſs, have preſer- " ved his dignity, and recovered his reputation. " But vanity, once irritated by diſappointment, " is not ſo provident. We find it more difficult " to forgive thoſe we have attempted to injure, " than thoſe to whom we have done the injury " in fact. Enraged to ſee that credit on which " he ſo much piqued himſelf baffled in the face " of all Europe, he could not prevail on him- " ſelf to give up the cauſe: he ſaid in the Con- " ſiſtory, that he was not without hopes of re- " newing it: he tries it at another Conſiſtory; " but, in order to ſcreen himſelf, he propoſes it " by his blackſmith, that faithful inſtrument of

" his

" his enterprizes, whom he calls to bear teſti-
" mony that it was not done thro' his means.
" Was not that a fine ſtroke! It is not that M. de
" Montmollin wants artifice; but a man, who
" is blinded by paſſion, is always committing
" blunders when he gives himſelf up to it.

" That expedient failed him again, and you
" might imagine that his malignity ended there.
" Far from it: in the next meeting of the ſynod,
" he propoſed another method, founded on the
" impoſſibility of eſcaping the diligence of the
" prince's officer in his pariſh; that was, to
" wait till I went into another pariſh, and then
" begin the proſecution anew, at freſh coſts. In
" conſequence of this fine expedient, the violent
" ſermons recommenced, the people were again
" put into diſorder, and it was expected theſe
" animoſities would have forced me to quit the
" pariſh. This, indeed, was too much for a
" man of M. de Montmollin's tolerating ſpi-
" rit, who did nothing but by the orders of his
" ſuperiors. My letter grows very long: but
" it is neceſſary it ſhould be ſo; why ſhould I
" curtail it? Would it ſhorten it to multiply
" ceremonies? Let us give M. de Montmollin
" the pleaſure of ſaying ten times ſucceſſively,
" *Siſter Dinarzade, are you aſleep?*

" I have not entered upon the point of right:
" I have reſolved to meddle no more with that
" affair. I confined myſelf, in the ſecond part
" of this letter, to prove that M. de Montmol-
" lin, notwithſtanding his affected tone of de-
" votion, was not brought into this affair thro'
" zeal for the faith, nor by a ſenſe of his duty;
" but, according to cuſtom, has made the cauſe
" of God ſubſervient to his paſſions. Now

" judge

" judge if for ſuch purpoſes they uſually employ
" the moſt honeſt means; and excuſe my en-
" tering into a diſcuſſion of matters that would
" draw a ſigh from virtue herſelf.

" In the former part of my letter I mention-
" ed facts, in oppoſition to thoſe advanced by
" M. de Montmollin. He had the artifice to make
" uſe of circumſtances to which I could anſwer
" nothing, but by a true recital of all that paſs-
" ed. From the different aſſertions on both ſides,
" you muſt conclude one of us to be a liar, and
" I allow the propriety of that concluſion.

" When I would finiſh my letter and diſ-
" patch it in haſte, I am ſtill turning over new
" leaves. Reflections innumerable offer them-
" ſelves, and one muſt not always begin a-new.
" Yet I cannot paſs over what I have this mo-
" ment before me. *What ſhall our miniſters do?*
" (it is ſaid;) *ſhall they defend the Goſpel, at-*
" *tacked ſo openly by its enemies?* It is I, there-
" fore, who am this enemy to the Goſpel, be-
" cauſe I reſent the manner in which they diſ-
" figure and degrade it. Why do not the pre-
" tended defenders imitate the method I would
" eſtabliſh? Why do not they make uſe of ſuch
" parts as conduce to their edification, in ren-
" dering them good and juſt, and lay aſide ſuch
" as are of ſervice to nobody, and which they
" underſtand no better than myſelf?

" *If a native of this country had dared to ad-*
" *vance, in words or writing, any thing near*
" *to what has been done by Mr. Rouſſeau, would*
" *not the miniſters have acted with the ſame ri-*
" *gour?* No, certainly; I dare believe ſo for the
" honour of the ſtate. What would then be-
" come of your privileges, you that are the people

" of

" of Neufchatel, if, for ſome ſmall matter that " might give your miniſters a handle for being " litigious, they could perſecute, among your- " ſelves, the author of a tranſaction, printed " in another part of Europe, only for his de- " fence in a ſtrange country? M. de Montmol- " lin has picked me out as a proper ſubject by " which he may lay the yoke on you; but how " unworthy muſt I be of your protection, if I " could ſuffer, by my example, a ſervitude to " be eſtabliſhed which I found not amongſt you!

" *Has Mr. Rouſſeau, our new citizen, any* " *more privileges than all our ancient citizens?* " I do not claim any of their privileges; I only " demand thoſe I am entitled to as a man and " a ſtranger. The correſpondent quoted by M. " Montmollin, that wonderful perſon whom he " has not named, and who praiſes him ſo much, " is a very extraordinary reaſoner. According " to him, I would claim more privileges than " all the citizens, becauſe I oppoſed their mea- " ſures in which every citizen would have ac- " quieſced. So that to take from me the right " of defending my purſe againſt a thief that " would rob me, he might as well ſay, *You are* " *certainly a very ſtrange man, who will not* " *ſuffer me to take your money! I could eaſily rob* " *any of the natives, if they came in my way.*

" Obſerve here, that the Profeſſor Montmollin " is the only ſovereign judge who condemns " me; and that law, the Conſiſtory, the Magi- " ſtracy, the Government, the Governor, and " the King himſelf who protects me, are all ſo " many rebels againſt the ſupreme authority of " M. de Montmollin.

" The anonymous correſpondent aſks, if I

" am

" am not obedient to the laws and cuſtoms of
" the ſtate? And from anſwering in the affir-
" mative, he concludes, that I muſt ſubmit to
" a law that never exiſted, and to a cuſtom that
" never was known. M. de Montmollin re-
" plies, that there is ſuch a law at Geneva, and
" that I myſelf complained of its being violated
" to my prejudice. So that at Geneva they
" have violated a law which exiſts there, and
" doth not exiſt at Motiers, on purpoſe to con-
" demn me; and they made uſe of it at Motiers
" to excommunicate me. You muſt own that I
" am in a pretty ſituation! It was certainly in
" one of his gay humours that M. de Mont-
" mollin reaſoned in that manner.

" He diverts himſelf in the ſame way in a re-
" mark on the offer I made to the ſynod, provided
" they dropped their proſecution. He ſays, I
" did it in jeſt, and that we ought not thus to
" pretend to give law to our ſuperiors.

" Firſt, he certainly is not ſerious, in ſaying,
" that an humble and ſatisfactory offer made to
" perſons who complain againſt us, tho' in the
" wrong, is dictating to them, and preſcribing
" them rules.

" But the beſt of all is, his calling the gen-
" tlemen of the Synod my ſuperiors, as though
" I was one of their brethren. For every one
" knows that the Synod has no juriſdiction but
" over the clergy; and beſides, having no power
" over any other perſon, its members are ſupe-
" rior to nobody, as being ſuch. So that to
" treat me as a churchman, is, in my opinion,
" a very ill-judged pleaſantry. M. de Mont-
" mollin knows very well I am no churchman;

" and that I have, thank God, no very great call " that way.

" Indulge me a few words concerning the " letter I wrote to the Conſiſtory, and I have " done. M. de Montmollin does not promiſe " many remarks on that letter; I believe he is " in the right, and that he would have ſtill done " better never to have meddled with it: give me " leave to run over ſuch as relate to myſelf; I " ſhall not detain you long.

" *How can a perſon* (ſays he) *anſwer to* " *what he knows nothing of?* as I have done, " by proving before-hand that they had no " right to aſk me. *Such a faith as we are* " *only to account for to God, is not profeſſed* " *in any part of Europe.* And why is there " any other faith, but ſuch as makes us account- " able only to God, publiſhed in any part of " Europe? Obſerve that ſtrange pretence of " hindering a man from ſpeaking his own opi- " nion, by imputing to him other ſentiments.

" *He that errs as a Chriſtian, is ready to re-* " *nounce his errors.* A pleaſant ſophiſm! *He* " *that errs as a Chriſtian, knows not that he* " *errs.* If he ſhould reform his errors without " knowing them, he would err nevertheſs, and " would beſides be a liar. Then he could not " err as a Chriſtian.

" *Is the rendering miracles doubtful, a re-* " *liance on the authority of the Goſpel?* Yes, " when it is by the authority of the ſame Go- " ſpel they are rendered doubtful. *And to ri-* " *dicule them.*—Why not! when, relying on " the authority of the Goſpel, it can be proved, " that the ridicule is no where but in the inter- " pretations of divines. I am certain that M.

" de

" de Montmollin is very well pleaſed with his " laconic manner of expreſſion. It is always " eaſy to reply to an argument with a jeſt.

" *As to the remark of* Theodore Beza, " *he would never have ſaid otherwiſe, if the* " *Chriſtian faith had not been entirely ſupported* " *by miracles.* Take care, Mr Profeſſor; ei- " ther you do not underſtand Latin, or you are " a bad man. This paſſage, *Non ſatis tuta fi-* " *des eorum qui miraculis nituntur*, doth not " ſignify, as you pretend, *that the Chriſtian* " *faith is not ſupported by miracles alone.* On " the contrary, the meaning is, *the faith of him* " *who relies on miracles, is not of much ſolidity.* " This ſenſe is very applicable to that paſſage " in St John, on which he comments, where it " is ſaid, *That many believed in Jeſus on ac-* " *count of his miracles; but he did not truſt them* " *with his perſon, becauſe he knew them well.* " Do you think he would put more confidence " at this time in thoſe who make ſo great a " noiſe about the ſame faith?

" *Would not every one believe they heard Mr.* " *Rouſſeau ſay, in his letter to the Archbiſhop* " *of Paris, that they ought to erect ſtatues to* " *his memory for writing his Emilius?* Ob- " ſerve, he ſays this at a time when he is pinch- " ed by the compariſon of *Emilius* and the *Let-* " *ters from the Mountains*; M. de Montmollin " cannot tell how to eſcape, and ſo he brings " himſelf off by cutting a caper. If we were " to follow him through all his extravagancies, " if I were to examine the weight of his ar- " guments, and analyſe his extraordinary rea- " ſonings, I ſhould never have done, and I muſt " haſten to the end. At the concluſion of all,

" he

" he values himſelf much on having his name
" made uſe of. I cannot ſee how that is an oc-
" caſion of boaſting; for when a man has ta-
" ken ſuch a part in affairs as he has done, he
" may well be aſhamed of owning himſelf.

" As to you, Sir, who have, in regard to
" him, preſerved that anonymous character
" with which he now reproaches you; pray
" own yourſelf, ſince he would have it ſo: re-
" ceive that praiſe of honeſt men, which is your
" due. Shew them openly the worthy advocate
" of a juſt cauſe, the hiſtorian of truth, the
" apologiſt for the rights of the oppreſſed, of
" the Prince, of the ſtate, and people, all in-
" vaded by him in my perſon. My defenders,
" my protectors, are known; let him, in his
" turn, ſhew his anonymous author, and all his
" abettors in this affair: he has named already
" two of them, let him name all the reſt. He
" has done me much injury, he would do me
" a great deal more; let all the world know
" his friends and mine, and I deſire no other
" revenge.

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" Accept, Sir, my beſt reſpects, &c.

" J. J. ROUSSEAU."

FINIS.